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Section 1. Introduction: Purpose and Methodology of the Project  
 
The Treaty on European Union establishes that the rule of law is one of the values on which 
the EU is founded and one of the principles which the EU is bound to promote in its relations 
with third countries. Specifically in the field of migration, the Commission adopted the 
European Agenda on Migration (COM (2015) 240 final) in May 2015, which sets several 
policy tools in the field of asylum, later complemented by its Communication (COM (2016) 
197 final) of April 2016 presenting options for the reform of the Common European Asylum 
System. The sources of EU secondary law in this field (Recast Reception Conditions Directive 
2013/33/EU, Return Directive 2008/115/EC and Dublin III Regulation) provide the rules on 
detention of asylum seekers and third country nationals (TCN). 
 
While the deadline for the transposition of the Return Directive (2008/115) expired already 
in December 2010, several recent projects, resolutions and empirical data on administrative 
detention of third-country nationals (irregular migrants and/or asylum seekers) that are 
mentioned in section 2 of this Statement show that courts and tribunals of the Member 
States still face important and difficult challenges concerning a harmonised approach to 
common standards and effective implementation of the rule of law in detention cases with 
respect to EU law and CJEU case-law, and with respect to case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR).  
 
Additionally, detention of asylum seekers has been very poorly defined in the Reception 
Directive (2003/9) and in the Procedures Directive (2005/85). The Recast Reception Directive 
(2013/33) changed this by regulating much more detailed rules on detention of asylum 
seekers. The deadline for the transposition of the Recast Procedures Directive expired on 20 
July 2015. The third EU legal source, which constitutes a focus of the project carried out 
under the auspices of the European Law Institute (ELI), is the Dublin III Regulation 
(604/2013), which became directly applicable in early 2014. The case-law of the ECtHR on 
detention of asylum seekers and irregular migrants is extensive and very detailed in respect 
of the rule of law, while the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) based on 
preliminary ruling procedures is more extensive for detention of irregular migrants as for 
asylum seekers.  
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In line with the first indent of Article 3(2) of the ELI Articles of the Association, the ELI 
Statement on “Detention of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants and the Rule of Law” 
aims at contributing to an effective implementation of due process standards and material 
law, including conditions of detention, based on an integrated approach in respect of EU 
secondary law, case-law of the CJEU and case-law of the ECtHR in judicial practices of the 
Member States. Its EU policy context can be linked to documents such as “A New EU 
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law” (COM(2014) 158 final/2) and the “European 
Agenda on Migration,” which sets several policy tools for immediate actions for an effective 
return system that would go hand in hand with a humane and dignified treatment of 
returnees and a proportionate use of coercive measures in line with fundamental rights and 
for a coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), paying 
particular attention to the needs of vulnerable groups (COM(2015) 240 final). 
 
Section 2 of this Statement presents an introductory link between the rule of law and 
detention and illustrates it with statistical and empirical data on detention of asylum seekers 
and irregular migrants in Europe. Section 3 is entitled “Interplay of EU law, the ECHR and 
national law in the context the protection of human rights”. Here, the complex interplay 
between the three aforementioned protective systems is described from the standpoints of 
case-law of the CJEU, ECtHR and some national supreme or constitutional courts. This 
section serves to support the correct use of the three check-lists (sections 4-6), which 
constitute the major outputs of the ELI Statement. The check-list for each of the three 
secondary EU law instruments on detention (Dublin III Regulation, Return Directive and 
Recast Reception Directive) consists of approximately 40 basic standards or rules that might 
be relevant in judicial review of detention cases. In the check-lists, basic standards are 
formulated as briefly as possible, with the legal sources for the basic standards and rules in 
footnotes. Any additional explanations, more detailed arguments or more extensive 
comparison between case-law of the CJEU and the ECtHR are provided in the explanatory 
notes attached to each check-list. 
 
Such structure is a consequence of the initial group of addressees of the Statement, 
primarily judges of the courts and tribunals of EU Member States dealing with effective 
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judicial protection (control) in detention cases. It could also serve as a useful tool for 
decision makers in administrative procedures on detention and legislators in EU Member 
States in regards to the transposition of relevant EU rules and standards into national law 
and practice. Finally, this work might also be a contribution to a convergent use of case-law 
of the CJEU and the ECtHR in the subject matter. 
 
The first step in the development of the project was to identify and compile all due process 
standards and material law on detention, including conditions of detention, from the 
following sources: 
 relevant case-law of the CJEU; Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation (EU) 
604/2013; Articles 7-11 of the Recast Reception Directive 2013/33 in 
conjunction with Article 26 of the Recast Procedures Directive 2013/32; 
Articles 15-18 of the Return Directive 2008/115/EC; 
 case-law of the ECtHR in relation to Article 5 and Article 3 of the ECHR. 
 
Particular standards and safeguards for children and other vulnerable persons and eventual 
differences in due process standards and material law between EU law (including case-law of 
the CJEU) and case-law of the ECtHR were also identified. 
 
This work also took into account some completed and ongoing projects or research 
materials on detention of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, such as the UNHCR 
Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012)1; UNHCR Global Strategy “Beyond Detention” 
(2014-2019)2; Equal Rights Trust “Guidelines to Protect Stateless Persons from Arbitrary 
Detention” (2012)3; Safeguarding Principles “Immigration Detention and the Rule of Law” by 
the Bingham Centre for the Rule of law (2013)4; the projects “Contention”5 and “Redial”6 of 
                                                 
1
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 'Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards 
relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention' (2012). 
2
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 'Beyond Detention: A Global Strategy to support governments 
to end the detention of asylum-seeker and refugees 2014-2019' (2014). 
3
Equal Rights Trust 'Guidelines to Protect Stateless Persons from Arbitrary Detention' (Equal Rights Trust 2012)  
4
Michael Fordham QC, Justine N Stefanelli, Sophie Eser 'The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law: Immigration, 
Detention and the Rule of Law Safeguarding Principles' (British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law 2013).  
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the European University Institute (2014-2016); the FRA and ECtHR “Handbook on European 
Law in Relation to Asylum, Borders and Immigration” (section 6, Edition 2014)7, the FRA 
report on “Detention of Third Country National's in Return Procedures” (September 2010)8; 
and Recommendation 1900 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(of 28 January) on 10 guiding principles governing the circumstances in which the detention 
of asylum seekers and irregular migrants may be legally permissible and 15 European rules 
governing minimum standards of conditions of detention for migrants and asylum seekers9. 
 
As the second step, the Project Team: 
 identified the challenges and problems that judges may face when applying the 
selected due process standards and material law on detention included in each of 
the three aforementioned legal sources of EU law (Dublin III Regulation, Recast 
Reception Directive and Return Directive) in conjunction with the case-law of the 
ECtHR on Article 5 and Article 3 of the ECHR; 
 provided a user-friendly check-list with indications or recommendations on how 
to apply those standards in an integrated manner. For this purpose, protective 
standards of EU law and case-law of the ECtHR were merged in the three check-
lists (sections 4-6), while general approaches regarding complex inter-
relationships between EU law, ECHR and national (constitutional) law are 
described in section 3 of this Statement. This was done through a methodological 
question on how national judges can bring together those standards from two 
distinct European protection systems, in conjunction with constitutional law 
standards of the Member States, into a coherent legal structure in individual 
                                                                                                                                                        
5
European University Institute, Project ‘Contention’ (Migration Policy Centre at the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies and Odysseus Network (ULB) < http://contention.eu/>. 
6
European University Institute, Project ‘Redial' (Migration Policy Centre, Centre for Judicial Cooperation (CJC), 
Odysseus Academic Network) <http://euredial.eu/>. 
7
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the European Court of Human Rights ‘Handbook on 
European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration’ (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
Council of Europe 2014) <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/handbook-european-law-relating-
asylum-borders-and-immigration>. 
8
FRA 'Detention of third-country nationals in return procedures' (FRA – European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, 2010) <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2010/detention-third-country-nationals-
return-procedures-0>. 
9
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly ‘Recommendation 1900 (2010) Final version’ (Council of Europe 
2010) < http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17815&lang=en>. 
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cases. 
 
The Project Team held two meetings (21 April 2016 and 6 June 2016, Vienna) to discuss the 
draft sections 2 to 4 of the document. Consultations between the members of the Project 
Team also took place through an electronic exchange of views until August 2016, when the 
draft sections 1-4 were submitted for comments, remarks and suggestions for improvement 
to the members of the Advisory Committee. The check-list on the Dublin III Regulation was 
also tested in the context of a workshop for judges and lawyers titled “ACTIONES” (Active 
Charter Training through Interaction of National Experiences), which was organised on 27-28 
June 2016 by the Centre for Judicial Cooperation of the European University Institute in 
Florence. The Project Team received concrete and general comments and remarks from the 
members of the Advisory Committee or special adviser during the consultation in 2015-
2016. Several concrete comments and remarks were submitted by three members of the 
Advisory Committee also in a second round of consultation concerning sections 5 to 6; in 
this respect, there was an electronic exchange of views between Members of the Project 
Team during the first half of 2017. Consultation with the Council took place during the 
Council meeting of 1 April 2017 when the draft Statement was presented. At this occasion, 
the Project Team received feedbacks from Council members.   
 
The Project Team would like to express their special gratitude for the very concrete 
comments received from Adriano Silvestri, Michael Fordham QC, Professor Fabrizio Cafaggi 
and Professor Valsamis Mitsilegas.  
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Section 2: Detention and the Rule of Law 
 
The rule of law is a complex concept which has developed historically and takes different 
shapes in different democratic traditions. Generally, it refers to a system whereby all 
members of a society, including all structures of the State and its agents, conduct their 
affairs in the strict observance of the law and the judiciary acts as guarantor of such 
observance. The rule of law is grounded on the principle of legality and on the 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
Historically, one of the earliest expressions of the rule of law is the principle of habeas 
corpus. Already in Roman law, we can find a primitive expression of this principle in the 
Interdicto de Homine Libero Exhibendo,10 aimed at guaranteeing that a free person deprived 
from liberty be “exhibited” to the judge, so that he could determine the lawfulness of his 
imprisonment. Exhibere was there defined as the possibility to see and touch the person11 
and there was a requirement of celerity in its enforcement (execution).12 Although this was a 
measure of civil law applying between private parties and therefore did not refer to the 
deprivation of liberty by the public authorities, it constitutes one of the earliest expressions 
of the legal protection of individual freedom against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 
 
In public law, the principle of habeas corpus appears in the Magna Carta Libertarum, issued 
by King John of England on 15 June 1215, which constitutes one of the earliest expressions 
of the rule of law, as it acknowledges that everyone, including the king, is subject to the law. 
Only three of its original 63 clauses remain part of English law today, one being the principle 
of habeas corpus: 
 
“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or 
outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed 
with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his 
equals or by the law of the land.  
To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.” 
                                                 
10
Codified in the year 533 in the Digesto, Lib. XLIII, Tit. XXIX. 
11
Ibid. 3 § 8. 
12
Ibid. 4 § 2. 
Section 2: Detention and the Rule of Law 
 
11 
 
 
Currently, the requirements of the rule of law in relation to the deprivation of liberty are 
enshrined in constitutional texts and legislation worldwide, applied and interpreted by the 
judiciary across different legal cultures and jurisdictions.  
 
An expression of the rule of law applied to detention is established in the judicial test of “the 
most rigid scrutiny” introduced in some jurisdictions. In the US, the Supreme Court in the 
case of Korematsu,13 found that the racial basis of the decision in question had to be 
subjected to “the most rigid scrutiny”. This case referred to the internment programme 
developed in the US for the detention of persons of Japanese descent, including American 
citizens. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Owen Roberts stressed the unconstitutional nature 
of the detention programme to which Mr Korematsu was expected to be subject: ‘it is the 
case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting him to imprisonment in a 
concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without 
evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States.’ 
Other examples of significant intervention of domestic courts for the purpose of the 
preservation of the rule of law in the detention of non-nationals include the Belmarsh case 
of the House of Lords, declaring unlawful the indefinite detention without charges of foreign 
terrorist suspects;14 the judgments of the Federal High Court of Germany15 and the High 
Administrative Court of Austria,16 determining that there is no legal basis for detention 
within the Dublin procedure if alleged risk of absconding is not properly defined by objective 
criteria in national law; and the Judgment of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, 
declaring that the Fast Track Rules, which establish the mandatory detention of asylum-
seekers pending the fast-track procedure, are systemically unfair and unjust.17 
 
The rule of law is one of the values on which the EU is founded and, accordingly, also one of 
the guiding principles of the EU’s external action. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union 
                                                 
13
Korematsu v United States (No 22) 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
14
A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
15
Bundesgerichtshof, 26 June 2014, V ZB 31/14. 
16
Verwaltungsgerichtshof, 19 February 2015, RO 2014/21/0075.  
17
R (Detention Action) v First-tier Tribunal [2015] EWCA Civ 840.  
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(TEU)18 reads:  
 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States 
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.” 
 
While Article 21(1) TEU establishes that: 
 
“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law.” 
 
EU action in the field of asylum and migration -both within EU Member States, as well as in 
its agreements with third countries- must therefore have at its core the respect, 
advancement and promotion of the rule of law. 
 
In order to ensure that the values on which the EU is founded are effectively observed, the 
TEU also establishes a sanctioning mechanism in Art 7, aimed at suspending certain rights of 
Member States in cases of ‘a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in 
Article 2.’  
 
In 2014, the European Commission adopted a new Framework to strengthen the rule of 
law.19 The Commission explained there that: 
 
                                                 
18
Treaty on European Union (TEU) Article 2.  
19
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council ‘A new EU Framework to 
strengthen the Rule of Law’ COM(2014) 158 final/2, 19 March 2014. 
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“The principle of the rule of law has progressively become a dominant organisational 
model of modern constitutional law and international organisations (including the 
United Nations and the Council of Europe) to regulate the exercise of public powers. It 
makes sure that all public powers act within the constraints set out by law, in 
accordance with the values of democracy and fundamental rights, and under the 
control of independent and impartial courts.”20 
 
The Commission also recalled that the core meaning of the rule of law as a common value in 
the EU has been developed through the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and that it includes the principles of 
legality, legal certainty, prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers, independent 
and impartial courts, effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights and 
equality before the law.21  
 
The CJEU has stressed that, when applying EU law, the EU institutions and its Member States 
are subject to judicial scrutiny of the compatibility of their acts with the Treaties and with 
the general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights.22 Likewise, the ECtHR has 
consistently affirmed that the rule of law is a concept inherent in all articles of the ECHR, and 
that the lawfulness of detention is to be determined by reference ‘to the quality of the law, 
requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the 
Convention. In addition, any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of 
Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness’.23 
 
In this regard, the European Parliament, in its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the 
situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2013-2014)24, affirmed that “the rule 
of law is the backbone of European liberal democracy, and is one of the founding principles 
                                                 
20
Ibid. p 3-4. 
21
Ibid. p 4. 
22
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 Kadi and Al Barakaat (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2008:461, para 316. 
23
 Stafford v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 46295/99 (ECtHR 28 May 2002), para 63; see also 
ECtHR, Amuur v France (1996) App no 19776/92 (ECtHR, 25 June 1996), para 50. 
24
Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union 
(2013-2014) (2014/2254(INI)). 
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of the EU stemming from the common constitutional traditions of all Member States”25. It 
recalled that “respecting the rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of fundamental 
rights and that security measures should not compromise them, [and] recalls that under 
Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person”.26 The Parliament then: 
 
“Condemns the indiscriminate recourse to unlawful detention of irregular migrants, 
including asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors and stateless persons; […] recalls 
that the detention of migrants must remain a measure of last resort and urges the 
Member States to implement alternative measures; condemns the appalling 
detention conditions in some Member States and urges the Commission to address 
them without delay; reiterates the need to ensure that irregular migrants are granted 
the right to an effective remedy in the event of violations of their rights.”27 
 
The Parliament also stressed “the importance of democratic control of all forms of 
deprivation of liberty pursuant to the laws on immigration and asylum”28 and called ‘for 
closer monitoring of migrant reception and detention centres’.29 
 
At EU level, the protection of fundamental rights as one of the values of the EU is articulated 
in Article 6 TEU around three areas: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (the Charter), the ECHR, and the recognition of fundamental rights as (legally binding) 
general principles of EU Law: 
 
 The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties. 
[…] 
                                                 
25
Ibid. recital S. 
26
Ibid. para 18. 
27
Ibid. para 124. 
28
Ibid. para 126. 
29
Ibid. para 127. 
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The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted […] with due 
regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter that set out the sources of those 
provisions. 
 The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms […] 
 Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union’s law. 
 
Implementation of the EU’s legal framework then requires transposition and/or application 
of EU law in the domestic legal orders of Member States, as well as the role of national 
judges when acting as EU courts in interpreting and applying EU law. 
 
The right to liberty appears prominently in all three sources of fundamental rights at EU 
level: as a right enshrined in the Charter, as a right recognised in the ECHR which shall be 
binding directly on the EU itself if and when the EU accedes to the ECHR, and as a general 
principle of EU law through its recognition in the ECHR and in constitutional tradition 
common to the Member States. 
 
Article 6 of the Charter establishes that ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person.’ While Article 5(1) ECHR only allows deprivation of liberty, provided that such a 
measure is “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”, in very specific cases, 
including: 
 
(Paragraph f) “the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being 
taken with a view to deportation or extradition.” 
(Paragraph b) “the lawful detention in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
prescribed by law.” 
 
Article 5 of the ECHR further regulates procedural guarantees in four paragraphs as follows: 
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2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, 
of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this 
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release 
pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court 
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
 
From the standpoint of EU law, Article 41 (right to good administration) and Article 47 (right 
to effective remedy and a fair trial) of the Charter are relevant. Although Article 41 of the 
Charter, which includes, inter alia, the right of every person to be heard before any 
individual measure which would affect him adversely is taken, is addressed solely to the 
institutions of the EU, such a right is nevertheless inherent in respect for the rights of the 
defence, which is a general principle of EU law and it binds Member States, too. The 
observance of those rights to defence and to be heard is required even where the applicable 
legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (C-383/13 PPU, 
M.G., N.R., 10 September 2013, para. 3230; C-166/13, Mikarubega, 5 November 2014, paras. 
43, 4531; C-249/13, Boudjlida, 11 December 2014, paras. 30-3132). 
 
The relationship between the ECHR and the EU legal order is a multifaceted one. In 
particular, Article 52 of the Charter (on the scope and interpretation of rights and principles) 
establishes in paragraph 3: 
 
“In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
                                                 
30
C-383/13 PPU M.G. and N.R. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie EU:C:2013:533, para 32. 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection.” 
 
The Explanations to the Charter33 on Article 52, which are to be given due regard in the 
interpretation of the Charter provisions (as established by Article 6(1) TEU), identify Article 5 
ECHR as the source of Article 6 of the Charter and explain that ‘the meaning and the scope 
of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those instruments, but also 
by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.’ 
 
To sum up, the content of the protection that the right to liberty enjoys in the EU legal order 
is given by the Charter, including the case-law of the CJEU and of the ECtHR on Article 5 
ECHR; by general principles of EU law common to the constitutional traditions of Member 
States; and eventually, directly by Article 5 ECHR itself if and when the EU accedes to the 
ECHR.  
 
It is important to stress that the ECHR (as outlined above) is the minimum standard that the 
Union must respect, but nothing prevents the Union from providing more extensive 
protection. In fact, when it comes to the interpretation of human rights, the scope and 
meaning of rights is constantly evolving and the “living nature” of international human rights 
instruments has been consistently reaffirmed by human rights monitoring bodies, such as 
the ECtHR. Interpreting international instruments in light of the evolving state of the law is a 
well-established rule of international law, as it has been recognised by the ECtHR when 
referring to the ECHR as a “living instrument”.34 The rights enshrined in the law have to be 
interpreted in the light of present day conditions so as to be practical and effective and 
therefore the evolving standards in the field of human rights have to be considered when 
applying existing legislation. In this regard, the role of the national judge cannot be 
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underestimated. By interpreting the international obligations of Member States under 
relevant instruments, as well as national constitutional frameworks and, in particular, the 
right to liberty and the protection of non-nationals, the national judge is contributing to the 
process of law-making at EU level, shaping and developing the meaning and content of the 
right to liberty. Likewise, national courts, acting as EU courts when they interpret EU law, 
contribute to the interpretation and development of standards of EU law. 
 
In the EU secondary law there is no mandatory rule or standard concerning reporting 
requirements of detention of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. In the document 
„Beyond Detention: A Global Strategy to Support Governments to End the Detention of 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees 2014-2019“, the UNHCR invites states to adopt national action 
plans which should among other aspects include accurate and up to date information on 
policies and practices, including statistical data. The UNHCR proposes to establish 
transparent mechanisms for requesting data, as well as for collecting and sharing such data. 
Official statistics and reports will need to be cross-checked with other sources available to 
ensure consistency and reliability.35 The statistical information selected below on detention 
of immigrants serves only to provide a very rough picture on the scale of detention of the 
aforementioned group of immigration detention in Europe. This statistical information 
certainly does not allow a comprehensive and reliable overview of the scale of detention 
practices across Europe; in some cases the selected information does not include detention 
in police or border guard facilities or it refers only to a particular unit of detention or to a 
particular period of time. Therefore, in most cases numbers of detention cannot be 
compared between Member States.  For example, statistical information collected by Global 
Detention Project based on various sources, including non-governmental and official 
sources, may differ substantially. For the purpose of the ELI Statement, the Project Team has 
collected some information which is partly cross-checked and published by the Asylum 
Information Data Base (AIDA), ECRE (European Council on Refugee and Exiles), Global 
Detention Project,36 Fundamental Rights Agency. 37 
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In France, in 2016, 45,937 third-country nationals have been detained (27,947 in mainland 
France and 19,618 in overseas).38 4,822  of these detainees were children compared to 
5,692 in 2014, which constitutes a decrease of 18%. This decline is mainly due to the 
decrease of detained children in Mayotte (from 5,582 to 4,706), which is an overseas island 
close to Madagascar, while in mainland France there was an increase of 57% (from 45 to 105 
children detained).39 According to Global Detention Project, in 2015, 5,100 minors have 
been detained. On average, in 2015, third country nationals remained in administrative 
detention centres for 12.3 days; in 2014, 323 third-country nationals were detained until the 
45th day.40 In 2015, the five NGOs working in administrative detention centres met 280 
detained persons who declared themselves to be children; in 2014, there were 170 such 
cases. These were young persons whose age had been disputed by the authorities and who 
had been considered as adults as a result of a medical examination. 49% of these young 
persons were released after a judicial decision in 2015.41 
 
In the United Kingdom, in 2016, a total of 13,230 people who had sought asylum had been 
detained and there were 1,626 in detention at the end of the year.42 According to Global 
Detention Project the total number of immigration detainees in 2016 was 32,526.43 
According to the report of AIDA and ECRE, in 2016, 45.8% of the total population subject to 
detention were asylum seekers.44 In 2014, 3,865 people were detained in the detained fast 
track, but this procedure was suspended in July 201545 after the judgment of the Court of 
                                                                                                                                                        
reforming detention practices; to promote scholarship and comparative analysis of immigration control 
regimes (Global Detention Project, July 2017 (https://www.globaldetentionproject.org)). 
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For some information on detention of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, see also website of 
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Global Detention Project, Country Profiles, France, July 2017. 
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Assfam, Forum Réfugiés, France terre d'asile, La Cimade and Ordre de Malte, 'Centres et locaux de rétention 
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Appeal. In 2016, 144 minors were detained.46 The instances of applicants detained as adults 
and found to be children has decreased since the case of AA in June 2016.47 Periods of 
immigration detention including asylum seekers and other foreign nationals vary 
enormously from a few days to several years. In 2016, 29 people stayed detained at least 2 
years, 179 from 1 to 2 years, 3,261 from 2 to 4 months.48 
 
In Greece, there were 14,864 immigration detainees in 2016; 4,072 of them were asylum 
seekers.49 However, AIDA reports that out of total 21,566 detention orders issued in 2016, as 
many as 18,114 detention orders (84%) were issued after the EU-Turkey statement on 20 
March 2016.50 As of 28 December 2016, out of 1,443 unaccompanied children, who were on 
the waiting list for an accommodation place, 309 unaccompanied children were detained in 
“closed reception facilities” and 15 were detained “in protective custody”. One month later, 
317 were in closed reception facilities and 4 in protective custody.51 
 
In Austria, in 2014, there were 1,920 immigration detainees and in 2013, 741 asylum seekers 
were detained (175 minors).52 However, in the first half of 2016, detention numbers have 
risen dramatically: there were 14,661 detentions for migration-related reasons.53 
 
In Bulgaria, in 2016, there were 11,314 asylum seekers detained. The average duration of 
detention was 9 days.54 In 2013, 667 minors were detained.55  
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In Hungary, the total number of asylum seekers detained in 2016 was 2,621.56 The number 
of persons detained at the end of 2016 was 27357, thus exceeding the number of people 
accommodated in open reception centres (194).58 The total number of immigration 
detainees in 2015 was 8,562; of whom 190 were minors.59 
 
In Spain, the total number of persons detained in 2016 was 7,597; 1,240 were detained at 
the end of 2016.60 In 2016, 769 asylum seekers were detained and in 2015 19 minors were 
detained.61 According to police records, the average stay in detention was 24 days in 2015.62 
 
In Belgium, in 2015, there were 6,229 immigration detainees which constitutes an 11% 
increase compared to 2014. In 2015, 969 asylum seekers were detained. In 2014, the length 
of detention was approximately 44 days. From October 2008 to January 2014, 633 families 
with a total of 1,224 minors were accommodated in return houses for an average length of 
24.1 days. Among these families, 18 were released after having reached the maximum 
detention length of four months. In 2014, 217 families were placed in return houses, with a 
total of 459 minor children. In 2015, 161 families were hosted in the return houses (580 
persons including 328 children).63 
 
For the Czech Republic, the Global Detention Project reports that in 2016 there were 5,261 
immigration detainees and in 2013, 22 minors were detained. The average length of 
detention was 51 days in 2013, 77 days in 2012, 83 days in 2011.64 
  
For Italy, the Global Detention Project reports that there were 5,242 immigration detainees 
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and 150 detained asylum seekers in 2013,65 while AIDA reports that the total number of 
persons detained in Centres for Identification and Expulsion (CIE) was 1,968.66 CIEs have 
detention capacities of 1,901. There are also “Welcome Centres” (CDA), with the capacity of 
1,163 and Asylum Seekers Reception Centres” (CARA).67 The number of persons in detention 
in CIE at the end of 2016 was 288.68 
 
In Sweden, in 2016, there were 3,714 immigration detainees (108 minors) compared to 
3,524 in 2015. In 2012, 2,569 asylum seekers were detained. The average length of 
detention of all categories was 7 days in 2012 and 5 days in 2013, while the average duration 
of detention of asylum seekers was 10 days in 2012 and 8 days in 2013. In 2015, Caritas 
Sweden noted that asylum seekers are generally detained for up to two weeks.69 According 
to the AIDA country report, the average period of detention for children in 2016 was 3.9 
days. For adults, it was 27.3 days and for the whole group 26.6 days, compared to 18 days in 
2015.70 
 
In Slovenia, according to police statistics, out of 2,338 persons detained in 2015, 2,006 (86%) 
were in return proceedings or procedures establishing identity, 316 (13%) were subject to 
readmission based on bilateral agreements, and 16 were asylum seekers. As admitted by 
official sources, due to lack of adequate facilities, in practice unaccompanied children and 
families with children are systematically placed in detention. Unaccompanied children and 
families with children are placed in the same part of the detention centre, which is separate 
from other categories of detainees. In 2015, Slovenia detained 449 children, constituting 19 
percent of all immigration detainees. According to the Interior Ministry, 34 unaccompanied 
minors were detained in 2013, 30 in 2012, 12 in 2011, 26 in 2010 and 29 in 2009. In 
September 2016, following the campaign by non-governmental organizations, including the 
Legal Centre for the Protection of Human Rights and Environment, the government issued a 
                                                 
65
Global Detention Project, Country Profiles, Italy, July 2017, 
<https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/italy>. 
66
AIDA, Country Report: Italy, 31 December 2016, 87. 
67
Global Detention Project, Country Profiles, Italy, July 2017, 
<https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/italy>. 
68
AIDA, Country Report: Italy, 31 December 2016, 87. 
69
Global Detention Project, Country Profiles, Sweden, July 2017, 
<https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/sweden>. 
70
AIDA, Country Report: Sweden, 31 December 2016, 55, 59. 
Section 2: Detention and the Rule of Law 
 
23 
 
decree according to which all unaccompanied children, irrespective of whether they applied 
for asylum or not, shall not be placed in detention but rather accommodated in dormitories. 
Implementation of the decree has reportedly been slow. According to the official statistics, 
the average length of detention for all categories of immigration detainees was 17.8 days in 
2013, while the average length of detention of asylum seekers was 47.2 days.  The police 
reported that 16 asylum seekers were detained in 2015. According to data provided by the 
Interior Ministry to the European Migration Network, in 2013, 49 asylum seekers were 
detained, in 2012, 43 and in 2011 39 asylum seekers were detained.71 
 
In the Netherlands, the number of immigration detainees has dropped from 6,104 in 2011 to 
2,176 in 2015. According to some accounts this is due in part to the fact that the 
government takes the obligation to consider alternatives to detention more seriously than it 
did before the EU Return Directive was adopted and because of a ruling of the Council of 
State, which prohibits the mobile surveillance team of the Royal Military Constabulary to 
arrest irregular migrants at the border with other EU countries. In 2014, 261 asylum seekers 
were detained. In 2012, 402 detainees were minors. The average length of detention was 55 
days in 2015, 67 days in 2014, 72 days in 2013 and 75 days in 2012. In 2010, out of 2,255 
immigration detainees, 29% were detained two or three times and 9% were detained four 
times or more.72 
 
In Malta, in 2013, there were 1,900 immigration detainees. In 2015, 11 minors were 
detained.  In 2016, 20 asylum seekers were detained.73 
 
In Germany, in 2016, 3,968 people were transferred following a Dublin procedure. In these 
cases transfers are usually preceded by detention, but this often is only for a very short 
period of time. Exact statistics on the duration of custody and/or detention are not available. 
The number of deportations increased to 25,375 in 2016, in comparison to 20,888 in 2015 
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and the number of people in detention pending deportation seems to have risen as well.74 
According to Global Detention Project, there were 1,850 immigration detainees in 2014. In 
2013, 15 minors were detained constituting a decrease from 55 in 2012, 61 in 2011, 114 in 
2010 and142 in 2009.75 Based on media reports, in the first months of 2016, detainees 
(asylum seekers or former asylum seekers) at particular facilities were detained for an 
average period of 16 days or three weeks.76 
 
In Poland, 292 children were detained in 2016.77 The number of detained asylum seekers 
was 1,119 in 2013 and 603 in 2016. In 2014, there was a total of 1,322 immigration 
detainees347 of these detainees were minors of whom 18 were unaccompanied, compared 
to 3 unaccompanied minors detained in 2013, 16 in 2012 and 14 in 2011.However, the 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Association for Legal Intervention have 
observed a sharp increase in the percentage of detained children during the monitoring 
visits. During 2014 visits, children constituted 24 percent of detainee population (84 out of 
347 detainees), while in 2012 they made up 9 percent (34 out of 391 detainees). Border 
Guard data shows a decrease in the number of detained children by more than 40% after 
the introduction of alternative measures in 2014, while according to the Ministry of Interior 
and the Border Guards, in 2011, 1,109 migrants were detained, the Polish National Contact 
Point to the European Migration Network reported that there were 1,823 detainees that 
year. In 2015, the average length of detention was 65.8 days. In 2013, the maximum period 
of detention was 363 days.78 
 
In Slovakia, according to official sources, 1,058 people were placed in immigration detention 
in 2015. In 2016, there were 412 immigration detainees. In 2012, 47 asylum seekers were 
detained, among them 4 minors.79 
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In Finland, detained persons include both asylum seekers whose identity is unclear and 
irregular migrants subject to deportation order. The latter group constitutes approximately 
90 percent of detained persons. In 2013, there were 444 immigration detainees, and in 
2012, there were 369 detained asylum seekers. In 2003, out of the total population of 
detained persons 11.5 percent were minors. 15 unaccompanied minors were detained in 
2005.80 
 
In Lithuania, in 2015, 353 persons were held in immigration detention; 292 in 2014; 363 in 
2013 and 375 in 2012. In 2012, 60 asylum seekers were detained. According to official 
sources the average length of detention was 38 days in 2013; 40 days in 2012; 51 days in 
2011; 61 days in 2010. However, in 2010, the Jesuit Refugee Service found the average 
length of detention to be much higher – nine and a half months. Unaccompanied children 
are generally not detained but placed in the Refugee Reception Centre. 9 unaccompanied 
children were placed in such reception centres in 2013; 81 in 2012; 4 in 2011; 8 in 2010. 5 
children were detained in 2015 and 11 in 2014.81 
 
In Latvia, according to information provided by the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs 
of the Interior Ministry, out of 273 non-nationals who were detained in 2011, 238 were 
asylum seekers. In 2013, 166 asylum seekers were detained and 127 asylum seekers were 
detained in 2012. The country places some 200 people annually in immigration detention. 
According to official sources, the average length of detention was 20 days in 2013; 18 days in 
2012 and 20 days in 2011. The average length of detention of asylum seekers has decreased 
over the years from 25 days in 2011, 15 days in 2012, to 12 days in 2013.82 
 
In Portugal, in 2012, there were 196 immigration detainees.83  
 
In Romania, in 2012, there were 671 immigration detainees.84  
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In Ireland, according to the Irish Prison Service, there were 335 immigration detainees in 
2015, down from 407 in 2014 and 374 in 2013. In 2014, the average daily number of migrant 
detainees was 6 and in 2015 it was 4.85  
 
In Cyprus, it is reported that there are three categories of people detained on immigration 
related issues: those detained for a few days until their removal is arranged; those whose 
removal presents various difficulties (non-disclosure of their country of origin or their 
country of origin is unwilling to accept them); and third country nationals who had initially 
been declared illegal and who subsequently applied for international protection.86 
 
Croatia placed 258 non-citizens in detention in 2015, of whom 41 were asylum seekers. In 
2016, 50 asylum seekers were detained. By comparison, more than 1,500 people were 
detained in both, 2006 and 2007. In 2010, 39 minors (children under age of 14) were 
detained, constituting an increase from 25 in 2009 and 27 in 2008; older children are not 
included in these statistics.87    
According to the Luxembourg Government, no more than two dozen people are detained at 
any one time in Luxembourg. In 2013, there were 243 immigration detainees. In 2012, 9 
asylum seekers were detained. In 2012, 27 minors were detained.88 
 
In Estonia, in 2013, 94 migrants were detained. The average length of immigration detention 
was 58 days in 2013, 80 days in 2012, 92 days in 2011. Between 2010 and 2012, 6 
unaccompanied minors were detained. Since 2014, unaccompanied children have not been 
placed in detention; instead they are accommodated in »substitute homes«.89  
 
For Denmark, the Global Detention Project was unable to learn the number of migrants 
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detained on an annual basis. According to the annual report of the Danish Prison and 
Probation Service90 , an average of 92 people were held on immigration-related charges in 
Denmark each day in 2014.91 
 
For non EU Member States, who are signatories to the ECHR, the Global Detention Projects 
reports that there are (in different years) 37,522 immigration detainees in Russia, 10,922 in 
Ukraine, 2,939 in Norway (330 detained minors), 389 in Macedonia (22 detained minors), 
5,732 in Switzerland.92 However, AIDA reports a much higher number of administrative 
detentions in Switzerland: 7,540 asylum seekers were reportedly detained in 2011, 6,806 in 
2012, 6,039 in 2013 and 5,417 asylum seekers were detained in 2015.93 In 2016, Turkey has 
established capacities for 7,216 pre-removal or asylum detention.  
 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) also reports that there are no comparable and reliable 
data on how many children are detained for immigration related purposes in the EU. The 
numbers of children and unaccompanied children below reflect only the number of children 
in detention at a specific point in time. These figures exclude children temporarily confined 
to facilities other than formal detention centres, such as cells in police stations, border 
crossing points or airports.94 It is reported that on the December 31st, 2015, 716 children 
were detained in 25 Member States, while for the other three Member States there were no 
data available. On the September 1st, 2016, 821 children were detained in 21 Member 
States, while for the remaining 7 Member States there were no data available. On November 
15th, 2016, 180 children were detained in 14 Member States, while for the other 14 Member 
States no data was available.95 The longest periods of detention of unaccompanied children 
were 195 days (15-year-old boy) and 151 days (16-year-old boy).96  
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Section 3. Interplay of EU Law, the ECHR and National Law in the Context of the 
Protection of Human Rights  
 
(1) With every decision or judgment on administrative detention of asylum seekers or 
irregular migrants, Member States implement not only EU law97 but most often also Article 5 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)98 (possibly in conjunction with Article 
3 of the ECHR)99 and national constitutional and/or statutory provisions.100 The interplay 
between the three major protection systems under EU law, ECHR and national law may 
evolve into very complex legal settings which must be taken into account by a judge in each 
particular case. In the five subsections, this interplay is described through general 
approaches used by the respective courts dealing with this interplay in practice.  
 
(2) In cases of detention of minors, the principle of the best interests of the child of Article 
3(1) of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child applies.101 This 
general principle of law, however, is already part of EU primary law and it is, therefore, 
covered by the protection system of EU law.102  
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movement (Article 2(1) of Protocol 4 to the ECHR), see Chapter 4, point 4, of this Statement. 
99
Article 5 of the ECHR regulates the right to liberty and security of person, while Article 3 of the ECHR states 
that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
100 From the standpoint of the ECHR, the relevance of national law in detention cases derives from the second 
sentence of Article 5 of the ECHR which says that “(…) no one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
cases” listed in Article 5 indents from a.) to f.) and “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”. The 
latter means national or EU law. 
101
This Article states that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the 
child shall be a primary consideration.” See also Article 37 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. 
102
Article 24(2) of the Charter states that “in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities 
or private institutions, the child's best interest must be a primary consideration.” Article 24(3) of the Charter 
states that “every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct 
contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.” See, for example, 
references to the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of a Child in recital 13 of the Dublin III Regulation 
(604/2013), in recitals 9 and 18 of the Recast Reception Directive (2013/33) and in recital 22 of the Return 
Directive (2008/115). 
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(3) In cases of detention of asylum seekers, a relationship between EU law and Article 31 of 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (hereinafter the Geneva Convention)103 needs to be taken into account. 
Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) defines the relationship 
between EU law and the Geneva Convention. This Article provides that a common policy on 
asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection “must be in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention, and other relevant treaties.” Although the CJEU has referred to this 
provision, it has not yet defined which “other relevant treaties” it refers to.  
 
3.1. The relationship between EU law and the ECHR from the standpoint of EU law 
and the CJEU case-law 
 
(4) Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU established a principle 
regarding the relationship between Community law and the ECHR in the Nold case (1974). 
The CJEU stated that “international treaties for the protection of human rights, on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines 
which should be followed within the framework of Community law.”104 In the Kremzow case, 
the CJEU stated that the ECHR “has a special significance in that respect.”105 
 
(5) After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, a legal link between EU 
law and the ECHR was established in Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
                                                 
103
Article 31(1) of the Geneva Convention states that “the Contracting States shall not impose penalties on 
account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, 
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry 
or presence.” Article 31(2) of the Geneva Convention among other things states that “the Contracting States 
shall not apply to the movements of such refugees’ restrictions other than those which are necessary and 
such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission 
into another country.” See also recital 15 of the Recast Reception Directive (2013/33). 
104
 C-4/73 Nold  EU:C:1974:51, para 13. 
105
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providing that fundamental rights from the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law.106 
In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter), which has “the same 
legal value as the Treaties”107 is addressed to the Member States “only when they are 
implementing Union law”.108 The term “when implementing Union law” has been 
interpreted by the CJEU in a non-restrictive way. For example, in the Åklagaren case, the 
CJEU decided that a Member State is implementing EU law, because “there is a direct link 
between the collection of VAT revenue in compliance with the EU law applicable and the 
availability to the EU budget of the corresponding VAT resources, since any lacuna in the 
collection of the first potentially causes a reduction in the second /.../ The fact that the 
national legislation upon which those tax penalties and criminal proceedings are founded 
has not been adopted to transpose Directive 2006/112 cannot call that conclusion into 
question”/…/109 Where, on the other hand, a legal situation does not come within the scope 
of EU law, the CJEU does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter 
relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction”110, since the Charter 
“does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or 
establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties.”111 In the Siragusa case, the CJEU has further developed this interpretation opining 
that “the concept of implementing EU law as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, requires 
a certain degree of connection above and beyond the matters covered being closely related 
or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other. In order to determine 
whether national legislation involves the implementation of EU law for the purposes of 
Article 51 of the Charter, some of the points to be determined are whether that legislation is 
intended to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and whether it 
pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly 
affecting EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or 
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Article 6(3) of the TEU states that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and resulting from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's 
law. See also: C-571/10 Kamberaj (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2012:233, para 60. 
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Article 6(1) of the TEU. 
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capable of affecting it.”112 
 
(6) Article 51(2) of the Charter provides “in so far as this Charter contains rights which 
correspond to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights 
shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
from providing more extensive protection.”113  
 
(7) In its opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 on the draft agreement providing for the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR, the CJEU states that, in regard to the relationship between 
EU law and the ECHR, that “in the first place it must be borne in mind that Article 53 of the 
Charter provides that nothing therein is to be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
fundamental rights as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by EU law and 
international law and by international agreement to which the EU or all the Member States 
are party, including the ECHR and by the Member States' constitutions /.../ In so far as Article 
53 of the ECHR essentially reserves the power of the Contracting parties to lay down higher 
standards of protection of fundamental rights that those guaranteed by the ECHR, that 
provision should be coordinated with Article 53 of the Charter, as interpreted by the CJEU, so 
that the power granted to Member States by Article 53 of the ECHR is limited – with respect 
to the rights recognised by the Charter that correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR – to 
that which is necessary to ensure that the level of protection provided for by the Charter and 
the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not compromised /.../ Thus, when 
implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that 
fundamental rights have been observed by other Member States, so that not only may they 
not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another 
Member States than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not 
check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU.”114 
 
                                                 
112
C-206/13 Siragusa EU:C:2014:126, paras 24-25. 
113
Article 52(3) of the Charter. 
114
Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2014:2454, paras 187, 189 and 192. 
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(8) The Explanations to the Charter, which do not have binding legal effect,115 provide that 
“the rights in Article 6 of the Charter are the rights guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR and 
/.../they have the same meaning and scope. Consequently, the limitations which may 
legitimately be imposed on them may not exceed those permitted by the ECHR.”116 The CJEU 
in the J.N. case confirms that “rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter correspond to those 
guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR and that limitations which may legitimately be imposed 
on the exercise of the rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter may not exceed those 
permitted by the ECtHR, in the wording of Article 5 thereof. However, the explanations 
relating to Article 52 of the Charter indicate that paragraph 3 of that article is intended to 
ensure the necessary consistency between the Charter and the ECHR, without thereby 
adversely affecting the autonomy of Union law and that of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.”117 
 
(9) On the other hand, according to the opinion of the CJEU, Article 6(3) of the TEU does not 
govern the relations between the ECHR and legal systems of the Member States, nor does it 
lay down the consequences for a national court in case of a conflict between the rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR and a provision of national law.118 Technically speaking, as long as 
the EU has not acceded to the ECHR, “the ECHR does not constitute a legal instrument which 
has been formally incorporated into EU law”.119 This is confirmed also in detention cases, 
where the CJEU stated that /.../ “whilst Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that the rights 
contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR are to have the 
same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR, the latter does not constitute, as 
long as the EU has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally 
                                                 
115
Second paragraph of Article 6(1) of the TEU states that rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall 
be interpreted with due regard to the Explanations referred to in the Charter that set out the sources of 
those provisions. The Preamble of the Explanations relating to the Charter (2007/C/303/02, 14.12.2007) 
provides that although the Explanations “do not as such have the status of law, they are a valuable tool of 
interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter”. See also Article 52(7) of the Charter. 
116
Explanation on Article 6: Article 6 of the Charter entitled “right to liberty and security” states that “everyone 
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C-601/15 PPU, J.N. (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2016:84, para 47. 
118
C-571/10 Kamberaj (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2012:233, para 62.  
119
C C-617/10 Åklagaren EU:C:2013:105, para 44. 
Section 3. Interplay of EU Law, the ECHR and National Law in the Context of the Protection of 
Human Rights 
 
33 
 
incorporated into EU law.”120 
 
(10) Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that secondary EU law on asylum and on returns of 
irregular migrants explicitly refers to the case-law of the ECtHR and to its binding force for 
Member States under the ECHR. For example, recital 32 of the Dublin III Regulation provides 
that “with respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this Regulation, 
Member States are bound by their obligations under instruments of international law, 
including the relevant case-law of the ECtHR.” Recital 10 of the Recast Reception Directive 
provides that “with respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this 
Directive, Member States are bound by obligations under instruments of international law to 
which they are party.” In the recital 15 of the Recast Reception Directive, the term 
“international obligations of the Member States” is mentioned in relation to detention.121 
The ECHR is explicitly mentioned in recital 9 of the Recast Reception Directive in relation to 
the issue of family unity. Similarly, recital 22 of the Return Directive states that “in line with 
the ECHR, respect for family life should be a primary consideration of Member States when 
implementing this Directive.” 
 
(11) Given the described legal framework, a question derives on what are the consequences 
of this interplay between EU law and the ECHR for national courts’ practice as regards the 
effective protection of human rights in general and in detention cases, in particular. 
 
(12) A possible answer to this question can be drawn out from the preliminary rulings of the 
CJEU in relevant cases on human rights protection. For example, in some cases the CJEU 
took full responsibility for the protection of human rights and did not transfer responsibility 
for the protection of fundamental rights under EU law back to the referring national 
courts.122 In some other cases, the CJEU did transfer the responsibility for the concrete 
decision on the protection of human rights to referring courts of the Member States.123 In 
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more recent cases on immigration and international protection, it perhaps becomes clearer 
that the main responsibility for the protection of fundamental rights under EU law and 
international human rights obligations rests on the Member States’ courts. For example, in 
the case of N.S. and M.E.,124 the CJEU states in paragraph 80 that “it must be assumed that 
the treatment of asylum seekers in all Member States complies with the requirements of the 
Charter, the Geneva Convention and the ECHR.” In paragraph 77 the CJEU adds: “According 
to settled case-law Member States must not only interpret their national law in a manner 
consistent with EU law but also make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of an 
instrument of secondary legislation which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights 
protected by the EU legal order or with other general principles of EU law. In the Dereci case, 
the CJEU establishes it is up to the referring court to examine whether the refusal of the 
right of residence undermines the right to respect for private and family life from Article 7 of 
the Charter: “If it takes the view that the situation is not covered by EU law, it must 
undertake that examination in the light of Article 8(1) of the ECHR. All the Member States 
are, after all, parties to the ECHR which enshrines the right to respect for private and family 
life in Article 8.”125 In the Zakaria case, the CJEU states that when the person is refused 
permission to cross the border, “it is for the referring court to ascertain, (…), whether refusal 
to grant the claimant (…) the right to bring his claims before the court infringes the rights 
from Article 47 of the Charter.”126 In the case of M.G. and N.R., which relates to detention, 
the CJEU says in paragraph 35 that “authorities of the Member States are, as a rule, subject 
to the obligation to observe the rights of the defence.”127 In the Arslan case, which also 
relates to detention, the CJEU has stated that “it is for Member States to establish, in full 
compliance with their obligations arising from both international law and EU law, the ground 
on which an asylum seeker may be detained or kept in detention.”128  
 
(13) If in a given case a question on interpretation of secondary EU law in conjunction with 
the ECHR and national law is raised, the referring court is entitled to expect the CJEU to 
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provide a preliminary ruling concerning the correct interpretation of a legal provision of EU 
law.129 Referring courts may expect this not only in cases of preliminary reference concerning 
material law, which might130 or might not131 overlap with the issues already raised in the 
existing case-law of the ECtHR, but also in cases of the reference for a preliminary ruling on 
procedural law standards. 132  As the CJEU has reiterated in the Kremzow case, “(...) where 
national legislation falls within the field of application of Community law the CJEU, in a 
reference for a preliminary ruling, must give the national court all the guidance as to 
interpretation necessary to enable it to assess the compatibility of that legislation with the 
fundamental rights – as laid down in particular in the ECHR – whose observance the CJEU 
ensures.”133 
 
(14) The interplay between EU law and the ECHR is influenced also by a particular 
relationship between the primary EU law on effective legal remedy and on fair trial from 
Article 47 of the Charter and corresponding provisions on effective legal remedies against 
detention orders as these remedies are specifically regulated in the respective secondary EU 
law.  
 
(15) The first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter is based on Article 13 of the ECHR.134 
Protection under Article 47(1) of the Charter is more extensive, since it guarantees the right 
to an effective remedy before a court, which is not the case for Article 13 of the ECHR.135 The 
second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR, with 
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"The presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be 
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the Charter guaranteeing more extensive protection than the ECHR. This is because, unlike 
the ECHR, the Charter guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a court, whilst the 
right to a fair hearing is not confined only to disputes relating to civil law rights and 
obligations.136 From the judgment in the case of Maaouia v France onwards, the ECtHR 
remains consistent in interpreting that decisions regarding the entry, stay and deportation of 
aliens do not concern the determination of the civil rights or obligations of an applicant or of 
a criminal charge against him, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on fair trial.137 
In cases of detention, however, asylum seekers and irregular migrants have the right to be 
brought promptly before a “judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial 
power” according to the provisions of the ECHR.138 Furthermore, a complete set of standards 
of fair procedure and trial are regulated in paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 5 of the ECHR. The 
ECtHR has held that it is not always necessary that procedure under Article 5(4) of the ECHR 
be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 for criminal or civil 
litigation. It must have a judicial character and provide guarantees appropriate to the type of 
deprivation of liberty in question.139 
 
(16) This could lead to the conclusion that the Member States’ judges, when dealing with 
detention cases of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, should take into account the 
aforementioned standards of fair judicial procedure regulated in paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 
5 of the ECHR in conjunction with fair trial standards from Article 47(2) and (3)140 of the 
Charter, as legitimate criteria for examining the validity of provisions on the right to effective 
judicial protection from specific secondary EU law (the Dublin III Regulation, the Recast 
Reception Directive or the Return Directive). 
 
(17) Despite the fact that the Charter is part of the primary law of the EU, it is not so clear 
whether the standards for effective judicial protection set out in secondary EU law (in the 
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 Explanation relating to the Charter, Article 47. 
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two directives and the regulation) on detention must be in accordance with Article 47 of the 
Charter (in conjunction with Article 5 of the ECHR). The reason for this reservation or 
eventual doubt lies in the interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter, which was developed by 
the CJEU in the Diouf case. In this case, the CJEU deals with the issue of effective legal 
remedy in asylum procedures and refers to the provision of Article 47 of the Charter 
inconsistently – in some parts of the preliminary ruling the CJEU refers to it as being a 
general principle,141 while in some other parts of the ruling the CJEU refers to it as being a 
right.142 
 
(18) The difference between a principle and a right is crucial for judicial interpretation.143 
Article 52(5) of the Charter states that “the provisions of this Charter which contain 
principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are 
implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially 
cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.” This 
means that if judges indeed have to consider the right to an effective legal remedy of Article 
47(1) of the Charter as being a mere principle and not a right, then it is secondary EU law 
which gives the concrete legal expression to Article 47 of the Charter and not vice versa. In 
that case, the EU legislator could define standards for effective legal remedies in each field 
of law differently, without regarding the standards and conditions laid down in Article 47 of 
the Charter. 
 
(19) However, in the preliminary rulings following the Diouf case, the CJEU has not reiterated 
or further developed that interpretation. This could lead to a tentative conclusion that the 
CJEU does not reiterate consideration of secondary EU law’s significance or even 
decisiveness over Article 47 of the Charter. Instead, in a detention case (M.G., N.R.), 
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regarding the right to a defence, the CJEU stated that where neither the “conditions under 
which observance of the third-country national's right to be heard is to be ensured, nor the 
consequences of the infringement of that right, are laid down by EU law, those conditions 
and consequences are governed by national law” /.../.144 Similarly, in the Mahdi case, the 
CJEU states that “according to settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules concerning the 
procedural requirements relating to a detention-review measure, the Member States remain 
competent, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to determine those 
requirements, whilst at the same time ensuring that the fundamental rights are observed 
and that the provisions of EU law relating to that measure are fully effective.”145 In the 
Mukarubega case, the CJEU again reaffirmed that observance of the right to be heard and of 
the right to defence, which are general principles of law, is obligatory even where the 
applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement.146 
 
(20) Although, from among the cases mentioned above, the CJEU made an explicit reference 
to Article 47 of the Charter only in the Mahdi case, one could conclude based on preliminary 
rulings that followed the judgment in the Diouf case, that it is not just secondary EU law 
what defines the procedural requirements in detention cases. Instead, secondary EU law 
needs to be applied always in conjunction with the right to an effective judicial protection as 
being a general principle of law and this includes case-law of the ECtHR, as well as 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.147 
 
3.2. The relationship between the ECHR and EU law from the standpoint of case-
law of the ECtHR 
 
(1) The basic principle of the relationship between the ECHR and EU law implemented by a 
Member State was set in the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the Bosphorus 
case. The ECHR does not prohibit Contracting Parties from transferring sovereign power to 
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international organisations in order to pursue co-operation in certain fields of activity. Even 
as a holder of such transferred sovereign power, that organisation is not held responsible 
under the ECHR for proceedings before, or decisions of, its organs as long as it is not a 
Contracting Party. A Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the ECHR for all acts 
and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a 
consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal 
obligations. Article 1 of the ECHR makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure 
concerned and does not exclude any part of a Contracting Party´s jurisdiction from scrutiny 
under the ECHR. Member States are thus fully responsible under the ECHR and are subject 
to full judicial scrutiny by the ECtHR for all acts falling outside its strict international legal 
obligations. For example, in cases, in which EU law grants certain discretion to Member 
States. On the other hand, Member States acting on the basis of EU law leaving no discretion 
are presumed to be in accordance with the ECHR, as the EU legal order is presumed to offer 
protection of fundamental rights that is equivalent to protection under the ECHR. By 
"equivalent" the ECtHR means "comparable": any requirement that the organisation´s 
protection be "identical" could run against the interest of the pursued international co-
operation. However, any such finding of equivalence could not be final and would be 
susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in fundamental right´s protection. 
The presumption on equivalent protection is open to rebuttal in case of "manifest 
dysfunction" of EU law fundamental rights protection.148  In cases of such rebuttal, “the 
interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a 
constitutional instrument of European public order in the field of human rights.”149 
 
(2) In the case of Avotniš v Latvia (May 2016), the ECtHR reiterated that the application of 
the presumption of equivalent protection in the legal system of the EU is subject to two 
conditions. Firstly, the absence of any margin of manoeuvre on the part of the domestic 
authorities and secondly, the deployment of the full potential of the supervisory mechanism 
                                                 
148
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provided for by EU law.150 
 
(3) The fact that a certain situation is regulated by EU secondary law in the field of detention 
may have further consequences for the responsibility of a contracting state to respect 
human rights contained in the ECHR. For example, in the case of M.S.S. v Belgium and 
Greece, the fact that a contracting state was bound by legal obligations under the Reception 
Directive was recognised by the ECtHR as a decisive factor for the establishment of a level of 
protection of human dignity of an asylum seeker against degrading treatment during 
detention151 (and because of living conditions152). 
 
(4) In addition, from the standpoint of the ECtHR, no deprivation of liberty, even if it is 
regulated in secondary EU law, is lawful unless it falls within one of the grounds contained in 
sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5(1) of the ECHR.153 Regarding of irregular migrants, the 
second limb of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR may be relevant, since detention in cases of 
irregular migrants should be decided “with a view to deportation or extradition.” In cases of 
detention of asylum seekers, the first limb of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, which relates to 
“prevention of unauthorised enter”, could also be relevant.154  
 
(5) If, however, a Contracting State is bound by a secondary EU law on reception of asylum 
seekers, a third-country national, who has applied for asylum should not be regarded as 
staying illegally on the territory of that Contracting State.155An asylum applicant has the right 
to remain on the territory of such Member State for the purpose of the procedure according 
to the provisions of the existing Recast Procedures Directive.156 An asylum seeker should, 
therefore, not be detained for a reason of his or her deportation or extradition or to prevent 
unauthorised entry. Perhaps for that reason, in some cases the ECtHR has implicitly 
stipulated that Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR shall not be referred to in cases of detention of 
                                                 
150
For the application of these two conditions in a particular case, see the judgment in the case of Avotinš v 
Latvia (Grand Chamber) App no 17502/07 (ECtHR 23 May 2016), paras 106-127. 
151
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011), paras 231, 233. 
152
Ibid. paras 250, 263. 
153
A and Others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 163. 
154 
See, for example: Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 January 2008).  
155 
Recital 9 of the Return Directive 2008/115. 
156
 Article 9(1) of the Recast Procedures Directive 2013/32. 
Section 3. Interplay of EU Law, the ECHR and National Law in the Context of the Protection of 
Human Rights 
 
41 
 
asylum seekers.157 A relevant provision in these cases could be the second limb of Article 
5(1)(b) of the ECHR.158 
 
(6) The relationship between the ECHR and EU law is affected also by the case-law of the 
ECtHR when a national court, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law, refuses to refer to the CJEU a question raised before that court on the 
interpretation of EU law in the preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 of the TFEU). If that 
national court does not provide legitimate reasons for such refusal, the ECtHR may find a 
violation of article 6(1) of the ECHR. The standard for justifying a decision of non-referral for 
a preliminary ruling should be that allowing the ECtHR to establish the reasons of non-
referral and whether the question concerned was considered as irrelevant, sufficiently clear 
or had already been interpreted by the CJEU or whether it was simply ignored.159  
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3.3. The relationship between EU law and national (constitutional) law from the 
standpoint of EU law and case-law of the CJEU 
 
(1) The relationship between EU law and national law is governed by clearly established 
rules of EU law and principles or standards developed by the CJEU. Some of the most 
frequently used rules, principles and standards governing this relationship from the 
standpoint of EU law in general and in detention cases have been summarised in the 
following paragraphs; while a potentially more problematic relationship between EU law and 
constitutional law of Member States is discussed in paragraphs 20 to 25 and in subsection 
3.4. 
 
(2) As regards specific EU law, the Dublin III Regulation is directly applicable and is binding in 
its entirety.160 In the Simmenthal II case, the CJEU establishes that provisions of a regulation 
are “a direct source of rights and duties for all those affected thereby, whether Member 
States or individuals, who are parties to legal relationships under Community law.”161 This 
does not mean that a national measure introduced with the intention of giving effect to the 
Dublin III Regulation should be considered in breach of EU law. Generally, such a measure 
could be considered invalid only if it alters, obstructs or obscures the nature of an EU 
regulation.162 Member States are, however, required to transpose certain provisions of the 
Dublin III Regulation into their national legal systems. For example, they should define 
objective criteria for the risk of absconding163 and less coercive alternative measures to 
detention (such as regular reporting, a deposit of a financial guarantee or an obligation to 
stay at an assigned place).164  
(3) The Return Directive and the Recast Reception Directive are binding upon each Member 
State as to the result to be achieved, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of 
form and methods.165 However, some provisions contained in directives may also have direct 
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effect.166 
 
(4) In accordance with the principle of “indirect effect”167 of EU law, a national court called 
upon to interpret applicable national law, regardless of whether the provisions in question 
were adopted before or after the directive, is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light 
of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the 
latter;168 this includes provisions of EU framework decisions.169 However, the principle of 
indirect effect applies only insofar as the wording of national law makes it possible to do so. 
The national court is not required to act contra legem. In addition, the principle of indirect 
effect is limited by general principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-
retroactivity.170 
 
(5) Member States may not seek to impose on an individual a provision of its own law which 
is incompatible with a directive that the State has, through its own fault, omitted to 
implement.171 
 
(6) A particular provision of EU law (Treaty provisions, secondary law, including directives in 
case of failure to transpose within the time specified, provisions of international agreements 
and decisions) may have “direct effect” by conferring rights that may be invoked by 
individuals before the national courts and initially seek the protection of those rights by 
judges in EU Member States. If a provision has direct effect, the national judge does not wait 
for the Commission to bring an infringement action against the State. Such a judge is bound 
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to provide immediate and direct protection for the rights of individuals.172  
 
(7) The “direct effect” test provides that the provision at issue is “unconditional and 
sufficiently precise”.173  For example, the CJEU in the El Dridi and Mahdi cases decided that 
Article 15 of the Return Directive regulating detention is unconditional and sufficiently 
precise, so that no other specific elements are required for it to be implemented by the 
Member State.174 
 
(8) In the Marks & Spencer case, the CJEU states that implementation of a directive must be 
such as to ensure its application in full. Consequently, the adoption of national measures 
correctly implementing a directive does not exhaust the effects of the directive. Member 
States remain bound actually to ensure full application of the directive even after the 
adoption of those measures. Individuals are therefore entitled to rely before national courts, 
against the State, on the provisions of a directive which appear, so far as their subject-matter 
is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise whenever the full application of 
the directive is not in fact secured. That is to say, not only where the directive has not been 
implemented or has been implemented incorrectly, but also where the national measures 
correctly implementing the directive are not being applied in such a way as to achieve the 
result sought by it.175 
 
(9) National rules on the application of EU law on the national court's own motion vary 
greatly across Member States. The CJEU has not yet made any exhaustive statements on this 
issue. However, it has identified some particular instances, two of which are particularly 
worth mentioning here. In the first instance, by virtue of the domestic law, courts must raise 
of their own motion such points of law, which have not been raised by the parties; such an 
obligation also exists where binding EU rules are concerned.176  In the second instance, no 
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national rule, even one laid down by national constitution,177 can preclude a national court 
from deciding at its discretion and of its own motion to refer a case for a preliminary 
ruling.178 For example, in a case concerning EU law, a national court which considers that a 
provision of national law is not only contrary to EU law but also is unconstitutional, does not 
lose the right or escape the obligation under Article 267 TFEU to refer questions to the CJEU 
on the interpretation or validity of EU law by reason of the fact that the declaration of a 
national legal rule as unconstitutional is subject to mandatory reference to the constitutional 
court.179 
 
(10) In regards to sufficient remedies to ensure effective legal protection, it is a matter of 
national law to establish courts with jurisdiction to provide remedies and to lay down 
procedural rules and time limits for the pursuit of claims arising from EU law (the principle of 
“procedural autonomy”).180 This principle comprises of two requirements: national 
procedural rules should not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions 
(“principle of equivalence”) and they should not render virtually impossible or excessively 
difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness).181  It is for the 
national judge, to decide by applying the carefully balanced test whether the particular 
national rules are within the permitted scope of national procedural autonomy or whether 
they infringe EU law.182  
 
(11) However, the principle of procedural autonomy may not in all cases be sufficiently 
effective to serve the purpose of protection of rights derived by individuals from EU law183 
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and, therefore, needs to be supplemented with the principle of effective judicial protection. 
For example, in the Factortame case the CJEU stated that “judicial practice which might 
impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having 
jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its 
application to set side national legislative provisions which might prevent, even temporarily, 
Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements, 
which are the very essence of Community law.”184 
 
(12) Under the principle of “effective judicial protection”, the national judge is required to 
exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon him by national law to the greatest extent possible 
so as to enable the court to give effective protection to rights conferred by EU law. If the 
deficiency in national remedies consists in the absence of any court capable of exercising the 
jurisdiction required by Union law, it would fall to the Commission by means of an 
infringement action to require the Member State to remedy that matter.185 
 
(13) Under the (next) principle of “state liability”, individuals who have suffered loss or 
damage as a result of the breach of EU law by a Member State, should be entitled to recover 
compensationfrom that State,186 since respect of the principle of direct effect is “only a 
minimum guarantee and is not sufficient in itself to ensure the full and complete 
implementation of the Treaty.”187 In the case of loss or damage caused by the failure to 
implement a directive by a Member State, the conditions for State liability are that the result 
prescribed by the directive should entail the grant of rights to individuals; and that it should 
be possible to identify the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the 
directive; and finally, there should be a causal link between the breach of the State's 
obligation and the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties.188 In cases, in which the 
complaint relates to a national legislative act passed within an area, where Member States 
enjoy broad legislative discretion, the CJEU has devised a principle which obliges national 
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courts to establish whether the breach of Union law is “sufficiently serious”, meaning that a 
Member States has “manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion.”189 If 
particular conditions are met, a Member State could be liable also for the effects of judicial 
decisions of courts of last instance.190  
 
(14) The CJEU is especially vigilant in protecting a system of judicial dialogue between 
national courts and the CJEU under Article 267 of the TFEU. Thus, the preliminary ruling 
mechanism is the “cornerstone of EU law.”191 For preliminary reference procedure in 
detention cases, the introduction of an urgent procedure into the rules of the CJEU in March 
2008 was very important.192  It contains an additional requirement: if a preliminary ruling 
question is referred to in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State with 
regard to a person in custody, the CJEU shall act with the minimum of delay (Article 267(4) of 
the TFEU). 
 
(15) Every court or tribunal in a Member State has the unfettered right to make a 
reference193  concerning the interpretation of the Treaties (Article 267(1)(a) of the TFEU) or 
the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union (Article 267(1)(b) of the TFEU). If a national court considers that the grounds put 
forward by the party in support of invalidity are unfounded, a court may reject them, 
concluding that the measure is completely valid.194 But no national court has jurisdiction to 
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declare measures taken by EU institutions invalid.195 
 
(16) Lower courts have discretion and may, if they consider that a decision on the question is 
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the CJEU to give a ruling thereon (Article 
267(2) of the TFEU), while the court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law, has no such discretion and thus has an obligation to bring the matter 
before the CJEU (Article 267(2) of the TFEU). 
 
(17) Discretion of lower courts regarding initiation of the procedure under Article 267 of the 
TFEU extends to the relationships between lower and higher courts under national law of a 
Member State. Thus, for example, if under a national law a lower court is bound by a 
superior court’s interpretation of EU law, such national rule or standard cannot of itself 
deprive the lower court of the possibility of making a reference to the CJEU, even when the 
superior court had denied that a reference was necessary.196  
 
(18) The courts of last instance are not obliged to request the CJEU to give preliminary ruling 
only if the matter is “acte clair”, which means that correct application of EU law may be so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the 
question raised should be resolved and that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of 
the other Member States and to the CJEU.197 Following a reference in a particular case, it is 
the duty of the national court to apply EU law as so interpreted, and to decide the main 
case.198  
 
(19) In both phases of the preliminary reference procedure – before and after receiving the 
preliminary ruling of the CJEU – national courts have to use methods of interpretation of EU 
law, which may differ from the well-established methods of national administrative law and 
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international law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to the 
case-law of the CJEU the literal interpretation is not decisive. It is necessary to consider the 
spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the relevant EU provisions. Every provision of 
EU law must be placed in its context and interpreted in light of the provisions in a particular 
field as a whole, with regard to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the 
date on which the provision is to be applied.199 
 
(20) It would be impossible for EU law and national law to have equal force simultaneously, 
without some rule for the resolution of potential conflicts. Moreover, it would be pointless 
for EU law to have full force and effect in a Member State, if an inconsistent rule or 
subsequently enacted national law could override a provision of EU law.200 Hence, the CJEU 
in the Simmenthal case II decided that “the principle of precedence of Community law, the 
relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the 
institutions on the one hand and the national law of the Member States on the other is such 
that those provisions and measures not only by their entry into force render automatically 
inapplicable any conflicting provisions of current national law but – in so far as they are 
integral part of, and take precedence in the legal order applicable in the territory of each of 
the Member States – also preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative measures 
to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community provisions.201 /.../ Every 
national court must apply /.../ Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the 
latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law 
which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.”202  
                                                 
199
C-238/81 CILFIT EU:C:1982:335, para 16-20. For other aspects of the methods of interpretation of EU law, 
see, for example: C-8/55 Charbonnière de Belgique EU:C:1956:7; C-70/88 Chernobyl EU:C:1990:217; 2/74, 
Reyners v Belgium EU:C:1974:68; 6/72 Continental Can EU:C:1975:50; C-43/75 Defrenne EU:C:1976:56; C-
495/03 Intermodal Transports  EU:C:2005:552, paras 39, 45; C-257/00 Givane EU:C:2003:8, para 37; C-
292/89 The Queen EU:C:1991:80; C-378/97 Wijsenbeek EU:C:1999:439; C-1/99 Kofisa Italia EU:C:2001:10. 
For more details on how to formulate questions for preliminary rulings in disputes concerning asylum 
seekers, see:  Preliminary References to the CJEU: A Note for National Judges Handling Asylum-Related 
Cases, International Association of Refugee Law Judges, available on the website of the IARLJ. 
200
Fennelly, Nial, “The National Judge as Judge of the European Union” in: Rosas, A., Levits, E., Bot,, Y, (eds.), 
“The Court of Justice and the Constitution of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-Law” 
Asser Press, Springer (2012), p. 66; Case 6/64 Costa Enel EU:C:1964:66. 
201
C-106/77 Simmenthal II EU:C:1978:49, para 17. 
202
Ibid. para 21.  
Section 3. Interplay of EU Law, the ECHR and National Law in the Context of the Protection of 
Human Rights 
 
50 
 
(21) This principle (“primacy of EU law”) is valid from the standpoint of the CJEU not just for 
the lower courts, but for all the courts in a Member State.203 This does not mean that the 
national judge is required to annul conflicting national law, because in such case national law 
may continue to be applied, but only for the matters outside the scope of EU law.204 
 
(22) In the Nold case (May 1974), the CJEU stated that in safeguarding the rights, the CJEU is 
“bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights 
recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those States.”205 However, this standard of 
“drawing inspiration” does not change the early position of the CJEU from 1970, where the 
CJEU stated that the “validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State 
cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as 
formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional 
structure.”206 
 
(23) After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, a value of constitutional identity of a 
Member State has received particular meaning in primary EU law. Article 4(2) of the TEU 
states that the Union shall respect national identities of the Member States, which are 
inherent in their fundamental structures, both political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government. Article 52(6) of the Charter states that “full account shall 
be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter.” In addition, Article 53 of 
the Charter states that “nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of 
application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which 
the Union or all the Member States are party, including the ECHR, and by the Member States' 
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constitutions.” 
 
(24) The practical significance of the interplay between constitutional standards of a 
Member State and EU law can be exemplified by two cases: Melloni and Jeremy F. The 
Melloni case referred to the European Arrest Warrant (the EAW). The EAW is secondary EU 
law, which to some extent is comparable to the Dublin III Regulation. Both secondary EU 
laws are based on the concept of “mutual trust” between Member States.207 The contested 
issue in the Melloni judgment is an example where actions of Member States are entirely 
determined by EU law.  Since in the Melloni case the relevant actions of Member States 
were entirely determined in the EAW, the CJEU did not allow the Spanish Constitutional 
Court to incorporate (higher) constitutional principles on due process. However, in the latter 
Jeremy F case, where another question concerning fair trial in relation to EAW was referred 
to the CJEU by the French Conseil Constitutionnel, the CJEU decided that the Framework 
Decision does not prevent a Member State from applying its constitutional rules in respect 
of suspensive effect of appeal.208 In general, situations in which Member States enjoy 
autonomy in procedural law may be frequent, but can also concern material law in the field 
of fundamental rights.209  
 
(25) In the Gauweiler case (2015), where a preliminary question affected the relationship 
between EU law and German constitutional law, the CJEU reiterated its previous case-law in 
Elchimov210 and Fazenda Publica.211 It established that a judgment in which the CJEU gives a 
preliminary ruling is binding on the national court in regards to the interpretation or the 
validity of the acts of the EU institutions in question, for the purposes of the decision to be 
given in the main proceedings.212 
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3.4. The relationship between national constitutional law and EU law from the 
standpoint of case-law of national (constitutional) courts 
 
(1) While national constitutional courts typically accept supremacy of EU law over statutory 
(ordinary) legal provisions, many of them reject the unconditional or absolute supremacy of 
valid EU law over “(the core of) national constitutional law.”213  
 
(2) For example, in the Frontini judgment of 1973, the Italian Constitutional Court adopted a 
doctrine establishing that EU law may derogate from ordinary constitutional law rules, but 
not from certain fundamental principles or inalienable rights of persons.214 In Solange I and 
Solange II judgments of 1974 and 1986, the German Constitutional Court made an explicit 
reference to the doctrine of its Italian counterpart when developing a principle, according to 
which the Constitutional Court will refrain from scrutinising individual EU acts for their 
respect of fundamental rights (this being a matter left to CJEU), but that it could scrutinise 
the conformity of a general fundamental rights protection regime in the EU with the German 
constitutional standards.215 This type of Solange principle with regard to the relationship 
between constitutional law of Member States and EU law can be related also to other 
national constitutional case-law, for example, in Poland,216 the Czech Republic217 and 
Lithuania.218  
 
(3) There is, therefore, an existing trend among constitutional courts to use the narrative of 
constitutional reservations against EU law in exceptional cases. Initially, these national 
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jurisprudence developments were focusing on fundamental rights protection, but after the 
ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the focus moved to ultra vires control. Apart from 
the aforementioned national courts, and some other Member States’ courts,219 
commentators refer to the further three distinct groups of Member States. The courts in 
such Member States as Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta, Slovenia and Romania have not developed a 
clear view on ultra vires and constitutional identity review. In another group of States – 
Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands – supremacy of EU law is almost 
uncontested, and the courts do not claim their right to the review of EU law and its 
applicability. In another group of Member States, certain elements of ultra vires review or 
some sort of constitutional identity (review) are present due to specific unamendable 
constitutional provisions (Greece, Portugal), or due to supremacy of the national 
constitution over EU law (Lithuania, Slovakia).220  
 
(4) National courts have accepted EU law supremacy over national law in those areas where 
the Member States have conferred competence upon the EU and admitted the ultimate 
judicial authority of the CJEU on matters of EU law within these fields. The remaining issue, 
however, concerns the cases which question the scope of EU competences and conflict 
between EU law and national constitutional law.221 
 
(5) The only constitutional court that has gone so far as to declare EU law ultra vires was the 
Czech Constitutional Court in the context of the Czechoslovak social security treaty. The 
commentators argue, however, that this decision is a result of a domestic conflict between 
the Supreme Administrative Court supported by the Government during the preliminary 
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ruling proceedings before the CJEU and the Czech Constitutional Court, rather than a conflict 
between fundamental rights contained in the national constitution and EU law.222 
 
(6) In the more recent Gauweiler case, where for the first time the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany (FCC) referred a preliminary question to the CJEU, the FCC adopted a 
similar position on ultra vires and constitutional identity review suggesting that there is 
something like a more or less common European approach to the issue.223 Thus, the FCC has 
explicitly situated itself in an alleged group of constitutional and highest national courts of 
such Member States as Denmark, Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, 
Spain and Czech Republic. In the Gauweiler case, the FCC considered it likely that the 
European Central Bank’s act was ultra vires and encroached on the Member States’ 
competence in the area of economic policy. The FCC proposed an interpretation, which 
could save the act from invalidity, and asked the CJEU to support the FCC’s interpretation. 
The FCC stipulated that, should the CJEU not follow the proposed approach, the act could 
still be considered ultra vires and would, therefore, have to be considered inapplicable under 
German constitutional law.224  
 
(7) The Melloni and Jeremy F cases, discussed in section 3.3., reveal that examples of conflict 
between EU law and national constitutional law can occur not only in the field of economic 
policy and pensions rights, but also in the field of fair trial in the criminal or extradition 
procedure.  
 
(8) Despite the fact that in the Melloni judgment the CJEU has strongly put forward an 
argument of mutual trust and effectiveness of EU law, in its decision of 15 December 2015, 
which also relates to the European Arrest Warrant, the FCC established that in individual 
cases, protection of fundamental rights by the FCC may include review of sovereign acts 
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determined by Union law, if this is indispensable to protect the constitutional identity 
guaranteed by Art. 79 sec. 3 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The FCC argued that the 
principle of individual guilt is rooted in the guarantee of human dignity enshrined in Article 1 
sec. 1 of the Basic Law and which is not open to European integration. Therefore, it also has 
to be guaranteed in the context of extraditions pursuant to the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant if they are meant to ensure the execution of sentences that have 
been rendered in the absence of the requested person. The FCC also stated that declaring a 
violation of the constitutional identity is reserved for the FCC. However, in this case the FCC 
did not decide that due process standards under Union law with regard to the execution of a 
European Arrest Warrant are lower than those that are required by Article 1 sec. 1 of the 
Basic Law. Instead, the FCC decided that the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court failed to 
recognise the extent of its obligation to investigate and to establish the facts and thereby 
failed to recognise the significance and the scope of Article 1 sec. 1 of the Basic Law. The FCC 
reversed and remanded an order of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court to extradite a US 
citizen to Italy, where he had been sentenced in absence to a custodial sentence of thirty 
years. The FCC invoked a doctrine of acte clair and stated that there is no conflict between 
Union law and the protection of human dignity under Basic Law in the case at hand. 225  
 
(9) It is reasonable to expect a continuation of a dynamic development of this kind of judicial 
dialogue between national constitutional courts and the CJEU. It remains to be observed 
whether or to what extent this dynamic will affect also the protection of the fundamental 
right to “human dignity” of asylum seekers226 and irregular migrants in administrative 
detention cases, especially since the decisions on transfer, which may affect the issue of 
detention under Dublin III Regulation, are also based on a principle of “mutual trust” 
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between the Member States.227 
 
3.5. The relationship between ECHR and national law 
 
(1) It is not relevant for the purposes of this Statement whether the relationship between 
national law and international obligations under the ECHR is defined by the so-called 
“monism” or “dualism” or perhaps a combination of both legal models in the systems of 
particular Member States. Many examples of the ECtHR judgments against different 
Member States confirm the existence of a relationship between the ECHR and national law 
(implementing EU law) in the context of detention of asylum seekers or illegally staying third 
country nationals. This relevance has been proven not only in cases, in which the ECtHR had 
found a violation of Articles 5, 3 or 13 of the ECHR while taking into account, among other 
things, the legal situation under EU law,228 but also in those cases, in which EU law was not 
mentioned by the ECtHR at all, although it could be.229  
 
(2) The most general principle which determines the relationship between the ECHR and 
national law of the Member States is the principle of subsidiarity. This principle forms part of 
Article 1 of the ECHR.230 This principle implies that “the machinery of protection established 
by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights /.../. The 
Convention leaves to each Contracting State, in the first place, the task of securing the rights 
and liberties it enshrines. The institutions created by it make their own contribution to this 
task but they become involved only through contentious proceedings and once all domestic 
remedies have been exhausted (Article 26).”231  
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(3) The function of the ECHR and the ECtHR is to provide a European minimum standard for 
the protection of human rights.232 In this context, and along with the principle of 
subsidiarity, the so called doctrine of (wide) “margin of appreciation” plays an important role 
too. Nevertheless, in his concurring opinion in the M.S.S. judgment, Judge Villinger has 
provided that it would be a wrong place to apply the principle of subsidiarity in a case such 
as M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece. He explains that “tribute has already been paid to 
subsidiarity in this case by testing the complaint expressly or implicitly with various 
admissibility conditions and in particular with that of the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
(which is in itself an application of the principle of subsidiarity par excellence). Subsidiarity 
plays an important part, for instance, in applying the second paragraphs of Articles 8-11 of 
the Convention. Its role must surely be more restricted in the light of a cardinal provision 
such as Article 3 in view of the central importance of the applicant's refoulement for this 
case.”  
 
(4) Thus, for example, in the case of Khlaifia v Italy concerning conditions for detention and 
an absolute right contained in Article 3 of the ECHR, the issue of the European countries 
experiencing “exceptional situation characterised by mass arrivals of migrants”233 and, as a 
result, struggles to accommodate and process migrants was raised. The question, therefore, 
arises as to how the ECtHR will assess their efforts, bearing in mind the absolute nature of 
the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR in 
detention cases. The Khlaifia case has been referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. 
 
(5) With regard to due process standards on detention, the principle of subsidiarity and the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation have limited scope, too, particularly in the sense that: 
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 Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5(1) of the ECHR contain an exhaustive list of 
permissible grounds for detention and, therefore, no deprivation of liberty is lawful 
unless it falls within one of those grounds.234 
 Detention must conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law,235 but 
a person must be entitled to review the lawfulness of his/her detention not only based 
on requirements of domestic law but also of the ECHR.236 However, Articles 5 § 4 of 
the ECHR do not impose an obligation on a judge examining an appeal against 
detention to address every argument contained in the appellant's submissions; nor 
does it guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to empower the national 
court, on all aspects of the case including questions of pure expediency, to substitute 
its own discretion for that of the decision-making authority.  However, the ECtHR has 
held that its guarantees would be deprived of their substance if the judge could treat 
as irrelevant, or disregard, particular facts invoked by the detainee which could cast 
doubt on the existence of the conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in 
the sense of the ECHR, of the deprivation of liberty.237  
 The previously mentioned standard from Article 5(4) of the ECHR is somehow “lex 
specialis” to the relationship between ECHR and national law in non-detention cases, 
because in non-detention cases, the position of the ECtHR is that “in accordance with 
Article 19 of the ECHR, its sole duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the ECHR. In particular, it is not its function to 
deal with errors of facts or law allegedly made by a national court in assessing the 
evidence before it, unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms 
protected by the ECHR. The ECtHR cannot itself assess facts which have led a national 
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court to adopt one decision rather than another; otherwise, it would be acting as a 
court of fourth instance and would disregard the limits imposed on its action.”238 
 National law on detention must satisfy the principle of legal certainty, so that the law 
must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable.239 However, quality of law 
only becomes relevant if it is shown that any failing in this regard has tangibly 
prejudiced applicant's substantive rights from the ECtHR.240 This includes the 
requirement of clear legal provisions for ordering detention, for extending detention 
and for setting time limits for detention and the existence of a legal remedy. 
 
With regard to the legal impact of the final judgments of the ECtHR on national law, the 
ECtHR in the case of L.M. And Others v Russia, which relates also to the issue of detention of 
asylum seekers, reiterates that, by Article 46 of the ECHR, the Contracting Parties have 
undertaken to abide by the final judgments of the ECtHR in any case to which they are 
parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that 
a judgment in which the ECtHR finds a breach of the ECHR imposes on the respondent State 
a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just 
satisfaction, but also to choose the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be 
adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the ECtHR and 
to redress as far as possible the effects. It is primarily for the State concerned to choose the 
means to be used in its domestic legal order to discharge its obligation under Article 46 of 
the ECHR. However, with a view to helping the respondent State to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 46, the ECtHR may seek to indicate the type of individual and/or general measures 
that might be taken in order to put an end to the situation it has found to exist. In certain 
situations, the ECtHR can exceptionally indicate the specific remedy or other measure to be 
taken by the respondent State. Whenever the ECtHR takes this adjudicative approach, it 
does so with due respect for the Convention organs’ respective functions: it falls to the 
Committee of Ministers to evaluate the implementation of individual and general measures 
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under Article 46(2) of the ECHR.241 
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Section 4. Detention under the Dublin III Regulation and the ECHR: Basic Judicial 
Check-list 1 
 
Standard 1. Direct applicability of Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation 
 
The Dublin III Regulation242 is generally applicable. It is binding in its entirety and it is directly 
applicable in the Member States.243 This does not mean that any national measure enacted 
with the intention of transposing or giving effect to the provisions on detention under the 
Dublin III Regulation into national legislation is invalid.244 Only the methods of 
implementation of the Dublin III Regulation which “would have the result of creating an 
obstacle to the direct effect of the Regulation and of jeopardizing its simultaneous and 
uniform application in the whole of the EU “/.../ can be considered contrary to the TFEU.245 
The CJEU further adds that “it cannot be accepted that a Member State applies in an 
incomplete or selective manner provisions of a Community Regulation so as to render 
abortive certain aspects of Community legislation“ /.../.246  
 
Furthermore, in detention cases under the Dublin III Regulation and within the limits of 
recitals 12 and 20 and Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation, Reception Directive 
2013/33/EU and the Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU are relevant, too. 
 
Recital 32 of the Dublin III Regulation states that: “With respect to the treatment of persons 
falling within the scope of this Regulation, Member States are bound by their obligations 
under instruments of international law, including the relevant case-law of the European 
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Court of Human Rights.”247 Due to Article 78 of the TFEU and recital 20 of the Dublin III 
Regulation the first relevant “instrument of international law” that needs to be mentioned is 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which in Article 31(2) regulates 
restrictions in movements of refugees.248 
 
Recital 39 of the Dublin III Regulation among other things states that “this regulation 
respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles which are acknowledged, in 
particular, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU”.249 In this sense, Article 6 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights,250 which corresponds to Article 5 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the ECHR),251 needs to 
be mentioned and Article 45(2) of the Charter”,252 which may be considered in the light of 
Article 2(1) of Protocol 4 to the ECHR. 
 
Standard 2. Definition of detention  
 
Article 31(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees uses the expression 
“restrictions on movements of refugees”. Unlike Recast Reception Directive (2013/33/EU),253 
the Dublin III Regulation does not use the specific terminology “deprivation of freedom of 
movement” or “deprivation of liberty”. The CJEU in the case of Al Chodor and Others stated 
that Articles 2(n) and 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation provide for limitation on the exercise 
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of the “fundamental right to liberty” enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter and that for the 
purpose of interpreting Article 6 of the Charter, account must be taken of Article 5 of the 
ECHR as the “minimum threshold of protection.”254 The CJEU further adds that detention of 
applicants constitutes a “serious interference” with applicant's right to liberty.255  
 
Despite this general position of the CJEU it is worth noting that under the ECHR, a distinction 
between the right to liberty of movement under Article 2(1) of Protocol 4 to the ECHR and 
the right to liberty and security of person under Article 5 of the ECHR, leading to application 
of different procedural safeguards under the ECHR,  can be explained by the test established 
by the ECtHR, which says that “to determine whether someone has been deprived of his 
liberty /.../ the starting-point must be his concrete situation, and account must be taken of a 
whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of 
the measure in question. The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty 
is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance /.../. The mere fact 
that it is possible for asylum seekers to leave voluntarily the country where they wish to take 
refuge cannot exclude a restriction on liberty /.../.”256 
 
The notion of deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the ECHR comprises 
not only the objective element of a person’s confinement in a particular restricted space for 
a non-negligible length of time, but also, as an additional subjective element, the question of 
whether he has validly consented to the confinement in question.257 However, the ECtHR 
also decided that the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to 
lose the benefit of Convention protection for the single reason that he/she may have given 
himself/herself up to be taken into detention, especially when that person is legally 
                                                 
254
C-528/15 Al Chodor and Others [2017] EU:C:2017:213, paras 36-37. 
255
Ibid. para 40. 
256
Amuur v France App no 19776/92 (ECtHR, 25 June 1996)  paras 42, 48. See also: Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia 
(2010) App no 25965/04 (ECtHR, 7 January 2010) para 314, Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App no 
367/60/06 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012) para 115, Medvedyev and Others v France (Grand Chamber) App no 
3394/03 (ECtHR 29 March 2010) para 73, Creangă v Romania (Grand Chamber) App no 29226/03 (ECtHR 23 
Feb 2012) para 91; Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App No 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 
2016) para 64. 
257
Storck v Germany App no 61603/00 (ECtHR 16 June 2005) para 74; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App 
No 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012) para 117. 
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incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action.258 Thus, “[d]etention 
may violate Article 5 of the ECHR even though the person concerned has agreed to it.”259 
Where the facts indicate a deprivation of liberty within Article 5(1) of the ECHR, a relatively 
short duration of the detention does not affect this conclusion.260 For concrete examples of 
deprivation of liberty or restriction of freedom of movement in the case-law of the ECtHR 
and the CJEU, see the Explanatory note. 
 
Standard 3. Special reception needs of vulnerable persons 
 
“As regards the general guarantees governing detention /.../, Member States should apply 
the provisions of the Reception Directive 2013/33/EU also to persons detained on the basis of 
this Regulation.”261 In order to effectively implement the “general principle” from Article 21 
of the Recast Reception Directive 2013/33/EU on taking into account the special situation of 
vulnerable persons, Member States shall assess whether the applicant is someone with 
special reception needs.262 That assessment shall be initiated “within a reasonable period of 
time” after an application for international protection is made and may be integrated into 
existing national procedures, but does not need to take the form of an administrative 
procedure.263 However, “reasonable period of time” could mean as soon as possible and 
without delay if age assessment is at stake and asylum seeker is detained.264 Member States 
shall provide for appropriate monitoring of the situation of persons with special needs 
                                                 
258
H.L v United Kingdom, App no 45508/99 (ECtHR 5 October 2004), para 90; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand 
Chamber) App No 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012) para 119. 
259
Kasparov v Russia App no 53659/07 (ECtHR 11 October 2016) para 36. 
260
Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App No 25965/04 (ECtHR, 7 January 2010) para 317; Iskandarov v Rusia App no 
17185/05 (23 September 2010) para 140; European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right to 
Liberty and Security (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014)  5-6 (points 7, 9, 12).  Since 
measures of the Member States on detention under the Dublin III Regulation in most cases interfere with 
the right to personal liberty, this check-list further refers to standards and rules in relation to Article 5 of 
the ECHR and Article 6 of the Charter. 
261
Recital 20 of the Dublin III Regulation. 
262
For more on this principle, see various standards under point 34 of this check-list. According to Article 2(k) 
of the Recast Reception Directive applicant with special needs means a vulnerable person, in accordance 
with Article 21, who is in need of special guarantees in order to benefit from the rights and comply with the 
obligations provided for in this Directive. 
263
Article 22(1) and (2) of the Recast Reception Directive 2013/33/EU. 
264
See, for example, Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), paras 148-150; 
Aarabi v Grèce App no 39766/09 (ECtHR 2 April 2015), paras 43-45. 
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throughout the duration of the asylum procedure.265 Member States shall ensure that those 
special reception needs are also addressed, if they become apparent at a later stage in the 
asylum procedure.266 
 
Standard 4. Persons who can be subject to detention 
 
There are two categories of persons who can be detained under the Dublin III Regulation: an 
asylum seeker (“an applicant”) or “another person” (who is a third country national or a 
stateless person who has withdrawn the application under examination, or whose 
application has been rejected and he/she made an application in another Member State, or 
who is on the territory of another Member State without a residence document).267 Based 
on the judgment of the CJEU in the MA, BT, DA case, an unaccompanied minor, having no 
member of his family present in the territory of a Member State268 and whose identical 
application has not been rejected by a final decision in another Member State,269 cannot be 
detained under the Dublin III Regulation, because he/she, as a rule, should not be 
transferred to another Member State.270  Furthermore, if the Member State, following 
interpretation of the CJEU in the case of K, has an obligation to apply a humanitarian clause 
for the purpose of family reunification, the applicant cannot be detained in order to secure 
transfer procedures.271 Similarly, the applicant could be successful also in an action 
challenging a transfer decision made in respect of him/her, where he/she can invoke an 
infringement not just of the rules set out in Article 19(2) of Dublin III Regulation272, but also 
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The third sub-paragraph of Article 22(1) of the Recast Reception Directive 2013/33/EU. 
266
The second sub-paragraph of Article 22(1) of the Reception Directive 2013/33/EU. As regards the 
importance of early and proper examination of whether a child is accompanied or unaccompanied, see 
Rahimi v Greece, App no 8687/08 (ECtHR 2 April 2015), paras 63-73. In regards to an appointment of child's 
representative, see also standard 12 on best interests of a child. For the example of excessive delays in the 
procedure for vulnerability assessment, see: Abdi Mahamud, v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016) 
paras 132-135. 
267
Article 27(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.  
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C-648/11 MA, BT and DA v Secretary of State of the Home Department EU:C:2013:367, para 62. 
269
Ibid. paras 63-64. 
270
Ibid.para 55; See also standard no 12 on the principle of the best interests of the child. For the possible 
interplay between the detention procedures under the Return Directive and the Dublin III Regulation, see 
the first paragraph in the Explanatory note of this standard. 
271
See in particular paragraphs 40, 38 and 41 of the judgment in C-245/11 K v Bundesasylamt (Grand Chamber) 
EU:C:2012:685, para 40. 
272
C-155/15 George Karim v Migrationsverket (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2016:410, para 21. 
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of the other criteria for determining the Member State responsible laid down in Chapter III 
of the Dublin III Regulation.273 The procedures under the Dublin III Regulation have to be 
carried out in compliance with a series of specified time limits.  For example, 
“notwithstanding the deadline” from Article 21(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, which 
provides that the take charge request must be made as quickly as possible and in any event 
(“absolutely”) within the three months of the date on which the application for international 
protection was lodged; in the case of a Eurodac hit with data registered under Article 14 of 
the Eurodac Regulation, that request must be made within two months of receipt of that hit.  
If those deadlines are passed, the responsibility for examining the application for 
international protection is on the Member State in which the application was lodged. 
Therefore, a decision to transfer to a Member State other than the one with which the 
application was lodged cannot validly be adopted once the period laid down in those 
provisions have expired even if the requested Member State would be willing to take charge 
of the person concerned.  Consequently such a person cannot be detained based on Dublin 
III Regulation. In the same way, the CJEU interpreted also the meaning of deadlines from 
Article 13(1) and 29(2) of the Dublin III Regulation.274 
 
Standard 5. Authorities who can order a detention 
 
Detention of applicants shall be ordered by judicial or administrative authorities.275 
 
Standard 6. Permissible grounds for detention – significant risk of absconding linked 
to the purpose of securing transfer procedures 
 
The “significant risk of absconding”276 constitutes a permissible ground for detention, but 
only for the legitimate purpose “to secure transfer procedures” in accordance with the 
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C-63/15 Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie EU:C:2016:186, paras 44, 51, 54. 
For more on the importance of the judgment of the Grand Chamber in the case of Ghazelbash, see the 
Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
274 
C-490/16 A.S. v Republika Slovenija (Grand Chamber) ECLI:EU:C:2017:585, paras. 45-60. Concerning the 
legal interpretation of „irregular crossing of an external border“ from Article 13(1) of the Dublin III 
Regulation, which may be relevant for detention of asylum seeker, see also judgment of the CJEU in the 
case of C-646/16 Jafari (Grand Cahmber) ECLI:EU:C:2017:586. 
275
Article 9(2) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
276
Articles 28(2) and 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation.  
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Dublin III Regulation. Where – for different reasons according to the Dublin III Regulation –  
the obligation of a requested Member State does not exist or ceases to exist so that the 
transfer cannot take place,277 a permissible ground for detention under the Dublin III 
Regulation also ceases to exist.278 Article 28(1) of the Dublin III regulation explicitly states 
that Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is 
subject to the procedure established by this Regulation. This may also be considered as a 
reflection of the right to non-discrimination from Article 21 of the Charter which prohibits 
any discrimination based on any ground such as sex race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief, birth, political or any other opinion, 
membership of national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation; within 
the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific 
provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited, too. Article 5(1) 
sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of the ECHR contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds of 
deprivation of liberty. Thus, no deprivation of liberty is lawful unless it falls within one of 
those grounds.279 Only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the 
aim of that provision which enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of 
the individual against arbitrary interference by the state with his or her right to liberty.280 The 
risk of absconding in the context of securing transfer procedures under Dublin III Regulation 
could be linked either to Article 5(1)(f)281 or to Article 5(1)(b)282 of the ECHR.283  
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See, for example: the second sub-paragraph of Article 13(2) or Article 19(2) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
278See also standard no 3 on who can be subject to detention. 
279
Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 Jan 2008), para 43; A and Others v 
United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 163. See also standard 
no 18 of this Check-list. 
280
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016) para 88. 
281
The lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or 
of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.  
282
The lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to 
secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law. 
283
See the Explanatory notes to this Check-list on significant risk of absconding and on the question who can be 
subject to detention (standard no 4). Factors which under case-law of the ECtHR might speak against the 
risk of absconding in relation to Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR are state of health, stable place of residence, no 
attempt to escape, strong family ties, no previous criminal record of the applicant (Segeda v Russia App no 
41545/06 (ECtHR 19 December 2013) para 65. 
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Standard 7. Objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding 
 
Based on Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, Member States have a legal obligation to 
define objective criteria for a risk of absconding in “national law”. In the light of standard no. 
9 of this check-list and based on case-law of the CJEU from other sorts of disputes, 
guidelines or circulars cannot be considered as adequate instruments for implementing 
Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation. The provisions of Directives “must be implemented 
with unquestionable binding force, and the specificity, precision and clarity necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of legal certainty; mere administrative practices, which by their 
nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, 
cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State's obligation 
under the Treaty.284 In the case of Al Chodor, the CJEU has confirmed that objective criteria 
for the risk of absconding have to be defined in a binding provision of general application, 
while settled case-law confirming a consistent administrative practice cannot suffice.285  
Standard 8. Proof and burden of proof concerning the risk of absconding  
 
According to Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, risk of absconding means the existence 
of legitimate reasons to “believe” that a person “may” abscond. A standard of proof, which is 
defined in Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, is set at the level of “significant” risk. The 
burden of proof is on the State. The nature of the assessment of the risk of absconding can 
be compared to the nature of the assessment of real risk that an asylum seeker would be 
tortured or ill-treated if returned or extradited to his/her country of origin. In both those 
cases, any such allegation always concerns an eventuality, “something which may or may not 
occur in the future. Consequently, such allegations cannot be proven in the same way as past 
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C-159/99 Commission v Italy [2001]  EU:C:2001:278 para 32; see also: C-315/98, Commission v Italy, para 10.  
285
C-528/15 Al Chodor and Others [2017] EU:C:2017:213 para 45; mutatis mutandis C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. v 
Staatsecretariat van Veiligheid en Justitie [2016] EU:C:2016:84 para 60. See also standard no 9 of this 
Check-list. For concrete examples of criteria for the risk of absconding that are defined in national law of 
the Member States along with the possible legal consequences if objective criteria are not defined in 
national law, see the Explanatory note. Factors which under case-law of the ECtHR might speak against the 
risk of absconding in relation to Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR are state of health, stable place of residence, no 
attempt to escape,  strong family ties, no previous criminal record of the applicant (Segeda v Russia (2013) 
App no 41545/06 (ECtHR 19 December 2013) para 65). 
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events.286  
 
Standard 9. Control of the quality of law on detention 
 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR requires that any deprivation of liberty must be “lawful”; it must 
conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law.287 The law must satisfy the 
principle of legal certainty. It must be “sufficiently accessible and precise, in order to avoid all 
risk of arbitrariness”288 It must also be foreseeable.289 This was reiterated by the Grand 
Chamber in the case of Khlaifia and others v Italy, in which the ECtHR stated “where 
deprivation of liberty is concerned it is particularly important that the general principle of 
legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of 
liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its 
application, so that it meets the standard of lawfulness set by the ECHR, a standard which 
requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate 
advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail”.290 The standards on the quality of law relate not only to 
clearly regulated grounds for detention, but also to time-limits for detention or for extending 
detention and for the existence of a legal remedy by which the lawfulness of detention may 
be challenged.291 
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Fozil Nazarov v Russia App no 74759/13 (ECtHR 20 April 2015), para 38. In his concurring opinion in the case 
of Saadi v Italy App no 37201/06 (ECtHR 28 February 2008) Judge Zupančič opined that “the cognitive 
approach to future events may be only a rational probabilistic assessment in the spectrum of experiment 
which moves from abstract probability to concrete probability. The correctness of that probabilistic 
assessment – one might use the word prognosis – critically depends on the nature of information (not 
evidence!) adduced in a particular situation.” 
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Amuur v France App no 19776/92 (ECtHR, 25 June 1996), para 50; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey App no 
30471/08 (ECtHR 22 September 2009).  
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290
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App No 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 92. 
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Standard 10. Right to information and a personal interview before detention order 
is issued 
 
The right to information and a personal interview are expressions of the general principles of 
EU law to be heard or to a defence during the administrative procedure and before the 
detention order is issued. As soon as a form for international protection is submitted by the 
applicant on the territory of a Member State, including at the border or in the transit 
zones292, or a report prepared by the authorities has reached the competent authorities, the 
latter shall inform the applicant about the application of the provisions of the Dublin III 
Regulation.293 However, under the case-law of the ECtHR certain obligations for the 
contracting State regarding effective access to the relevant procedures (access to 
information, interpreters, legal advisers) in relation to Article 3 or Article 5 of the ECHR or 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 may exist also outside the territory of that Member State. For 
example, on the high seas, when aliens are intercepted by that Member State for the 
purpose of their return to a third country (a form of detention, which shall be subject to the 
effective control).294 Under EU secondary law, the information provided may have the form 
of a common leaflet and shall be provided in writing in a language that the applicant 
understands or is reasonably supposed to understand. The information may be supplied in 
conjunction with the personal interview. The safeguards required during the personal 
interview are as follows: it shall be conducted in a language that the applicant understands 
or is reasonably supposed to understand and in which he/she is able to communicate; where 
necessary, an interpreter must ensure appropriate communication; confidentiality must be 
ensured; a person who conducts an interview must be qualified under national law; a 
written summary of the interview shall contain at least the main information supplied by the 
applicant; and an applicant and/or his/her legal advisor or counsellor must have timely 
access to the summary.295 The right to a personal interview as a general principle of EU law, 
which needs to be secured before a detention order is issued, will often be indispensable for 
the effective fulfilment of other standards such as individual assessment, consideration of 
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Article 3(1) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
293
Article 4(1) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
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Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 27765/09 (ECtHR 23 February 2012) paras 201-207; 
Sharifi et autres c. Italie et Grèce App No 16643/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2015) para 242. 
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less coercive alternative measures to detention and the principle of proportionality.296 
 
Standard 11. Requirement of individual assessment 
 
Detention may be ordered only in an individual case and based on an individual assessment 
of the particular circumstances of the person involved, in relation to at least one objective 
criterion which needs to be defined by national law and by taking into account the 
proportionality (necessity) test and the (in)effectiveness of less coercive measures.297  In 
practice, the requirement of an individual assessment means that the mere fact that, for 
example, the person concerned has no identity documents, which may be regulated as an 
objective criterion for the risk of absconding, cannot, on its own, be a ground for detention 
or extending detention, since any assessment relating to the risk of the person absconding 
concerned must be based on an individual examination of that person's case.298 
 
 
Standard 12. Best interests of a child 
 
“The minor's best interests, as prescribed in Article 23(2) of the Recast Reception Directive 
2013/33, shall be a primary consideration for Member States.”299 Minors shall be detained 
“only as a measure of last resort and after it having been established that other less coercive 
alternative measures cannot be applied effectively. Unaccompanied minors shall be detained 
only in exceptional circumstances.” Detention shall be for the shortest period of time and all 
efforts shall be made to release the detained minors as soon as possible.300  
However, in the MA, BT, DA case, the CJEU states that “although express mention of the best 
interests of the minor is made only in the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Dublin III 
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For further discussion on the right to be heard and to defence and for the consequences of the interference 
in this rights, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
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Articles 2(n) and 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation; C-528/15 Al Chodor and Others [2017] EU:C:2017:213, 
para 34. See also: Case of O.M. v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR 5 July 2016) para 52. 
298
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014], paras 70-74. 
299
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(2) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of 
the Dublin III Regulation. 
300
Articles 11(2) and 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III 
Regulation. 
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Regulation, the effect of Article 24(2) of the Charter,301 in conjunction with Article 51(1) of 
the Charter thereof, is that the child's best interests must also be a primary consideration in 
all decisions adopted by the Member States on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 6 
of the Dublin III Regulation”.302 This means – taking into account also the fact that the CJEU 
refers to Article 24(2) of the CFR as being a right and not a principle – the principle of the 
best interests of a child extends beyond the requirements of legal representation of an 
unaccompanied minor, family reunification, well-being and social development of a minor, 
his/her safety and security, respect of his/her opinion and the need to identify the family 
members, siblings or relatives of the unaccompanied minor.303 The best interests of the child 
extend to all sorts of decisions taken during the procedures carried out under the Dublin III 
Regulation and this includes detention. As regards unaccompanied children, the child's 
representative must be appointed “as soon as possible” and before any administrative 
proceedings are undertaken.304  Under the case law of the ECtHR, where children are 
seeking asylum their extreme vulnerability is compounded. Such double vulnerability must 
take precedence over child's irregular status.305 It derives both from the case-law on the 
detention of children306 and from other cases concerning children,307 and requires that in all 
actions relating to children an in-depth examination of the child's best interests must be 
undertaken prior to a decision that will impact that child's life. This includes principle of 
proportionality and consideration of the effectiveness of less coercive and alternative 
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Article 24(2) of the Charter states that “in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities 
or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration.” 
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 C-648/11 MA, BT and DA v Secretary of State of the Home Department EU:C:2013:367 [2013]  para 59. 
303
Articles 6(2), 6(3)(a),(b),(c) and (d) and 6(4) of the Dublin III Regulation and Article 23 of the Recast 
Reception Directive 2013/33. 
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Article 25(1)(a) of the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), [2013] OJ L180/60 
(hereinafter the Recast Procedures Directive). 
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Mubilanzila, Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 Jan 2007) para 55; Popov v 
France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012) para 91; Tarakhel v Switzerland App no 
29217/12 (ECtHR 4 November 2014) para 99; A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 
2016) para 110. 
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Rahimi v Greece App no 8687/08 (ECtHR 5 July 2011), paras 51-96; Mubilanzila, Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga 
v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 Jan 2007), para 53; Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium App no 
41442/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2010) paras 61-62; Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 
January 2012) paras 92-103. 
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measures to detention.308 
 
Standard 13. Consideration of the effectiveness of less coercive alternative 
measures to detention  
 
Article 8(4) of the Recast Reception Directive requires that Member States shall ensure that 
the rules concerning alternatives to detention, such as regular reporting to the authorities, 
the deposit of a financial guarantee, or an obligation to stay at an assigned place, are laid 
down in national law. Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation309 does not make reference to 
Article 8(4) of the Recast Reception Directive. However, recital 20 of the Dublin III Regulation 
states that “as regards the general guarantees governing detention, as well as detention 
conditions, where appropriate, Member States should apply the provisions of Directive 
2013/33/EU also to persons detained on the basis of this Regulation.” A requirement for less 
coercive alternative measures can be considered as part of the “general guarantees 
governing detention” and since under Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation one of the 
conditions for detention is that other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied 
effectively, it is possible to take the aforementioned recital of the Dublin III Regulation and 
Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation as the legal grounds for the obligation of the 
Member State to define alternatives to detention in national law.310  The assessment 
whether a less coercive alternative measure cannot be effectively applied in a particular case 
is a specific element of the requirement of individual assessment and principle of 
proportionality, because the text of Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation requires that a 
Member State may detain only in so far as detention is proportional “and” other less 
                                                 
308
Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012)  para 119; A.B. and Others v 
France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016)  para 110. For further discussion on the best interest of a 
child, see the Explanatory note and standards nos. 34.1, 34.5. and 34.6 of this check-list. 
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This provision states that “as regards the detention conditions and the guarantees applicable to persons 
detained, in order to secure the transfer procedures to the Member State responsible, Articles 9, 10 and 11 
of Directive 2013/33/EU shall apply.” 
310
See mutatis mutandis C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. v Staatsecretariat van Veiligheid en Justitie [2016] EU:C:2016:84 
para 61. See also: the Explanatory note on consideration of the effectiveness and less coercive measures to 
detention. For the relevance of alternative measures for detention from the standpoint of case-law of the 
ECtHR, see the last paragraph of the Explanatory note on the standard of proportionality (necessity test). 
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coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively.311  
 
Standard 14. Principle of proportionality and the necessity test  
 
The necessity test in cases of restrictions of “movements” of refugees is part of Article 31(2) 
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However, under EU law, Article 
28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation is an expression of the principle of proportionality from 
Article 52(1) of the Charter and the necessity test forms a part of that principle of 
proportionality.312 Article 52(1) of the Charter states that “any limitations on the exercise of 
the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect 
the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognized by the Union on the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.”313 In a case of detention under the Dublin III Regulation, the objective of the general 
interest recognised by the EU is “to secure transfer procedures in accordance” with the 
Dublin III Regulation.314 As regards the principle of proportionality and the necessity test, the 
standards under the case-law of the ECtHR – if taken in conjunction with applicable EU law – 
are not less stringent.315 
 
 
                                                 
311
See mutatis mutandis the standard that administrative authority must ascertain whether other sufficient but 
less coercive measures to detention can be applied effectively in a specific case under the Return Directive 
(C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014] para 61). In regards to the effectiveness of less coercive 
measures to detention, see the last paragraph of the Explanatory note on effective and less coercive 
measures to detention. 
312
“When there is a significant risk of absconding, Member States may detain the person concerned in order to 
secure transfer procedures in accordance with this Regulation, on the basis of an individual assessment and 
only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied 
effectively” (Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation). 
313
See mutatis mutandis judgment of the CJEU in the case C-601/15 PPU, J.N. , 15 February 2016, para 50. 
Necessity and proportionality are mentioned also in recital 20 of the Dublin III Regulation. Among other 
things, recital 20 of the Dublin III Regulation states that detention of applicants must be in accordance with 
Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention states that contracting States 
shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are “necessary”.  
314
Article 28(2) and (4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
315
For more on this, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
Section 4. Detention under the Dublin III Regulation and the ECHR: Basic Judicial Check-list 1 
 
75 
 
Standard 15. Length of detention and due diligence requirement 
 
Detention shall be applied for the shortest period possible and shall not be longer than the 
time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative procedures with due 
diligence until the transfer under this Regulation is carried out.316 The transfer from the 
requesting Member State to the Member State responsible shall be carried out as soon as 
practically possible, and at the latest within six weeks of the implicit or explicit acceptance of 
the request by another Member State or of the moment when the appeal or review no 
longer has a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
When the requesting Member State fails to comply with deadlines for submitting a take 
charge or take back request or where the transfer does not take place within the period of 
six weeks referred to in the third sub-paragraph, the person shall no longer be detained.317 
 
Standard 16. Right to be informed “promptly” about the reasons for detention after 
a detention order is issued 
 
According to Article 9(4) of the Recast Reception Directive, in conjunction with Article 28(4) 
of the Dublin III Regulation, detained applicants “shall be immediately” informed – among 
other things – of the reasons for detention. Article 5(2) of the ECHR states that “everyone 
who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the 
reasons for his arrest.” The requirement of “prompt information”  is to be given an 
autonomous meaning extending beyond the realm of criminal law measures.318 The 
standards of “immediate” information under EU law and of “prompt” information under the 
case-law of the ECHR could slightly differ, because of a different obligatory content and form 
of the information that needs to be given to the applicants.319 Under the case-law of the 
ECtHR the requirement of “promptness” means that the “reasons” for detention need to be 
                                                 
316
Article 28(3) of the Dublin III Regulation. A Member State must ask for an urgent reply for a take charge or 
take back request (second paragraph of Article 28(3) of the Dublin III Regulation). See also Recital 17 of the 
Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Recital 20 of the Dublin III Regulation. 
317
The third and the fourth subparagraphs of Article 28(3) of the Dublin III Regulation. Concerning the length of 
detention, see also standard no 25 on the right to judicial review of the continuing detention. In regards to 
the length of the detention from the standpoint of the case-law of the ECtHR, see Explanatory note on 
length of detention. 
318
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App No 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016) para 116. 
319
See standard no 17 of this Check-list. 
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given to the applicant within a few hours of arrest.320 Where reasons were provided after 76 
hours of detention,321 after 4 days of detention322 or after 10 days of detention,323 the ECtHR 
found that they were not given promptly. If the applicant is incapable of receiving the 
information, the relevant details must be given to those persons who represent his interests 
such as a lawyer or a guardian.324 
 
Standard 17. Right to be informed “adequately” about the reasons for detention 
and about procedures laid down in national law for challenging the detention order 
 
Based on EU secondary law, detained applicants must be informed immediately “in writing, 
in a language which they understand or are reasonably supposed to understand” not just 
about the reasons for detention, but also about “the procedures laid down in national law 
for challenging the detention order, as well as of the possibility to request free legal 
assistance and representation”.325  
 
As regards the manner of communicating the reasons for arrest, the ECtHR states that “any 
person arrested must be told in simple, non-technical language that he can understand, the 
essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest, so as to be able, if he sees fit, to apply to a 
court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with Article 5(4) of the ECHR /.../.” This 
information “need[s] not be related in its entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment 
of arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the information conveyed were sufficient 
is to be assessed in each case according to its special features,”326 but the information 
                                                 
320
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom App no 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (ECtHR 30 August 1990) 
paras 41-42; M.A. v Cyprus App no 41872/10  (ECtHR 23 July 2013) para 228; Kerr v United Kingdom 
(decision) App no 40451/98 (ECtHR 7 December 1999). 
321
Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 Jan 2008) paras 81-85. 
322
Shamayev and Others v Georgia and Russia App no 36378/02 (ECtHR 12 October 2005), para 416; Khlaifia 
and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016) para 120. 
323
Rusu v Austria App no 34082/02 (ECtHR 2 October 2008), para 43. 
324
X. v United Kingdom, Commission report, para 16; Z.H. v Hungary App no 28973/11 (ECtHR 8 November 
2012) paras 42-43; see: European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right to Liberty and Security 
(Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014) 22 (point 116). 
325
Article 9(4) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
326
Shamayev and Others v Georgia and Russia App no 36378/02 (ECtHR 2 October 2005) para 413; Khlaifia and 
Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12, (ECtHR 5 December 2016) para 115. 
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provided must be correct.327  Information about the legal status of a migrant or about the 
possible removal measures that could be implemented cannot satisfy the need for 
information as to the legal basis for the migrant’s deprivation of liberty.328 Moreover “a bare 
indication of the legal basis” for the arrest, taken on its own, is insufficient for the purposes 
of Article 5(2) of the ECHR.329 In M.A. v Cyprus (para. 229), the ECtHR has accepted that 
(correct) information does not necessarily have to be given in writing. “In cases where 
detainees had not been informed of the reasons for their deprivation of liberty, the ECtHR 
has found that their right to appeal against their detention was deprived of all effective 
substance”.330 
 
Standard 18. Written decision on detention (or its extension)331 must be delivered 
to the applicant/legal representative and must contain reasons closely connected 
to the grounds of detention  
 
Detention of applicants shall be ordered in writing. The detention order shall state the 
reasons in fact and in law on which it is based.332 Similarly, under ECHR de facto detention 
must be “incarnated by a formal decision of legal relevance, complete with reasoning.”333 If 
the express – or even underlying – reason for detention is other than to prevent the 
detainee from effecting an unauthorised entry or to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
                                                 
327
Rusu v Austria App no 34082/02 (ECtHR 2 October 2008), para 42. 
328
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App No 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016) para 118. 
329
Guide on Article 5 – Right to Liberty and Security (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014) 
22( point 122); Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom, App no 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 
(ECtHR 30 August 1990), para 40; Murray v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 14310/88 (28 
October 1994) para 76, Kortesis v Greece App no 60593/10 (ECtHR 12 June 2012) paras 61-62. 
330
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016) para 132. For  
examples of incorrect information about the reasons for detention, see the Explanatory note to this Check-
list. 
331
 Detention and extension of detention are similar in nature since both deprive the third-country national   
concerned of his liberty“ /.../ (C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014] para 44. 
332
Article 9(2) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
The obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions is a general principle of EU law (see: 
Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter;  see also: C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. v Staatsecretariat van Veiligheid en Justitie 
[2016] EU:C:2016:84, para 62 and mutatis mutandis , C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014] paras 
44, 52. 
333
Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017) para 68.  
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prescribed by law, it cannot be justified under Article 5(1)(f)334 or Article 5(1)(b) of the ECHR. 
The detention will be arbitrary where there has been bad faith or deception.335   
 
Standard 19. The obligation to keep records on detention cases 
 
A special requirement of Article 5(1) of the ECHR is the obligation to keep records of matters 
of detention. The ECtHR considers that the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a 
complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the 
ECHR and discloses the gravest violation of that provision.336 The absence of a record of such 
information as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the 
reasons for detention and the name of the person effecting it must be seen as incompatible, 
inter alia, with the very purpose of Article 5 of the ECHR.337 
 
Standard 20. Right to free legal assistance and representation 
 
In cases of judicial review of the detention order provided for in Article 9(3) of the Recast 
Reception Directive Member States “shall” ensure that applicants have access to free legal 
assistance and representation.  “This shall include, at least, the preparation of the required 
procedural documents and participation in the hearing before the judicial authorities on 
behalf of the applicant. Free legal assistance and representation shall be provided by suitably 
qualified persons as admitted or permitted under national law whose interests do not 
conflict or could not potentially conflict with those of the applicant.”338 Procedures for access 
to legal assistance and representation shall be laid down in national law.339 The second 
sentence of Article 47(2) of the Charter states that “everyone shall have the possibility of 
                                                 
334
See mutatis mutandis: Bozano v France App no 9990/82 (ECtHR 18 December 1986); para 60; Čonka v. 
Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR 5 Feburary 2002), para 42; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia App no 5829/04 
(ECtHR 31 May 2011), para 142; Azimov v. Russia App no 67474/11 (ECtHR 28 April 2013), para 164. 
335
Bozano v France App no 9990/82 (ECtHR 18 December 1986), para 55; Čonka v Belgium App no 51564/99 
(ECtHR 5 February 2002), para 42. 
336
El-Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Grand Chamber) App no 39630/09 (ECtHR 13 
December 2012) para 233; Kurt v Turkey App no 15/1997/799/1002 (ECtHR 25 May 1998) para 125. 
337
Kasparov v Russia App no 53659/07 (11 October 2016)  para 55.  
338
Article 9(6) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) and Recital 20 of the Dublin III 
Regulation.  
339
Article 9(10) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
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being advised, defended and represented.” Article 47(3) of the Charter states that “legal aid 
shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice”. These are mandatory provisions of EU law. 
Article 9(7) of the Recast Reception Directive is a non-mandatory provision and sets possible 
conditions or modalities that Member States may regulate regarding the right to free legal 
assistance and representation. In addition, and without prejudice to the aforementioned 
provisions from the Recast Reception Directive, rules on free legal aid from Articles 20-23 of 
the Recast Procedures Directive 2013/32 are also applicable.340 
 
From the standpoint of the case-law of the ECtHR, the ECHR “is intended to guarantee rights 
that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective.”341 In the case of Čonka, the 
ECtHR held that the accessibility of a remedy implies, inter alia, that the circumstances 
voluntarily created by the authorities must be such as to afford applicants a realistic 
possibility of using the remedy.342 In the context of detention proceedings, the ECtHR has 
held that the authorities are not obliged to provide free legal aid.343 However, if the absence 
of legal aid raises concerns about the accessibility of a remedy, an issue may arise under 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR344 (for example, when legal representation is required in the 
domestic context) or under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the ECHR.345 
 
Standard 21. Other aspects of the practical and effective right to judicial review 
 
Apart from the issues of free legal aid and representation,346 there may be certain other 
aspects of effective access to a court relevant in detention cases. The following guidance 
                                                 
340
See Recital 12 of the Dublin III Regulation. 
341
Čonka v Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR 5 February 2002) para 46. 
342
Ibid. para 46. 
343
Lebedev v Russia, App no 4493/04 (ECtHR 25 October 2007), para 84; Susa Musa v Malta App 42337/12 (23 
July 2013) para 61. 
344
Ibid. para 61; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey App no 30471/08 (ECtHR 22 September 2009) para 141. For 
further standards as regards free legal aid under EU law and the ECHR, see the Explanatory note. 
345
See, for example: Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 66.                                                                                                                                        
346
For the example of violation of the right of individual petition under Article 34 of the ECHR due to measures 
limiting an asylum applicant's contact with his representative, see quotation from the judgment in the case 
of L.M. and Others v Russia App nos 40081/14, 40088/14 and 40127/14 (ECtHR 10 October 2015) paras 
153-163 and judgment in the case of I.M. v France that are mentioned in the Explanatory note to this 
Check-list. 
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may be gleaned from the case-law of the ECtHR regarding general standards for practical 
and effective access to a court in civil disputes. The right of access to a court must be 
“practical and effective”.347 For the right of access to be effective, an individual must “have a 
clear, practical opportunity to challenge an act that is an interference with his rights”.348 The 
rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied with in 
lodging an appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring a proper 
administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty.349 
The rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an 
available remedy.350 The practical and effective nature of this right may be impaired by the 
prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity;351 by issues 
relating to time-limits;352 and by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the 
possibilities of applying to a court.353 The right of access to a court is not absolute, but may 
be subject to limitations permitted by implication.354 The limitations applied must not 
restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the 
very essence of the right is impaired. The limitation must pursue a legitimate aim and there 
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
                                                 
347
Bellet v France App no 23805/94 (4 December 1995) para 38. 
348
Ibid. para 36. See also: Stoichkov v Bulgaria App no 9808/02,(ECtHR 24 March 2005)  para 66; Vachev v 
Bulgaria App no 42987/98, (ECtHR 8 July 2004) para 71; Ismoilov and others v Russia, App no 2947/06 
(ECtHR 24 April 2008)  para 45; Nunes Dias v Portugal App nos 69829/01; 2672/03 (ECtHR 10 March 2003). 
349
Cañete de Goñi v Spain App no 55782/00 (ECtHR 15 October 2002) para 36. 
350
Miragall Escolano and Others v Spain App nos. 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 
      41400/98, 41446/98, 41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98 (ECtHR 25 January 2000); Zvolsky and Zvolska v 
the Czech Republic App no 46129/99 (ECtHR 12. November 2002) para 51. 
351
Aït-Mouhoub v France App no 22924/93 (ECtHR 28 October 1998), paras 57-58; Garcia Manibardo v Spain, 
App no 38695/97 (ECtHR 15 February 2000), paras 38-45; Kreuz v Poland (no1), App no 28249/95 (ECtHR 19 
June 2001) paras 60-67, Podbielski and PPU PolPure v Poland App no 39199/98 (ECtHR 26 July 2005) paras 
65-66; Weissman and others v Romania App no 63945/00 (ECtHR 24 May 2006) para 42. 
352
Melnyk v Ukraine App no 23436/03 (28 February 2006), para 26; Yagtzilar and Others v Greece App no 
41727/98, (6 December 2001) para 27.  
353
Perez de Rada Cavanilles v Spain App no 28090/95 (ECtHR 28 October 1998), para 49, Miragall Escolano And 
Others v Spain App no 38366/97 (ECtHR 25 January 2000), para 38; Case of Sotiris and Nikos Koutras Attee 
v Greece, App no 39442/98 (ECtHR 16 February  2001), para 20; Beles and Others v Czech Republic, 
47273/99 (ECtHR 12 November 2002), para 50; RTBF v Belgium, 50084/06 (ECtHR 29 March 2011) paras71, 
72, 74; Annoni di Gussola and Others v France App no 31819/96, 33293/96 (ECtHR 14 November 2000), 
para 56; The App nos 13092/87, 13984/88  (ECtHR 9 December 1994), para 83, Philis v Greece App nos 
12750/87, 13780/88, 14003/88 (ECtHR 27 August 1981), para 65. 
354
Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR 21 February 1975) para 38; Stanev v Bulgaria, App no 
36760/06 (17 January 2012), para 230. 
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aim sought to be achieved.355 
 
 
Standard 22. Automatic judicial review or detainee’s right to initiate judicial review 
of the lawfulness of detention (including conditions of detention)356 
 
Under secondary EU law, a judicial review of the lawfulness of detention (including 
conditions of detention) may be provided ex officio from the beginning of detention or/and 
at the request of the applicant after the launch of the relevant proceedings.357  However, 
according to Article 5(4) of the ECHR, everyone who is deprived of his/her liberty by arrest or 
detention “shall be entitled to take proceedings” by which the lawfulness of his/her 
detention shall be decided.358 A difference between EU law and the ECHR could imply that 
the ECtHR may find a breach of Article 5(4) of the ECHR, because proceedings could only be 
initiated ex officio, for example by the prosecutor, meaning that the applicant himself had no 
right to bring proceedings.359 Article 5(4) is the lex specialis which cannot be bypassed by 
relying on the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR read together with Article 
5. However, where the complaint concerns the conditions of detention, Article 13 can be 
invoked together with Article 3. However, even if the ECtHR does not find a violation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR, it may find a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the 
ECHR.360 
 
                                                 
355
Ashingdane v United Kingdom, App no 8225/78 (ECtHR 28 May 1985), para 57; Fayed v United Kingdom, App 
no 17101/90 (ECtHR 21 September 1994), para 65, Markovic and Others v Italy App no 1398/03 (ECtHR 14 
December 2006), para 99. For more details about these aspects of effective and practical right to access to 
a court, see the Explanatory note and the European Court of Human Rights Guide on Article 6, Right to fair 
trial (civil limb) (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2013) 13-14. 
356
As regards conditions of detention, see standard no 34 of this Check-list. 
357
Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
See also Article 26(2) of the Recast Procedures Directive (in conjunction with Recital 12 of the Dublin III 
Regulation), which imposes an obligation to the Member States to ensure a possibility to speedy judicial 
review. 
358
This option should not be merely hypothetical. See, for example: Abdi Mahamud v Malta App no 56796/13 
(ECtHR 3 May 2016) para 53. 
359
 Nasrulloyev v Russia App no 656/06 (ECtHR 11 October 2007)  paras 88-90.For some further examples of 
automatic review under the case-law of the ECtHR (including of persons of unsound mind), see the 
Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
360
 See, for example: Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no  47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017) paras 98-101. 
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While the ECtHR has generally held that Article 5(4) can only be invoked while the person 
remains in detention, which means that Article 5(4) had no application for the purpose “of 
obtaining, after release, a declaration that a previous detention or arrest was unlawful,”361 
Article 3 complaints can be invoked anytime. Nevertheless, Article 5(4) complaint might be 
admissible if lodged while the applicant is still in detention, even if he/she is subsequently 
released, if the applicant did not have an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of 
his/her detention during the time he/she was detained; likewise, the ECtHR has recognised 
that a complaint concerning the “speediness”  of the review can be raised even after the 
person has been released.362  Furthermore, complaints under Article 3 of the ECHR may be 
raised not just based on Article 5(4) of the ECHR, but also based on Article 13 of the ECHR.363 
 
A difference between EU law, which regulates alternatively automatic judicial review and 
detainee’s right to initiate judicial review, and the ECHR, which guarantees the right to 
initiate judicial review, could imply that the ECtHR may find a breach of Article 5(4) of the 
ECHR where proceedings could only be initiated ex officio, for example, by the prosecutor, 
meaning that the applicant had no right to bring proceedings.364 
 
 At the same time, the requirement deriving from the ECtHR case law that the detainee be 
“entitled to take proceedings” suggests that there is no requirement for automatic review, 
even where the detainee may find it difficult to initiate proceedings (for example, where 
there are language difficulties or he/she is not represented).365  As regards distinction 
between judicial protection concerning lawfulness of detention and judicial protection 
concerning compensation in the case of unlawful detention see standard no. 31 of this 
Check-list. 
                                                 
361
Stephens v Malta (no1) App no 11956/07 (ECtHR 21 April 2009), para 102; Fox, Hartley and Campbell v 
United Kingdom App no 12244/86, 12245/86, 12383/86 (ECtHR 30 August 1990),  para 45; Slivenko v Latvia 
App no 48321/99 (ECtHR 9 October 2003), para 155; X v Sweden App no 10230/82 (Commission decision, 
11 May 1983); Richmond Yaw and Others v Italy App nos. 3342/11, 3391/11, 3408/11 and 3447/11 (ECtHR 
6 October 2016) para 82. 
362
Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta App 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR 22 November 2016), paras 
117-119. 
363
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 267. 
364
For some further examples of automatic review under the case-law of the ECtHR (including of persons of 
unsound mind), see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
365
See: J.N. v United Kingdom App no 37289/12 (ECtHR 19 May 2016). 
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Standard 23. Right to judicial review before an “independent and impartial 
tribunal/court established by law” 
 
Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin 
III Regulation and Article 26(2) of the Recast Procedures Directive and do not define the 
concrete character of the institution which must provide a “judicial review”. A logical 
conclusion might be that “judicial” review may only be provided by a judicial authority. 
Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive taken in conjunction with Article 47(1) and (2) 
of the Charter provide a guarantee that the “judicial review” on detention is provided by an 
“independent and impartial tribunal.”366  Furthermore, Article 6 of the Charter corresponds 
to Article 5(4) of the ECHR (a lex specialis to Article 13 of the ECHR), which gives a right to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of detention will be decided by a “court.” The 
CJEU has already stated: “limitations which may legitimately be imposed on the exercise of 
the rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter may not exceed those permitted by the 
ECtHR.”367 In the case of H.I.D. the CJEU has put that “the first sentence of recital 27 in the 
preamble to the Procedures Directive 2005/85 states that, in accordance with a fundamental 
principle of European Union law, the decisions taken in relation to an application for asylum 
and the withdrawal of refuge status must be subject to an effective remedy before a court or 
tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.”368 Based on this starting point the CJEU 
then developed standards on independence of courts or tribunals with a reference to the 
settled case-law of the CJEU in relation to the question whether a “body making a reference 
is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU.”369 In respect of determination of 
courts or tribunals, unlike the recital 27 of the Directive 2005/85, the recital 50 in the 
preamble of the Recast Procedures Directive no longer refers to Article 267 of the TFEU. 
Since the standards on the notions of “tribunal/court”, “established by law”, “independence 
and impartiality” in the case-law of the CJEU in the field of rights of asylum-seekers are 
                                                 
366
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal in a compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article “(Article 
47(1) of the Charter). “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law” (first sentence of Article 47(2) of the 
Charter). 
367
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. v Staatsecretariat van Veiligheid en Justitie [2016] EU:C:2016:84 para 47.  
368
C-175/11, H.I.D, B.A. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Refugee Appeals Tribunal , Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform, Ireland , Attorney General (ECtHR 31 January 2013), para 81. 
369
Ibid. para 83. 
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limited to the interpretation provided by the preliminary ruling in the H.I.D. case, additional 
guidance for the interpretation of these standards may be found in the case-law of the 
ECtHR.370  
 
Standard 24. Right to “speedy” judicial review of the lawfulness of detention  
 
Under the provisions of Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive and Article 26(2) of the 
Recast Procedures Directive, according to which administrative authorities order detention, 
Member States shall provide for a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention. 
Under the Recast Reception Directive, a judicial review of the lawfulness of detention may 
be provided as speedily as possible ex-officio from the beginning of detention or/and as 
speedily as possible at the request of the applicant after the launch of the relevant 
proceedings. A Member State has an obligation to define in national law the period within 
which the judicial review (ex-officio and/or at the request of the applicant) shall be 
conducted.371 
Under the standards of the ECHR, “speediness”  is in itself a virtue to be protected regardless 
of the outcome of the proceedings in question.372 As a starting point, the ECtHR has taken 
the moment when the application for release was made/proceedings were instituted. The 
relevant period comes to an end with the final determination of the legality of the 
applicant’s detention, including any appeal.373 If an administrative remedy has to be 
exhausted before recourse can be taken to a court, time starts running when the 
administrative authority is seized of the matter.374 If the proceedings have been conducted 
over two levels of jurisdiction, an overall assessment of the speediness of judicial review 
must be made in order to determine whether the requirement of speediness has been 
                                                 
370
For the concrete standards on “independence” and “impartiality” of courts “established by law” that are 
developed by the CJEU in the case of H.I.D. and by the ECtHR, see the Explanatory note. 
371
Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
372
Doherty v United Kingdom App no 76874/11 (18 February 2016), para 80. 
373
Sanchez-Reisse v Switzerland App no 9862/82 (ECtHR 21 October 1986), para 54; E. v  Norway, 11701/85 (29 
August 1990), para 64. 
374
Sanchez-Reisse v Switzerland App no 9862/82 (ECtHR 21 October 1986), para 54. 
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complied with.375 There could be a breach of Article 5(4) of the ECHR even if the applicant 
has not been prejudiced by the failure to conduct a “speedy” review (for example, if his/her 
detention was at all times lawful). The question whether a right to the speedy decision has 
been respected must be determined in light of the circumstances of an individual case.376 
The relevant questions arise as to whether an applicant or his/her counsel had in some way 
contributed to the length of the appeals proceedings and if the Government provided some 
justification for the delay.377 Any exceptions to the requirement of “speedy” review of the 
lawfulness of a measure of detention call for “strict interpretation. The question whether the 
principle of speedy proceedings has been observed is not to be addressed in the abstract but 
in the context of a general assessment of the information, taking into account the 
circumstances of the case, particularly in the light of the complexity of the case, any 
specificities of the domestic procedure and the applicant’s behaviour in the course of the 
proceedings”.378  
Thus, the ECtHR in its case-law decided that where an individual's personal liberty is at stake, 
the ECtHR has very strict standards concerning the State's compliance with the requirement 
of a speedy review of the lawfulness of detention. In the cases of Kadem v Malta (paras. 44-
45) and Rehbock v Slovenia (paras. 82-86), the ECtHR considered periods of seventeen (17) 
and twenty-six (26) days excessive for deciding on the lawfulness of the applicant's 
detention. In Mamedova v Russia (para. 96), the length of appeal proceedings lasting, inter 
alia, twenty-six days (26), was found to be in breach of the speediness requirement.379 In 
Karimov v Russia, the ECtHR established that delays of thirteen (13) to twenty (20) days in 
examining the appeals against detention order may be incompatible with the “speediness” 
requirement of Article 5(4) of the ECHR.380 It is thus for a State to organise its judicial system 
in such a way as to enable the courts to comply with the requirements of Article 5(4) of the 
                                                 
375
Hutchison Reid v United Kingdom App no 50272/99 (ECtHR 20 Feb 2003), para 78; Navarra v France, 
13190/87 (ECtHR 23 November 1993), para 28; European Court of Human Rights Guide on Article 5 of the 
Convention, (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014) 33/points 211-213. 
376
Karimov v Russia App no 54219/08 (ECtHR 29 July 2010), para 123; Rehbock v Slovenia App no 29462/95 
(ECtHR 28 November 2000) para 84. 
377
Karimov v Russia App no 54219/08 (ECtHR 29 July 2010), paras 125-126.  
378
Khlaifia and others v Italy App no 16483/12, (ECtHR 15 December 2016) para 131. 
379
Aden Ahmed v Malta App no 55352/12 (ECtHR 23 June 2013), para 115. 
380
Karimov v Russia App no 54219/08 (ECtHR 29 July 2010), para 127. 
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ECHR.381 Neither an excessive workload nor a vacation period can justify a period of 
inactivity on the part of the judicial authorities.382 
 
Standard 25. Right to judicial review of the continuing detention 
 
“Detention shall be reviewed by a judicial authority at reasonable intervals of time, ex-officio 
and /or at the request of the applicant concerned, in particular whenever it is of a prolonged 
duration, relevant circumstances arise or new information becomes available which may 
affect the lawfulness of detention.”383 Also from the standpoint of ECHR, it is not sufficient 
that the lawfulness of detention is determined at the time of an arrest. There must be a 
possibility of subsequent review to ensure that the continuing detention does not become 
unlawful or arbitrary. For example, in Kim v Russia (para. 42), the ECtHR expressly recognised 
that during a long period of detention new factors may come to light which impact on the 
lawfulness of detention, and the detained person should have the possibility of bringing new 
proceedings before a court which has jurisdiction to consider the complaint “speedily”.  
 
Standard 26.The scope and intensity of judicial review including procedural 
guarantees 
 
The Dublin III Regulation does not regulate specifically the scope or intensity of the judicial 
review of a detention order. The relevant standards should, therefore, be derived from the 
general principle of effectiveness of legal remedies under EU law384 in conjunction with 
Article 47(1) of the Charter. Furthermore, in this respect, the CJEU's interpretation of the 
right to an effective legal remedy in cases of the extension of detention under the Return 
Directive and the case-law of the ECtHR under Article 5(1) (f) and 5(4) of the ECHR 
concerning expulsion of irregular migrants, are relevant, too. Thus, based on the standards 
                                                 
381
Ibid. para 123.  
382
E. v Norway App no 11701/85 (ECtHR 29 August 1990), para 66; Bezicheri v Italy, App no 11400/85 (ECtHR 
25 October 1989), para 25. For further examples of decisions as regards speediness of judicial review, see 
the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
383
Article 9(5) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
See mutatis mutandis standard no 29 on the right to judicial review of the continuing detention or its 
extension in case of detention under the Return Directive. 
384
For more on this, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
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developed in the Mahdi case, a judicial authority must be able to rule on all relevant matters 
of fact and of law in order to determine whether a detention is justified. This requires an in-
depth examination of the matters of fact specific to each individual case. Where detention is 
no longer justified, the judicial authority must be able to substitute its own decision for that 
of the administrative authority and to make a decision on whether to order an alternative 
measure or to release the third country national concerned. To that end, the judicial 
authority must be able to take into account both the facts stated and the evidence adduced 
by the administrative authority and any observations that may be submitted by a third-
country national. Furthermore, a judicial authority must be able to consider any other 
elements that are relevant for its decision should it so deem necessary. Accordingly, the 
powers of the judicial authority in the context of an examination can under no 
circumstances be confined only to the matters adduced by the administrative authority 
concerned. Any other interpretation would result in an ineffective examination by the 
judicial authority and would thereby jeopardize the achievement of the objectives 
pursued.385 Similarly to Article 9(5) of the Recast Reception Directive386  (in conjunction with 
Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation, under the case law of the ECtHR, the reviewing 
court must have jurisdiction to decide on whether or not deprivation of liberty has become 
unlawful in the light of new factors, which have emerged subsequently to the initial decision 
depriving a person of his/her liberty.387 
 
Nevertheless, under the case-law of the ECtHR, the scope and intensity of judicial review on 
detention is explained in a slightly different way as this was decided by the CJEU in the case 
of Mahdi. Under the case-law of the ECtHR “Article 5(4) of the ECHR does not guarantee a 
right to judicial review of such a scope as to empower the court, on all aspects of the case 
including questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the 
decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide enough to bear on those 
conditions, which are essential for the lawful detention of a person according to Article 5(1) 
of the ECHR. The reviewing court must not have merely advisory functions but must have the 
                                                 
385
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014] paras 62-64. 
386
Detention shall be reviewed by a judicial authority /…/ in particular whenever it is of a prolonged duration, 
relevant circumstances arise or new information becomes available which may affect the lawfulness of 
detention. 
387
Azimov v Russia App no 677474/11 (ECtHR, 18 April 2013), paras 151-152. 
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competence to decide the lawfulness of the detention and to order release if the detention is 
unlawful. The requirement of procedural fairness under Article 5(4) does not impose a 
uniform, unvarying standard to be applied irrespective of the context, facts and 
circumstances. Although it is not always necessary that an Article 5(4) procedure be 
attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 for criminal or civil 
litigation, it must have a judicial character and provide guarantees appropriate to the type of 
deprivation of liberty in question. Thus, the procedure must be adversarial and must always 
ensure equality of arms between the parties. An oral hearing may be necessary, for example 
in cases of detention on remand.”388 Equality of arms is not ensured if the applicant, or 
his/her counsel, is denied access to those investigation file documents which are essential in 
order to challenge effectively the lawfulness of his/her detention.389 It may also be essential 
that the individual concerned not only has the opportunity to be heard in person but that 
he/she also has the effective assistance of his/her lawyer.390 Article 5(4) of the ECHR does 
not require that a detained person is heard every time he/she lodges an appeal against a 
decision extending his/her detention, but it should be possible to exercise the right to be 
heard at reasonable intervals.391  
 
Standard 27. Restrictions on the right to a defence and/or equality of arms based 
on national (public) security, public policy or public order  
 
If in a given case, a risk of absconding exists and, in addition or related to the risk of 
absconding, a Government ascertains the existence of a risk to national security, because a 
person had been, for example, concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of 
acts of international terrorism and were members of, belong to, or had links with an 
international terrorist group, then certain limitations as regards standards of equality of 
arms and/or the right to a defence, such as restricted access to a court file, may be 
                                                 
388
A and Others v United Kingdom App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009) para 204; Reinprecht v Austria, 
67175/01 (ECtHR 15 November 2005), para 31; see also: Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber), App 
no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 128. 
389
Ovsjannikov v Estonia App no 1346/12 (ECtHR 20 February 2014), para 72; Fodale v Italy App no 70148/01 (1 
June 2006), para 41; Korneykova v Ukraine App no 56660/12 (ECtHR 24 March 2016), para 68. 
390
Cernák v Slovakia App no 36997/08 (ECtHR 17 December 2013), para 78. 
391
Çatal v Turkey App no 26808/08 (ECtHR 17 March 2012), para 33; Altınok v Turkey App no 31610/08 (ECtHR 
29 November 2011), para 45. 
Section 4. Detention under the Dublin III Regulation and the ECHR: Basic Judicial Check-list 1 
 
89 
 
imposed.392 For example, under the Recast Reception Directive national security or public 
order may be a separate and an autonomous ground for detention and, thus, in such a case 
an applicant may be limited not only in access to court files, but also in his/her personal 
freedom in view of the requirement of necessity, if the applicant’s individual conduct 
represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat, affecting a fundamental 
interest of society or the internal or external security of the Member State concerned”.393  
Based on recital 12 of the Dublin III Regulation,394 rules under Article 23 of the Recast 
Procedures Directive on exceptions as regards disclosure of information or sources due to 
security concerns395 could be relevant also in detention cases under the Dublin III 
regulation.396 The right to have access to a court file (as being part of the right from Article 
5(4) of the ECHR or Article 47(1) and (2) of the Charter in conjunction with Article 9(3) of the 
Recast Reception Directive) may be restricted for reason of national security and public 
order in accordance with principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter.397  
                                                 
392
See circumstances of national security concerns in the case of A and Others v United Kingdom App 3455/05, 
(ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 166. The recital 37 of the Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) (Official 
Journal of the EU, L 337, 20. 12. 2011) states that the notion of national security and public order also 
covers cases in which a third-country national belongs to an association which supports international 
terrorism or supports such an association. 
393
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. v Staatsecretariat van Veiligheid en Justitie [2016] EU:C:2016:84 para 67. However, 
under the Recast Reception Directive a competent authority must previously determine on a case-by-case 
basis, whether the threat presented by the person concerned  to national security or public order 
corresponds at least to the gravity of the interference with the liberty of those persons that such measures 
entail (Ibid. para 69).  
394
Recital 12 of the Dublin III regulation states that the Recast Procedures Directive “should apply in addition 
and without prejudice to the provisions concerning the procedural safeguards regulated under this 
Regulation, subject to the limitations in the application of that Directive.” 
395
Such as: the security of the organisations or person(s) providing the information or the security of the 
person(s) to whom the information relates or where the investigative interests relating to the examination 
of applications for international protection by the competent authorities of the Member States or the 
international relations of the member States would be compromised (Article 23 of the Recast Procedures 
Directive). 
396
See also second sentence of Article 32(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 
397
See mutatis mutandis: C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department EU:C:2013:363, para 50-
51; C-601/15 PPU, J.N. v Staatsecretariat van Veiligheid en Justitie [2016] EU:C:2016:84, para 50; Joined 
Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 Kadi and Al Barakaat (Grand Chamber) , 3. 9. 2008. For further comparison, 
see approach of the CJEU concerning the risk of “public policy” in the case of Z.Zh (C-554/13,, 11. 06. 2015, 
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Standard 28. Right to be released immediately in cases of unlawful detention  
 
The second sub-paragraph of Article 9 of the Recast Reception Directive (in conjunction with 
Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation) states that “where, as a result of the judicial review, 
detention is held to be unlawful, the applicant concerned shall be released immediately.”  
However, not every irregularity in the exercise of the rights for the defence in an 
administrative procedure will constitute an infringement of those rights, and therefore, not 
every such breach will automatically require the release of the person concerned.398  
 
Similarly, Article 5(4) of the ECHR states that for “everyone who is deprived of his liberty /.../ 
the “lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered 
if the detention is not lawful.“ The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Stanev v Bulgaria states 
that “the reviewing court must not have merely advisory functions but must have the 
competence to decide the lawfulness of the detention and to order release if the detention is 
unlawful” (see Ireland v the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 200, Series A no. 25; Weeks 
v the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, § 61, Series A no. 114; Chahal v the United Kingdom, 
15 November 1996, § 130, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V; and A. and Others v 
the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 202, ECHR 2009).399 The court must have the 
power to order release if it finds that the detention is unlawful, because a mere power of 
recommendation is insufficient.400 It is inconceivable that in a State subject to the rule of law 
a person should continue to be deprived of his liberty despite the existence of a court order 
for his release.401 Therefore, while the ECtHR recognises that some delay in carrying out a 
decision to release a detainee is understandable and often inevitable, the national 
                                                                                                                                                        
Article 8(3)(e) of the Recast Reception Directive is also ensured by the interpretation which the case law of 
the CJEU gives to the concepts of “national security” and “public order” found in other directives and which 
aslo applies in the case of Recast Reception Directive. 
398
C-383/13 PPU M.G. and N.R. EU:C:2013:533, para 39.  
399
Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App no 36760/06 17 January 2012, para 168; see also: Amie v Bulgaria, 
App no 58149/08 (ECtHR 12 February 2013), para 80; A and Others v United Kingdom, 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 
Feb 2009, para 202; Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber), 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), 
para 131. 
400
Benjamin and Wilson v United Kingdom App no 28212/95 (26 September 2002), paras 33-34. In case the 
ECtHR finds a violation of Article 5 of the ECHR, it may decide in the operative part of the judgment that the 
respondent State must ensure immediate release of applicants from detention (see, for example: L.M. and 
Others v Russia, 15 October 2015, point 9 of the operative part of the judgment, para 169 and the last 
paragraph of section 3.5. of the ELI Statement). 
401
Assanidze v Georgia (Grand Chamber) App no 71503/01, (ECtHR 8 April 2004), para 173. 
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authorities must attempt to keep it to a minimum.402 This rule needs to be applied in 
conjunction with standards on the right to speedy judicial review.403 If a judgment of the first 
instance court on unlawfulness of detention with a judicial order to release a detainee is not 
final due to the possibility of the administrative authority appealing against the judgment of 
the first instance court to the appellate court, then it is highly probable that standards of 
immediate release and speedy judicial review cannot be guaranteed, unless the first 
instance court issues an effective interim measure regarding the release of a detainee or if 
the first instance court applies the principle of direct effect of the second sub-paragraph of 
article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. In this respect, it is also relevant that pursuant 
to Article 47 of the Charter, “the principle of effective judicial protection affords an individual 
a right of access to a court or tribunal but not to a number of levels of jurisdiction.”404 Also, 
under the case-law of the ECtHR, States are not obliged to set up a second level of 
jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention.405 However, if a State 
institutes such a system, it must in principle accord to detainees the same guarantees on 
appeal as at first instance406and this includes the principle of adversarial proceedings and 
equality of arms.407 
 
For the standards on immediate release in case of infringement in the right to be heard 
before the detention order is issued, see the Explanatory Note on standard no. 10 on the 
right to information and to personal interview before the detention order is issued. 
                                                 
402
Giulia Manzoni v Italy App no 19218/91, 1 July 1997, para 25. In the case of Quinn v France, a delay of 
eleven hours in executing a decision to release the applicant “forthwith” was found to be incompatible 
with Article 5(1) of the ECHR (Quinn v France, 18580/91 (ECtHR 22 March 1995) para 39-43); 114. European 
Court of Human Rights Guide on Article 5 of the Convention, (Council of Europe/European Court of Human 
Rights, 2014), p.11/point 40). In the case of Mahamed Jama v Malta, the applicant remained in detention 
for five days following a decision granting her subsidiary protection and the ECtHR found violation of article 
5(1) of the ECHR (Mahamed v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), paras 154-159). 
403
See standard no 24 of this Check-list. 
404
C-69/10, Diouf  v  Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration EU:C:2011:524 para 69. 
405
A.M. v the Netherlands App no 29094/09 (ECtHR 5 July 2016), para 70. 
406
 Kučera v Slovakia App no 48666/99, (ECtHR 17 07 2007), para 107, Navarra v France, 13190/87 (ECtHR 23 
November 1993), para 28; Toth v Austria, 11894/85 (12 December 1991), para 84. 
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Standard 29. The impact of interim measures (under Rule 39 and national law) on 
the lawfulness of detention408 
 
The ECtHR has held that the grant of an interim measure under Rule 39 does not in itself 
render the detention of the person concerned unlawful.409 However, the authorities must 
still envisage expulsion at a later stage.410 Therefore, in a number of cases, in which 
respondent States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with a Rule 39 
measure, the ECtHR accepted that expulsion proceedings were temporarily suspended, but 
nevertheless remained “in progress”, with the consequence that the applicant’s continued 
detention did not violate Article 5(1) of the ECHR.411 Similarly, when expulsion is suspended 
or blocked as a consequence of internal judicial review proceedings, the ECtHR considers 
them as a part of the deportation proceedings being ‘in progress’.412 Nevertheless, 
suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the 
ECtHR should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in detention for an 
unreasonably long period.413 
 
Standard 30. Derogation from obligations under Article 5(1) of the ECHR414 
 
In regards to Article 15 of the ECHR, the ECtHR states that by reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in 
principle better placed than an international judge to decide both on the presence of such 
                                                 
408
Rule 39(1) states that Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge 
appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may, at the request of a party or of any other person 
concerned, or of their own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which they consider should 
be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings (Rules of Court, 
Registry of the Court, Strasbourg, 1 January 2016). 
409
Gebremedhin v France, App no 25389/05 (ECtHR 26 March 2007), para 74. 
410
S.P. v Belgium (decision) App no 12572/08 (ECtHR 14 June 2011). 
411
Al Hanchi v Bosnia and Herzegovina, App no 48205/09, (ECtHR 15 November 2011),  paras 49-51; Al Husin v 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3727/08, 7.02.2012, paras 67-69; Umirov v Russia, 17455/11, 11.02.2013, paras 
138-42. 
412
Alim v Russia, App no 39417/07 (ECtHR 27 September 2011), para 60. 
413
A.H. and J.K. v Cyprus App no 41903/10 and 41911/10 (ECtHR 21 June 2015), para 188. 
414
Article 15 of the ECHR states that “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with its other obligations under international law.”  
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an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. 
Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national 
authorities. Nonetheless, Contracting Parties do not enjoy an unlimited discretion. It is for 
the ECtHR to rule whether, inter alia, the States have gone beyond the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the crisis. The domestic margin of appreciation is thus 
accompanied by European supervision. In exercising this supervision, the ECtHR must give 
appropriate weight to such relevant factors as the nature of the rights affected by the 
derogation and the circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the emergency 
situation.415 If the highest domestic court has examined the issues relating to the States’ 
derogation, the ECtHR considers it would be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only 
if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the ECtHR's 
jurisprudence under that Article or reached a conclusion which was manifestly 
unreasonable.416  
 
Standard 31. Right to compensation in the case of unlawful detention 
 
Explanations relating to the Charter provide that “the rights in Article 6 are the rights 
guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR, and in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, they 
have the same meaning and scope. Consequently, the limitations which may legitimately be 
imposed on them, may not exceed those permitted by the ECHR.417 Article 5(5) of the ECHR 
states that “everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” In the case of 
Richmond Yaw and others v Italy, the ECtHR confirmed that mere recognition given by the 
Supreme Court of the irregularity of the prolongation of detention does not constitute a 
                                                 
415
A and Others v United Kingdom App no 3455/05 (19 February 2009) para 173. 
416
Ibid. para 174. For the standards on “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” and on the 
measures “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
417
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Official Journal of the EU (2007/C 303/02, 14 
December 2007). The third sub-paragraph of Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the Consolidated Version of the 
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sufficient redress for the victim of a violation of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.418 Under the 
case-law of the ECtHR, the right to compensation set forth in paragraph 5 presupposes that 
a violation of one of the paragraphs has been established, either by a domestic authority or 
by the Court.419 Article 5(5) of the ECHR is complied with where it is possible to apply for 
compensation in respect of a deprivation of liberty affected in conditions contrary to 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4.420 The arrest or detention may be lawful under domestic law, but still 
in breach of Article 5, which makes Article 5(5) of the ECHR applicable.421 Article 5(5) creates 
a direct and enforceable right to compensation before the national courts.422 An enforceable 
right to compensation must be available either before or after the ECtHR’s judgment.423 The 
effective enjoyment of the right to compensation must be ensured with a sufficient degree 
of certainty.424 Compensation must be available both in theory425 and in practice.426 In 
considering compensation claims, the domestic authorities are required to interpret and 
apply domestic law in the spirit of Article 5, without excessive formalism.427 The right to 
compensation relates primarily to financial compensation. It does not confer a right to 
secure the detained person’s release, which is covered by Article 5(4) of the ECHR.428  In the 
case of Abdi Mahamud v Malta, the ECtHR established that action in tort cannot be 
considered as an effective remedy for the purpose of a complaint about conditions of 
detention under Article 3 of the ECHR. In that case the ECtHR established that it has not 
been satisfactory established that action in tort may give rise to compensation for any non-
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pecuniary damage and that it was not a preventive remedy as it cannot impede the 
continuation of the violation alleged or provide the applicant with an improvement in the 
detention conditions.429 
 
Article 5(5) of the ECHR does not prohibit the Contracting States from making the award of 
compensation dependent upon the ability of the person concerned to show damage 
resulting from the breach. There can be no question of “compensation” where there is no 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage to compensate.430 However, excessive formalism in 
requiring proof of non-pecuniary damage resulting from unlawful detention is not compliant 
with the right to compensation.431 
 
Article 5 (5) of the ECHR does not entitle the applicant to a particular amount of 
compensation.432 However, compensation which is negligible or disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the violation would not comply with the requirements of Article 5 (5) of the 
ECHR as this would render the right guaranteed under that provision theoretical and 
illusory.433 An award cannot be considerably lower than that awarded by the ECtHR in similar 
cases.434  
 
For the general principles and standards regarding state liability where an individual suffered 
loss or damage as a result of the breach of EU law by a Member State, see paragraph 13 of 
Section 3.3. of this Statement. 
 
Standard 32. Right to reasoned judicial decisions and their enforcement (execution) 
 
In general, the fundamental right to fair legal process enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter 
                                                 
429
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entails an obligation “to provide a relevant and adequate statement of reasons”.435 
Concerning disputes on detention of asylum seekers, the secondary EU law explicitly 
regulates that decisions on detention, which must be ordered in writing by judicial or 
administrative authorities, shall state “the reasons in fact and in law on which the decision is 
based”.436Since Article 47 of the Charter is not limited to civil rights (and obligations and 
criminal charges) as is the case with Article 6 of the ECHR,437 more detailed standards 
regarding the obligation to state reasons in judgments may be inspired by the guarantees 
enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR. Under case-law of the ECtHR, these guarantees include 
the obligation for courts to give “sufficient” reasons for their decisions.438 A reasoned 
decision shows the parties that their case has truly been heard. Although a domestic court 
has a certain margin of appreciation when choosing arguments and admitting evidence, it is 
obliged to justify its activities by giving reasons for its decisions.439 Article 6(1) of the ECHR 
obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, but cannot be understood as requiring a 
detailed answer to every argument.440 The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies 
may vary according to the nature of the decision,441 and can only be determined in the light 
of the circumstances of the case. It is necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity 
of the submissions that a litigant may bring before the courts and the differences existing in 
the contracting States with regard to statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion and 
the presentation and drafting of judgments.442 However, where a party’s submission is 
decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, it requires a specific and express reply.443 The 
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courts are therefore required to examine the litigants’ main arguments444 and/or pleas 
concerning the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR and its Protocols with 
particular rigour and care.445 
 
Furthermore, the right to enforcement (execution) of judicial decisions, given by any court, is 
an integral part of the right of access to court.446 The effective protection of the litigant and 
the restoration of legality therefore presuppose an obligation on the administrative 
authorities’ part to comply with the judgment.447 Thus, while some delay in the enforcement 
(execution) of a judgment may be justified in certain circumstances, the delay may not be 
such as to impair the litigant’s right to enforcement of the judgment.448 Enforcement 
(execution) must be full and exhaustive and not just partial,449 and may not be prevented, 
invalidated or unduly delayed.450  
 
Standard 33. Protection of inhuman or degrading treatment in relation to reception 
conditions (of detention) in another Member State(s) 
 
If there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum 
procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in the Member State, resulting in a 
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, the 
determining Member State must continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III of 
the Dublin III Regulation in order to establish whether some other Member State can be 
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designated as responsible.451 If there is no other Member State responsible, then the 
applicant cannot be transferred and cannot be detained any longer, based on the Dublin III 
Regulation. One of the relevant criteria for the application of Article 3(2) of the Dublin III 
Regulation is that the Member State “cannot be unaware” of systemic deficiencies in the 
reception conditions in the relevant Member State.452 The term “systemic flaws” should not 
be taken to mean that the “slightest infringement” would be sufficient to prevent the 
transfer of an asylum seeker to the Member State.453 Furthermore, in this context, the CJEU 
makes a comparison to the concept of “safe third country,” in the sense that a country can 
only be considered safe if it “not only has ratified the Geneva Convention and the ECHR, but 
it also observes the provisions thereof /.../ The same principle is applicable both to Member 
State and third countries.”454 Under the case-law of the ECtHR, the applicant “should not be 
expected to bear the entire burden of proof”regarding the detention conditions in the 
Member State where he/she is supposed to be transferred.455 From the reasoning in the 
judgment of the Grand Chamber in the case of Tarakhel v Switzerland, it is clear that the 
existence of systemic deficiencies as regards reception conditions in another Member State 
is not a conditio sine qua non for protection under Article 3 of the ECHR.456  
 
Since the existence of systemic deficiencies regarding reception conditions in another 
Member State is not a conditio sine qua non for the protection under Article 3 of the ECHR 
(or Article 4 of the Charter), suffering which flows from naturally occurring illness - 
particularly serious mental or physical conditions, which may lead to the applicant's health 
significantly deteriorating - may be covered by Article 3 of the ECHR (or Article 4 of the 
Charter), too. 457 
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Standard 34. Conditions of detention  
 
“As regards /.../ detention conditions, where appropriate, Member States should apply the 
provisions of the Reception Directive 2013/33/EU also to persons detained on the basis of 
this Regulation.”458 The standard no. 34 is composed of 9 particular elements that are 
described under points 34.1. - 34.9. below. 
 
Standard 34.1. General conditions of detention: respect for human dignity, prohibition of 
inhuman/degrading treatment and the protection of family life  
 
“Applicants who are in detention should be treated with full respect for human dignity and 
their reception should be specifically designed to meet their needs in that situation.”459 The 
CJEU in the case of Cimade states that “further to the general scheme and purpose of the 
Reception Directive 2003/9 and the observance of fundamental rights, in particular the 
requirements of Article 1 of the Charter, under which human dignity must be respected and 
protected, the asylum seeker may not /.../ be deprived  - even for a temporary period of time 
after the making of the application for asylum and before being actually transferred to the 
responsible Member State - of the protection of the minimum standards laid down by that 
directive.”460 
As a rule, detention shall take place in specialised detention facilities. If this is not possible, 
the detained applicant shall, in so far as possible, be kept separately from ordinary prisoners 
and detention conditions, as provided for in the Recast Reception Directive.461 This 
exception (derogation) must be interpreted strictly,462 because the separated 
accommodation of third-country nationals and ordinary prisoners is an unconditional 
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obligation.463 
 
When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects, 
as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant. In particular, the major factors will 
be the length of the period during which the applicant was detained in the impugned 
conditions and where overcrowding reaches a certain level, the lack of space in an 
institution may also constitute a key factor to be taken into account.464 
Moreover, where children are detained (either alone or together with their parents), the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR shows that Article 3 of the ECHR is not the only right that may be 
engaged. In the case of Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium the Court found 
that the detention of an unaccompanied five-year old violated the Article 3 and Article 8 
rights of both the child and her mother in DRC.465  In the case of A.B et autres c. France, 
which concerned the administrative detention of accompanied foreign minors, the Court not 
only held that the conditions of detention violated the children’s Article 3 rights, but also 
that there had been an interference with the whole family’s Article 8 rights.466 In this 
context, the ECtHR has also adjudicated that the sole fact that a family unit is maintained 
does not necessarily guarantee respect for the right to a family life, particularly where the 
family is detained.467 The fact of confining the applicants to a detention centre, for fifteen 
days, thereby subjecting them to custodial living conditions typical of that kind of institution, 
can be regarded as an interference with the effective exercise of their family life.468 Such 
interference must be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society.469 
Authorities have a duty to strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the 
individual and society as a whole. In assessing proportionality, the child's best interests must 
be paramount. The protection of the child's best interests involves both keeping the family 
together as far as possible, and considering alternatives to detention so that the detention 
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of minors is only a measure of last resort.470 
 
From the standpoint of EU law, there is a “general principle” that in implementing the Recast 
Reception Directive Member States shall take into account the specific situation of 
vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, 
pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of human trafficking, persons 
with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who have been subjected 
to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, such as 
victims of female genital mutilation.471 
 
Standard 34.2. Inhuman/degrading treatment in detention: threshold and onus 
 
Article 3 of the ECHR enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies 
and prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
irrespective of the circumstances and of the victim’s conduct. In view of the absolute nature 
of Article 3 of the ECHR, the “margin of appreciation” does not apply where there is an 
alleged breach of the substantive Article. In order to fall within the scope of Article 3, ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is 
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the 
treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of 
health of the victim.472 Article 3 of the ECHR requires the State to ensure that detention 
conditions are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of 
the execution of the measure do not subject the detainees to distress or hardship of an 
intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given 
the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately 
secured.473 From the standpoint of Article 3 of the ECHR, the ECtHR “attaches considerable 
importance to the applicant's status as an asylum seeker and, as such, a member of a 
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particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special 
protection”.474 
 
In order to determine whether the threshold of severity has been reached, the ECtHR also 
takes other factors into consideration, in particular: the purpose for which the ill-treatment 
was inflicted, although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot 
conclusively rule out its characterisation as degrading; the context in which the ill-treatment 
was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions; whether the 
victim is in a vulnerable situation, which is normally the case for persons deprived of their 
liberty, but there is an inevitable element of suffering and humiliation involved in custodial 
measures and this as such, in itself, will not entail a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.475 
The ECtHR considers treatment to be “inhuman” when it was “premeditated, was applied for 
hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental 
suffering”.476 The treatment is considered to be “degrading” when it humiliates or debases 
an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or 
arousing feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and 
physical resistance.477 It may suffice that the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes, even 
if not in the eyes of others. Although the question whether the purpose of the treatment 
was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the absence of any 
such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.478 
In practice, the ECtHR will not always distinguish between inhuman treatment and degrading 
treatment, sometimes preferring instead to simply find that there has been a breach of 
Article 3. In other cases, it might make a specific finding that the treatment in question is 
either inhuman or degrading. 
With regard to the burden of proof, the ECtHR generally relies on the rule that allegations of 
ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. In other words, the applicant 
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bears the responsibility of providing evidence of treatment contrary to Article 3. However, 
the ECtHR has noted that cases concerning allegations of inadequate conditions of detention 
do not lend themselves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit 
probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation) because in such instances 
the respondent Government alone has access to information capable of corroborating or 
refuting these allegations. Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in 
procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection. Nevertheless, in such 
cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts 
complained of and provide – to the greatest possible extent – some evidence in support of 
their complaints.479 However, after the ECtHR has given notice of the applicant’s complaint 
to the Government, the burden is on the latter to collect and produce relevant documents. A 
failure on their part to submit convincing evidence on material conditions of detention may 
give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant’s 
allegations.480 “In assessing evidence, the ECtHR has generally applied the standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of 
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of 
facts”.481 
 
Standard 34.3. Conditions of detention: overcrowding, ventilation, access to light and 
natural air or to exercise in the open air, quality of heating, health requirements, basic 
sanitary and hygiene requirements 
 
The ECtHR has found overcrowding by itself to be sufficient to breach Article 3 where the 
personal space granted to the applicant was less than 3 m² of floor surface per detainee 
(including space occupied by furniture but not counting the in-cell sanitary facility). In multi-
occupancy accommodation this ought to be maintained as the relevant minimum standard 
                                                 
479
See Visloguzov v Ukraine App no 32362/02 (ECtHR 20 May 2010), para 45. 
480
See: Gubin v Russia App no 8217/04 (ECtHR 17 June 2010), para 56; Khudoyorov v Russia App no 6847/02 
(ECtHR 8 November 2005), para 113; Alimov v Turkey, App no 1434/13, (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 
75. 
481
Koktysh v Ukraine App no 43707/07 (ECtHR 10 December 2009), para 90; Salman v Turkey, (Grand 
Chamber), App no 21986/93 (ECtHR 27 June 2000) para 100; Khlaifia and Others v Italy App no 16483/12 
(ECtHR 15 December 2016), paras 127, 168. 
Section 4. Detention under the Dublin III Regulation and the ECHR: Basic Judicial Check-list 1 
 
104 
 
for its assessment under Article 3 of the ECHR.482 A weighty but not irrebuttable 
presumption of a violation of Article 3 arose when the personal space available to a detainee 
fell below 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation. The presumption could be rebutted 
in particular by demonstrating that the cumulative effects of the other aspects of the 
conditions of detention compensated for the scarce allocation of personal space. In that 
connection, the ECtHR takes into account such factors as the length and extent of the 
restriction, the degree of freedom of movement and the adequacy of out-of-cell activities, 
as well as whether or not the conditions of detention in the particular facility are generally 
decent.”483  
In Aden Ahmed v Malta (para. 87) the ECtHR had regard not just to the floor space afforded 
to each detainee, but also to whether each detainee had an individual sleeping place in the 
cell, and whether the overall surface area of the cell was such as to allow detainees to move 
freely between the furniture items. Based on standards from Aden Ahmed v Malta, in 
deciding whether or not there has been a violation of Article 3 on account of the lack of 
personal space, the ECtHR has to have regard to the following three elements: “each 
detainee must have an individual sleeping place in a cell; each detainee must dispose of at 
least three square meters of floor space; and the overall surface area of the cell must be such 
as to allow the detainees to move freely between the furniture items. The absence of any 
above elements creates in itself a strong presumption that the conditions of detention 
amounted to degrading treatment and were in breach of Article 3.484 As the fourth element, 
the ECtHR refers to “other aspects.” Where overcrowding was not significant enough to raise 
itself an issue under Article 3, the ECtHR has taken into account “other aspects” of detention 
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conditions, including the ability to use the toilets privately,485 available ventilation, access to 
light and natural air, the quality of heating and balanced meals486 and respect for basic 
health requirements. Therefore, in cases where each detainee had 3 to 4 m², the ECtHR 
found a violation of Article 3 where the lack of space was accompanied by a lack of 
ventilation and light,487  limited access to outdoor exercise,488 or a total lack of privacy in 
cells.489  The ECtHR mentions the Prisons Standards developed by the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture, which specifically deal with outdoor exercise and consider it a basic 
safeguard of prisoners' well-being that all of them, without exception, should be allowed at 
least one hour of exercise in the open air every day, preferably as part of a broader 
programme of out-of-cell activities.490 Under the standards of the ECHR “access to outdoor 
exercise is a fundamental component of the protection afforded to persons deprived of their 
liberty under Article 3 and as such it cannot be left to the discretion of the authorities.”491 For 
that reason, physical characteristics of outdoor exercise facilities are also relevant.492 Under 
EU secondary law, there is a special provision which says that detained applicants shall have 
                                                 
485
For the compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements, see, for example: Anayev and Others v 
Russia App nos 42525/07 and 60800/08, paras 156-159, Aden Ahmed v Malta App no 55352/12 (ECtHR 9 
December 2013), para 88; Moiseyev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR 9 October 2008) para 124. 
486
See, for example, Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), paras 96, 98; Abdi 
Mahamud v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), paras 84, 85, 89). 
487
Torreggiani and Others v Italy App nos 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09 et al (ECtHR 8 January 2013), para 69; 
see also Sergey Babushkin v Russia App no 5993/08 (ECtHR 16 October 2015) para 44; Vlasov v Russia App 
no 51279/09 (ECtHR 10 February 2010), para 84; Moiseyev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR 9 October 
2008), paras 124-127. 
488
István Kovács Gábor v Hungary App no 15707/10 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 26; see also Mandič and 
Jović v Slovenia App nos 5774/10 and 5985/10, para 78; Babar Ahmad and Others v United Kingdom App 
nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09 (ECtHR 10 April 2012) paras 213-214.  
489
Novoselov v Russia App no 66460/01 (ECtHR 2 June 2005) paras 32 and 40-43; Khoudoyorov v Russia no 
6847/02 (ECtHR 8 November 2005), paras 106-107; Belevitski v Russia App no 72967/01 (ECtHR 1 March 
2007) paras 73-79. 
490
Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta App nos 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR 22 November 2016),  
para 102. 
491
This is so regardless of how good the material conditions might be in the cells. (Alimov v Turkey App no 
14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 83. See also: Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 
25 November 2015), para 93. 
492
For instance, an exercise yard that is just two square metres larger than the cell, is surrounded by three 
metre high walls, and has an opening to the sky covered with metal bars and a thick net does not offer 
inmates proper opportunities for recreation and recuperation (Mahamed Jama v Malta App no10290/13 
(ECtHR 26 November 2015), para 93; see also paras 94-95). 
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access to open-air spaces.493  In addition, the time during which an individual was detained 
in the contested conditions is an important factor to consider.494 
As regards the notion of the so called “continuous detention”, the ECtHR stated that when 
complaints in relation to conditions of detention do not simply relate to a specific event, but 
which concern a whole range of problems regarding sanitary conditions, the temperature in 
cells, overcrowding, lack of adequate medical treatment, which have affected an inmate 
throughout his or her incarceration, the ECtHR regards this as a “continuing situation”, even 
if the person concerned has been transferred between various detention facilities in the 
relevant period. 495 
 
For concrete examples of circumstances where the ECtHR did (not) find a violation of Article 3 of the 
ECtHR, see summaries of cases in the judgment of the Khlaifia and others v Italy (paras. 171-177) and 
the Explanatory Note. 
 
Standard 34.4. Right to communication and information in detention 
 
In regards to the right to communication, representatives of the UNHCR or of the 
organisation which is working on the territory of the Member State concerned (on behalf of 
the UNHCR) pursuant to an agreement with that Member State, shall have the possibility to 
communicate and visit applicants in conditions that respect privacy.496 Member States shall 
ensure that family members, legal advisers or counsellors and persons representing relevant 
non-governmental organisations recognised by the Member State concerned have the 
possibility to communicate with and visit applicants in conditions that respect privacy. 
Restrictions on access to the detention facility may be imposed only where, by virtue of 
national law, they are objectively necessary for the security, public order or administrative 
management of the detention facility, provided that access is not thereby severely restricted 
or rendered impossible.497  In addition, regarding rules applied in detention facilities and 
                                                 
493
Article 10(2) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
494
Kalashnikov v Russia App no 47095/99 (ECtHR 15 July 2002) para 102; Kehayov v Bulgaria App no 41035/98 
(ECtHR 18 January 2005) para 64, Alver v Estonia App no 64812/01 (ECtHR 8 November 2005), para 50.  
495
Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 59. 
496
Article 10(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
497
Article 10(4) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
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rights and obligations of detainees, Member States shall ensure that applicants in detention 
are systematically provided with information that explains those rules, rights and 
obligations. They must be informed in a language which they understand or are reasonably 
supposed to understand. Member States may derogate from this obligation in duly justified 
cases and for a reasonable period which shall be as short as possible, in the event that the 
applicant is detained at a border post or in a transit zone.498 
 
Standard 34.5. Minors 
 
According to Article 2(i) of the Dublin III Regulation “minor” means a third country national 
or a stateless person below the age of 18 years. “The minor's best interest, as prescribed in 
Article 23(2), shall be a primary consideration for Member States.”499 This includes taking 
due account of family reunification possibilities; the minor's well-being and social 
development, taking into particular consideration the minor's background; safety and 
security considerations, in particular where there is a risk of the minor being a victim of 
human trafficking; and the views of the minor in accordance with his or her age and 
maturity.500 The child's extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence 
over considerations relating to the status of illegal migrants.501 
 
The second sentence of Recital 18 of the Recast Reception Directive states that Member 
States should in particular ensure that Article 37 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child is applied. Apart from general conditions and procedural 
requirements that are described in other standards of this check-list, Article 37 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child among other things provides that deprivation of 
liberty of a child “shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time” /.../ and “in a manner which takes into account the needs of 
                                                 
498
This derogation shall not apply in cases referred to in Article 43 of Directive 2013/32/EU (Article 10(5) of the 
Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation.  
499
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(2) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of 
the Dublin III Regulation. See also: Article 6(1) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
500
 See also standard 12 on the best interests of a child. 
501
 Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012), para 91; Mubilanzila Mayeka 
and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 October 2006), para 55. 
Section 4. Detention under the Dublin III Regulation and the ECHR: Basic Judicial Check-list 1 
 
108 
 
persons of his or her age” /.../.502 Every child deprived of liberty “shall be separated from 
adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right 
to maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in 
exceptional circumstances /.../ and shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other 
appropriate assistance.”503 When minors are detained, they shall have the possibility to 
engage in leisure activities, including play and recreational activities appropriate to their 
age.”504 In general, from the standpoint of Article 3 of the ECHR, several criteria need to be 
taken into consideration in cases concerning the detention of children: whether the child is 
accompanied or not; the age of the child, his/her state of health, including eventual feelings 
of fear, anguish, inferiority; the duration of detention and its physical and mental effects; 
and the particular circumstances in the detention centre, including circumstances in the 
close surrounding area.505 
 
Standard 34.6. Unaccompanied Minors 
 
Under the Recast Reception Directive unaccompanied minor means a minor who arrives on 
the territory of the member State unaccompanied by an adult responsible for him or her 
whether by law or by the practice of the Member State concerned, and for as long as he or 
she is not effectively taken into the care of such a person; it includes a minor who is left 
unaccompanied after he or she entered the territory of the Member State.506  
 “Unaccompanied minors shall be detained only in exceptional circumstances. All efforts shall 
be made to release the detained unaccompanied minor as soon as possible.”507 
                                                 
502
Those needs have to be considered also in the light of the right to primary education under Article 28 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.    
503
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 
Art 37(c)-(d). 
504
Third sub-paragraph of Article 11(2) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of 
the Dublin III Regulation.  
505
A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), paras 109-115; Rahimi v Greece App no 
8687/08 (ECtHR 5 June 2011) para 59; Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 
(ECtHR 12 October 2006), para 48. See concrete examples of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in the 
Explanatory note. 
506
Article 2(e) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
507
First sub-paragraph of Article 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the 
Dublin III Regulation. 
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Unaccompanied minors have to be accommodated separately from adults508 and shall never 
be detained in prison accommodation.509 As far as possible, they shall be provided with 
accommodation in institutions provided with personnel and facilities which take into 
account the needs of persons of their age.510 
 
Standard 34.7. Ill-health and special medical conditions 
 
As regards detention of persons with special medical needs, the case-law of the ECtHR has 
considered the situation of detainees with mental illness, suicidal tendencies, detainees who 
are HIV-positive, paraplegics who are confined to a wheelchair and pregnant women. 
Besides, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities511, to which the EU 
became a party, provides “programmatic” standards that need to be implemented by the 
adoption of subsequent measures which are the responsibility of the Contracting Parties in 
relation to the detention of people with disabilities.512  
 
Standard 34.8. Elderly 
 
The ECtHR has not expressly considered the detention of elderly persons in the expulsion 
context. However, the ECtHR has routinely stated that age and state of health will be 
relevant to the assessment of the level of severity of ill-treatment, and there are a number 
of cases in which the ECtHR has addressed the vulnerability of this group within the 
domestic prison regime.513  
                                                 
508
Fourth sub-paragraph of Article 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of 
the Dublin III Regulation. 
509
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of 
the Dublin III Regulation. 
510
Third sub-paragraph of Aricle 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the 
Dublin III Regulation. See also standard 33.4. on minors and the Explanatory note on examples of detention 
of unaccompanied minors in the case-law of the ECtHR. 
511
Council Decision (2010/48/EC) Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the 
European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [2010] 
OJ L 23/35. 
512
See also the Explanatory note of standard no 34.7 of this Check-list on ill-health (special medical conditions). 
513
See, for example: Sawoniuk v United Kingdom App no 63716/00 (ECtHR 29 May 2001), Papon v France App 
no 54210/00 (ECtHR 25 July 2002); Farbtuhs v Latvia App no 4672/02 (ECtHR 2 December 2004), and Enea v 
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Standard 34.9. Other vulnerable persons (female applicants, mothers, LGBT etc.) 
 
“Where female applicants are detained, Member States shall ensure that they are 
accommodated separately from male applicants, unless the latter are family members and 
all individuals concerned consent thereto.” Exceptions may apply to the use of common 
spaces designated for recreational or social activities, including the provision of meals.514 
“Where vulnerable persons are detained, Member States shall ensure regular monitoring and 
adequate support taking into account their particular situation, including their health.”515 In 
case of female detainees, a lack of female staff in the centre, may be relevant, too.516 In the 
case of Mahamad Jama v Malta, irrespective of health concerns or age factor the ECtHR 
considered the female applicant more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker 
detained at the time.517 Detained families shall be provided with separate accommodation 
guaranteeing adequate privacy.518 
In the case of O.M. v Hungary the ECtHR decided that the authorities failed to exercise 
particular care in order to avoid situations which may reproduce the conditions that forced 
that person to flee in the first place. The authorities ordered the applicant's detention 
without considering the extent to which vulnerable individuals - for instance, LGBT were safe 
or unsafe in custody among other detained persons, many of whom had come from 
countries with widespread cultural or religious prejudice against such persons.519 For further 
concrete examples in the case-law of the ECtHR on the detention of vulnerable persons, see 
the Explanatory Note.  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Italy App no 74912/01 (ECtHR 17 September 2009), Haidn v Germany App no 6587/04 (ECtHR 13 January 
2011), Contrada (no2) v Italy App no 7509/08 (ECtHR 11 February 2014) and Explanatory note. 
514
Article 11(5) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
515
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(1) of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of 
the Dublin III Regulation. 
516
See, for example: Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2016), para 97; Abdi 
Mahamud v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), paras 84, 86, 89. 
517
Ibid. para 100. 
518
Article 11(4) of the Recast Reception Direcitve in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
519
O.M. v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR 5 July 2016)  para 53. 
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Standard 2. Definition of detention 
 
In the case of detention, the right to freedom of movement under Article 45 (2) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter: the Charter) or under Article 2(1) of 
Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR cannot be applicable to asylum-seekers or irregular migrants, 
because these categories of third country nationals do not have the status of lawful 
residents on the territory of the Member States.520 Asylum seekers only have a right to 
remain, which does not constitute an entitlement to a residence permit521; they only have 
the right not to be “regarded as staying illegally” on the territory of a Member State.522 The 
CJEU adds that “Article 7(1) of the Directive 2003/9 lays down the principle that asylum 
seekers may move freely within the territory of the host Member State or within an area 
assigned to them by that Member State /.../.”523 This is in line with Article 26 of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which states that each Contracting State shall 
accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to 
move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in 
the same circumstances.524  
 
In its case law (until 2016), the CJEU uses solely the term “detention” without making a 
distinction between deprivation of freedom of movement and deprivation of liberty. 
However, in the Mahdi case, which refers to detention under the Return Directive, the CJEU 
                                                 
520
Article 45(2) states that freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the 
Treaties, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State. Article 2(1) of 
the Protocol No 4 to the ECHR states that “everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that 
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence”. 
521
Article 9(1) of the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (OJEU, L 180, 29. 6. 
2013; hereinafter the Recast Procedures Directive). See also: C-534/11 Arslan EU:C:2013:343, para 44. 
522
Recital 9 of the Return Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals (Official Journal of the EU, L 348, 24. 12. 2008; hereinafter the Return Directive); C-
357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741, para 41; C-534/11 Arslan EU:C:2013:343, para 48.  
523
Ibid. para 53; C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741, para 42. 
524
See also: C-443/14 and C-444/14 Alo and Osso, EU:C:2016:127, paras 35, 44. 
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briefly refers to Article 6 of the Charter.525 In the Alo and Osso case, the resident permits 
were issued to the applicants with subsidiary protection with a condition requiring them to 
take up residence, in Mr Alo's case in the town of Ahlen (Germany), and in Ms Osso’s case in 
Hannover Region (Germany), with the exception of the capital of the Land of Lower Saxony. 
The CJEU delivered its preliminary ruling based on the provision on freedom of 
movement.526 The CJEU states that the fact that Article 33 of the Recast Qualifications 
Directive (2011/95)527 is entitled “Freedom of Movement” is not sufficient to dispel the 
ambiguities of its wording.528  Similarly, the ECtHR states that “it is often necessary to look 
beyond the appearances and the language used and concentrate on the realities of the 
situation.”529  
 
In the case of Nada v Switzerland, the ECtHR states in general terms that “the requirement to 
take account of the type and manner of implementation of the measure in question /.../ 
enables it to have regard to the specific context and circumstances surrounding types of 
restriction other than the paradigm of confinement in a cell /.../. Indeed, the context in which 
the measure is taken is an important factor, since situations commonly occur in modern 
society where the public may be called on to endure restrictions on freedom of movement or 
liberty in the interest of the common good” /.../.530  In this case, the ECtHR observed that the 
area in which the applicant was not allowed to travel was the territory of a third country, 
Switzerland. The restrictions in question did not prevent the applicant from living and 
moving freely within the territory of his permanent residence, where he had chosen of his 
own free will to live and carry on his activities. These circumstances differ radically from the 
                                                 
525
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, para 52 and point 1 of the operative part of the judgment. 
526
C-443/14 and C-444/14 Alo and Osso EU:C:2016:127, paras 15-16, 22-24. 
527
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, 
for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted (recast) (OJEU EU, L 337/9, 20. 12. 2011; hereinafter: the Recast Qualifications 
Directive). 
528
C-443/14 and C-444/14 Alo and Osso EU:C:2016:127,  para 25. For distinctions between the notions of 
restriction of person's liberty of movement, restriction of liberty and deprivation of liberty in the context of 
detention under the European arrest warrant, see judgment of the CJEU in the case of C-294/16 PPU JZ v 
Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź EU:C:2016:610. 
529
Kasparov v Russia App no 53659/07 (ECtHR 13 September 2016), para 36. See also: Ilias and Ahmed v 
Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017), para 66. 
530
Nada v Switzerland (Grand Chamber) App no 10593/08 (ECtHR 12 September 2012), para 226. 
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factual situation in the Guzzardi case.531 
 
In the case of Guzzardi v Italy, the applicant was suspected of belonging to a “band of 
mafiosi” and had been forced to live in an island within an (unfenced) area of 2.5 km2, 
together with other residents in a similar situation and supervisory staff. The ECtHR found 
that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the 
ECHR. 
 
In the case of Raimondo v Italy532  the applicant was suspected of involvement with mafia 
and he had been confined to his home in the evenings. He had an obligation to inform the 
police when he planned to leave his home; however, he did not require permission from the 
police to leave his home. Thus, the ECtHR concluded that this amounted to a restriction of 
freedom of movement and not to deprivation of liberty. When a border official stops a 
passenger during border control in an airport in order to clarify his/her situation and where 
a detention has not exceeded the time strictly necessary to comply with relevant formalities, 
no issue arises under Article 5 of the ECHR.533  
 
In the case of Khlaifia  and Others v Italy the Italian authorities had kept the Centro di 
Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza (CSPA) on the island of Lampedusa, where after giving 
migrants first aid the authorities proceeded with their identification “under surveillance” 
and the applicants were “prohibited from leaving the centre and the ships Vincent and 
Audace”. Despite the fact that detainees were not in cells, the conditions to which they were 
subjected were similar to detention and deprivation of freedom. They were subject to 
prolonged confinement, unable to communicate with the outside world and there was a lack 
of freedom of movement for the migrants placed in the Lampedusa reception centres. They 
were not free to leave the CSPA. “When they have managed to evade the police surveillance 
                                                 
531
Guzzardi v Italy App no 7367/76 (ECtHR 6 November 1980), paras 26-29. 
532
Raimondo v Italy App no 12954/87 (ECtHR 22 February 1994). 
533
Gahramanov v Azerbaijan App no 26291/06
 
(ECtHR 15 October 2013), para 41. For further examples, see 
also: Cyprus v Turkey App no 25781/94 (ECtHR 10 May 2001); Djavit An v Turkey App no 20652/92  (ECtHR 
20 Feb 2003); Hajibeyli v Azerbaijan App no 16528/05 (10 July 2008); Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v Germany 
App no 34044/96, 35532/97, 44801/98 (ECtHR 22 March 2001), Ashingdane v United Kingdom App no 
8225/78 (ECtHR 28 May 1985); Beghal v the UK (pending) (no 4755/16). 
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and reach the village of Lampedusa, they were stopped by the police and taken back to the 
reception centre. This suggests that the applicants were being held at the CSPA involuntarily. 
The duration of the applicants’ confinement in the CSPA and on the ships, lasting for about 
twelve days in the case of the first applicant and about nine days in that of the second and 
the third applicants, was not insignificant. Classification of the applicantsʹ confinement in 
domestic law cannot alter the nature of the constraining measures imposed on them. 
Moreover, the applicability of Article 5 of the ECHR cannot be excluded by the fact, relied on 
by the Government, that the authoritiesʹ aim had been to assist the applicants and ensure 
their safety. Even measures intended for protection or taken in the interest of the person 
concerned may be regarded as a deprivation of liberty.”534 
Depending on the factual circumstances, under the case-law of the ECtHR detention during 
the period of 9 hours,535 12 hours,536 or even only 2 hours537 or 3 hours538 can mean a 
deprivation of liberty. 
 
Standard 4. Persons who can be subject to detention 
 
In its case-law, the CJEU also dealt with a situation in which a third country national was 
detained on the basis of the Return Directive on the ground of the risk of absconding, after 
which he also applied for asylum with the sole intention of delaying or even jeopardising 
enforcement of the return decision, which must be based on a case-by-case assessment of 
all relevant circumstances. Such a situation does not mean that the return procedure is 
definitely terminated, as it may continue if the applicant is not transferred based on the 
Dublin III Regulation and his/her asylum application is examined and rejected by that 
Member State.539  
 
As regards the judgment in the case of Ghezelbash, it is important to note that in this case 
the CJEU developed an interpretation that is relevant also for the grounds for detention 
                                                 
534
 Khlaifia and Others v Italy, (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR, 15 December 2016), paras 65-71. 
535
 Tiba v Romania  App no 36188/09 (ECtHR 13 December 2016), para 45.  
536 
Iustin Robertino Micu v Romania App no 41040/11 (ECtHR 13 January 2015), para 109. 
537
 Tomaszewscy c. Pologne App no 8933/05 (ECtHR 15 April 2014), para 129. 
538 
Baisuev and Anzorov v Georgia App no 39804/04 (ECtHR 18 December 2012), para 53. 
539
 C-534/11 Arslan EU:C:2013:343, paras 60-62; see also: C-601/15 PPU, J.N.  (Grand Chamber), EU:C:2016:84, 
paras 75, 79-80; Nabil and Others v Hungary App no 62116/12 (ECtHR 22 September 2015), para 38. 
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based on the Dublin III Regulation. Regulation No 604/2013 differs in essential respects from 
Regulation No 343/2003. The legal remedy provided for in Article 27(1) of the Dublin III 
Regulation must be effective and cover questions of both fact and law. The drafting of that 
provision makes no reference to any limitation of the arguments that may be raised by the 
asylum-seeker when availing himself of that remedy. The EU legislature did not provide for 
any specific link or, a fortiori, any exclusive link between the legal remedies established in 
Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation and the rule, now set out in Article 3(2) of that 
Regulation, which limits possibilities for transferring an applicant to the Member State 
initially designated as responsible where there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure 
and in the reception conditions resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.540 
 
In the opinion of the CJEU, the EU legislature has introduced or enhanced various rights and 
mechanisms guaranteeing the involvement of asylum-seekers in the process for determining 
the Member State responsible. Thus, Regulation No 604/2013 differs, to a significant degree, 
from Regulation No 343/2003, which was applicable in the case which gave rise to the 
judgment in the case of Abdullahi.541  The EU legislature did not confine itself to introducing 
organisational rules simply governing relations between Member States, but decided to 
involve asylum-seekers in that process by obliging Member States to inform them of the 
criteria for determining responsibility and to provide them with an opportunity to submit 
information relevant to the correct interpretation of those criteria, and by conferring on 
asylum-seekers the right to an effective remedy in respect of any transfer decision that 
might be taken at the conclusion of that process.542 
 
Standard 6. Permissible grounds for detention: significant risk of absconding linked 
to the purpose of securing transfer procedures 
 
In the past, the ECtHR mostly examined the ground for detention of asylum-seekers or 
immigrants under the first limb of Article 5(1)(f), which states that “no one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
                                                 
540
 C-63/15 Ghezelbash, EU:C:2016:186, paras 34, 36, 37. 
541 
Ibid. para 46. 
542 
Ibid. para 51. 
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law to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country.”543 However, taking EU 
law into account, the other possible ground for detention under the ECHR544 is Article 5(1(b) 
of the ECHR.545 For example, in the context of Greece, the ECtHR stated in general terms that 
“the Court examined and found a violation of Article 5(1) under its second limb on the basis 
that the applicant's detention pending asylum proceedings could not have been undertaken 
for the purposes of deportation, given that national law did not allow for deportation 
pending a decision on asylum”.546 Additionally, the ECtHR adds that, if a State enacts 
legislation (of its own motion or pursuant to EU law) explicitly authorising the entry or stay 
of immigrants pending an asylum application, “it would be hard to consider the measure as 
being closely connected to the purpose of the detention and to regard the situation as being 
in accordance with domestic law. In fact, it would be arbitrary and thus run counter to the 
purpose of Article 5(1)(f) of the Convention to interpret clear and precise domestic law 
provisions in a manner contrary to their meaning. The Court notes that in Saadi the national 
law /.../did not provide for the applicant to be granted formal authorisation to stay or to 
enter the territory, and therefore no such issue arose. The Court therefore considers that the 
question as to when the first limb of Article 5 ceases to apply, because the individual has 
been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law.”547 
Thus, in the case of S.D. c. Greece, the ECtHR established that a detention was unlawful from 
the standpoint of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, because under the legal circumstances in 
Greece, as long as the asylum application is pending, a deportation order cannot be 
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executed.548  
 
However, in the later case of Nabil and Others (22 September 2015), which was decided by 
the former second section, the ECtHR first cited relevant paragraphs from the judgments of 
the Ahmade and R.U. cases,549 but later added that “for the Court the pending asylum case 
does not as such imply that the detention was no longer with a view to deportation – since 
an eventual dismissal of the asylum applications could have opened the way to the execution 
of the deportation orders.”550 The Guide on Article 5 of the Convention clarifies this with the 
reference to the case of Suso Musa v Malta (para. 97) by saying that the question as to when 
the first limb of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR (detention to prevent unauthorised entry into 
country) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to 
enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law.551 
 
In the later case of O.M. v Hungary, the ECtHR examined permissible grounds for detention 
under Article 5(1)(b) of the ECHR. It observed that detention is only authorised under sub-
paragraph (b) of Article 5(1) to secure the fulfilment of the obligation prescribed by law. “At 
the very least, there must be an unfulfilled obligation incumbent on the person concerned, 
and the arrest and detention must be for the purpose of securing its fulfilment and must not 
be punitive in character. As soon as the relevant obligation has been fulfilled, the basis for 
detention under Article 5(1)(b) ceases to exist. Moreover, this obligation should not be given 
a wide interpretation. It has to be specific and concrete, and the arrest and detention must 
be truly necessary for the purpose of ensuring its fulfilment. An arrest will only be acceptable 
under the ECHR if the obligation prescribed by law cannot be fulfilled by milder means. The 
principle of proportionality further dictates that a balance must be struck between the 
importance in a democratic society of securing the immediate fulfilment of the obligation in 
question and the importance of the right to liberty. In its assessment the ECtHR considers the 
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(ECtHR 7 June 2011) paras 94, 96; Ahmade v Greece App no 50520/09 (ECtHR 25 September 2012) paras 
142-144. These are judgments of the first section of the ECtHR. 
549
Nabil and Others v Hungary App no 62116/12 (ECtHR 22 September 2015), para 35. 
550
Ibid. para 38. 
551
Guide on Article 5 of the Convention, European Court of Human Rights, 2014 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_5_ENG.pdf, p. 19/point100. 
Explanatory Note to the Basic Judicial Check-List 1 
 
118 
 
following points relevant: the nature of the obligation arising from the relevant legislation, 
including its underlying object and purpose; the person being detained and the particular 
circumstances leading to the detention; and the length of the detention.”552 
Standard 7. Objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding 
 
Article 3(7) of the Return Directive corresponds to Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
The Return Handbook (draft) on page 11 (point 1.6.) says that frequently used criteria for 
risk of absconding based on the Return Directive that are defined in national law are, for 
instance: lack of documentation; absence of cooperation to determine identity; use of false 
documentation or destroying existing documents; failing repeatedly to report to relevant 
authorities; explicit expression of intent of non-compliance; conviction of a criminal offence; 
violation of a return decision; non-compliance with an existing entry ban; prior conduct (i.e. 
escaping); and being the subject of a return decision made in another Member State. 
However, it needs to be pointed out that based on the judgment in the case of Mahdi the 
State may consider, for example, a lack of identity documents as objective criteria for the risk 
of absconding. But the mere fact that the person concerned has no identity documents 
cannot, on its own, be a ground for detention or extending detention, since any assessment 
relating to the risk of the person concerned must be based on an individual examination of 
that person's case.553 Where national legislation has not introduced objective criteria for the 
risk of absconding in relation to the Dublin III Regulation, the German Federal High Court554 
and the Austrian High Administrative Court555 ruled that detention lacked sufficient legal 
basis and could not be applied.  
 
Standard 9. Control of the quality of law on detention 
 
In the cases of Abdolkhani and Karimnia (para. 125-135) and Keshmiri v Turkey ((no.2), para. 
33), the Government sought to rely on certain legal provisions to justify the applicants’ 
detention, but the ECtHR held that these provisions were not concerned with a deprivation 
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of liberty in the context of deportation proceedings, but rather the regulation of the 
residence of certain groups of foreigners in Turkey. Consequently, it found that the 
applicants’ detention had no legal basis. Likewise, in the case of Khlaifia v Italy the ECtHR 
held that there had been no legal basis for the applicants’ detention in a reception centre in 
Lampedusa as domestic law only permitted foreigners to be detained if they needed special 
assistance or where additional identity checks or documentation were required. 
Furthermore, even if these criteria were met, they should have been detained in a different 
centre pursuant to an administrative decision. The ECtHR also considered whether the 
power to detain existed under a bilateral agreement between Italy and Tunisia. However, it 
noted that even if such a power had existed, the content of this agreement was not public. It 
was therefore not accessible to the interested parties and they could not have foreseen the 
consequences of its application.556  
In the case of Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary detention in a transit zone was based on 
“elastically interpreted general provision of the law. Thus, according to Article 71/A(1) and 
(2) of the Asylum Act asylum seekers who were subjected to the border procedure were not 
entitled to stay in the territory of Hungary or to seek accommodation at a designated facility 
and the ECtHR was not persuaded that these rules circumscribe with sufficient precision and 
foreseeability. Furthermore, no special grounds for detention in the transit zone were 
provided for in Article 71/A of the Asylum Act. These were important elements in 
argumentation that detention was not lawful for the purposes of Article 5(1) of the ECHR.557 
 
Standard 10. The right to information and a personal interview before the 
detention order is issued  
 
Although Article 5(3) of the Dublin III Regulation states that a personal interview shall take 
place before any decision is taken to transfer the applicant, this does not mean that the 
personal interview is a procedural guarantee applicable only before a transfer decision is 
taken and not before a detention order is issued.  Article 5 of the Dublin III Regulation is part 
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of the “general principles and safeguards”. The personal interview may be omitted in only 
two situations.558 The requirement of an individual assessment both of the relevant facts 
and of proportionality (necessity) after the application for international protection is lodged 
can hardly be exercised effectively without a personal interview, especially since Member 
States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is subject to the 
procedure established by the Dublin III Regulation.559 Furthermore, the right to good 
administration includes, as a general principle of EU law, the right of every person to be 
heard before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken.560 
“The right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his views 
effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable 
to affect his interests adversely”.561 “Observance of the right to be heard is required even 
where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural 
requirement.”562  
 
However, “fundamental rights, such as respect for the rights of the defence, do not constitute 
unfettered prerogatives and may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact 
correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question and that 
they do not involve, with regard to the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights guaranteed.”563  
Therefore, not every irregularity in the exercise of the rights of the defence in an 
administrative procedure on detention will constitute an infringement of those rights. Not 
every breach of the right to be heard will systematically render unlawful the decision taken 
and therefore not every such breach will automatically require the release of the person 
concerned.564 “To make such a finding of unlawfulness, the national court must – where it 
considers that a procedural irregularity affecting the right to be heard has occurred – assess 
whether, in the light of the factual and legal circumstances of the case, the outcome of the 
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administrative procedure at issue could have been different if the third-country nationals in 
question had been able to put forward information which might show that their detention 
should be brought to an end.”565 However, in this respect it needs to be borne in mind that 
under the case-law of the ECtHR an infringement of the right to a personal interview (to be 
heard and to defence) before a detention is prolonged may constitute a gross or a manifest 
violation of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.566 
 
Standard 12. Best interests of a child 
 
In the case of MA, BT, DA, the CJEU refers to the best interests of a child as a fundamental 
right and not as a general principle of law. The CJEU says that /.../ ”those fundamental rights 
include, in particular, that set out in Article 24(2) of the Charter /.../ Thus, the second 
paragraph of Article 6 of the Dublin III Regulation cannot be interpreted in such a way that it 
disregards that fundamental right”.567 The difference between a right and a general principle 
of law in the light of the Charter is significant, because “principles” may be implemented by 
legislative and executive acts taken by institutions of the Union, and by acts of Member 
States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers and 
“they shall be judicially congisable only in the interpretation of such acts in the ruling on their 
legality.”568 Such limitation, therefore, does not exist in case of judicial interpretation of 
“rights.” 
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The general position of the ECtHR as regards best interests of a child is that “there is 
currently a broad consensus – including in international law – in support of the idea that in 
all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be paramount”.569 The following 
concrete examples show how this principle can affect the outcome of the court proceedings: 
Rahimi v Greece, Popov v France,570 Tarakhel v Switzerland.571 
 
Standard 13. Consideration of the effectiveness and less coercive alternative 
measures to detention 
 
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency mentions the following alternatives to detention: an 
obligation to surrender passports or travel documents; residence restrictions combined with 
regular reporting requirements in designated places, open or semi-open facilities run by the 
government or NGOs, as well as hotels, hostels or private addresses; release on bail and 
provision of sureties by third parties, regular reporting to the authorities; placement in open 
facilities with caseworker support; and electronic monitoring.572 The UNHCR lists in its 
publication “Alternatives to Detention”573 very similar, less coercive alternative measures to 
detention: deposit or surrender of travel or identity documentation; reporting at periodic 
intervals by using new technologies; use of a designated or directed residence; bail or bond 
systems – financial deposit that may be forfeited in the event the individuals abscond; 
community supervision and case management; and child and family appropriate alternatives 
to detention (foster care, supervised independent living, group care, collective residential 
youth villages etc.).574 The UNHCR lists five elements that have been widely found to 
contribute to the success of alternatives to detention. These are: 1) treating asylum-seekers 
(and migrants) with dignity, humanity and respect throughout the relevant asylum or 
migration procedure; 2) providing clear and concise information about rights and duties 
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under the alternative to detention and the consequences of non-compliance; 3) providing 
asylum-seekers with legal advice, including on their asylum applications and options 
available to them should their asylum claim be rejected. Such advice is most effective when 
made available at the outset of and continuing throughout relevant procedures; 4) providing 
access to adequate material support, accommodation and other reception conditions; and 
5) offering individualized “coaching” or case management services.575 Also the research of 
the Odysseus network in Europe confirmed that alternatives were less successful when they 
did not incorporate one or more of those five elements.576 The UNHCR stresses the 
importance of developing and implementing alternatives to detention in a way that is 
context-specific. No single alternative to detention will be fully replicable in every context. 
However, there are elements that remain constant through the many examples that exist.577  
 
Regarding the availability of effective, less coercive measures to detention, it is relevant to 
note that Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration 
Fund578 provides in the second sub-paragraph of Article 5(1)(g) and in the second sub-
paragraph of Article 11(a) that this fund shall support actions focusing on the establishment, 
development and improvement of alternatives in relation to the categories of persons 
mentioned in the first sub-paragraph of the aforementioned provisions. The report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (Francois Crèpeau, 2 April 2012, 
A/HRC/20/24) pointed to research which had found that over 90% compliance or 
cooperation rates can be achieved when persons are released with proper supervision and 
assistance. The alternatives have also proved to be considerably less expensive than 
detention, not only in direct costs but also when it comes to longer-term costs associated 
with detention, such as the impact on health services, integration problems and other social 
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challenges.579 
 
As regards empirical research, the UNHCR has found that asylum seekers are predisposed to 
comply with immigration procedures and that perceptions of fairness in the asylum 
procedure were far more important for ensuring compliance than the use of detention.580 
Empirical findings of the International Detention Coalition show that community-based 
alternatives to detention programmes had demonstrated cost saving of USD $49 in the USA, 
AUD $86 in Australia and CAD $167 in Canada per person/per day.581  
 
Standard 14. Principle of proportionality and the necessity test 
 
In the cases of Chahal and Saadi,582 The ECtHR examined whether the person has been 
detained under Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR with a view to deportation. It held that “Article 
5(1)(f) does not demand that the detention of a person against whom action is being taken 
with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his 
committing an offence or fleeing; in this respect Article 5(1)(f) provides a different level of 
protection from Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR”.583  “Any deprivation of liberty under Article 
5(1)(f) will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress. If such 
proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be 
permissible.”584 In some recent cases the ECtHR introduces the necessity test also in the 
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sense that it is not sufficient that deprivation of liberty is in line with national law, but it 
must also be necessary in the circumstances of the case so that less coercive measures to 
attain legitimate aims should be taken into consideration, too.585 This is so particularly in 
cases of detention:minors.586 
 
Furthermore, it is a requirement of Article 5(1) of the ECHR that detention be “in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by domestic law”.587 Therefore, in considering the question of 
“lawfulness”, the ECtHR may have regard to the “necessity” of the measure as well, where 
“necessity” is a requirement of domestic law based on EU secondary law and case-law of the 
CJEU or national constitutional law.For example, in Rusu v Austria (para. 58), while the ECtHR 
reiterated that “necessity” was not normally part of the Article 5(1)(f) test, it noted that in 
Austria it was part of the domestic law test. In that case, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the ECtHR found that the applicant’s detention was such a serious measure 
that – in a context in which the necessity of the detention to achieve the stated aim was 
required by domestic law – it would be arbitrary unless it was justified as a last resort where 
other less severe measures had been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard 
the individual or public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained. 
The ECtHR, therefore, found a violation of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR in that case. Mutatis 
mutandis, this is relevant for detention under the Dublin III Regulation, since EU secondary 
law requires the necessity test.588  
 
As regards alternatives to detention, in a number of cases the ECtHR has considered relevant 
the fact that alternatives to detention were available to the authorities,589 especially if this is 
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a requirement of domestic law.590 This is especially - but not exclusively - the case when the 
detainee is exceptionally vulnerable, for example on account of his or her youth or ill health 
or sexual orientation.591 In Rahimi v Greece,592 the ECtHR observed that the authorities had 
not examined whether it had been necessary as a measure of last resort to place the 
applicant – an unaccompanied fifteen-year old – in a detention centre or whether less 
drastic action might not have sufficed to secure his deportation. These factors gave the 
ECtHR cause to doubt the authorities’ good faith in executing the detention measure. A 
similar approach was adopted in respect of an HIV-positive applicant in Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v 
Belgium. The ECtHR in the case of Popov v France (para. 119) stated that with respect to 
minors even if accompanied by their parents and even though the detention centre had a 
special wing for the accommodation of families, the authorities “did not verify that the 
placement in administrative detention was a measure of last resort for which no alternative 
was available.”593 
 
Standard 15. Length of detention and due diligence requirement 
 
As regards the length of the detention under case law of the ECtHR, the general standard 
based on Article 5(1)(f) of the ECtHR is that the detention should not continue for an 
unreasonable length of time. Deprivation of liberty will be justified only for as long as 
relevant proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due 
diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible.594 This means that the ECtHR will 
probably examine the activity – or inactivity – of the authorities during the period of the 
applicant’s detention in order to determine whether or not they could be said to have acted 
with adequate diligence. The refusal of an applicant to cooperate may be relevant to an 
assessment of the reasonableness of the length of a period of detention. The reasoning in 
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the case of Abdi v the United Kingdom suggests that not all refusals to transfer voluntarily 
will be treated equally. A conclusion that the refusal to return voluntarily is relevant to the 
assessment of the reasonableness of the period of detention could not be drawn in every 
case. It is necessary to distinguish between cases in which the return to the country of origin 
was possible and cases where it was not. Where return was not possible, for reasons 
extraneous to the person detained, the fact that he was not willing to return voluntarily 
could not be held against him since his refusal had no causal effect. If return was possible, 
but the detained person was not willing to go, it would be necessary to consider whether or 
not he had issued proceedings challenging his deportation. If he had done so, it would be 
entirely reasonable that he should remain in the United Kingdom pending the determination 
of those proceedings, unless they were an abuse of process, and his refusal to return 
voluntary could not be seen as a trump card which enabled the Secretary of State to 
continue to detain until deportation could be effected, otherwise the refusal would justify as 
reasonable any period of detention, however, long.595   
 
Although in some cases the ECtHR appeared to suggest that fixed domestic time-limits for 
detention were necessary to comply with the “quality of law” requirement under Article 5(1) 
of the ECHR596, in the recent case of J.N. v the United Kingdom597 the Court expressly 
rejected the applicant’s assertion that Article 5(1) requires Contracting States to establish a 
maximum period of immigration detention. Rather, it stated that it would examine the 
system of immigration detention in the respondent State as a whole, having regard to the 
particular facts of each individual case. In that case, it concluded that the system in the 
United Kingdom, by which detainees could challenge their ongoing detention by way of 
judicial review, having regard to domestic law principles which closely mirrored the 
requirements of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, in principle complied with the requirements of 
that Article. Consequently, the absence of domestic time-limits will not, by itself, constitute 
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a breach of Article 5(1) of the ECHR. However, the ECtHR has in some cases suggested that 
such time-limits might constitute an important procedural safeguard,598 in which the ECtHR 
noted that in the absence of time limits the applicant was subject to an undetermined 
period of detention and consequently the existence of other procedural safeguards (such as 
an effective remedy by which to contest the lawfulness and length of detention) would 
become decisive. It is also important to note that where fixed time-limits exist under 
domestic law, compliance with that time-limit cannot automatically be regarded as bringing 
the applicant’s detention into line with Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR if the expulsion 
proceedings were not otherwise prosecuted with due diligence. However, a failure to comply 
with them may be relevant to the question of “lawfulness”, as detention exceeding the 
period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to be considered “in accordance with the 
law”.599 It would therefore appear that while time-limits are one of a number of possible 
safeguards against arbitrariness, by themselves they are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
ensure compliance with Article 5 (1)(f) of the ECHR.  
 
Standard 17. Right to be informed “adequately” about the reasons for detention 
and about procedures laid down in national law for challenging the detention order  
 
In the case of Rusu v Austria (para. 42), the information given to the applicant on the day of 
her arrest was inexact as to the facts, and incorrect as to the legal basis of her arrest and 
detention, and the ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(2) of the ECHR. In the case of T and A 
v Turkey (para. 66), the applicant was told she was being held on suspicion of having 
committed a criminal act, rather than for the purposes of immigration control. The ECtHR 
thus established that the reasons for the applicant's detention were never communicated to 
her and decided there had been a violation of Article 5(2) of the ECHR.  
 
Standard 20. Right to free legal assistance and representation 
 
In the case of DEB, which does not relate to detention, the CJEU decided that in the context 
of principle of proportionality and the right to free legal aid the following elements need to 
be taken into consideration: the subject-matter of litigation; whether the applicant has a 
                                                 
598
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reasonable prospect of success; the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the 
proceedings; the complexity of the applicable law; the applicant's capacity to represent 
himself effectively; the amount of the costs of the proceedings and whether those costs 
might represent an insurmountable obstacle to access to the courts.600  
 
Although Article 6 of the ECHR is not directly applicable in detention cases under the Dublin 
III Regulation, the following standards relating to civil disputes may additionally serve as 
guidance for considering effective access to judicial review in detention cases. The question 
whether a particular case implies a requirement to provide legal aid depends, among other 
factors, on the following: the importance of what is at stake for the applicant;601 the 
complexity of the relevant law or procedure;602 the applicant’s capacity to represent him or 
herself effectively;603 and the existence of a statutory requirement to have legal 
representation.604 However, the right in question is not absolute and it may therefore be 
permissible to impose conditions on the grant of legal aid based in particular on 
considerations such as the financial situation of the litigant605 and his or her prospects of 
success in the proceedings.606 It is essential for the court to give reasons for refusing legal 
aid and to handle requests for legal aid with diligence.607 
 
However, assigning a lawyer to represent a party does not in itself guarantee effective 
assistance.608  The lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes may be prevented for a 
protracted period from acting or may shirk his duties. If they are notified of the situation, 
the competent national authorities must replace him; should they fail to do so, the litigant 
would be deprived of effective assistance in practice despite the provision of free legal 
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aid.609 It is above all the responsibility of the State to ensure the required balance between 
the effective enjoyment of access to justice on the one hand and the independence of the 
legal profession on the other. The ECtHR has stressed that any refusal by a legal aid lawyer to 
act must meet certain quality requirements. Those requirements will not be met where the 
shortcomings in the legal aid system deprive individuals of the “practical and effective” 
access to a court to which they are entitled.610  
 
Standard 21. Other aspects of the practical and effective right to judicial review 
 
In the case of L.M. And Others v Russia, the asylum seeker was detained during the 
procedure before the ECtHR, and in this case the ECtHR reiterates that it is of the utmost 
importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by 
Article 34 that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with 
the ECtHR without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw 
or modify their complaints. “In this context, pressure includes not only direct coercion and 
flagrant acts of intimidation but also other improper indirect acts or instances of contact 
designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy. The fact 
that an individual has actually managed to pursue his application does not prevent an issue 
arising under Article 34. The intentions or reasons underlying the acts or omissions in 
question are of little relevance when assessing whether Article 34 of the ECHR has been 
complied with; what matters is whether the situation created as a result of the authorities' 
act or omission conforms to Article 34. The ECtHR has already found in a number of cases 
that measures limiting an applicant's contact with his representative may constitute 
interference with the exercise of his right of individual petition (see, for example, Shtukaturov 
v Russia611, where a ban on lawyer's visits, coupled with a ban on telephone calls and 
correspondence, was held to be incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under 
Article 34 of the Convention)” Compliance by a representative with certain formal 
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requirements might be necessary before obtaining access to a detainee, for instance for 
security reasons or in order to prevent collusion or preventing the course of the 
investigation or obstructing justice. Excessive formalities in such matters, such as those that 
could de facto prevent a prospective applicant from effectively enjoying his right of 
individual petition, have been found to be unacceptable.612 
 
In the case of I.M. v France during detention, the applicant did not have access to a lawyer 
or a linguistic aid. When he arrived at court, he could talk to his lawyer only shortly before 
the hearing and his lawyer could not invoke any evidence apart from argumentation already 
written by the applicant. This and extremely short time-limit to introduce an action, 
constituted obstacles for the applicant to effectively submit arguments concerning breach of 
Article 3 of the ECHR.613  
 
Standard 22. Automatic judicial review or detainee's right to initiate judicial review 
of the lawfulness of detention (including conditions of detention) 
 
In J.N. v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that no requirement of “automatic judicial 
review” could be read into Articles 5(1)(f) or Article 5(4) of the ECHR.614 Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR has found that the fact that an applicant’s detention was subject to automatic 
periodic judicial review provided an important safeguard against arbitrariness, but could not 
be regarded as decisive.615 However, the systems in Auad and Dolinskiy were of automatic 
periodic review; in order to comply with the ECHR, it is likely that a system of automatic 
review would have to either be implemented at frequent intervals, or permit the detainee to 
also institute proceedings, otherwise there would be a risk that detention could become 
unlawful without the detainee having any means by which to challenge it. For example, in 
the context of Article 5(1)(e), the ECtHR has found that a person of unsound mind, who is 
compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy period of time, is entitled to 
take proceedings “at reasonable intervals” in order to put the lawfulness of his/her 
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detention in issue.616 A system of periodic review in which the initiative lies solely with the 
authorities is not sufficient on its own.617 The criteria for “lawful detention” under Article 
5(1)(e) of the ECHR entail that the review of lawfulness guaranteed by Article 5(4) in relation 
to the continuing detention of a mental health patient should be made by reference to the 
patient’s contemporaneous state of health, including his or her dangerousness, as evidenced 
by up-to-date medical assessments.618  
 
Standard 23. Right to judicial review before an “independent and impartial 
tribunal/court established by law” 
 
In the case of H.I.D., the CJEU stated that “according to the settled case-law of the CJEU, in 
order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes 
of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the CJEU takes account of 
a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is 
permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, 
whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent”.619 In this particular case, the 
CJEU established that the Irish Refugee Appeals Tribunal met the criteria of establishment by 
law, permanence, application of rules of law, that positive decisions of the Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal had binding force,620 that the requirement for the procedure to be inter partes was 
not an absolute criterion, and that each party had the opportunity to make the Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal aware of any information necessary to the success of the application for 
asylum or to the defence.621 The CJEU established that the Refugee Appeals Tribunal had a 
broad discretion, since it took cognisance of both questions of fact and questions of law and 
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ruled on the evidence submitted to it, in relation to which it enjoyed discretion.622 As 
regards the contested issue of independence of the Refugee Appeal Tribunal, the CJEU 
reiterated that independence has external and internal aspects. The external aspect “entails 
that the body is protected against external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise the 
independent judgment.” The internal aspect “is linked to impartiality and seeks to ensure a 
level playing field for the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests in relation 
to the subject-matter of those proceedings”.623 As for the rules governing the appointment of 
Members of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, in the opinion of the CJEU, these were not 
capable of calling into question the independence of that tribunal. The members were 
appointed for a specific term from among persons with at least five years of experience as a 
practising barrister or a practising solicitor, and the circumstances of their appointment by 
the Minister did not differ substantially from the practice in many other Member States.624 
With regard to the issue of the removal of members of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, it 
followed from paragraph 7 of the second schedule to the Refugee Act that the Minister 
could remove the ordinary members of that Tribunal from office. The Minister's decision had 
to state the reasons for such removal.625 The CJEU then noted that the cases in which the 
members “may be removed from office are not defined precisely by the Refugee Act. Nor 
does the Refugee Act specify whether the decision to remove a member of the Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal is amenable to judicial review.”626 Obviously, this was a problematic aspect 
for the CJEU, because in the next paragraph the CJEU refers to the second sentence of recital 
27 of the Procedures Directive (2005/85), which states that the “effectiveness of the remedy, 
also with regard to the examination of the relevant facts, depends on the administrative and 
judicial system of each Member State seen as a whole.” Based on this recital of secondary EU 
law, the CJEU then decided that since the applicant in the Irish system could also question 
the validity of the recommendations of the Refugee Applications Commissioner and 
decisions of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal before the High Court, the judgments of which 
could be the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Irish system “as a whole” 
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respected the right to an effective remedy.627  
 
However, in the context of the right to speedy judicial review of detention under Article 9(3) 
of the Recast Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III 
Regulation or under Article 5(4) of the ECHR, where in case of unlawful detention the 
applicant must be released immediately,628 it is not possible to consider the requirements of 
independence and impartiality of courts or tribunals as a whole. Already at the first instance 
of judicial procedure, the court or tribunal, which provides speedy judicial review, must 
meet the requirements of independence and impartiality and must be established by law. 
Thus, in relation to Article 5(4) of the ECHR, the ECtHR states that the court which reviews 
the lawfulness of detention must be independent both of the executive and of the parties to 
the case.629 Basic standards as regards these requirements in the case-law of the ECtHR are 
as follows: 
 
The concept of tribunal/court:  
A court or tribunal is characterised in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial 
function, that is to say, determining matters within its competence on the basis of rules of 
law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner.630 The proceedings must 
provide the “determination by a tribunal of the matters in dispute” which is required by 
Article 6 (1) of the ECHR.631 For the purposes of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, a “tribunal” need 
not be a court of law integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country 
concerned. It may be set up to deal with a specific subject matter, which can be 
appropriately administered outside the ordinary court system. The guarantees in place, both 
substantive and procedural, are important to ensure compliance with Articles 6 § 1. .632 The 
fact that it performs many functions (administrative, regulatory, adjudicative, advisory and 
disciplinary) cannot in itself preclude an institution from being a “tribunal”.633 The power to 
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give a binding decision, which may not be altered by a non-judicial authority to the 
detriment of an individual party, is inherent in the very notion of a “tribunal”.634   
The court/tribunal established by law:  
A “tribunal” must always be “established by law”, as it would otherwise lack the legitimacy 
required in a democratic society to hear individual cases.635 The phrase “established by law” 
covers not only the legal basis for the very existence of a “tribunal”, but also compliance by 
the tribunal with the particular rules that govern it.636 The lawfulness of a court or tribunal 
must by definition also encompass its composition.637 The practice of tacitly renewing 
judges’ terms of office for an indefinite period after their statutory term of office had 
expired and pending their reappointment was held to be contrary to the principle of a 
“tribunal established by law”.638 The procedures governing the appointment of judges could 
not be relegated to the status of internal practice.639  “Law”, within the meaning of Article 
6(1) of the ECHR, thus comprises not only legislation providing for the establishment and 
competence of judicial organs, but also any other provision of domestic law which, if 
breached, would render irregular the participation of one or more judges in the examination 
of a case.640 This includes, in particular, provisions concerning the independence of the 
members of a “tribunal”, the length of their term of office, impartiality and the existence of 
procedural safeguards.641 The object of the term “established by law” in Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR is to ensure that the organisation of the judicial system does not depend on the 
discretion of the executive, but is regulated by law emanating from Parliament.642  
 
An independent tribunal/court:  
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The term “independent” refers to independence vis-à-vis the other powers (the executive 
and the Parliament)643 and also vis-à-vis the parties.644  
 
The independence of judges will be undermined where the executive intervenes in a case 
pending before the courts with a view to influencing the outcome.645 The fact that judges 
are appointed by the executive and are removable does not per se amount to a violation of 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR.646 The appointment of judges by the executive is permissible 
provided that the appointees are free from influence or pressure, that they do not receive 
any instructions when carrying out their adjudicatory role.647 In determining whether a body 
can be considered to be independent, the ECtHR has had regard, inter alia, to the following 
criteria: the manner of appointment of its members;648 the duration of their term of 
office;649 guarantees against outside pressure,650 including safeguards against the arbitrary 
exercise of a court president’s duty to (re)assign cases to judges;651 and appearance of 
independence.652 
 
An impartial tribunal/court:  
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Impartiality normally denotes the absence of prejudice or bias, and its existence can be 
tested in various ways.653 The existence of impartiality must be determined on the basis of 
the following criteria:654  
- a subjective test, where regard must be had to the personal conviction and behaviour of a 
particular judge; that is, to whether the judge held any personal prejudice or bias in a given 
case. In this regard, the personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is 
proof to the contrary;655   
- an objective test, that is to say, by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among 
other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt 
in respect of its impartiality.  
 
Under the objective approach, it must be determined whether quite apart from the judge's 
conduct, there are ascertainable facts, which may raise doubts as to his/her impartiality. 
When applied to a body sitting as a bench, it means determining whether, apart from the 
personal conduct of any of the members of that body, there are ascertainable facts which 
may raise doubts as to the impartiality of the body itself. This implies that, in deciding 
whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge656or a 
body sitting as a bench657 lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the person concerned is 
important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be 
objectively justified.658 The objective test mostly concerns hierarchical or other links 
between the judge and other actors in the proceedings.659 Therefore, it must be decided in 
each individual case whether the relationship in question is of such a nature and degree as 
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to indicate a lack of impartiality on the part of the tribunal.660 In order that the courts may 
inspire confidence in the public, which is indispensable, account must also be taken of 
questions of internal organisation. The existence of national procedures for ensuring 
impartiality, namely rules regulating the withdrawal of judges, is a relevant factor.661 Such 
rules manifest the national legislature’s concern to remove all reasonable doubts as to the 
impartiality of the judge or court concerned and constitute an attempt to ensure impartiality 
by eliminating the causes of such concerns.662  
 
Standard 24. Right to “speedy” judicial review of the lawfulness of detention 
 
In the case of Khudyakova v Russia (para. 99), fifty-four (54) days elapsed from the date the 
application was lodged until the final decision of the appeal court. The Government did not 
plead that complex issues had been involved in the determination of the lawfulness of the 
applicant’s detention, or otherwise seek to justify the delay, apart from their contradictory 
statement that the review of the applicant’s detention could not have affected her situation 
as the detention had been authorised by the court and should thus be considered lawful. In 
the case of M.D. c. Belgique, an applicant was detained based on the Dublin Regulation. On 
2 July 2010, the applicant's detention was extended and on 12 July 2010 he filed an appeal 
to the first instance tribunal.  On 15 July 2010, the tribunal of first instance decided not to 
grant his lawsuit. In the next stage of the procedure, on 28 July 2010, the Court of Appeal 
decided to order an immediate release of the applicant. The Government appealed against 
that judgment to the Cour de cassation. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(4) of the 
ECHR, because the applicant was not released based on the judgment of the Appeal Court, 
while the Cour de cassation, which abrogated the judgment of the Court of Appeal, did not 
examine substantial issues of the case, but merely procedural issues.663  
                                                 
660
Micallef v Malta App no 17056/06 (ECtHR 15 October 2009), paras 97, 102. 
661
See the specific provisions regarding the challenging of judges in Micallef v Malta App no 17056/06 (ECtHR 
15 October 2009), paras 99-100. 
662
Guide on Article 6: Right to a fair trial (civil limb), the European Court of Human Rights, May 2013, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf  29-30. For further standards as regards the 
exercise of both advisory and judicial functions in the same case, the exercise of both judicial and extra-
judicial functions in the same case and exercise of different judicial functions, see: Guide on Article 6: Right 
to a fair trial (civil limb), the European Court of Human Rights, May 2013, pp. 30-32. 
663
M.D.and M.A v Belgium App no 58689/12 (ECtHR 19 January 2016), paras 39-47. 
Explanatory Note to the Basic Judicial Check-List 1 
 
139 
 
 
The ECtHR also states that where a decision to detain a person has been taken by a non-
judicial authority other than a court, the standard of “speediness”  of judicial review under 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR comes closer to the standard of “promptness” under Article 5(3) of 
the ECHR. Thus, in the case of Scherbina, a delay of sixteen (16) days in the judicial review of 
the applicant’s detention order issued by the prosecutor was found to be excessive.664 The 
standard of “speediness” is less stringent when it comes to proceedings before a court of 
appeal.665 Where a court in a procedure offering appropriate guarantees of due process 
imposed the original detention order, the ECtHR is prepared to tolerate longer periods of 
review in the proceedings before the second instance court.666  
 
Standard 26. The scope  and intensity of judicial review including procedural 
guarantees 
 
The CJEU had not yet provided guidelines as regards the scope or intensity of “judicial 
review” from Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive in the light of Article 47 of the 
Charter.667 Thus, from the standpoint of EU law, the basic principle is that “Member States 
shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by 
Union law,”668 but the characteristics of such a remedy “must be determined in a manner 
that is consistent with Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes a reaffirmation of the 
principle of effective judicial protection.”669 The principle of effective judicial protection 
(along with the principle of equivalence) is a general principle of European law stemming 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined 
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in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.670 The principle of equivalence means that rules applicable 
in an EU law dispute are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions. It 
requires that the national rule in question be applied without distinction, whether the 
infringement alleged is of EU law or national law, where the purpose and cause of action are 
similar.671 As regards the application of the principle of effectiveness, the CJEU has held that 
every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes 
the application of EU law (practically) impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed 
with reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its conduct and its special 
features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. For those purposes, account 
must be taken, where appropriate, of the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, 
such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the 
proper conduct of procedure.672 “In the absence of EU rules concerning the procedural 
requirements relating to a detention-review measure, the Member States remain competent, 
in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to determine those requirements, 
whilst at the same time ensuring that the fundamental rights are observed and that the 
provisions of EU law relating to that measure are fully effective.”673  
 
The above-cited argumentation was a (general) starting point of the interpretation adopted 
by the CJEU in the case of Mahdi, which deals with judicial review of the extension of 
detention under the Return Directive. However, in its reasoning in paragraphs 62-64, the 
CJEU went beyond this general principle of effectiveness by explaining in more detail what 
the term “fully effective” means. Although the CJEU in some other cases stated that 
detention for the purpose of removal governed by the Return Directive and detention of an 
asylum-seeker fall under “different legal rules”,674 there seems to be no objective and 
reasonable justification to think that the standards as regards the scope and intensity of 
judicial review of the detention of irregular migrants under the Return Directive, as they are 
explained under standard no. 26 of this check-list, are or should be higher than the 
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standards in cases of the detention of asylum-seekers under the Dublin III Regulation.675  
 
Standard 27. Restrictions on the right to a defence and/or equality of arms based 
on national (public) security, public policy or public order 
 
In the Kadi case, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU states that “according to settled case-law, 
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance 
the CJEU ensures. For that purpose, the CJEU draws inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international 
instruments for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have 
collaborated or to which they are signatories. In that regard, the ECHR has a special 
significance /.../ Measures incompatible with respect for human rights are not acceptable in 
the Community.676 In the context of measures against terrorism in the Kadi case, the right to 
a defence, the right to be heard and the right to effective judicial review were at stake. The 
CJEU decided “in such a case, it is none the less the task of the Community judicature to 
apply, in the course of the judicial review it carries out, techniques which accommodate, on 
the one hand, legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of information 
taken into account in the adoption of the act concerned and, on the other, the need to accord 
the individual a sufficient measure of procedural justice.”677 In the case of A. and Others v the 
United Kingdom (para. 218), the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR formulated the following basic 
principle: “It was essential that as much information about the allegations and evidence 
against each applicant was disclosed as was possible without compromising national 
security or the safety of others. Where full disclosure was not possible, Article 5(4) of the 
ECHR required that the difficulties this caused were counterbalanced in such a way that each 
applicant still had the possibility to effectively challenge the allegations against him.” This 
must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Where the evidence was to a large extent 
disclosed and the open material played a predominant role in the determination, it could 
not be said that the applicant was denied an opportunity to challenge effectively the 
reasonableness of the belief and suspicion of the Secretary of State. In other cases, even 
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where all or most of the underlying evidence remained undisclosed, if the allegations 
contained in the open material were sufficiently specific, it should have been possible for the 
applicant to provide his/her representatives and the special advocate with information with 
which to refute them, if such information existed, without him/her having to know the 
details or sources of the evidence which formed the basis of the allegations.678  
 
The ECtHR states that even in proceedings under Article 6 of the ECtHR for the 
determination of guilt on criminal charges, there may be restrictions on the right to a fully 
adversarial procedure where strictly necessary, in the light of a strong countervailing public 
interest such as national security, the need to keep secret police methods of investigation, or 
the protection of the fundamental rights of another person. There will not be a fair trial, 
however, unless any difficulties caused to the defendant by a limitation on his rights are 
sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities.679 Thus, 
while the right to a fair criminal trial under Article 6 includes a right to disclosure of all 
material evidence in the possession of the prosecution, both for and against accused, the 
ECtHR has held that it might sometimes be necessary to withhold certain evidence from the 
defence on public-interest grounds.680  
 
In the context of detention under the 2013/33/EU Reception Directive, the CJEU developed 
an interpretation of the concept of “public order” that entails, in any event, the existence – 
in addition to the disturbance of the social order which any infringement of the law involves 
– of a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental 
interests of society, while the concept of “public security” covers both the internal and 
external security of a Member State and that, consequently, a threat to the functioning of 
institutions and essential public services and the survival of the population, as well as the 
risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations, or a 
risk to military interests, may affect public security.681 
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It is settled case-law that the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no 
definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language.682 
In the context of the decisions taken under the Return Directive, the concept of the “risk of 
public policy”, must be determined by considering that term in its usual meaning in everyday 
language. This needs to be done by taking into account also the context in which that term 
occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part. When such term appears in a 
provision which constitutes derogation from a principle, it must be read so that that 
provision can be interpreted strictly683 and it is a Member State which must be able to prove 
that the person concerned “in fact constitutes such a risk.”684 “While Member States 
essentially retain the freedom to determine the requirements of public policy in accordance 
with their national needs, which can vary from one Member State to another and from one 
era to another, the fact still remains that, in the EU context and particularly when relied upon 
as a justification for derogating from an obligation designed to ensure that the fundamental 
rights of third-country nationals are respected when they are removed from the EU, those 
requirements must be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined 
unilaterally by each Member state without any control by the institutions of the EU”.685 
According to the general principles of EU law, decisions should be adopted on a case-by-case 
basis and be based on objective criteria in order to ascertain whether the personal conduct 
of the third-country nationals concerned “poses a genuine and present risk to public policy”. 
The principle of proportionality must be observed throughout all the stages of the return 
procedure.686 When the State relies on general practice or any assumption in order to 
determine such a risk, without properly taking into account the national’s personal conduct 
and the risk that that conduct poses to public policy, a Member State fails to have regard to 
the requirements relating to an individual examination of the case concerned and to the 
principle of proportionality. It follows that the fact that a third-country national is suspected, 
or has been criminally convicted, of an act punishable as a criminal offence under national 
law cannot, in itself, justify a finding that that national poses a risk to public policy. However, 
in the event of criminal conviction, a Member State may find that there is a risk to public 
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policy even where that conviction has not become final and absolute, where that conviction, 
taken together with other circumstances relating to the situation of the person concerned, 
justifies such a finding. Moreover, the mere suspicion that a third-country national has 
committed an act punishable as a criminal offence under national law may, together with 
other factors relating to the case in question (such as the nature and seriousness of that act, 
and the time which has elapsed since it was committed), be used as a basis for a finding that 
he poses a risk to public policy.687  
 
In the context of decision refusing a citizen of the EU admission to a Member State the CJEU 
stated that the provisions of Directive 2004/38 oblige the Member States to lay down, in 
domestic law, the measures necessary to enable Union citizens and members of their 
families to have access to judicial, and where appropriate, administrative redress procedures 
to appeal against or seek review of any decision restricting their rights to move and reside 
freely in the Member States on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
In order that the person concerned may make effective use of the redress procedures, the 
competent authority is required, as is laid down as a principle by Article 30(2) of Directive 
2004/38, to inform him in the administrative procedure precisely about the facts and 
circumstances on which the proposed measure is based and in full of the public policy, 
public security or public health grounds on which the decision in question is based.688 It is 
only by way of derogation that Article 30(2) of Directive 2004/83 permits the Member States 
to limit the information sent to the person concerned in the interests of State security. This 
provision must be interpreted strictly, but without depriving it of its effectiveness (Article 47 
of the Charter). It is in that context that it must be determined whether and to what extent 
Article 30(2) and 31 of Directive 2004/38 permit the grounds of a decision taken under 
Article 27 of the directive “not to be disclosed precisely and in full /…/. It should be taken into 
account that, whilst Article 52(1) of the Charter admittedly allows limitations on the exercise 
of the rights enshrined by the Charter, it nevertheless lays down that any limitations must in 
particular respect the essence of the fundamental right in question and requires, in addition, 
that subject to the principle of proportionality, the limitation must be necessary and 
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genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU.689 According to the 
settled case law of the CJEU, “if the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter is 
to be effective, the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the 
decision taken in relation to him is based, either by reading the decision itself or by 
requesting and obtaining notification of those reasons, without prejudice to the power of the 
court with jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to provide that information /…/ so 
as to make it possible for him to defend his rights in the best possible conditions and to 
decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his applying to 
the court with jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position in which it may 
carry out the review of the lawfulness of the national decision in question. Admittedly, it may 
prove necessary, both in administrative proceedings and in judicial proceedings, not to 
disclose certain information to the person concerned, in particular in the light of overriding 
consideration connected with State security.”690 In certain cases, disclosure of that evidence 
is liable to compromise State security in a direct and specific manner, in that it may, in 
particular, endanger the life, health or freedom of persons or reveal the methods of 
investigation specifically used by the national security authorities and thus seriously impede, 
or even prevent, future performance of the task of those authorities.691 By invoking reasons 
for State security, the court of the Member State must have at its disposal and apply 
techniques and rules of procedural law which accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate 
State security considerations regarding the nature and sources of the information taken into 
account in the adoption of such a decision and, on the other hand, the need to ensure 
sufficient compliance with the person’s procedural rights, such as the right to be heard and 
the adversarial principle.692 In the context of that judicial review, it is incumbent upon the 
Member States to lay down rules enabling the court entrusted with review of the decision’s 
legality to examine both all the grounds and the related evidence on the basis of which the 
decision was taken. It is necessary for a court to be entrusted with verifying whether those 
reasons stand in the way of precise and full disclosure of the grounds on which the decision 
in question is based and of the related evidence.693Thus, the competent national authority 
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has the task of proving, in accordance with the national procedural rules that State security 
would in fact be compromised by precise and full disclosure to the person concerned of the 
grounds which constitute the basis of a decision taken under Article 27 of Directive 2004/38 
and of the related evidence. It follows that there is no presumption that the reasons invoked 
by a national authority exist and are valid.694If that court concludes that State security does 
not stand in the way of precise and full disclosure to the person concerned, it gives the 
competent national authority the opportunity to disclose the missing grounds and evidence 
to the person concerned. If that authority does not authorise their disclosure, the court 
proceeds to examine the legality of such a decision solely on the basis of the grounds and 
evidence which have been disclosed.695 Any limitation of the right to effective judicial 
protection must be strictly necessary.696 In particular, the person concerned must be 
informed, in any event, of the essence of the grounds on which a decision refusing entry 
taken under Article 27 of Directive 2004/38 is based, as the necessary protection of State 
security cannot have the effect of denying the person concerned his right to be heard and, 
therefore, of rendering his right of redress as provided for in Article 31 of that Directive 
ineffective.697 
 
Standard 30. Derogation from obligations under Article 5(1) of the ECHR 
 
The concept of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” has a natural and 
customary meaning. Those words are sufficiently clear and they refer to an exceptional 
situation of crisis or emergency, which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat 
to the organised life of the community of which the state is composed. In the Greek case 
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece), the Commission held that, in 
order to justify a derogation, the emergency should be actual and imminent; that is, it 
should affect the whole nation to the extent that the continuance of the organised life of the 
community was threatened; and that the crisis or danger should be exceptional, in that the 
normal measures or restrictions, permitted by the ECHR for the maintenance of public 
safety, health and order, were plainly inadequate. In the case of Ireland v the United 
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Kingdom, the ECtHR agreed that the Article 15 test was satisfied, since terrorism in Northern 
Ireland had for a number of years presented a particularly far-reaching and acute danger for 
the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties of 
Northern Ireland and the lives of that province’s inhabitants. In the case of Aksoy, it 
accepted that Kurdish separatist violence had given rise to a public emergency in Turkey.698 
The requirement of imminence cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to 
wait for a disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it.699 Since the purpose of 
Article 15 is to permit States to take derogating measures to protect their populations from 
future risks, the existence of a threat to the life of the nation must be assessed primarily 
with reference to those facts which were known at the time of the derogation.700 The 
ECtHR's case-law has never explicitly incorporated the requirement that the emergency be 
temporary, although the question of the proportionality of the response may be linked to 
the duration of the emergency.701  In the past, the ECtHR has accepted that emergency 
situations have existed even though the institutions of the State did not appear to be 
imperilled, so that the existence of the institutions of the government or existence of civil 
society would be threatened.702  
 
As regards the question whether “the measures were strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation”, Article 15 of the ECHR allows the national authorities a wide margin of 
appreciation. However, in particular, where a derogating measure encroaches upon a 
fundamental right from the ECHR, such as the right to liberty, the ECtHR must be satisfied 
that it was a genuine response to the emergency situation, that it was fully justified by the 
special circumstances of the emergency and that adequate safeguards were provided 
against abuse.703 Where the measures are found to be disproportionate to that threat and to 
be discriminatory in their effect, there is no need to go further and examine their application 
in the concrete case of each applicant.704 
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Standard 33. Protection of inhuman or degrading treatment in relation to 
conditions of detention in another Member State(s) 
 
The Grand Chamber, in the case of Aranyosi, developed the following criteria that might be 
used as inspiration or even as analogy705 for the use of criteria under Article 3(2) of the 
Dublin III Regulation. The CJEU, in that case, states that, “where the judicial authority of the 
executing Member State is in possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment of individuals detained in the issuing Member State, having regard to the standard 
of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of 
the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment in Melloni, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, 
paragraphs 59 and 63, and Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 192), that judicial 
authority is bound to assess the existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide on the 
surrender to the authorities of the issuing Member State of the individual sought by a 
European arrest warrant. The consequence of the execution of such a warrant must not be 
that that individual suffers inhuman or degrading treatment. To that end, the executing 
judicial authority must, initially, rely on information that is objective, reliable, specific and 
properly updated on the detention conditions prevailing in the issuing Member State and 
that demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or 
which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain places of detention. 
That information may be obtained from, inter alia, judgments of international courts, such as 
judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the issuing Member State, and also 
decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under 
the aegis of the UN.”706 Nonetheless, a finding that there is a real risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment by virtue of general conditions of detention in the issuing Member 
State cannot lead, in itself, to the refusal to execute a European arrest warrant. Whenever 
the existence of such a risk is identified, it is then necessary that the executing judicial 
authority make a further assessment, specific and precise, of whether there are substantial 
grounds to believe that the individual concerned will be exposed to that risk because of the 
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conditions for his detention envisaged in the issuing Member State”.707 The CJEu in the case 
of Aranyosi adds that “the mere existence of evidence that there are deficiencies, which may 
be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may 
affect certain places of detention, with respect to detention conditions in the issuing Member 
State, does not necessarily imply that, in a specific case, the individual concerned will be 
subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the event that he is surrendered to the 
authorities of that Member State. Consequently, in order to ensure respect for Article 4 of the 
Charter in the individual circumstances of the person who is the subject of the European 
arrest warrant, the executing judicial authority, when faced with evidence of the existence of 
such deficiencies that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated, is bound to 
determine whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds 
to believe that, following the surrender of that person to the issuing Member State, he will 
run a real risk of being subject in that Member State to inhuman or degrading treatment, 
within the meaning of Article 4. To that end, that authority must, pursuant to Article 15(2) of 
the Framework Decision, request of the judicial authority of the issuing Member State that 
there be provided as a matter of urgency all necessary supplementary information on the 
conditions in which it is envisaged that the individual concerned will be detained in that 
Member State. That request may also relate to the existence, in the issuing Member State, of 
any national or international procedures and mechanisms for monitoring detention 
conditions, linked, for example, to visits to prisons, which make it possible to assess the 
current state of detention conditions in those prisons”.708 
 
The authorities concerned must verify whether the state of health of the applicant may be 
protected appropriately and sufficiently by taking the precautions envisaged by the Dublin III 
Regulation and, in affirmative, must implement those precautions.709 As regards those 
precautions, both Member States involved must ensure that the person concerned receives 
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health care during and after the transfer.710 The Member State carrying out the transfer may, 
in addition, obtain from the Member State responsible the confirmation that the necessary 
care will be fully available upon arrival.711 If there is a risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment the execution of a decision must be postponed.712 If the existence of that risk 
cannot be discounted within a reasonable time, the executing judicial authority must decide 
whether surrender procedure should be brought to an end.713 In the context of Dublin III 
Regulation this means that Member State may choose to conduct its own examination of 
that application by making use of the discretionary clause laid down in Article 17(1) of the 
Dublin III Regulation.714 
 
Standard 34.3. Conditions of detention: overcrowding, ventilation, access to light and 
natural air or to exercise in the open air, quality of heating, health requirements, basic 
sanitary and hygiene requirements 
 
In S.D. v Greece (paras. 49-54), an asylum-seeker was confined to a prefabricated cabin for 
two months without being allowed outdoors or to make a telephone call, and with no clean 
sheets and insufficient hygiene products. He was also detained for six days, in a confined 
space, with no possibility of taking a walk, no leisure area, sleeping on dirty mattresses and 
with no free access to a toilet. The ECtHR found both periods of detention to be in breach of 
Article 3. In Tabesh v Greece (paras. 38-44), the asylum-seeker was detained for three 
months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no 
access to any recreational activities and without proper meals. In A.A. v Greece (paras. 57-
65), an asylum-seeker was detained for three months in an overcrowded place in appalling 
conditions of hygiene and cleanliness, with no leisure or catering facilities, where the 
dilapidated state of repair of the sanitary facilities rendered them virtually unusable and 
where the detainees slept in extremely filthy and crowded conditions. The Grand Chamber 
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EU:C:2016:198, para 98. 
713
Ibid. para 104. 
714
C-578/16 PPU C.K. and Others EU:C:2017:127, para 88. 
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considered immigration detention conditions in Greece in the case of MSS. v Belgium and 
Greece. In that case, where the applicant had been detained in a building next to the airport, 
it found a violation of Article 3 where the sector for asylum-seekers was rarely unlocked, 
with the consequence that the detainees had no access to the water fountain outside and 
were obliged to drink water from the toilets. In the sector for arrested persons, there were 
145 detainees in a 110 m2 space. In a number of cells there was only 1 bed for 14 to 17 
people. There were not enough mattresses and a number of detainees were sleeping on the 
bare floor. There was insufficient room for all the detainees to lie down and sleep at the 
same time. Because of the overcrowding, there was a lack of sufficient ventilation and the 
cells were unbearably hot. Detainees’ access to the toilets was severely restricted and they 
complained that the police would not let them out into the corridors. The police admitted 
that the detainees had to urinate in plastic bottles which they emptied when they were 
allowed to use the toilets. It was observed in all sectors that there was no soap or toilet 
paper, that sanitary and other facilities were dirty, that the sanitary facilities had no doors 
and that the detainees were deprived of outdoor exercise. Against this background, the 
ECtHR found the relatively short periods of detention to be insignificant (4 days and 1 week), 
especially when the particularly vulnerable position of the applicant (an asylum-seeker) was 
taken into consideration. The applicant in MSS had been detained in Greece in 2009. 
However, the poor detention conditions there had been a persistent, long-standing and well-
documented problem (the Grand Chamber cited reports criticising detention conditions in 
Greece dating back as far as 2005). The Grand Chamber considered the issue of sudden 
arrival of a large group of migrants in the case of Khlaifia v Italy. The applicants in that case 
had fled from Tunisia during the “Arab Spring” in 2011. They complained both of their 
detention in a reception centre on the island of Lampedusa and on board ships moored in 
Palermo harbour. In considering their detention conditions, the ECtHR expressly accepted 
that there existed at the relevant time a state of emergency in Lampedusa due to a wave of 
over 50,000 arrivals after the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya, which placed many obligations 
on the Italian authorities as to rescue, medical care, reception and maintenance of public 
order. The Grand Chamber took into consideration the fact that Italy had declared a state of 
humanitarian emergency on the island of Lampedusa and appealed for solidarity from the 
Member States of the EU. The arrival en masse of North African migrants undoubtedly 
created organisational, logistical and structural difficulties for the Italian authorities in view 
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of the combination of requirements to be met, as they had to rescue certain vessels at sea, 
to receive and accommodate individuals arriving on Italian soil, and to take care of those in 
particularly vulnerable situations. The ECtHR observed in this connection that according to 
the data supplied by the Government, there were some 3000 women and 3000 children 
among the migrants who arrived during the period in question. The ECtHR could not 
criticise, in itself, the decision to concentrate the initial reception of the migrants on 
Lampedusa. As a result of its geographical situation, that was where most rudimentary 
vessels would arrive and it was often necessary to carry out rescues at sea around the island 
in order to protect the life and health of the migrants. It was therefore not unreasonable, at 
the initial stage, to transfer the survivors from the Mediterranean crossing to the closest 
reception facility. In addition to that general situation, there were some specific problems, 
like a revolt among the migrants, protest marches through the island's streets, clashes 
between the local community and a group of aliens threatening to explode gas canisters, 
self-harm and vandalism. While constraints inherent in such crisis could not, in themselves, 
be used to justify a breach of Article 3, the ECtHR took the view that it would certainly be 
artificial to examine the facts of the case without considering the general context in which 
those facts arose.715 As regards detention in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA the ECtHR took 
into account several things and among them the fact that migrants could move around 
freely within the confines of the facility, communicate by telephone with the outside world, 
make purchases and contact representatives of humanitarian organisations and lawyers. 
Even though the number of square metres per person in the centre's rooms had not been 
established, the ECtHR found that the freedom of movement enjoyed by the applicants in 
the CSPA must have alleviated in part, or even to a significant extent, the constraints caused 
by the fact that the centre's maximum capacity was exceeded. The applicants were not 
asylum-seekers and therefore did not have the specific vulnerability inherent in that status 
and did not claim to have endured traumatic experiences in their country of origin. They 
belonged neither to the category of elderly persons nor to that of minors. At the time of the 
events they were aged between 23 and 28 and did not claim to be suffering from any 
particular medical condition, nor did they complain of any lack of medical care in the centre. 
The applicants did not claim that they had been deliberately ill-treated by the authorities in 
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Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), paras 178-186. 
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the centre, that the food or water had been insufficient or that the climate at the time had 
affected them negatively when they had had to sleep outside.716 As regards the conditions 
on the ships Vincent and Audace, the ECtHR also found no violation of Article 3 of the 
ECHR.717 
 
Standard 34.5. Minors 
 
In Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium the ECtHR considered the detention of a mother 
and four children (asylum-seekers) in the same detention centre as the unaccompanied five-
year old applicant in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga. In Muskhadzhiyeva and 
Others the ECtHR took into account the children’s ages (they were 7 months, 3 and a half, 5 
and 7 years old at the relevant time), the fact that they were found to be suffering from 
psychological problems and the fact that they were detained for more than 1 month with 
their mother in a centre which was not adjusted to reception of children. It therefore 
accepted that detention conditions had violated their rights under Article 3 of the ECHR.718 
In the case of Kanagaratnam and Others v Belgium, the children were also detained with 
their mother. They did not have specific health concerns and they were older than the 
children in Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium. Nevertheless, the ECtHR took into 
account a traumatic situation they had experienced in the past and the fact that they were 
detained for a longer period (4 months). The ECtHR found a violation of the children’s rights 
under Article 3 of the ECHR.719 
In Popov v France, the ECtHR considered the detention for fifteen days of two infants - three 
years and five months old (asylum-seekers). During this period, they were detained with 
their parents at a centre authorised to receive families. In finding a violation of Article 3, the 
ECtHR noted that although the authorities had been careful to separate families from other 
detainees, the facilities available in the “families” area of the centre were nevertheless ill-
adapted to the presence of children: there were no children’s beds and adult beds had 
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Ibid. paras 187-198. 
717
Ibid. paras 202-211. 
718
Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium App no 41442/07 (ECtHR 19 Janurary 2010), paras 55-63. 
719
Kanagaratnam and Others v Belgium App no 15297/09 (ECtHR 13 December 2011), paras 66-69. 
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pointed metal corners; there were no activities for children; there was a very basic play area 
on a small piece of carpet; there was a concreted courtyard of 20 m2 with a view of the sky 
through wire netting; there was a tight grill over the bedroom windows obscuring the view 
outside; and there were automatically closing bedroom doors with consequent danger for 
children. The ECtHR had regard to the international Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which provided in Article 37 that “[e]very child deprived of liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which 
takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age”. It accepted that confinement in 
conditions such as these caused “great emotional and mental suffering” to minors, and that 
the “abnormal living conditions” imposed on very small children “exceeded the threshold of 
seriousness for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention”. However, as in Muskhadzhiyeva, 
the ECtHR declined to find an additional violation of Article 3 in respect of the parents. 
In the case of A. B. et autres v France, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in 
respect of a four-year old child detained together with his parents for 18 days in the centre 
Toulouse-Cornebarrieu, where he was exposed to extreme and constant noise from the 
nearby airport.720 In the case of A. M. et autres c. France, the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR in respect of two children aged 2 and a half and 4 months who were 
detained together with their mother for 8 hours in the centre Metz-Queuleu, where 
conditions were not suitable for young children.721 
 
Standard 34.6. Unaccompanied minors 
 
In Rahimi v Greece, the applicant was a fifteen-year old unaccompanied minor (asylum-
seeker) from Afghanistan. He was placed in a detention centre for a couple of days before 
being housed in a hostel. Although the ECtHR could not say with certainty that the applicant 
was placed in a detention centre with adults, it found that the conditions in the centre 
generally were so bad as to undermine the very meaning of human dignity. As he had been 
both an unaccompanied minor and an illegal alien, he had been extremely vulnerable and it 
                                                 
720
A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), paras 110-115; see also circumstances in 
the case of A.M. et autres c. France App no 24587/12 (12 July 2016), paras 48-53. 
721
A.M. et autres c. France App no 24587/12 (12 July 2016), paras 44-53. 
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had therefore been incumbent on the Contracting State to protect and care for him by taking 
appropriate measures in the light of its positive obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR.722 
In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium723, a five-year old child (asylum seeker) 
from DRC had been detained alone for nearly two months in a transit centre for adults. In 
finding a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, the ECtHR had regard to the child’s extreme 
vulnerability on account of her age and the fact that she was alone in a foreign country. In 
finding a violation of her rights under Article 3, it had regard to the fact that no one had 
been assigned to look after her; no measures were taken to ensure that she received proper 
counselling and educational assistance from qualified personnel; the place of detention was 
not adapted to her needs; and there was a legal void in respect of unaccompanied foreign 
minors. In respect of the last point, the ECtHR noted that there was virtually no possibility of 
accommodating a child such as the applicant in more suitable conditions (existing detention 
centres were not adapted to afford adequate protection to minors) and the domestic courts 
could only consider the lawfulness of her detention and not its appropriateness. The child 
had received legal assistance, had daily telephone contact with her mother or uncle, and 
staff and residents at the centre did their best for her. However, the ECtHR found that this 
“uncoordinated attention” could not be regarded as sufficient to meet all her needs as a 
five-year-old child.724 
 
Standard 34.7. Ill-health and special medical conditions 
 
In the case of Z v A Government Department and the Board of management of a community 
school, the CJEU states that following the ratification by the EU of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the concept of “disability” within the meaning of the 
Framework Directive (2000/78)725 had to be understood as referring to a “limitation which 
results in particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which in 
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Rahimi v Greece, App No 8687/08 (ECtHR 5 April 2011); See also violation of Article 3, Article 13 in 
conjunction with Article 3 and Article 5(1) of the ECHR in the case of Mohamad v Greece App no70586/11 
(ECtHR 11 December 2014). 
723
Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03  (ECtHR 12 October 2006). 
724
Ibid. paras 48-63. 
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Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
 employment and occupation (OJEU, L303, 2. 12. 2000). 
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interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person 
concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers.” However, the provisions 
of that Convention are not, as regards their content, unconditional and sufficiently precise; 
they are programmatic and therefore do not have direct effect. The validity of the directive 
cannot be assessed in the light of the UN Convention.726 
In the case of Mahmundi v Greece, one of the applicants had been detained pending her 
deportation while she was heavily pregnant. The ECtHR was critical of the fact that, 
according to a report on detention conditions, several pregnant women, in the last month of 
pregnancy, had been held in inhumane conditions in overcrowded cells. The report noted 
that in addition to the suffering caused by the emotional and psychological impact of 
detention, these women were often not examined by a doctor. The fact of not knowing 
where they were going to give birth and what would happen to them and their children 
increased their anxiety. However, although the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3, it based 
its decision on a combination of factors, including the poor detention conditions generally. 
In Aden Ahmed v Malta, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 in a case concerning the 
detention of a pregnant woman who miscarried in detention. In finding a violation, the 
ECtHR found “disconcerting” the lack of female staff in the centre. It accepted that this must 
have caused a degree of discomfort to the female detainees, particularly the applicant, who 
suffered from specific medical conditions related to her miscarriage. 
The applicant in Asalya v Turkey was paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair. He was 
detained (pending his deportation) for seven days in a regular detention facility which was 
not adapted for wheelchair users. No special arrangements were made to alleviate the 
subsequent hardship. As a consequence, the applicant experienced serious difficulties in 
meeting his most basic needs, such as using the toilet. He was dependent entirely on the 
good will of the police officers to assist him. In finding a violation of Article 3, the ECtHR 
reiterated that, where authorities decide to place and keep a person with a disability in 
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detention, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as 
correspond to the special needs resulting from his disability.727  
In Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v Belgium, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 where an HIV-
positive woman had been detained, while being subject to removal. The authorities were 
aware of her condition and there was evidence that her health had worsened and the 
infection had progressed while she was in detention. However, a number of weeks passed 
before she was examined by hospital specialists, and when treatment was eventually 
prescribed it was not administered until one week later. Accordingly, the ECtHR found that in 
failing to take at an earlier stage all the measures that could reasonably have been expected 
of them to protect the applicant’s health and prevent a worsening of her condition, the 
authorities had not acted with the requisite diligence. That situation had impaired the 
applicant’s dignity and, combined with the distress caused by the prospect of being 
deported, had subjected her to particularly acute hardship causing suffering beyond that 
inevitably associated with detention and with her condition. It had therefore amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment. 
The ECtHR has consistently held that detained persons with mental health problems should 
be detained in places appropriate to their pathology and be provided with the necessary 
treatment. For example, the ECtHR has found a violation of Article 3 where an applicant with 
a severe mental illness was placed in a normal prison and treated the same as other 
inmates.728 It has also recognized that persons with mental health problems might be more 
vulnerable within the detention regime and therefore conditions of detention might be 
more likely to undermine the detainee’s human dignity and aroused in him or her feelings of 
humiliation and debasement.729 However, in order to find a violation of Article 3, the ECtHR 
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See: Price v United Kingdom App no 33394/96 (ECtHR 12 September 2000), para 30; Farbtuhs v Latvia App 
no 4672/02 (ECtHR 2 December 2004), para 56; Jasinskis v Latvia App no 45744/08 (21 December 2010) 
para 59, and Z.H. v Hungary App no 28973/11 (ECtHR 8 November 2012) para 29. 
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Dvbeku v Albania App no 41153/06 (ECtHR 18 December 2007); Musial v Poland App no 28300/06 (ECtHR 20 
Janurary 2009). 
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See Romanov v Russia App no 63993/00 (ECtHR 20 October 2005) in respect of overcrowding; see also 
Kucheruk v Ukraine App no 2570/04 (ECtHR 6 September 2007) in respect of handcuffing and solitary 
confinement. 
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requires that the conditions of detention caused a deterioration in the applicant’s mental 
health.730  
Where detained persons have committed suicide, the ECtHR has found there to be a breach 
of the positive obligation under Article 2 where the authorities were aware of their suicidal 
tendencies and failed to either provide adequate treatment or monitoring/supervision.731 In 
the case of Keenan v the United Kingdom, which does not refer to detention of asylum 
seekers or irregular migrants, the ECtHR stated that, in the case of mentally ill persons, the 
assessment of whether the treatment or punishment concerned is incompatible with the 
standards of Article 3 has to take into consideration their vulnerability and their inability, in 
some cases, to complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any 
particular treatment. Treatment of mentally ill persons may be incompatible with the 
standards imposed by Article 3 on the protection of fundamental human dignity, even 
though that person may not be able or capable of pointing to any specific ill-effects. In this 
case, the ECtHR was struck by the lack of medical notes concerning the applicant, who was 
an identifiable suicide risk and undergoing the additional stresses that could be foreseen 
from segregation and, later, disciplinary punishment. The ECtHR ascertained an inadequate 
concern to maintain full and detailed records of his mental state and ineffectiveness of any 
monitoring or supervision process.732  
 
Standard 34.8. Elderly 
 
In Contrada (No. 2) v Italy, the ECtHR considered the detention of an 82-year old man who 
suffered from a number of serious and complex medical disorders. As it found that his state 
of health was incompatible with the prison regime to which he was subjected, it accepted 
that his continued detention had been incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. However, it would appear that in such 
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See Novak v Croatia App no 8883/04 (ECtHR 14 September 2007). 
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Renolde v France App no 5608/05 (ECtHR 16 October 2008); Jasinska v Poland App no 28326/05 (ECtHR 1 
June 2010) and Ketreb v France App no 38447/09 (ECtHR 19 July 2012). 
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Keenan v United Kingdom App no 27229/95 (ECtHR 3 April 2011), paras 111, 113, 114, 116. As regards the 
monitoring requirements in case of drug addicted prisoner, see also: McGlinchey and Others v United 
Kingdom App no 50390/99 (ECtHR 29 July 2003), paras 57-58. 
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cases the state of health of the detained person will be a relevant factor. In Haidn v 
Germany,733 the ECtHR found that the applicant's relatively advanced, but not particularly 
old age (he was 70), combined with his state of health, which could not be considered as 
critical, did not as such attain a minimum level of severity so as to fall within the scope of 
Article 3 of the ECHR. 
 
Standard 34.9. Other vulnerable persons (female applicants, mothers, LGBT etc.) 
 
In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium, in addition to finding a violation of 
Article 3 in respect of the child, the ECtHR also found a violation of the Article 3 rights of her 
mother in DRC. In doing so, it noted that the only action the Belgian authorities took was to 
inform her that her daughter had been detained and to provide her with a telephone 
number where she could be reached. The ECtHR therefore recognised that, as a mother, she 
would have suffered deep distress and anxiety as a result of her daughter’s detention, and 
this suffering reached the level of severity required for a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.734   
In Muskhadziyeva and Others v Belgium, in respect of the children’s mother, the ECtHR 
found that as she had not been separated from her children, and their constant presence 
would have somewhat appeased the distress and frustration she must have felt at being 
unable to protect them against the conditions of their detention. Any suffering or distress 
she would have experienced did not reach the level of severity required to constitute 
inhuman treatment. Like in Muskhadziyeva and Others v Belgium in Popov v France, the 
ECtHR also declined to find a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in respects of parents.735 
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Haidn v Germany App no 6587/04 (ECtHR 13 January 2011), para 108. 
734
Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 October 2006), paras 41-71. 
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The same type of judgment as regards the mother of detained children was taken in the case of 
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Standard 1. Direct effect of Article 15 of the Return Directive736  and a more 
favourable clause 
 
The Return Directive is binding as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State, but 
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form737 and methods. However, the CJEU 
decided in the cases of El Dridi and reiterated in Mahdi that Article 15 of the Return 
Directive regulating detention is unconditional and sufficiently precise, so that no other 
specific elements are required for it to be implemented by the Member State.738 As regards 
implementation of EU regulations, the CJEU states that methods of implementation which 
“would have the result of creating an obstacle to the direct effect of the Regulation and of 
jeopardizing its simultaneous and uniform application in the whole of the EU “/.../ can be 
considered contrary to the TFEU.739 The CJEU further adds that “it cannot be accepted that a 
Member State apply in an incomplete or selective manner provisions of a Community 
Regulation so as to render abortive certain aspects of Community legislation/.../.”740  
 
The first sentence of recital 17 of the Return Directive states that third-country nationals in 
detention should be treated in a humane and dignified manner with respect for their 
fundamental rights and in compliance with international and national law.741 
 
Recital 24 of the Return Directive states that “the Directive respects the principles recognised 
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU”.742 Article 1 of the Return 
Directive defines the subject matter as follows: “This Directive sets out common standards 
and procedures to be applied in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
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Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Official 
Journal of the EU, L 348, 24. 12. 2008; hereinafter: the Return Directive. 
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Article 288(3) of the TFEU, Article 20 of the Return Directive. 
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C-61/11, El Dridi EU:C:2011:268, para 47; C-146/14 PPU, Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, para 54. 
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C-39/72 Commission v Italy EU:C:1973:13, para 17. 
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Ibid. para 20. See also para 8 in the section 3.3. of the ELI Statement on the importance of »full 
implementation« of provision from a directive. 
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Ibid. 
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nationals, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Community law as 
well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations.”743 In 
this sense, in the case of detention under the Return Directive, a relevant provision is Article 
6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter: the Charter),744 which 
corresponds to Article 5 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the ECHR).745 In the case of Al Chodor, which refers to 
detention under the Dublin III Regulation, the CJEU decided that for the purpose of 
interpreting Article 6 of the Charter account must be taken of Article 5 of the ECHR as the 
“minimum threshold of protection.”746 In regards to the methods of interpretation of the 
Return Directive, it needs to be pointed out that according to the CJEU, as far deprivation of 
liberty measures are concerned, Articles 15 and 16 of the Return Directive are strictly 
regulated in order to ensure observance of the fundamental rights with regard to the third-
country nationals (TCN).747 
 
Article 1 of the Return Directive provides that the level of harmonisation of national laws is 
not limited to minimum standards, but to “common” standards related to asylum system, 
legal immigration policy, and the fight against illegal immigration, “which must be applied by 
each Member State”.748 However, Article 4 of the Return Directive is without prejudice to 
more favourable provisions of bilateral or multilateral agreements between the Community 
or between the Community and its Member States, and one or more third countries, or 
bilateral or multilateral agreements between one or more Member States and one or more 
third countries. Furthermore, the Return Directive is without prejudice to more favourable 
provisions on the right of Member States to adopt or maintain provisions that are more 
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See also: C-534/11 Arslan EU:C:2013:343, para  4. 
744
In the case of Kadzoev, the CJEU uses the terminology of deprivation of a persons's liberty (C-357/09 PPU 
Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741, para 56. Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(hereinafter: the Charter) states that everyone has a right to liberty and security of person. 
745
In the case of J.N., the CJEU established that rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter correspond to those 
guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR (C-601/15 PPU, 15. 2. 2016,  para 47). 
746
C-528/15 Al Chodor EU:C:2017:213, paras 36-37. 
747
C-47/15 Affium EU:C:2016:408, para 62. 
748
Recital 1 of the Return Directive; C-534/11 Arslan EU:C:2013:343, para 42; C-146/14 PPU Mahdi 
EU:C:2014:1320, para 39. In relation to the concept of  “common standards”, the CJEU also adds that the 
“Member States enjoy, in a number of respects, a discretion with regard to the implementation of the 
provisions of the directive in the light of the particular features of national law” (Ibid. para 39). 
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favourable to persons, to whom it applies, provided that such provisions are compatible with 
this Directive. “More favourable” provisions refer to illegally staying third-country nationals, 
since the Return Directive “does not allow those States to apply stricter standards in the area 
that it governs.”749 
 
Standard 2. Definition of detention  
 
Unlike the Recast Reception Directive,750 the Return Directive does not use such specific 
terminology as “deprivation of freedom of movement” or “deprivation of liberty”. However, 
in the early cases of Kadzoev and El Dridi751, the CJEU had used the term “person's 
liberty”.752 The ECtHR explained the distinction between the right to liberty of movement 
(Article 2(1) of Protocol 4 to the ECHR), and the right to liberty and security of person 
(Article 5 of the ECHR), leading to the application of different procedural safeguards under 
the ECHR the following way: “to determine whether someone has been deprived of his liberty 
/.../ the starting-point must be his concrete situation, and account must be taken of a whole 
range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the 
measure in question. The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is 
merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance /.../. The mere fact 
that it is possible for asylum seekers to leave voluntarily the country where they wish to take 
refuge cannot exclude a restriction on liberty /.../.”753   
 
The notion of deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the ECHR contains 
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C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268, para 33. 
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Article 2(h) of the Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) (Official Journal 
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C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741; C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268.  
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Amuur v France App no 19776/92 (ECtHR 25 June 1996), paras  42 and 48. See also: Rantsev v Cyprus and 
Russia App no 25965/04 (ECtHR 7 January 2010),  para 314; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App no 
36760/06 (ECtHR 7 January 2012), para 115., Medvedyev and Others v France (Grand Chamber) App no 
3394/03 (ECtHR 29 March 2010), para 73, Creangă v Romania (Grand Chamber), App no 29226/03 (ECtHR 
23 February 2012), para 91; Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 
December 2016), para 64. 
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both an objective element of a person’s confinement in a particular restricted space for a 
non-negligible length of time, and a subjective element providing that a person has not 
validly consented to the confinement in question.754 However, the ECtHR also decided that 
the right to liberty is too significant in a democratic society for a person to lose the benefit of 
the protection for the mere reason that he/she may have given himself/herself up to be 
taken into detention, especially when that person is legally incapable of consenting to, or 
disagreeing with, the proposed action.755 In another ruling, the ECtHR provided 
that“Detention may violate Article 5 of the ECHR even though the person concerned has 
agreed to it.”756 Additionally, where the facts indicate a deprivation of liberty within Article 
5(1) of the ECHR, a relatively short duration of detention does not affect this conclusion.757 
For concrete examples of deprivation of liberty or restriction of freedom of movement in the 
case-law of the CJEU and the ECtHR, see the Explanatory note to this check-list. 
 
 
 
Standard 3. Special needs of vulnerable persons 
 
In order to effectively implement Article 16(3) and 17 of the Return Directive, which 
addresses the special situation of vulnerable persons, Member States shall assess whether 
an irregular migrant has special needs concerning health care, child and family protection.758 
The category vulnerable persons includes unaccompanied minors, disabled persons, elderly 
persons, pregnant women, single parents with minor(s) and persons who have been 
subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual 
                                                 
754
Storck v Germany App no 61603/00 (ECtHR 16 June 2005), para 74; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App 
no 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 117. 
755
H.L. v United Kingdom App no 45508/99 (ECtHR 5 October 2004), para 90; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand 
Chamber) App no 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 119. 
756
Kasparov v Russia App no 53659/07 (ECtHR 11 October 2016), para 36. 
757
Ranstev v Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (ECtHR 7 January 2010), para 317; Iskandarov v Russia App no 
17185/05 (ECtHR 23 September 2010), para 140; European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – 
Right to Liberty and Security (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014), pp. 5-6/points 7, 
9, 12. Since measures of the Member States on detention under the Return Directive in most cases 
interfere with the right to personal liberty, this check-list further refers to standards and rules in relation to 
Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 6 of the Charter. 
758
Article 17 regulates special conditions concerning detention of minors and families, while Article 16(3) of the 
Return Directive states that particular attention shall be paid to the situation of vulnerable persons; 
emergency health care and essential treatment of illness shall be provided. 
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violence.759 If taken as analogy, under the Recast Reception Directive 2013/33/EU, such an 
assessment should be initiated “within a reasonable period of time” after the detention 
procedure was launched and may be integrated into existing national procedures, but does 
not need to take the form of an administrative procedure.760 However, “reasonable period of 
time” could mean as soon as possible and without delay if age assessment is at stake and 
asylum a person concerned is detained.761 Member States shall provide for appropriate 
monitoring of the situation of persons with special needs throughout the duration of the 
detention order.762 Likewise Member States shall ensure that those special needs are also 
addressed, if they become apparent at a later stage in the procedure.763 
 
Standard 4. Persons who can be subject to detention 
 
Rules on detention under the Return Directive are applicable to third country nationals, who 
do not or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, stay or residence in a Member State 
and are the subject of return.764 This means that the Return Directive does not preclude a 
third-country national being placed in detention “with a view to determining whether or not 
his stay is lawful.”765 
 
“Illegal stay” is defined as the presence of a third- country national on the territory of a 
Member State, which does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in 
Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in 
                                                 
759
Article 3(9) of the Return Directive. 
760
See Article 22(1) and (2) of the Recast Reception Directive 2013/33/EU. 
761
See, for example, Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), paras 148-150; 
Aarabi v Greece App no 39766/09, (ECtHR 2 April 2015), paras 43-45. 
762
See mutatis mutandis the third sub-paragraph of Article 22(1) of the Recast Reception Directive 
2013/33/EU. 
763
See mutatis mutandis the second sub-paragraph of Article 22(1) of the Recast Reception Directive 
2013/33/EU. As regards the importance of early and proper examination of whether a child is accompanied 
or unaccompanied see Rahimi v  Greece App no 8687/08 (ECtHR 5 July 2011), paras 63-73; as regards an 
appointment of child's representative, see also standard 14 on best interests of a child. 
764
Recital 5, Article 3(7) and Article 15(1) of the Return Directive. 
765
C-329/11 Achughbabian EU:C:2011:807, paras 29-30; see also the first sentence of Recital 17 of the Return 
Directive. 
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that Member State.766 “Third-country national” is defined as any person, who is not an EU 
citizen of the Union within the meaning of Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter; TFEU), and who is not a person enjoying the Community right 
of free movement, as defined in Article 2(5) of the Schengen Borders Code.767 Article 2(2)(a) 
of the Return Directive does not permit Member States to exclude certain illegally staying 
third-country nationals from the Directive's scope on the ground of illegal entry across an 
internal border.768 
 
The Member States “may decide”769, however, not to apply the Return Directive to those 
third-country nationals who are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of 
the Schengen Borders Code770, or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent 
authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border 
of a Member State, and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to 
stay in that Member State, or who are subject to return as a consequence of a criminal law 
sanction, according to national law, or who are subject of extradition procedures.771 As 
regards the possible interpretation(s) of the term “apprehended or intercepted” in 
connection with the irregular crossing the external border of a Member State, the legal 
implications of extraterritorial interceptions under the case-law of the ECtHR, and a possible 
situation when a detained irregular migrant files an asylum application, see the Explanatory 
Note. 
 
 
                                                 
766
Article 3(2) of the Return Directive; see also Article 2(1) of the Return Directive and the last paragraph under 
standard no 5 of this check-list. 
767
Article 3(1) of the Return Directive; see also Article 2(3) of the Return Directive. 
768
C-47/15 Affium EU:C:2016:408, para 77. 
769
In the light of the standard no 12 of this Check-list, the aforementioned decision should be expressly 
provided in national legislation implementing EU law. 
770
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). 
771
Article 2(2)(a) and (b) of the Return Directive; C-297/12, Filevu in Osmani EU:C:2013:569, para 50. However, 
Article 2(2)(b) of the Return Directive is not applicable to third-country nationals who have committed 
“only the offence of illegal staying” (C-329/11 Achughbabian EU:C:2011:807,  para 41). 
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Standard 5. Identifying the illegality of stay as a pre-condition for detention 
 
The second sentence of Recital 17 of the Return Directive distinguishes between 
“apprehension by law-enforcement authorities, regulated by national legislation,” and 
“detention under the Return Directive”. Therefore, since the Return Directive does not 
preclude the placement of a third-country national in a detention facility “with a view to 
determining whether or not his stay is legal,”772  in order to guarantee the effective 
implementation of the Return Directive the CJEU provides that competent authorities “must 
have a brief but reasonable time to identify the person under constraint and to research the 
information enabling it to be determined whether that person is an illegally-staying third-
country national.” They must act with “diligence and take a position without delay on the 
legality or otherwise of the stay of the persons concerned. Once it has been established that 
the stay is illegal, the said authorities must, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the said directive and 
without prejudice to the exceptions laid down by the latter adopt a return decision.”773  An 
exception to this situation is regulated by Article 6(3) of the Return Directive.774 
 
The concept of “illegal stay” is defined in Article 3(2) of the Return Directive. The CJEU 
further provides that “by virtue of that fact alone, staying there illegally, without such 
presence being subject to a condition requiring a minimum duration or an intention to 
remain on that territory,”  such a person is to be considered illegally staying in the sense of 
the Return Directive. “[However, if] (…) such presence is merely temporary or by way of 
transit among the grounds listed in Article 2(2) of the Return Directive, (…) Member States 
may decide to exclude an illegally staying third-country national from the Directive's 
scope.”775 
 
Standard 6. Authorities who can order a detention 
 
Detention of applicants shall be ordered by judicial or administrative authorities.776 
                                                 
772
C-329/11 Achughbabian EU:C:2011:807, paras 29-30; C-47/15 Affium EU:C:2016:408, para 53. 
773
Ibid. para 79; C-329/11 Achughbabian ECLI:EU:C:2011:807, para 31. 
774
C-47/15 Affium EU:C:2016:408, para 80, see also para 84. 
775
Ibid. paras 47-48. 
776
Article 15(2) of the Return Directive. 
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Standard 7. Permissible grounds for detention (“in particular” when there is a risk 
of absconding or a person avoids or hampers the preparation of return or removal) 
 
A Member State may only keep a third-country national in detention in order to prepare the 
return and/or carry out the removal process (as long as removal arrangements are in 
progress), “in particular” when there is a risk of absconding or the third-country national 
concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of the return or the removal process.777  In the 
case of Kadzoev778 the CJEU states that the “possibility of detaining a person on grounds of 
public order and public safety cannot be based on the Return Directive. None of the 
circumstances mentioned by the referring court can therefore constitute in itself a ground for 
detention under the provisions of that directive”.779 It might happen, however, that in a given 
case the issue of public order, public safety, or national security is connected with the risk of 
absconding.780 
 
Article 5(1) sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of the ECHR contain an exhaustive list of permissible 
grounds for deprivation of liberty. Thus, no deprivation of liberty is lawful unless it falls 
within one of those grounds.781 Only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is 
consistent with the aim of that provision which enshrines a fundamental human right, 
namely: the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the state with his 
or her right to liberty.782 The risk of absconding in the context of the Return Directive should 
be linked to Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.783  
 
                                                 
777
Article 15(1) of the Return Directive. 
778
Op. cit. … 
779
C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741, para 70. In this context, see also the right to non-
discrimination from Article 21 of the Charter, which prohibits any discrimination based on any ground such 
as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, birth, political or 
any other opinion, membership of national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation; 
within the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited, too. 
780
See Article 7(4) of the Return Directive and further discussion standard no 31 on restrictions on the right to 
defence and/or equality of arms based on national (public) security, public policy or public order. 
781
Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 January 2008), para 43; A and Others 
v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (EctHR 19 February 2009), para 163. 
782
Khalaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 88. 
783
The second limb of Article 5(1)(f) regulates a situation of lawful arrest or detention of a person against 
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.  
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Standard 8. Objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding 
 
Based on Article 3(7) of the Return Directive, Member States have a legal obligation to 
define objective criteria for the risk of absconding in national law. Under this provision, the 
“risk of absconding” means the existence of reasons in an individual case which are based 
on objective criteria defined by law to believe that the third-country national may abscond. 
This should go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay.784  Furthermore, according to the 
case-law of the CJEU, the lack of identity documents cannot, on its own, form the grounds 
for extending detention under Article 15(6) of the Return Directive.785 In the light of the 
standard no. 12 of this check-list and based on the case-law of the CJEU related to other 
sorts of disputes, guidelines or circulars should not be considered as adequate instruments 
for implementing Article 3(7) of the Return Directive. The provisions of directives “must be 
implemented with unquestionable binding force, and the specificity, precision and clarity 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of legal certainty; mere administrative practices, which 
by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate 
publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State's 
obligation under the Treaty.786 In the case of Al Chodor, the CJEU has decided that objective 
criteria for the risk of absconding in the context of Dublin III Regulation have to be defined in 
a binding provision of general application and that settled case-law confirming a consistent 
administrative practice cannot suffice.787      
 
Standard 9. Proof and burden of proof concerning the risk of absconding 
 
According to Article 3(7) of the Return Directive, the “risk of absconding” may be defined as 
                                                 
784
Recital 6 of the Return Directive; C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320,  para 40. 
785
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 , para 73. 
786
C-159/99 Commission v Italy EU:C:2001:278, para 32; C-315/98, Commission v Italy EU:C:1999:551, para 10. 
787
C-528/15 Al Chodor EU:C:2017:213, para 45; mutatis mutandis C-601/15 PPU, J.N. (Grand Chamber) 
EU:C:2016:84, para 60. See also standard no 9 of this Check-list. For concrete examples of criteria for the 
risk of absconding that are defined in national law of the Member States along with the possible legal 
consequences if objective criteria are not defined in national law, see the Explanatory note on objective 
criteria for a risk of absconding. Factors which under case-law of the ECtHR might speak against the risk of 
absconding in relation to Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR are state of health, stable place of residence, no 
attempt to escape, strong family ties, no previous criminal record of the applicant (Segeda v Russia App no 
41545/06 (ECtHR 19 December 2013), para 65). 
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the existence of reasons in an individual case, which are based on objective criteria defined 
by law, “to believe” that a person concerned “may abscond”. The burden of proof lies with a 
State. The nature of the assessment of the risk of absconding may be compared to the 
nature of assessment of real risk that an asylum seeker would be tortured or ill-treated if 
returned or extradited to his/her country of origin. In both those cases, any such allegation 
always concerns “something which may or may not occur in the future. Consequently, such 
allegations cannot be proven in the same way as past events.”788 
 
 
Standard 10. Avoiding or hampering the preparation of the return or the removal 
process and reasonable prospects of removal 
 
The EU Commission’s Return Handbook789 does not differentiate between such grounds as 
the “risk of absconding” and the “circumstances of avoiding or hampering removal 
procedure”. The European Synthesis Report on the Judicial Implementation of Chapter III of 
the Return Directive had identified that some Member States' legislation does not 
differentiate between the risk of absconding and avoiding removal procedures, while in 
some other Member States, the legislation clearly differentiates between the risk of 
absconding and avoiding or hampering the preparation of return or the removal process. 
Among the circumstances of avoiding or hampering the preparation of the return or the 
removal process, the following circumstances from some national legislations or 
jurisprudences are mentioned: a refusal to board the plane; giving false information on one's 
identity; concealing documents; previous failures to depart.790 According to the ECtHR, in 
cases where the deportation is no longer possible, the detention would cease to be lawful, 
                                                 
788
Fozil Nazarov v Russia App no 74759/13 (ECtHR 20 April 2015), para 38. In his concurring opinion in the case 
of Saadi v Italy App no 37201/06 (ECtHR 28 February 2008), Judge Zupančič says “the cognitive approach to 
future events may be only a rational probabilistic assessment in the spectrum of experiment which moves 
from abstract probability to concrete probability. The correctness of that probabilistic assessment – one 
might use the word prognosis – critically depends on the nature of information (not evidence!) adduced in 
a particular situation.” 
789
Return Handbook, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/return_handbook_en.pdf 
790
Project Redial, 2016, European University Institute, the European Synthesis Report on the Judicial 
Implementation of Chapter III of the Return Directive - Procedural safeguards, authors: Madalina Moraru 
and Geraldine Renaudiere, pp. 12-13. 
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even if the person detained fails to cooperate in his or her removal process.791   
 
Standard 11. Reasonable prospects of removal 
 
Similarly to the decisions of the ECtHR in the aforementioned cases of Mikolenko v Estonia792 
and Louled Massoud v Malta,793 the Return Directive provides that “when it appears that a 
reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists for legal or other considerations or the 
conditions laid down in paragraph 1 no longer exist, detention ceases to be justified and the 
person concerned shall be released immediately.”794 It must, therefore, be apparent “at the 
time of the national court's review of the lawfulness of detention that a real prospect exists 
that the removal can be carried out successfully” /.../.795 A reasonable prospect of removal 
does not exist where it appears unlikely that the person concerned will be admitted to a third 
country, having regard to those periods.”796 
 
Standard 12. Control of the quality of law on detention  
 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR requires that any deprivation of liberty must be “lawful”; it must 
conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law.797 The law must satisfy the 
principle of legal certainty. It must be “sufficiently accessible and precise, in order to avoid all 
risk of arbitrariness.”798 It must also be foreseeable.799 This is reiterated by the Grand 
                                                 
791
Mikolenko v Estonia App no 10664/05 (ECtHR 8 August 2009), para  65; Louled Massoud v Malta App no 
24340/08 (ECtHR 27 July 2010), para 67. 
792
Mikolenko v Estonia App no 10664/05 (ECtHR 8 August 2009), paras 65-68. 
793
Louled Massoud v Malta App no 24340/08 (ECtHR 27 July 2010), para 67. 
794
Article 15(4) of the Return Directive. 
795
C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741, para 65. 
796
C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741, paras  65-67. For example, under the case law of 
the ECtHR, if the country of return does not confirm the nationality of the person concerned, the realistic 
prospect of removal ceases to exist (Tabesh v Greece App no 8256/07 (ECtHR 26 November  2009), para 
62). See also standard no 18 of this Check-list on length of detention and conditions for extension of 
detention. 
797
Amuur v France (1996) App no 19776/92 (ECtHR, 25 June 1996), para 50; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey 
App no 30471/08 (ECtHR 22 September 2009), para 130. 
798
Amuur v France (1996) App no 19776/92 (ECtHR, 25 June 1996), para 50. 
799
Nasrulloyev v Russia App no 656/06 11 (ECtHR October 2007), para 71; C-528/15; Al Chodor EU:C:2017:213, 
paras 38-40. 
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Chamber in the case of Khlaifia and others v Italy800, where the ECtHR provides that “where 
deprivation of liberty is concerned it is particularly important that the general principle of 
legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of 
liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its 
application, so that it meets the standard of lawfulness set by the ECHR, a standard which 
requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate 
advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail”.801 The standards on the quality of law relate not only to 
clearly regulated grounds for detention, but also to time limit for detention or for extending 
detention and for the existence of a legal remedy by which the lawfulness of detention may 
be challenged.802 Therefore, “at the time of the national court's review” of the lawfulness of 
detention, there must be a “real prospect that the removal can be carried out successfully, 
having regard to the periods laid down in Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive.”803 
 
Standard 13. Right to information and a personal interview before detention order 
is issued 
 
Under EU secondary law, procedural safeguards are regulated only in relation to return 
decisions, entry-ban decisions, and decisions on removal (Chapter III of the Return 
Directive). However, the right to information  and to a personal interview during the 
administrative procedure and before the detention order is issued are expressions of the 
general principles of EU law (the right to be heard, or the right to a defence (to good 
administration). Effective realisation of those rights will often be indispensable for the 
effective fulfilment of other standards such as individual assessment, consideration of less 
coercive alternative measures to detention and the principle of proportionality. “The right to 
be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his views effectively 
during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect 
                                                 
800
Op. cit. ... 
801
Khalaifia and others v Italy  (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 92. 
802
See the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
803
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320,  para 60; C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741, 
para 65. 
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his interests adversely”.804 “Observance of the right to be heard is required even where the 
applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement.”805  
 
However, “fundamental rights, such as respect for the rights of the defence, do not constitute 
unfettered prerogatives and may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact 
correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question and that 
they do not involve, with regard to the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights guaranteed.”806  Not every 
irregularity in the exercise of the rights of the defence in an administrative procedure on 
detention will constitute and infringement of those rights. Not every breach, in particular, of 
the right to be heard, will systematically render unlawful the decision taken and therefore 
not every such breach will automatically require the release of the person concerned.807  “To 
make such a finding of unlawfulness, the national court must – where it considers that a 
procedural irregularity affecting the right to be heard has occurred – assess whether, in the 
light of the factual and legal circumstances of the case, the outcome of the administrative 
procedure at issue could have been different if the third-country nationals in question had 
been able to put forward information which might show that their detention should be 
brought to an end.”808 In this respect, however, regard should be had for the case-law of the 
ECtHR providing that an infringement of the right to a personal interview (to be heard and to 
a defence) before the extension of a period of detention may constitute a gross or a 
manifest violation of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.809 
 
Furthermore, under the case-law of the ECtHR, certain obligations of the Contracting State 
regarding effective access to the relevant procedures (access to information, interpreters, 
legal advisers) in relation to Article 3 of the ECHR (or Article 4 of Protocol No. 4) exist also 
outside the territory of that contracting State.  For example, on the high seas, when aliens 
                                                 
804
C-357/09 PPU Boudjlida (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2014:2431, para 36; C-166/13 Mukarubega EU:C:2014:2336, 
para 46. 
805
C-249/13, Boudjlida, para 39. 
806
Ibid. para 43. 
807
See C-383/13 PPU M.G. and N.R. EU:C:2013:533, paras 39, 41. 
808
Ibid. para 40. 
809
Richmond Yaw and others v Italy App nos 3342/11, 3391/11, 3408/11 and 3447/11 (ECtHR 6 October 2016), 
paras 74-78. 
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are intercepted by that contracting State for the purpose of their return to a third country.810  
 
Standard 14. Requirement of individual assessment 
 
Detention may be ordered only in an “individual” case,811 and based on a “specific” 
assessment of the circumstances of a third-country national concerned, in relation to 
objective criteria that should be defined by national law, and unless other sufficient but less 
coercive measures can be applied effectively.812 The requirement of individual assessment 
guarantees that if in a given dispute the objective criteria for the risk of absconding are 
ascertained by the administrative authority or by the court, this does not provide sufficient 
grounds for the detention order. In addition, the individual situation and individual 
circumstances must be taken into consideration. “It is only where, in the light of an 
assessment of each specific situation, the enforcement of the return decision in the form of 
removal risks being compromised by the conduct of the person concerned that the Member 
States may deprive that persons of his liberty and detain him.”813 
 
Standard 15. Best interests of a child 
 
Recital 22 of the Return Directive states that “in line with the 1989 UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration of 
Member States when implementing this Directive. In line with the ECHR, respect for family 
life should be a primary consideration of Member States when implementing this Directive.” 
The principle of the best interest of a child is mentioned also in Article 5(a) and Article 17(5) 
of the Return Directive. However, in the case of MA, BT, DA, the CJEU states that “although 
express mention of the best interest of the minor is made only in the first paragraph of 
                                                 
810
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 27765/09 (ECtHR 23 February 2012), para 201-207; 
Sharifi and Others v Italy and Greece App no 16643/09 (ECtHR  21 Janurary 2015), para 242. 
811
Article 15(1) of the Return Directive. Recital 6 uses the expression that a decision must be adopted on a  
“case-by case basis”. The same expression is used by the CJEU in the case of Mahdi (C-146/14 PPU Mahdi 
EU:C:2014:1320, para 40). 
812
Article 3(7) of the Return Directive; see also: O.M. v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR 5 July 2016), para 52. 
813
C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268, para 39; C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, para 70-73; Recital 6 of the 
Return Directive. 
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Article 6 of the Dublin III Regulation,814 the effect of Article 24(2) of the Charter,815 in 
conjunction with Article 51(1) of the Charter thereof, is that the child's best interests must 
also be a primary consideration in all decisions adopted by the Member States on the basis 
of the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Dublin III Regulation.816 This means – taking into 
account also the fact that the CJEU refers to Article 24(2) of the Charter as being a right and 
not a principle817 – the principle of the best interests of a child extends beyond the 
requirements of legal representation of an unaccompanied minor, family reunification,818 
access to the basic education system,819 emergency health care and essential treatment of 
illness,820 leisure, recreational activities, privacy, separate accommodation and other 
requirements from Article 17 of the Return Directive. In regards to unaccompanied child, 
his/her representative must be appointed before any administrative proceedings are 
undertaken. The best interests of a child extend to all sorts of decisions taken during the 
procedures carried out under the Return Directive, including detention. The ECHR operates 
from the standpoint that in all actions relating to children, an in-depth examination of the 
child's best interests must be undertaken prior to a decision that will impact that child's 
life.821 Where children are seeking asylum their extreme vulnerability is compounded. Such 
double vulnerability must take precedence over a child's irregular status.822 When 
considering the detention of children, the principle of proportionality in the application of 
Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR is relevant in the sense that less coercive measures or alternatives 
                                                 
814
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast), 2013 OJ L 180. 
815
Article 24(2) of the Charter states that “in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities 
or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration.” 
816
C-648/11 MA, BT, DA, EU:C:2013:367, para 59. 
817
For more on this, see the Explanatory note. 
818
Article 14(a) of the Return Directive. 
819
Article 14(c) of the Return Directive. 
820
Article 16(3) of the Return Directive. 
821
Rahimi v Greece App no 8687/08 (ECtHR 5 April 2011), paras 51-96; Mubilanzila, Mayeka and Kaniki 
Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 Jan 2007), para 53; Muskhadziyeva and Others v Belgium, 
41442/07 App no 41442/07 (19 January 2010), paras 61-62 Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 
39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012),  paras 92-103. 
822
Mubilanzila, Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium, para 55; Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 
39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012), para 91; Tarakhel v Switzerland (Grand Chamber) App no 29217/12 
(ECtHR 4 November 2014), para 99; A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), para 
110. 
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to detention, need to be taken into consideration.823 
 
Standard 16. Consideration of the effectiveness of less coercive alternative 
measures to detention  
 
As alternatives to detention Article 7(3) of the Return Directive mentions regular reporting 
to the authorities, the deposit of an adequate financial guarantee, the submission of 
documents or the obligation to stay at a certain place.824 The CJEU states in the case of El 
Dridi that “the order in which the stages of the return procedure established by the Return 
Directive are to take place corresponds to a gradation of the measures to be taken in order to 
enforce the return decision /.../ A gradation goes “from the measure which allows the person 
concerned the most liberty, namely granting a period for his voluntary departure, to 
measures which restrict that liberty the most, namely detention in a specialised facility, the 
principle of proportionality must be observed throughout those stages.”825 The less coercive 
alternative measures to detention must be defined in national law.826 In the case of Mahdi, 
the CJEU states that the administrative authority must assess whether other sufficient but 
less coercive measures to detention can be applied effectively in a specific case.827 The 
assessment whether a less coercive alternative measure may be effectively applied in a 
particular case is a specific element of the requirement of individual assessment and of the 
principle of proportionality under EU law.828  
                                                 
823
Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012), para 119; A.B. and Others v 
France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), para 110. For further discussion on the best interests of a 
child, see the Explanatory note and standards nos. 37.1, 37.5 and 37.6 of this Check-list. 
824
See also: C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268 , para 37. In this context, Article 8(4) of the Recast Reception 
Directive mentions regular reporting to the authorities, the deposit of a financial guarantee, or an 
obligation to stay at an assigned place. 
825
C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268, para 41. See also standard no 17 of this Check-list on the principle of 
proportionality. 
826
Article 15(1) of the Return Directive; see also mutatis mutandis C-601/15 PPU, J.N. (Grand Chamber) 
EU:C:2016:84, para 61. 
827
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, paras 61, 67. As regards possible less coercive measures to detention, 
see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. For the relevance of alternative measures for detention from 
the standpoint of case-law of the ECtHR, see the last paragraph of the Explanatory note on the standard no 
17 on principle of proportionality and the necessity test of this Check-list. 
828
The term “necessary” is used in Article 15(5) of the Return Directive, while the principle of proportionality is 
mentioned in Recital 16 of the Return Directive, which states that “the use of detention for the purpose of 
removal should be limited to the principle of proportionality with regards to the means used and objectives 
pursued.” 
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Standard 17. Principle of proportionality and the necessity test 
 
Recital 16 of the Return Directive states that “the use of detention for the purpose of 
removal should be limited to the principle of proportionality with regards to the means used 
and objectives pursued.”829 The principle of proportionality contains the so-called “necessity 
test”, which is integrated into Article 15(1) of the Return Directive (“unless other sufficient 
but less coercive measures can be applied effectively”) and in Article 15(5) of the Return 
Directive (“detention shall be maintained as long as it is necessary to ensure successful 
removal, but may not exceed 6 months or under exceptional circumstances 18 months”).  
 
Article 52(1) of the Charter, which regulates the general principle of proportionality, states 
that “any limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to 
the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union on the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others.”830 In case of detention under the Return Directive, the 
objective of the general interest recognised by the EU is the “establishment of an effective 
removal and repatriation policy, based on common standards, for persons to be returned in a 
humane manner and with full respect for their fundamental rights and dignity”.831 As regards 
proportionality and the length of detention, the CJEU states that the Return Directive is 
intended to take account of the case-law of the ECtHR, which sets limits for the length of 
detention of a person against whom a deportation or extradition procedure is under way 
(proportionality principle).832  
 
In regards to aspects of the proportionality and the necessity test, the case-law of the ECtHR 
– if taken in conjunction with applicable EU law – is not less stringent.833 
 
                                                 
829
See also Recital 13 of the Return Directive and C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268 , para 57. 
830
See also: C-601/15 PPU, J.N. (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2016:84, para 50 and C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268 , 
para 38, 41, 42. 
831
Recital 2 of the Return Directive. 
832
C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268, para 43. 
833
See the Explanatory note to this Check-list.  
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Standard 18. Length of detention and conditions for extension of detention, 
including due diligence requirement 
 
“Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as 
removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence.834 When it appears 
that a reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists for legal or other considerations or 
the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 no longer exist, detention ceased to be justified and 
the person concerned shall be released immediately.835 Each Member State shall set a limited 
period of detention, which may not exceed six months.836 In two exceptional cases (lack of 
cooperation, and delays in obtaining the necessary documentation), which are set out in 
Article 15(6) of the Return Directive, a detention lasting for 6 months may be extended for 
an additional 12 months, but it cannot last more than 18 months.837  When assessing “a lack 
of cooperation by the third-country national” within the meaning of Article 15(6) of the 
Return Directive, the CJEU developed an interpretation that  the national authority must 
examine, on the one hand, whether a person “during the initial period of detention  has 
failed to cooperate with the competent authorities as regards implementation of the 
removal operation and, on the other, the likelihood of the removal operation lasting longer 
than anticipated because of the conduct of the person concerned. If the removal of the third-
country national is taking, or has taken, longer than anticipated for another reason, no 
causal link may be established between the latter's conduct and the duration of the 
operation in question and therefore no lack of cooperation on his part can be established. 
Furthermore, Article 15(6) of the Return Directive requires that before it considers whether 
the third-country national concerned has shown that he has failed to cooperate, the 
authority concerned should be able to demonstrate that the removal operation is lasting 
longer than anticipated, despite all reasonable efforts: that means that, in the case before 
the referring court, the Member State in question should have sought, and should still 
actively be seeking, to secure the issue of identity documents for the third-country 
national.”838  The CJEU further held that a third-country national, "who, in circumstances 
                                                 
834
Second sub-paragraph of Article 15(1) of the Return Directive. See also Article 15(5) of the Return directive. 
835
Article 15(4) of the Return Directive; C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, para 59. 
836
Article 15(5) of the Return Directive. 
837
Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive. For the length of detention under case-law of the ECtHR, see 
the Explanatory note. 
838
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, paras 82-83. 
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such as those in issue in the main proceedings, has not obtained an identity document which 
would have made it possible for him to be removed from the Member State concerned may 
be regarded as having demonstrated a lack of cooperation within the meaning of that 
provision only if an examination of his conduct during the period of detention shows that he 
has not cooperated in the implementation of the removal operation and that it is likely that 
that operation lasts longer than anticipated because of that conduct, a matter which falls to 
be determined by the determining court.”839 
 
“Article 15(5) and (6) fix the maximum period of detention for the purpose of removal”840 
and “no case authorises the maximum period defined in that provision to be exceeded.”841 A 
period during which a person has been held in detention on the basis of a decision taken 
pursuant to the provisions concerning asylum-seekers may not be regarded as detention for 
the purpose of removal within the meaning of the Return Directive.842 The period of 
detention completed by the person concerned during the procedure in which the lawfulness 
of the removal decision is subject of judicial review, must be taken into account for 
calculating the maximum duration of detention.843 The maximum duration of detention 
must be common to the Member States.844 
For some concrete examples of due diligence standards under case-law of the ECtHR, see 
the Explanatory note. See also standard no. 33 of this check-list on impact of interim 
measures issued by courts on the lawfulness of detention. 
 
Standard 19. Due diligence requirement and criminal sanctions 
 
“Any detention shall be /…/ maintained [only] as long as removal arrangements are in 
progress and executed with due diligence.”845 The due diligence requirement and the Return 
Directive, preclude providing a sentence of imprisonment of an illegally staying third-country 
national on the sole ground that he/she remains without valid grounds on the territory of 
                                                 
839
Ibid. para 85. 
840
C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741, para 35. 
841
Ibid. para 69. 
842
Ibid. para 48. 
843 
Ibid. para 53. 
844 
Ibid. para 54. 
845
Second sub-paragraph of Article 15(1) of the Return Directive.  
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that state. The sentence based on merely these grounds is contrary to an order to leave that 
territory within a given period of time.846  In the case of Achughbabian847 the CJEU further 
stated that “the removal must be fulfilled a soon as possible. That would clearly not be the 
case if, after establishing that a third-country national is staying illegally, the Member State 
were to preface the implementation of the return decision, or even the adoption of that 
decision, with a criminal prosecution, followed, in appropriate cases, by a term of 
imprisonment. Such a step would delay the removal.848 That does not exclude the possibility 
of using other measures of a criminal nature, as long as they are in accordance with the 
principles and the objectives of the Return Directive, and that they are subject to full 
observance of fundamental rights, particularly those guaranteed by the ECHR.849 Such 
measures of a criminal nature may be, for example, a fine or replacing a fine with an 
expulsion order accompanied by an entry ban.850 The Return Directive, however, does not 
preclude Member States from adopting legislation which provides for the imposition of a 
term of imprisonment on an illegally staying third-country national, who, after having been 
returned to his country of origin in the context of an earlier return procedure, unlawfully re-
enters the territory of that state in breach of an entry ban.851 
 
Standard 20. Right to be informed “promptly” about the reasons for detention after 
a detention order is issued 
 
Where a Member State grants a third-country national the right to take proceedings by 
means of which the lawfulness of detention shall be subject to a speedy judicial review, 
Article 15(2)(b) of the Return Directive provides that a Member State shall “immediately” 
inform the third-country national concerned about the “possibility of taking such 
proceedings”. This provision could not be effective if this information did not include the 
reasons for detention. More specifically, Article 5(2) of the ECHR states that “everyone who 
is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons 
                                                 
846
C-61/11 El Dridi EU:C:2011:268, para 62; C-329/11 Achughbabian EU:C:2011:807, paras 37-40.  
847
C-329/11 Achughbabian EU:C:2011:807. 
848
Ibid. para 45. This includes a criminal measure of fine for which a home detention order may be substituted 
(C-430/11, Sagor EU:C:2012:777, para 33). 
849
C-329/11, Achughbabian EU:C:2011:807, paras 28, 46-49. 
850
C-430/11 Sagor EU:C:2012:777, paras 36-42. 
851
C-290/14 Celaj EU:C:2015:640 operative part of the judgment in conjunction with paragraph 32. 
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for his arrest.” The requirement of “prompt information”  means being provided with an 
autonomous explanation extending beyond the realm of criminal law measures.852 The 
standards of “immediate” information under EU law and of “promptness” under the case-
law of the ECtHR may differ slightly because of the different obligatory content and form of 
the information that should be provided to the applicants.853 The requirement of 
“promptness” under the case-law of the ECtHR means that the “reasons” for detention 
should be provided to the applicant within a few hours after detention began,854 because if 
information is provided after 76 hours of detention,855 after 4 days of detention856 or after 
10 days of detention,857 there will likely be a breach of the requirement that such reasons 
should be given promptly. If the applicant is incapable of receiving the information, the 
relevant details must be given to those persons who represent his/her interests, such as a 
lawyer or a guardian.858 
 
Standard 21. Right to be informed “adequately” about the reasons for detention 
and about procedures laid down in national law for challenging the detention order 
 
In case of detention of asylum seekers, EU secondary law explicitly requires that detained 
asylum-seekers must be informed immediately “in writing, in a language which they 
understand or are reasonably supposed to understand”, not only about “the procedures laid 
down in national law for challenging the detention order, as well as of the possibility to 
request free legal assistance and representation”, but also about the reasons of detention.859  
However, in case of detention under the Return and where a Member State grants a third-
country national the right to take proceedings by means of which the lawfulness of 
                                                 
852
Khlaifia and Others v Italy, (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 116. 
853
See standard no 21 of this Check-list. 
854
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom App nos 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (ECtHR 30 August 
1990),  paras 41-42; M.A. v Cyprus App no 41872/10 (ECtHR 23 July 2013), para 228; Kerr v United Kingdom 
App no 40451/98 (ECtHR 7 December 1999). 
855
Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 January 2008), paras 81-85. 
856
Shamayev and Others v Georgia and Russia App no 36378/02 (ECtHR 12 April 2015), para 416; Khalaifia and 
others v Italy, (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 120. 
857
Rusu v Austria App no 34082/02 (ECtHR 2 October 2008), para 43. 
858
X. v United Kingdom App no 7215/75 (ECtHR 5 November 1981), para 16; Z.H. v Hungary App no 28973/11 
(ECtHR 8 November 2012), paras 42-43; European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right to 
Liberty and Security (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014), p. 22/point 116. 
859
Article 9(4) of the Reception Directive in conjunction with Article 28(4) of the Dublin III Regulation. 
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detention shall be subject to a speedy judicial review only Article 15(2)(b) of the Return 
Directive provides that a Member State shall immediately inform the third-country national 
concerned about the “possibility of taking such proceedings.”  
 
As regards the manner of communicating the reasons for the detention, the ECtHR more 
specifically states that “any person arrested must be told in simple, non-technical language 
that he can understand, the essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest, so as to be 
able, if he sees fit, to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with Article 
5(4) of the ECHR /.../. This information “need[s] not be related in its entirety by the arresting 
officer at the very moment of arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the 
information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in each case according to its special 
features,”860 but the information provided must be correct.861 The information on the legal 
status of a migrant, or on possible removal measures does not provide the sufficient level of 
detail, and thus cannot form the legal basis for the migrant’s deprivation of liberty.862 “A 
bare indication of the legal basis” for the arrest, taken on its own, is insufficient for the 
purposes of Article 5(2) of the ECHR.863 In M.A. v Cyprus (para. 229), the ECtHR has accepted 
that (correct) information does not necessarily have to be provided in writing. “In cases 
where detainees had not been informed of the reasons for their deprivation of liberty, the 
ECtHR has found that their right to appeal against their detention was deprived of all 
effective substance”.864  
 
                                                 
860
Shamayev and Others v Georgia and Russia App no 36378/02 (ECtHR 12 April 2015), para 413; Khalaifia and 
Others v Italy, (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 115. 
861
Rusu v Austria App no 34082/02 (ECtHR 2 October 2008), para 42. 
862
Khalaifia and Others v Italy, (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 118. 
863
European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right to Liberty and Security (Council of 
Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014), p. 22/point 122; Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United 
Kingdom App nos 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (ECtHR 30 August 1990), para 41; Murray v United 
Kingdom  (Grand Chamber) App no 14310/88 (ECtHR 28 October 1994), para 76; Kortesis v Greece App no 
60593/10 (ECtHR 12 June 2012),  paras 61-62. 
864
Khalaifia and Others v Italy, (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 132. For 
further examples on this issue, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
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Standard 22. Written decision on detention (and its extension)865 must be delivered 
to the applicant/legal representative and must contain reasons closely connected 
to the grounds of detention  
 
Detention and the extension of the detention period of third-country nationals shall be 
ordered in writing. A detention order shall provide the factual and legal reasons on which it 
was issued.866  Similarly, under ECHR de facto detention must be “incarnated by a formal 
decision of legal relevance, complete with reasoning.”867 If the express (or even underlying) 
reason for detention is other than to prevent the person effecting an unauthorised entry or 
to take action with a view to deportation or extradition, it cannot be justified under Article 
5(1)(f).868 The detention will be arbitrary where there has been bad faith or deception.869 
 
Standard 23. An obligation to keep records on detention cases 
 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR includes a special requirement on the obligation to keep records of 
matters of detention. The ECtHR considers that the unacknowledged detention of an 
individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in 
Article 5 of the ECHR and discloses the gravest violation of that provision.870 The absence of 
a record of information such as the date, time and location of detention, the name of a 
detainee, the reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it, must be 
seen as incompatible, inter alia, with the very purpose of Article 5 of the ECHR. This 
requirement is also necessary due to Article 15(3) of the Return Directive, which provides 
that “in every case, detention shall be reviewed at reasonable intervals of time either on 
application by the third-country national concerned or ex officio. In the case of prolonged 
                                                 
865
“Detention and extension of detention are similar in nature since both deprive the third-country national 
concerned of his liberty” /.../ (C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, para 44). 
866
Second sub-paragraph of Article 15(2) of the Return Directive; C-146/14 PPU, Mahdi, 5. 6. 2014, paras 41, 
44, 52. The obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions is a general principle of EU law 
(see: Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter;  see also: C-601/15 PPU, J.N.  (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2016:84, para 62). 
867
Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017), para 67. 
868
See mutatis mutandis: Bozano v France App no 9990/82 (ECtHR 18 December 1986), para 60; Čonka v 
Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR 5 Feburary 2002), para 42; Khodorkovskiy v Russia App no 5829/04 
(ECtHR 31 May 2011), para 142; Azimov v Russia App no 67474/11 (ECtHR 28 April 2013), para 164. 
869
Bozano v France App no 9990/82 (ECtHR 18 December 1986), para 55; Čonka v Belgium App no 51564/99 
(ECtHR 5 February 2002), para 42. 
870El-Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Grand Chamber) App no 39630/09 (ECtHR 13 
December 2012), para 233; Kurt v Turkey App no 15/1997/799/1002 (ECtHR 25 May 1998), para 125. 
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detention periods, reviews shall be subject to the supervision of a judicial authority.” 
 
Standard 24. Right to (free) legal assistance and/or representation 
 
A third-country national concerned “shall” have the possibility to obtain legal advice, 
representation and, where necessary, linguistic assistance.871  Member States “shall” ensure 
that the necessary “legal assistance and/or representation” is granted upon request, free of 
charge, in accordance with the relevant national legislation or rules regarding legal aid, and 
“may” provide that any free legal assistance and/or representation is subject to conditions 
as set out in Article 21(3) to (5) of Directive 2013/32 of the European parliament and of the 
Council of 16 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection (recast) (O J  L 180/60, 29. 6. 2013, hereinafter: the Recast Procedures 
Directive).872 This means that Member States may provide that free legal assistance and/or 
representation in detention cases is subject to conditions as set out in Articles 21(3) to (5) of 
the Recast Procedure Directive. This standard is an expression of the second sentence of 
Article 47(2) of the Charter which states that “everyone shall have the possibility of being 
advised, defended and represented.” Article 47(3) of the Charter states that “legal aid shall 
be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to 
ensure effective access to justice”. Procedures for access to legal assistance and 
representation shall be laid down in national law.  From the standpoint of the case-law of 
the ECtHR, the ECHR “is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but 
practical and effective.”873 In the case of Čonka, the ECtHR held that the accessibility of a 
remedy implies, inter alia, that the circumstances voluntarily created by the authorities must 
be such as to afford applicants a realistic possibility of using the remedy.874  In the context of 
detention proceedings, the ECtHR has held that the authorities are not obliged to provide 
free legal aid.875 However, if the absence of legal aid raises an issue concerning the 
accessibility of a remedy (for example, where legal representation is required in the 
                                                 
871Article 13(3) of the Return Directive. 
872See Article 13(4) of the Return Directive in conjunction wtih Article 53 of the Recast Procedure Directive.  
873
Čonka v Belgium App no51564/99 (ECtHR 5 February 2002), para 46. 
874
Ibid. para 46. 
875
Lebedev v Russia App no 4493/04 (ECtHR 25 October 2007),  para 84; Suso Musa v Malta App no 42337/12 
(ECtHR 23 July 2013), para 61. 
Section 5: Detention under the Return Directive and the ECHR: Basic Judicial Check-List 2 
 
184 
 
domestic context) an issue could arise under Article 5(4) of the ECHR876 or under Article 13 
in conjunction with Article 3 of the ECHR.877 
 
Standard 25. Other aspects of the practical and effective right to judicial review 
 
Apart from the issues of free legal aid and representation,878 there may be certain other 
aspects of effective access to court which are relevant in detention cases. Further guidance 
may be taken from the case-law of the ECtHR as regards general standards for practical and 
effective access to court in civil disputes. The right of access to a court must be “practical 
and effective”.879 For the right of access to be effective, an individual must “have a clear, 
practical opportunity to challenge an act that is an interference with his rights”.880 The rules 
governing the formal steps to be taken, and the time-limits to be complied with in lodging an 
appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring the proper administration 
of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty.881 The rules in 
question, or the application of these rules, should not prevent litigants from using an 
available remedy.882 The practical and effective nature of this right may be impaired by the 
inhibitive nature of the costs of the  proceedings in relation to the individuals financial 
capacity;883 by issues relating to time limits;884 and by the existence of procedural bars 
                                                 
876
Ibid. para 61; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey App no 30471/08 (ECtHR 22 September 2009), para 141. 
877
Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 66. For further standards as regards free 
legal aid under EU law and under the ECHR, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
878
For the example of violation of the right of individual petition under Article 34 of the ECHR due to measures 
limiting an asylum applicant's contact with his representative, see quotation from the judgment in the case 
of L.M. And Others v Russia App nos 40081/14, 40088/14 and 40127/14 (ECtHR 15 October 2015), paras 
153-163) in the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
879
Bellet v France App no 23805/94(ECtHR 4 December 1995), para 38. 
880
Ibid. para 36. See also: Stoichkov v Bulgaria App no 9808/02 (ECtHR 24 March 2005), para 66; Vachev v 
Bulgaria  App no 42987/98 (ECtHR 8 July 2004), para 71; Ismoilov and others v Russia App no 2947/06 
(ECtHR 24April 2008), para 45; Nunes Dias v Portugal App no 69829/01, 2672/03 (ECtHR 10 April 2003). 
881
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Miragall Escolano v Spain (ECtHR 25 January 2000); Zvolsky and Zvolska v the Czech Republic App no 
46129/99 (ECtHR 12 November 2002), para 51. 
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Aït-Mouhoub v France App no 103/1997/887/1099 (ECtHR 28 October 1998),  paras 57-58; Garcia 
Manibardo v Spain App no 38695/97 (ECtHR 15 February 2000), paras 38-45; Kreuz v Poland (no1) App no 
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preventing or limiting the possibility of applying to a court.885 The right of access to the 
courts is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations permitted by implication.886 The 
limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the access of an individual in such a way or to 
such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. The limitation must pursue a 
legitimate aim and maintain a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be achieved.887 
 
Standard 26. Automatic judicial review or detainee’s right to initiate judicial review 
(including conditions of detention) 
 
According to EU secondary law, when detention is ordered by administrative authorities, 
Member States “shall” either provide a judicial review of the lawfulness of detention 
(including the issues of material conditions of detention) to be decided as speedily as 
possible from the beginning of detention,888 “or” grant the third-country national concerned 
“the right to take proceedings” by means of which the lawfulness of detention shall be 
subject to judicial review to be decided as speedily as possible after the launch of the 
relevant proceedings. In the latter case, Member States shall immediately inform a third-
country national concerned about the possibility of taking such proceedings.889  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
884
Melnyk v Ukraine App no 23436/03 (ECtHR 28 March 2006), para 26; Yagtzilar and Others v Greece App no 
41727/98 (ECtHR 6 December 2001), para 27. 
885
Perez de Rada Cavanilles v Spain App no 28090/95 (ECtHR 28 October 1998),  para 49; Miragall Escolano 
And Others v Spain App nos 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 41400/98, 41446/98, 
41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98) (ECtHR 25 January 2000), para 38; Case of Sotiris and Nikos Koutras 
Attee v Greece App no 39442/98 (ECtHR 16 February  2001), para 20; Beles and Others v Czech Republic 
App no 47273/99 (ECtHR 12 November  2002), para 50; RTBF v Belgium App no 50084/06 (ECtHR 29 March 
2011), paras 71, 72, 74; Annoni di Gussola and Others v France App nos 31819/96 and 33293/96 (ECtHR 14 
November 2000), para 56; The Holy Monasteries v Greece App nos 13092/87, 13984/88  (ECtHR 9 
December 1994), para 83, Philis v Greece, App nos 12750/87 13780/88, 14003/88 (ECtHR 27 August 1981), 
para 65. 
886
Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR 21 February 1975), para 38; Stanev v  Bulgaria App no 
36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 230. 
887
Ashingdane v United Kingdom App no 8225/78 (ECtHR 28 May 1985); para 65, Markovic and Others v Italy 
App no 1398/03 (ECtHR 14 December 2006), para 99. For more details about aspects of effective and 
practical right to access to court, including possibility of effective contact of applicant with a lawyer, see 
the European Court of Human Rights Guide on Article 6, Right to a fair trial (civil limb), (Council of 
Europe/European Court of Human Rights, May 2013) 13-14. 
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However, according to Article 5(4) of the ECHR, everyone who is deprived of his/her liberty 
by arrest or detention “shall be entitled to take proceedings” by which the lawfulness of 
his/her detention shall be decided. According to the case-law of the ECtHR, a detainee is 
entitled to apply to a court having jurisdiction to speedily decide whether or not his or her 
detention has become unlawful in the light of new factors which have emerged subsequent 
to the initial detention decision.890 The question of whether periods comply with the 
requirement of “a reasonable interval” is determined by the ECtHR in light of the 
circumstances of each case, while the main focus remains on the question of whether any 
new relevant factors have arisen during the time between periodic reviews. 891  
 
A difference between EU law and the ECHR could imply that the ECtHR may find a breach of 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR if proceedings could only be initiated ex officio, for example, by a 
prosecutor, meaning that the applicant himself had no right to bring proceedings.892 Article 
5(4) is the lex specialis which cannot be bypassed by relying on the right to an effective 
remedy under Article 13 ECHR read together with Article 5. However, where the complaint 
concerns the conditions of detention, Article 13 can be invoked together with Article 3. 
However, even if the ECtHR does not find a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, it may find  a 
violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the ECHR.893 
 
While the ECtHR has generally held that Article 5(4) can only be invoked while the person 
remains in detention, which means that that Article 5(4) had no application for the purpose 
“of obtaining, after release, a declaration that a previous detention or arrest was 
unlawful,”894 Article 3 complaints can be invoked any time. Nevertheless, Article 5(4) 
complaint might be admissible if lodged while the applicant is still in detention, even if 
he/she is subsequently released, if the applicant did not have an effective remedy to 
challenge the lawfulness of his/her detention during the time he/she was detained; likewise, 
                                                 
890
Abdulkhakov v Russia App no 14743/11(ECtHR 2 October 2012), para 215. 
891
Ibid. para 208. 
892
See, for example: Nasrulloyev v Russia App no 656/06 (ECtHR 11 October 2007) 
893
See, for example: Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017) paras 98-101. 
894
Stephens v Malta (no1) App no 11956/07 (ECtHR 21 April 2009) para 102; Fox, Hartley and Campbell v 
United Kingdom App nos 12244/86, 12245/86, 12383/86 (ECtHR 30 August 1990), para 45; Slivenko v Latvia 
App no 48321/99 (ECtHR 9 October 2003) para 155; X v Sweden App no 10230/82 (Commission decision, 11 
May 1983); Richmond Yaw and Others v Italy App no (ECtHR 6 October 2016) para 82. 
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the Court has recognised that a complaint concerning the “speediness”  of the review can be 
raised even after the person has been released.895  Furthermore, complaints under Article 3 
of the ECHR may be raised not just based on Article 5(4) of the ECHR, but also based on 
Article 13 of the ECHR.896 
 
Standard 27. Right to judicial review before an “independent and impartial 
tribunal/court established by law” 
 
The Return Directive does not define the concrete character of the institution which must 
provide a “judicial review”.897 However, as opposed to the review of the return decisions, 
judicial review of detention cannot be done alternatively by an “administrative authority or 
a competent body composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of 
independence.”898The judicial review of detention may only be carried-out by a judicial 
authority.899 Articles 15(2)(a) and (b) and 15(3) of the Return Directive taken in conjunction 
with Article 47(1) and (2) of the Charter provide guarantees for the “judicial review” of 
detention by an “independent and impartial tribunal.”900 Furthermore, Article 6 of the 
Charter corresponds to Article 5(4) of the ECHR, which is a lex specialis to Article 13 of the 
ECHR, and Article 5(4) of the ECHR gives a right to take proceedings by which the lawfulness 
of detention will be decided by a “court.” The CJEU has already stated that “limitations which 
may legitimately be imposed on the exercise of the rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter 
may not exceed those permitted by the ECtHR.”901Since the standards on the notions of 
“tribunal/court”, “established by law”, and “independence and impartiality” in the related 
case-law of the CJEU are limited to the interpretation provided by the preliminary ruling in 
the case of H.I.D., additional guidance for the aforementioned standards may be taken from 
                                                 
895
Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta App 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR 22 November 2016) paras 
117-119. 
896
Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber), App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 267. 
897
Article 15(2)(a) and(b) of the Return Directive. 
898
See Article 13(1) of the Return Directive. 
899
Article 15(2) and (3) of the Return Directive; C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014] paras 56-57. 
900
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal in a compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article“(Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union art 47(1)) “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
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the case-law of the ECtHR.902  
 
Standard 28. Right to “speedy” judicial review of the lawfulness of detention  
 
Under both options, whether a third-country national has a right to initiate court 
proceedings or if there is an established system of ex officio judicial review of the lawfulness 
of detention, judicial review must be conducted “as speedily as possible.”903  Exceptionally, 
when a large number of third-country nationals to be returned imposes an unforeseen 
heavy burden on administrative or judicial staff, a Member State may, as long as the 
exceptional situation persists, decide to allow for periods of judicial review to exceed those 
periods in the third sub-paragraph of Article 15(2) of the Return Directive.904 
Under the standards of ECHR, “speediness”  is in itself a virtue of value to be protected 
regardless of the outcome of the proceedings in question.905 The ECtHR has as a starting 
point taken the moment when the application for release was made/proceedings were 
instituted. The relevant period ends with the final determination of the legality of the 
applicant’s detention, including any appeal.906 If an administrative remedy is to be exhausted 
before recourse can be taken to a court, the time starts running when the administrative 
authority is seized of the matter.907 If the proceedings have been conducted over two levels 
of jurisdiction, an overall assessment of speediness of judicial review must be carried out in 
order to determine whether the requirement of the “speediness” has been complied 
with.908 There could be a breach of Article 5(4) of the ECHR even if the applicant has not 
                                                 
902
For the details concerning the judgment in the case of CJEU - C-175/11 H.I.D, B.A. v Refugee Applications 
Commissioner, Refugee Appeals Tribunal , Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland , Attorney 
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907
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5 – Right to Liberty and Security (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014) 33/points 211-
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been prejudiced by the failure to conduct a “speedy” review, where, for example, his/her 
detention was at all times lawful. The question of whether the right to a speedy decision has 
been respected must be determined in the light of the circumstances of an individual 
case.909 The relevant questions arise as to whether an applicant or his/her counsel had in 
some way contributed to the length of the appeals proceedings and if the Government 
provided some justification for the delay.910 Any exceptions to the requirement of a 
“speedy” review of the lawfulness of a measure of detention call for “strict interpretation. 
The question whether the principle of speedy proceedings has been observed is not to be 
addressed in the abstract but in the context of a general assessment of the information, 
taking into account the circumstances of the case, particularly in the light of the complexity 
of the case, any specificities of the domestic procedure and the applicantʹs behaviour in the 
course of the proceedings”.911 In the previous case-law, too, the ECtHR decided that where 
an individual's personal liberty is at stake, the ECtHR has very strict standards concerning the 
State's compliance with the requirement of a speedy review of the lawfulness of detention. 
In cases such as Kadem v Malta (paras. 44-45) and Rehbock v Slovenia (paras. 82-86), the 
ECtHR considered periods of seventeen (17) and twenty six (26) days excessive for deciding 
on the lawfulness of the applicant's detention. In Mamedova v Russia, (para. 96) appeal 
proceedings lasting twenty six days (26) were found to be in breach of the speediness 
requirement.912 In the case of Karimov v Russia, the ECtHR held that delays of thirteen (13) 
to twenty (20) days in examining appeals against a detention order may be incompatible 
with the “speediness” requirement in Article 5(4) of the ECHR.913 Thus it is for a State to 
organise its judicial system in such a way as to enable the courts to comply with the 
requirements of Article 5(4) of the ECHR.914 Neither an excessive workload nor a vacation 
period can justify a period of inactivity on the part of the judicial authorities.915 
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Karimov v Russia App no 54219/08 (ECtHR 29 July 2010), para 123; Rehbock v Slovenia App no 29462/95, 
(ECtHR 28 November 2000), para 84. 
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Standard 29. Right to judicial review of the continuing detention or of the extension 
(prolongation) of the detention period 
 
“In every case, detention shall be reviewed at reasonable intervals of time either on 
application by the third-country national concerned or ex officio. In the case of prolonged 
detention periods, reviews shall be subject to the supervision of a judicial authority.”916 
 
However, in those cases the authorities, who carry out the review of a third-country 
national’s detention at regular intervals, are not obliged, at the time of each review, to adopt 
an express measure in writing that states the factual and legal reasons for that measure.917 
Nevertheless, EU law does not preclude national legislation from providing that the 
authority which reviews the detention at reasonable intervals must adopt, on the conclusion 
of each review, an express measure containing the factual and legal reasons justifying the 
measure adopted.918 
 
The CJEU states that “detention and extension of detention are similar in nature since both 
deprive the third-country national concerned of his liberty in order to prepare his return 
and/or carry out the removal process and in both cases the person concerned must be in a 
position to know the reasons for the decision taken concerning him.“ The requirement that a 
decision be adopted in writing must be understood as necessarily covering all decisions 
concerning an extension.919 Any period of detention which exceeds six months must be 
regarded, pursuant to Article 15(5), as prolonged detention for the purposes of Article 15(3) 
of the Directive.”920 In such a case, a judicial authority must carry out an examination of the 
detention even if the authority which brought the matter before the court has not expressly 
requested it to do so, and even if the detention of a third-country national concerned has 
already been reviewed by the authority which made the initial detention order.921 
 
From the standpoint of the ECHR, too, it is not sufficient that the lawfulness of detention is 
                                                 
916
Article 15(3) of the Return Directive; See also: C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014]  para 43. 
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920
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determined at the time of an arrest. There must be a possibility of subsequent review to 
ensure that the continuing detention does not become unlawful or arbitrary. For example, in 
the case of  Kim v Russia, the ECtHR expressly recognised that during a long period of 
detention new factors may come to light, which impact on the lawfulness of detention, and 
the detained person should have a possibility of bringing new proceedings before a court 
which has jurisdiction to consider the complaint “speedily”.922  
 
Standard 30. The “scope and intensity” of judicial review including procedural 
guarantees 
 
The Return Directive does not regulate specifically the scope or intensity of judicial review of 
a detention order.  However, relevant standards may be gleaned from the general principle 
of the effectiveness of a legal remedy under EU law, in conjunction with Article 47(1) of the 
Charter and taking into account the interpretation of the CJEU on the right to an effective 
legal remedy in existing cases concerning the extension of detention under the Return 
Directive.923 Thus, based on the standards developed in the case of Mahdi, a judicial 
authority must be able to rule on “all relevant matters of fact and of law” in order to 
determine whether detention is justified. This requires an “in-depth examination of the 
matters of fact specific to each individual case.” Where detention is no longer justified, the 
judicial authority must be able to substitute its own decision for that of the administrative 
authority and to take a decision on whether to order an alternative measure or the release 
of the third-country national concerned. “To that end, the judicial authority must be able to 
take into account both the facts stated and the evidence adduced by the administrative 
authority and any observations that may be submitted by a third-country national.” 
Furthermore, a judicial authority must be able to consider any other elements that are 
relevant for its decision should it deem it necessary to do so. “Accordingly, the powers of the 
judicial authority in the context of an examination can under no circumstances be confined 
only to the matters adduced by the administrative authority concerned.”924 Any other 
interpretation would result in an ineffective examination by a judicial authority and would 
                                                 
922
 Kim v Russia App no 44260/13 (ECtHR 17 July 2014) para 42.  
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For details on general standards on effectiveness of judicial review, see the Explanatory note to this Check-
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thereby jeopardize the achievement of the objectives pursued.925 Under the case-law of the 
ECtHR the scope and intensity of the judicial review of detention is explained in a slightly 
different way from the case of Mahdi. “Article 5(4) of the ECHR does not guarantee a right to 
judicial review of such a scope as to empower the court, on all aspects of the case including 
questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making 
authority. The review should, however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions, which 
are essential for the lawful detention of a person according to Article 5(1) of the ECHR. The 
reviewing court must not have merely advisory functions but must have the competence to 
decide the lawfulness of the detention and to order release if the detention is unlawful. The 
requirement of procedural fairness under Article 5(4) does not impose a uniform, unvarying 
standard to be applied irrespective of the context, facts and circumstances. Although it is not 
always necessary that an Article 5(4) procedure be attended by the same guarantees as 
those required under Article 6 for criminal or civil litigation, it must have a judicial character 
and provide guarantees appropriate to the type of deprivation of liberty in question. Thus, 
the procedure must be adversarial and must always ensure equality of arms between the 
parties. An oral hearing may be necessary, for example in cases of detention on remand.”926 
Equality of arms is not ensured if the applicant, or his/her counsel, is denied access to those 
investigation file documents which are essential in order to challenge effectively the 
lawfulness of his/her detention.927 It may also become essential to ensure that the individual 
concerned has an opportunity to be heard in person, and the effective assistance of his/her 
lawyer.928 
 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR does not require that a detained person is heard every time he/she 
lodges an appeal against a decision extending his/her detention, rather that it should be 
possible to exercise the right to be heard at reasonable intervals.929  
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Under the case law of the ECtHR, the reviewing court must have jurisdiction to decide on 
whether or not deprivation of liberty has become unlawful in the light of factors which have 
emerged subsequent to the initial decision depriving a person of his/her liberty.930  
 
 
Standard 31. Restrictions on the right to a defence and/or equality of arms based 
on national (public) security, public policy or public order  
 
If, in a given case, a risk of absconding exists or third -country national avoids or hampers the 
preparation of return or the removal process and, in addition, a Government establishes the 
existence of a risk to national (public) security931, certain limitations as regards the standards 
of equality of arms and/or the right to defence, such as restricted access to court file, may 
be imposed in the procedure during judicial control of detention.932  
 
It must be determined whether and to what extent the limitations on judicial review of the 
lawfulness of detention are compatible with Article 47 in conjunction with Article 52(1) of 
the Charter.933 Namely, the CJEU states that “although it is for Member States to take the 
appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, the mere fact that a 
decision concerns State security cannot result in EU law being inapplicable.”934 
 
Article 7(4) of the Return Directive refers to “a risk of public policy”. In this context the CJEU 
provides that a risk of public policy is neither foreseen by the concepts defined in Article 3 of 
the Return Directive, nor defined by other provisions of that Directive.935 The case Z.Zh 
relates to the possibility to refrain from granting a period for voluntary departure. In this 
context, the CJEU stated936 that the meaning and the scope of the term “risk of public policy” 
must be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also 
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Azimov v Russia App no 67474/11 (ECtHR 18 April 2013), paras 151-152. 
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If, for instance, a person had been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
international terrorism, and was a member of, belongs to or had links with a terrorist group. 
932
See circumstances of national security concerns in the case of A and Others v United Kingdom App no 
3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 166. 
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C-300/11, ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department EU:C:2013:363 paras 50-51. 
934
C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department EU:C:2013:363 para 38. 
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C-554/13, Z.Zh and O EU:C:2015:377 para  41. 
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taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules which they 
form part of. When those terms appear in a provision, which constitutes derogation from 
the principle, they must be read so that the provision can be interpreted “strictly.”937 A 
Member State must be able to prove that the person concerned “in fact” poses such a 
risk.938 Such a decision should be adopted on a case-by-case basis; the principle of 
proportionality must be observed throughout all the stages of the return procedure.939 A 
genuine and present risk to public policy must be established.940 If, however, the assessment 
is based only on general practice, or any assumption in order to determine such a risk, 
without proper consideration of the conduct of that person and the risk that that conduct 
poses to public policy, a Member State fails to have appropriate regard for the requirements 
relating to an individual examination of the case concerned and to the principle of 
proportionality.941 This means that it is not necessary that a criminal conviction is final, and a 
mere suspicion may, together with other factors relating to the case, be used as a basis for 
the conclusion that a person concerned poses a risk to public policy.942 Different expressions 
in national languages, like “danger” or “risk”, must be understood in the sense of a 
“threat”.943  
 
The concept of “public order” entails the existence (in addition to the disturbance of the 
social order which any infringement of the law involves) of a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.944 The 
concept of “public security” covers both the internal security of a Member State and its 
external security and, consequently, a threat to the functioning of institutions and essential 
public services and the survival of the population, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance 
to foreign relations or to the peaceful coexistence of nations, or a risk to military interests 
                                                 
937
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affecting public security.945 
 
Standard 32. Right to be released immediately in cases of unlawful detention  
 
“The third-country national concerned shall be released immediately if the detention is not 
lawful”946 or “when it appears that a reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists for 
legal or other considerations or the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 no longer exist”.947 
“In such a case the person concerned must in any event be released immediately.”948 
However, not every irregularity in the exercise of the right to a defence in an administrative 
procedure will constitute an infringement of those rights, and therefore, not every such 
breach will automatically require the release of the person concerned.949  
 
Similarly, Article 5(4) of the ECHR states that for “everyone who is deprived of his liberty” the 
“lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if 
the detention is not lawful.” The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the case of Stanev v 
Bulgaria states that “the reviewing “court” must not have merely advisory functions but 
must have the competence to “decide” the “lawfulness” of the detention and to order release 
if the detention is unlawful” (see Ireland v the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 200, 
Series A no. 25; Weeks v the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, § 61, Series A no. 114; Chahal v 
the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 130, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996V; 
and A. and Others v the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 202, ECHR 2009).950 The court 
must have the power to order release if it finds that the detention is unlawful, because a 
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Ibid. para 66. For further comparison on particular aspects of restrictions of the right to effective legal 
remedy in related fields of law, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
946
Fourth sub-paragraph of Article 15(2) of the Return Directive; C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014] 
paras 35, 59; C-383/13 PPU,  M.G., N.R. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie EU:C:2013:533 paras  
25, 31. 
947
Article 15(4) of the Return Directive. 
948
C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev EU:C:2009:741 para 60. 
949
C-383/13 PPU M. G. and N. R. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie EU:C:2013:533 para 39. 
950
Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App no 36760/06  (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 168; see also: Amie v 
Bulgaria App no 58149/08 (ECtHR 12 February 2013), para 80; A and Others v United Kingdom App no 
3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 202; see also: Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber), App no 
16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 131. 
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mere power of recommendation is insufficient.951 It is inconceivable that in a State, subject 
to the rule of law, a person may continue to be deprived of his/her liberty despite the 
existence of a court order for his/her release.952 Nevertheless, the ECtHR recognises that 
some delay in carrying out a decision to release a detainee is understandable and often 
inevitable. The national authorities must attempt to keep it to a minimum.953 This rule needs 
to be applied in conjunction with standards on the right to speedy judicial review.954 Where 
a judgment of the first-instance court on the unlawfulness of detention with a judicial order 
to release a detainee is not final, due to a possibility of the administrative authority to 
appeal against the judgment of the first instance court to the appellate court, it is highly 
likely that standards of immediate release and speedy judicial review cannot be guaranteed, 
unless the first-instance court issues an effective interim measure regarding the release of a 
detainee, or if the first instance court applies the principle of direct effect of the second sub-
paragraph of Article 15(1) of the Return Directive. In this respect, it is also relevant that from 
the standpoint of the right to an effective legal remedy (Article 47 of the CFR) “the principle 
of effective judicial protection affords an individual a right of access to a court or tribunal but 
not to a number of levels of jurisdiction.”955 Under the case law of the ECtHR, too, States are 
not obliged to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of 
detention.956 However, if a State creates such a system, it must, in principle, accord to 
detainees the same guarantees on appeal as at first instance,957 and this includes the 
                                                 
951
Benjamin and Wilson v United Kingdom App 28212/95 (ECtHR 26 September 2002), paras 33-34. In case the 
ECtHR finds a violation of Article 5 of the ECHR, it may decide in the operative part of the judgment that the 
respondent State must ensure immediate release of applicants from detention (see, for example: L.M. and 
Others v Russia App nos. 40081/14, 40088/14 and 40127/14 (ECtHR 15 October 2015), point 9 of the 
operative part of the judgment and para 169 and the last paragraph of section 3.5. of the ELI Statement). 
952
Assanidze v Georgia (Grand Chamber) App no 71503/01 (ECtHR 8 April 2004), para 173. 
953
Giulia Manzoni v Italy App no 19218/91 (ECtHR 1 July 1997), para  25. A delay of eleven hours in executing a 
decision to release the applicant “forthwith” was found to be incompatible with Article 5(1) of the ECHR 
(Quinn v France App no 18580/91 (ECtHR 22 March 1995), para 39-43; Guide on Article 5 of the Convention, 
European Court of Human Rights, 2014, p11/point 40). In the case of Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 
10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), the applicant remained in detention for five days following a decision 
granting her subsidiary protection and the ECtHR found violation of article 5(1) of the ECHR.  
954
See standard no 28 of this Check-list. 
955
C-69/10 Diouf  EU:C:2011:524, para 69. 
956
A.M. v the Netherlands App no 29094/09 (ECtHR 5 July 2016), para 70. 
957
Kučera v Slovakia App no 48666/99 (ECtHR 17 July 2007), para 107, Navarra v France App no 13190/87 , 
(ECtHR 23 November 1993), para 28; Toth v Austria App no 11894/85 (ECtHR 12 December 1991), para 84. 
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principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms.958 
 
For the standards on immediate release, in case of infringement in the right to be heard 
before the detention order is issued, see standard no. 13 of this Check-list on the right to 
information and to a personal interview before the detention order is issued. 
 
Standard 33. The impact of interim measures (under Rule 39 and national law) on 
the lawfulness of detention959 
 
The ECtHR has held that the grant of an interim measure under Rule 39 does not in itself 
render unlawful the detention of the person concerned.960 However, the authorities must 
still envisage expulsion at a later stage.961 Therefore, in a number of cases where respondent 
States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with an interim measure under 
Rule 39, the ECtHR accepted that expulsion proceedings were temporarily suspended, but 
nevertheless remained “in progress”, with the consequence that the applicant’s continued 
detention did not violate Article 5(1) of the ECHR.962 Similarly, when expulsion is suspended 
or blocked as a consequence of internal judicial review proceedings, the ECtHR considers 
them as a part of the deportation proceedings being ‘in progress’.963 Nevertheless, 
suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the 
ECtHR should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in detention for an 
unreasonably long period of time.964  
 
                                                 
958
Catal v Turkey App no 26808/08 (ECtHR 17 April 2012), paras 33-34. 
959
Rule 39(1) states that Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge 
appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may, at the request of a party or of any other person 
concerned, or of their own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which they consider should 
be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings (Rules of Court, 
Registry of the Court, Strasbourg, 1 January 2016). 
960
Gebremedhin v France App no 25389/05 (ECtHR 26 April 2007), para 74. 
961
S.P. v Belgium (decision) App no 12572/08 (ECtHR 14 June 2011). 
962
Al Hanchi v Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 48205/09 (ECtHR 15 November 2011), paras  49-51; Al Husin v 
Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 3727/08 (ECtHR 7 February 2012), paras  67-69; Umirov v Russia, 17455/11 
(ECtHR 11 February 2013), paras 138-42. 
963
Alim v Russia  App 39417/07 (ECtHR 27 September 2011), para 60. 
964
A.H. and J.K. v Cyprus, 41903/10 and 41911/10 (ECtHR 21 July 2015), para 188. 
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Standard 34. Derogation from obligations under Article 5(1) of the ECHR965 
 
 
As regards Article 15 of the ECHR, the ECtHR states that by reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in 
principle, better placed than an international Judge to decide both on the presence of such 
an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. 
Accordingly, a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities in this 
matter. Nonetheless, Contracting Parties do not enjoy an unlimited discretion. It is for the 
ECtHR to rule whether, inter alia, the States have gone beyond the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the crisis. The domestic margin of appreciation is thus accompanied by 
European supervision. In exercising this supervision, the ECtHR must give appropriate weight 
to such relevant factors as the nature of the rights affected by the derogation and the 
circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the emergency situation.966  Where the 
highest domestic court has examined the issues relating to the State’s derogation, the ECtHR 
considers that it would only be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion if it were satisfied 
that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the ECtHR's 
jurisprudence under that Article, or had reached a conclusion which was manifestly 
unreasonable.967  
 
Standard 35. Right to compensation in the case of unlawful detention 
 
The Explanations Relating to the Charter provides that “the rights in Article 6 are the rights 
guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR, and in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, they 
have the same meaning and scope. Consequently, the limitations which may legitimately be 
imposed on them, may not exceed those permitted by the ECHR.968 Article 5(5) of the ECHR 
                                                 
965
Article 15 of the ECHR states that “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with its other obligations under international law.” 
966
A and Others v United Kingdom App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 173. 
967
Ibid. para 174. For the standards on “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” and on the 
measures  “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
968
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The third sub-paragraph of Article 
6(1) of the Treaty of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union states that the rights 
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states that “everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” In the case of 
Richmond Yaw et Autres c. Italie the ECtHR established that mere recognition given by the 
Supreme Court of the irregularity of the prolongation of detention does not constitute a 
sufficient redress for the victim of a violation of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.969 Under the case 
law of the ECtHR, the right to compensation set forth in paragraph 5 presupposes that a 
violation of one of the paragraphs has been established, either by a domestic authority or by 
the Court.970 Article 5(5) of the ECHR is complied with where it is possible to apply for 
compensation in respect of a deprivation of liberty affected in conditions contrary to 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4.971 The arrest or detention may be deemed lawful under domestic 
law, but still be in breach of Article 5, which makes Article 5(5) of the ECHR applicable.972 
Article 5(5) creates a direct and enforceable right to compensation before the national 
courts.973 The enforceable right to compensation must be accessible either before or after 
the ECtHR’s judgment.974 The effective enjoyment of the right to compensation must be 
ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty.975 Compensation must be available both in 
theory976 and practice.977 In considering compensation claims, the domestic authorities are 
required to interpret and apply domestic law in the spirit of Article 5, without excessive 
                                                                                                                                                        
freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in 
Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations 
referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions. For general EU rules and standards 
on state liability in case that individual has suffered loss or damage as a result of the breach of EU law by a 
Member State, see paragraph 13 in the section 3.3. of the ELI Statement. 
969
Richmond Yaw and Others v Italy App nos 3342/11, 3391/11, 3408/11, 3447/11 (ECtHR 6 October 2016), 
para  50. 
970
N.C. v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 24952/94 (ECtHR 18 December 2012) para 49; Pantea v Romania App 
no 33343/96 (ECtHR 3 June 2003), para 262; Vachev v Bulgaria App no 42987/98 (ECtHR 8 July 2004), para 
78. 
971
Michalák v Slovakia App no 30157/03 (ECtHR 8 February 2011), para 204; Lobanov v Russia App no 
15578/03 (ECtHR 2 December 2010), para 54. 
972
Harkmann v Estonia, 2192/03 (ECtHR 11 July 2006), para  50. 
973
A and Others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 229; 
Storck v Germany App no 61603/00 (ECtHR 16 June 2006) para 122. 
974
Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App no 36760/06  (ECtHR 17 January 2012), paras 183-84; Brogan and 
Others v United Kingdom App nos 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85 (ECtHR 29 November 1988), 
para 67. 
975
Ciulla v Italy App no 11152/84 (ECtHR 22 February 1989), para 44; Sakık and Others v Turkey App no 
87/1996/706/898-903 (ECtHR 26 November 1997), para 60. 
976
Dubovik v Ukraine, 33210/07 and 41866/08 (ECtHR 15 October 2009), para 74. 
977
Chitayev and Chitayev v Russia App no 59334/00 (ECtHR 18 January 2007), para 195. 
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formalism.978 The right to compensation relates primarily to financial compensation. It does 
not confer a right to secure the detained person’s release, which is covered by Article 5(4) of 
the ECHR.979 In the case of Abdi Mahamud v Malta, the ECtHR established that action in tort 
cannot be considered as an effective remedy for the purpose of a complaint about 
conditions of detention under Article 3 of the ECHR. In that case the ECtHR established that 
it has not been satisfactory established that action in tort may give rise to compensation for 
any non- pecuniary damage and that it was not a preventive remedy as it cannot impede the 
continuation of the violation alleged or provide the applicant with an improvement in the 
detention conditions.980Article 5(5) of the ECHR does not prohibit the Contracting States 
from making the award of compensation dependent upon the ability of the person 
concerned to show damage resulting from the breach. In cases where no pecuniary or non-
pecuniary damage occurs, no question of “compensation” may arise.981 At the same time, 
excessive formalism in requiring proof of non-pecuniary damage resulting from unlawful 
detention is not compliant with the right to compensation.982  
 
Article 5(5) of the ECHR does not entitle the applicant to a particular amount of 
compensation.983 However, compensation which is negligible or disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the violation would not comply with the requirements of Article 5 (5) of the 
ECHR as this would render the right guaranteed under that provision theoretical and 
illusory.984 An award cannot be considerably lower than that granted by the ECtHR in similar 
cases.985 For the general principles and standards as regards the state’s liability where an 
individual suffered loss or damage as a result of a breach of EU law by a Member State, see 
section 3.3 of this Statement. 
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Shulgin v Ukraine App no 29912/05 (ECtHR 8 December 2011), para 65; Houtman and Meeus v Belgium, App 
no 22945/07 (ECtHR 17 March 2009), para 46. 
979
 Bozano v France App no 9990/82 (ECtHR 18 December 1986). 
980
Abdi Mahamud v Malta  App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), para 50. 
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Wassink v the Netherlands App no 12535/86 (ECtHR 27 September 1990), para 38. 
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Danev v Bulgaria App no 9411/05  (ECtHR 2 September 2010), para 34-35. 
983
Damian-Burueana and Damian v Romania App no 6773/02 (ECtHR 26 May 2009), para 89; Şahin Çağdaş v 
Turkey App no 28137/02 (ECtHR 11 April 2006), para 34. 
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Cumber v United Kingdom, Commission decision App no 28779/95 (ECtHR 27 November 1996), Attard v 
Malta (decision) App no 46750/99 (ECtHR 28 September 2000). 
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Ganea v Moldova App no 2474/06 (ECtHR 17 May 2011), para 30; Cristina Boicenco v Moldova App no 
25688/09 (ECtHR 27 September 2011), para 43. 
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Standard 36. Right to reasoned judicial decisions and their enforcement (execution) 
 
The fundamental right to a fair legal process enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter entails an 
obligation “to provide a relevant and adequate statement of reasons”.986  With regard to 
disputes on the detention of irregular migrants, secondary EU law explicitly requires that 
decisions on detention, which must be ordered in writing by judicial or administrative 
authorities, contain “reasons /.../ in fact and in law.”987 In the case of Mahdi the CJEU 
developed an interpretation that “all decisions concerning extension of detention must also 
be given in writing.988 However, authorities carrying out the review of detention at regular 
intervals pursuant to the first sentence of Article 15(3) are not obliged, at the time of each 
review, to adopt an express measure in writing that states the factual and legal reasons for 
that measure.989 Only when the authority reviewing the lawfulness of detention at the end of 
initial six-month period takes also a decision on the further course of detention it is under the 
obligation to adopt a written reasoned decision.”990 
 
Since Article 47 of the Charter is not limited to civil rights (and obligations and criminal 
charges) as is the case with Article 6 of the ECHR,991 more detailed standards in regards to 
the obligation to provide reasons in fact and in law in judgments may be gleaned from the 
guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR. Under the case law of the ECtHR, this 
standard includes the obligation for courts to give “sufficient” reasons for their decisions.992 
A reasoned decision demonstrates to the parties that their case has truly been heard. 
Although a domestic court has a certain margin of appreciation when choosing arguments 
and admitting evidence, it is obliged to justify its activities by giving reasons for its 
decisions.993 Article 6(1) of the ECHR obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, but 
should not be interpreted as requiring a detailed answer to every argument.994 The extent to 
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C-439/11 P, Ziegler EU:C:2013:513, para 104. 
987
The second sub-paragraphs of Article 15(2) of the Return Directive. 
988
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014]paras 43, 54. 
989
Ibid. para 47.  
990
Ibid. para 48. 
991
See: Maaouia v France App no 39652/98 (ECtHR 5 October 2000), paras 33-41. 
992
H v Belgium App no 8950/80 (ECtHR 30.November 1987), para 53. 
993
Suominen v Finland App no 37801/97 (ECtHR 1 July 2003), para 36. 
994
Van de Hurk v the Netherlands App no 16034/90 (ECtHR 19 April 1994), para 61; Garcia Ruiz v  Spain (Grand 
Chamber) App no 30544/96 (ECtHR 21January 1999), para 26 ; Jahnke and Lenoble v France (decision) App 
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which this duty to give reasons applies may vary depending on the nature of the decision,995 
and may only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. It is necessary to 
take into account, inter alia, the diversity of the submissions that a litigant may bring before 
the courts and the differences existing in the Contracting States with regard to statutory 
provisions, customary rules, legal opinion, and the presentation and drafting of 
judgments.996 However, where a party’s submission is decisive for the outcome of the 
proceedings, a specific and express response is needed.997 The courts are, therefore, 
required to examine with particular rigor and care: both the litigants’ main arguments,998 
and pleas concerning the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR and its Protocols.999 
 
In regards to the enforcement (execution) of judgments, the right to the enforcement 
(execution) of judicial decisions, given by any court, is an integral part of the right to 
court.1000 The effective protection of the litigant and the restoration of legality, therefore, 
presuppose an obligation on the administrative authorities to comply with the judgment.1001 
Thus, while some delay in the enforcement (execution) of a judgment may be justified in 
particular circumstances, a delay may not be such as to impair the litigant’s right to 
enforcement of the judgment.1002 Enforcement (execution) must be full and exhaustive and 
not just partial,1003 and may not be prevented, invalidated or unduly delayed.1004  
                                                                                                                                                        
no 40490/98 (ECtHR 29 August 2000); Perez v France (Grand Chamber) App no 47287/99 (ECtHR 12 
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998
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(ECtHR 7 March 2006), para 35. 
999
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Human Rights, May 2013). 
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Chamber) App no 36813/97 (ECtHR 29 March 2006), para 196. 
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Hornsby v Greece App no 18357/91 (ECtHR 19 March 1997), para 41; Kyrtatos v Greece App no 41666/98, 
(ECtHR 22 May 2003), paras 31-32. 
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Burdov v Russia App no 33509/04 (ECtHR 15 January 2009), paras 35-37. 
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Matheus v France App no 62740/00 (ECtHR 31 March 2005), para 58; Sabin Popescu v Romania App no 
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Standard 37. Conditions of detention  
This standard consists of 9 elements described below under points 37.1. - 37.9.1005  
 
Standard 37.1. General conditions of detention: respect of human dignity, prohibition of 
inhuman/degrading treatment, and the protection of family life  
 
“Third-country nationals in detention should be treated in a humane and dignified manner 
with respect for their fundamental rights and in compliance with international and national 
law. Without prejudice to the initial apprehension by law-enforcement authorities, regulated 
by national legislation, detention should, as a rule, take place in specialised detention 
facilities.”1006 If this is not possible, third-country nationals in detention shall be separated 
from ordinary prisoners.1007 This exception (derogation) must be interpreted strictly.1008 The 
separation of third-country nationals and ordinary prisoners is an unconditional 
obligation,1009 and it applies even if a person concerned wishes to be detained together with 
ordinary prisoners.1010 In the case of Pham1011, the CJEU reiterates its position set out in the 
cases of El Dridi (para. 31) and Arslan (para. 42), namely that the Return Directive “pursues 
the establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy, based on common 
standards, for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect for their 
fundamental rights and their dignity.”1012 However, exceptionally, when a large number of 
third-country nationals to be returned places an unforeseen heavy burden on the capacity of 
the detention facilities, a Member State may, as long as the exceptional situation persists, 
decide to derogate from conditions set out in Article 16(1) of the Return Directive.1013 
 
                                                 
1005
For further details on this issue, see also standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ‘CPT Factsheet on immigration detention’ 
(CPT/Inf(2017)3,  Council of Europe 2017). 
1006
Recital 17 of the Return Directive. 
1007
Article 16(1) of the Return Directive; C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi  EU:C:2011:268 para 40. See also standards on 
separation of facilities for detainees who are irregular migrants from ordinary prisoners in cases: C-473/13 
and C-514/13 Joined Cases Bero v Regierungspräsidium Kassel and Bouzalmate v Kreisverwaltung Kleve 
EU:C:2014:2095; C-474/13 Pham EU:C:2014:2096. 
1008
Bero v Regierungspräsidium Kassel and Bouzalmate v Kreisverwaltung Kleve EU:C:2014:2095 para 25. 
1009
C-474/13, Pham EU:C:2014:2096 para 17. 
1010
Ibid. para 23. 
1011
Ibid. 
1012
Ibid. para 20. See also: the first sentence of the Recital 17 of the Return Directive. 
1013
Article 18(1) of the Return Directive. 
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However, no derogation is lawful from the minimum standards for the protection of human 
dignity in the sense of Article 1 of the Charter or Article 3 of the ECHR. The CJEU in the case 
of Cimade, which relates to asylum seekers, states that “further to the general scheme and 
purpose of the Reception Directive 2003/9 and the observance of fundamental rights, in 
particular the requirements of Article 1 of the Charter, under which human dignity must be 
respected and protected, the asylum seeker may not /.../ be deprived  - even for a temporary 
period of time after the making of the application for asylum and before being actually 
transferred to the responsible Member State - of the protection of the minimum standards 
laid down by that directive;”1014and the Reception Directive 2003/9 aims, similarly as the 
Recast Reception Directive 2013/33, to ensure “full respect for human dignity and to 
promote the application of article 1 of the Charter “/.../.1015  
 
Article 3 of the ECHR enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies 
and prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
irrespective of the circumstances and of the victim’s conduct. In view of the absolute nature 
of Article 3 of the ECHR, the “margin of appreciation” does not apply where there is an 
alleged breach of the substantive Article. In order to fall within the scope of Article 3, ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is 
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the 
treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of 
health of the victim.1016 Article 3 of the ECHR obliges a State to ensure that detention 
conditions comply with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the 
execution of the measure do not subject the detainees to distress or hardship of an intensity 
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the 
practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured.1017 
 
From the standpoint of protection under Article 3 of the ECHR, the ECtHR “attaches 
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C-179/11, Cimade EU:C:2012:594 para 56. 
1015
Recital 18 of the Recast Reception Directive 2013/33. 
1016
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Grand Chamber) App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011), para 219; Kudła 
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considerable importance to the applicant's status as an asylum seeker and, as such, a 
member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special 
protection”.1018 
 
In order to determine whether the threshold of severity has been reached, the ECtHR also 
takes other factors into consideration, in particular: the purpose for which the ill-treatment 
was inflicted (although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot 
conclusively rule out its characterisation as degrading); the context in which the ill-treatment 
was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions; and whether the 
victim is in a vulnerable situation, which is normally the case for persons deprived of their 
liberty, but there is an inevitable element of suffering and humiliation involved in custodial 
measures and this, in itself, will not entail a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.1019 When 
assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects, as well 
as of specific allegations made by the applicant. In particular, the major factors will be the 
length of the period during which the applicant was detained in the impugned conditions 
and where overcrowding reaches a certain level, the lack of space in an institution may also 
constitute a key factor to be taken into account.1020  
 
As regards the detention of families pending removal, in line with the ECHR the “respect for 
family life should be a primary consideration of Member States when implementing the 
Return Directive.”1021 “Families with minors shall only be detained as a measure of last resort 
and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”1022 Detained families shall be provided with 
“separate accommodation guaranteeing adequate privacy;”1023 the only exception is an 
emergency situation regulated in Article 18(1) of the Return Directive.  
 
In cases of children detained separately from their parents, or children detained together 
with their parents, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR shows that Article 3 of the ECHR is not 
                                                 
1018
Ibid. para 251. 
1019
Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 160. 
1020
Ibid. paras 163-164. See more on this under standard no 37.3 of this Check-list. 
1021
Second sentence of Recital 22 of the Return Directive. 
1022
Article 17(1) of the Return Directive. 
1023
Article 17(2) of the Return Directive. 
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the only right applicable and/or violated. In case Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v 
Belgium1024, apart from Article 3, in relation to mother and her daughter, the ECtHR also 
found violation of Article 8 in relation to both applicants.1025  In the case A.B et autres c. 
France, apart from violation of Article 3 in relation to children, the ECtHR has found also 
violation of the right to family life from Article 8 of the ECHR in relation to children and their 
parents who were detained together.1026 When Article 8 of the ECHR is at stake, however, 
the principle of proportionality is applicable. For example, the ECtHR has adjudicated that 
the sole fact that family unit is maintained does not necessarily guarantee respect for the 
right to a family life, particularly where the family is detained.1027 The fact of confining the 
applicants to a detention centre, for fifteen days, thereby subjecting them to custodial living 
conditions typical of that kind of institution, may be regarded as an interference with the 
effective exercise of their family life.1028 Such interference must be in accordance with law 
and necessary in a democratic society.1029 Authorities have a duty to strike a fair balance 
between the competing interests of the individual and society as a whole in assessing 
proportionality. They must take into account the child's best interest as a paramount value. 
The protection of the child's best interests involves both keeping the family together as far 
as possible, and considering alternatives so that the detention of minors is only a measure of 
last resort.1030 
 
Regarding the conditions of detention, there is a general principle under EU secondary law 
that “particular attention shall be paid to the situation of vulnerable persons.1031  
 
 
                                                 
1024
Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 October 2006). 
1025
Ibid. paras 72-85. 
1026
A. B. et autres c. France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016)  paras 139-156. For more on this, see the 
Explanatory notes on (un)accompanied minors. 
1027
Popov v France, 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012), para 134. 
1028
Ibid. para 134. 
1029
Ibid. para 135. 
1030
Ibid. 139-141. See also standards no 37.5 and 37.6 of this Check-list on minors of this check-list. For 
particular circumstances of this case which have lead the ECtHR to found a violation of the right to family 
life of the applicants, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
1031
Article 16(3) of the Return Directive. 
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Standard 37.2. Inhuman/degrading treatment in detention: threshold and onus 
 
The ECtHR considers treatment to be “inhuman” when it was “premeditated, applied for 
hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental 
suffering”.1032 The treatment is considered to be “degrading” when it humiliates or debases 
an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or 
arousing feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and 
physical resistance.1033 It may suffice that the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes, 
even if not in the eyes of others. Although the question whether the purpose of the 
treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the 
absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 
of the ECHR.1034 In practice, the ECtHR will not always distinguish between inhuman 
treatment and degrading treatment, sometimes preferring instead to simply find that there 
has been a breach of Article 3. In other cases it might make a specific finding that the 
treatment in question is either inhuman or degrading. With regard to the burden of proof, 
the ECtHR generally relies on the rule that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by 
appropriate evidence. In other words, the applicant bears the responsibility of providing 
evidence of treatment contrary to Article 3. The ECtHR has, however, noted that cases 
concerning allegations of inadequate conditions of detention do not lend themselves to a 
rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (Lat.: “he who alleges 
something must prove that allegation”) because in such instances the respondent 
Government alone has access to information capable of corroborating or refuting these 
allegations. Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in procuring 
evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection. Nevertheless, in such cases 
applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts 
complained of and provide – to the greatest extent possible – some evidence in support of 
their complaints.1035 Once the ECtHR has given notice of the applicant’s complaint to the 
Government, the burden is on the latter to collect and produce relevant documents. A 
                                                 
1032
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Grand Chamber) App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011) para 220. 
1033
Ibid. para 220; Kudła v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECtHR 26 October 2000) para 92; Pretty v United Kingdom 
App no 2346/02 (ECtHR 29 April 2002) para 52. 
1034
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Grand Chamber) App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011) para 169. 
1035
See Visloguzov v Ukraine App no 32362/02 (ECtHR 20 May 2010), para 45. 
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failure on the part of the Government to submit convincing evidence on material conditions 
of detention may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the 
applicant’s allegations.1036 “In assessing evidence the ECtHR has generally applied the 
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, such proof may follow from the 
coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted 
presumptions of facts.”1037  
 
Standard 37.3. Conditions of detention: overcrowding, ventilation, access to light and 
natural air, quality of heating, health requirements, basic sanitary and hygiene 
requirements 
 
The ECtHR has found overcrowding by itself a sufficient factor to find a breach of Article 3. When the 
personal space granted to the applicant was less than 3 m² of floor surface per detainee (including 
space occupied by furniture but not counting the in-cell sanitary facility) in multi-occupancy 
accommodation. This should be maintained as the relevant minimum standard for its assessment 
under Article 3 of the ECHR.1038 A weighty but not irrebutable presumption of a violation of Article 3 
will arise when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 m2 in multi-occupancy 
accommodation. The presumption could be rebutted in particular by demonstrating that the 
cumulative effects of other aspects of the conditions of detention compensated for the scarce 
allocation of personal space. In that connection, the ECtHR takes into account such factors as the 
length and extent of the restriction, the degree of freedom of movement and the adequacy of out-
of-cell activities, as well as whether or not the conditions of detention in a particular facility are 
generally decent.”1039 
                                                 
1036
See Gubin v Russia App no 8217/04 (ECtHR 17 June 2010), para 56 and Khudoyorov v Russia App no 
6847/02 (ECtHR 8 November 2005) para 113; Alimov v Turkey App no 1434/13 (ECtHR  6 September 2016), 
para 75. 
1037
Koktysh v Ukraine App no 43707/07 (ECtHR 10 December 2009), para 90; Salman v Turkey (Grand Chamber) 
App no 21986/93 (ECtHR 27 June 2000), para 100; Khlaifia and Others v Italy App no16483/12 (ECtHR 15 
December 2016), paras 127, 168. 
1038
Ibid. para 166; see also: Kadikis v Latvia App no 62393/00 (ECtHR 4 May 2006), para 55; Andrei Frolov v 
Russia App no 205/02 (ECtHR 29 March 2007), paras 47-49; Kantyrev v Russia App no 37213/02 (ECtHR 21 
June 2007), paras 50-51; Sulejmanovic v Italy App no 22635/03 (ECtHR 16/07/2009), para 43; Torreggiani 
and Others v Italy App no 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09 et al.  (ECtHR 8 January 2013), para 68. 
1039
Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 166. For 
example, the ECtHR notes that scarce space in relative terms may in some circumstances be compensated 
for by the possibility to move about freely within the confines of a detention facility and by unobstructed 
access to natural light and air: Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 78 or by 
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In Aden Ahmed v Malta (para. 87) the ECtHR had regard not just to the floor space afforded 
to each detainee, but also to whether each detainee had an individual sleeping place in the 
cell, and whether the overall surface area of the cell was such as to allow detainees to move 
freely between the furniture items. Based on standards from Aden Ahmed v Malta, in 
deciding whether or not there has been a violation of Article 3 on account of the lack of 
personal space, the ECtHR has to have regard to the following three elements: “each 
detainee must have an individual sleeping place in a cell; each detainee must dispose of at 
least three square meters of floor space; and the overall surface area of the cell must be such 
as to allow the detainees to move freely between the furniture items. The absence of any 
above elements creates in itself a strong presumption that the conditions of detention 
amounted to degrading treatment and were in breach of Article 3.1040 As the fourth element 
the ECtHR refers to “other aspects.” Where overcrowding was not significant enough to raise 
itself an issue under Article 3, the ECtHR has taken into account “other aspects” of detention 
conditions, including the ability to use the toilets privately,1041 available ventilation, access to 
light and natural air, the quality of heating and and balanced meals1042 and respect for basic 
health requirements. Therefore, in cases where each detainee had 3 to 4 m², the ECtHR 
found a violation of Article 3 where the lack of space was accompanied by a lack of 
ventilation and light,1043 limited access to outdoor exercise,1044 or a total lack of privacy in 
                                                                                                                                                        
the freedom to spend time away from the dormitory rooms: Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 
(ECtHR 26 November 2016), para 92. See also: Abdi Mahamud v Malta, 56796/13, 3 May 2016 (paras 81-
83). 
1040
Aden Ahmed v Malta App no 55352/12 (ECtHR 9 December 2013), para 87. 
1041
For the compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements, see, for example: Anayev and Others v 
Russia App nos 42525/07 and 60800/08 (ECtHR 10 January 2012), paras 156-159, Aden Ahmed v Malta App 
no 55352/12 (ECtHR 9 December 2013), para 88; Moiseyev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR 9 October 
2008) para 124. 
1042
See, for example, Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), paras 96, 98; Abdi 
Mahamud v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), paras 84, 85, 89. 
1043
Torreggiani and Others v Italy App nos 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09 et al. (ECtHR 08 January 2013) para 
69; see also Babushkin v Russia App no 5993/08 (ECtHR 16 October 2014) para 44; Vlasov v Russia App no 
78146/01 (ECtHR 12 June 2008) para 84; Moisseiev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR 9 October 2008), 
paras 124-127. 
1044
István Kovács Gábor v Hungary App no 15707/10  (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 26; see also: Mandič and 
Jović v Slovenia App nos 5774/10 and 5985/10 (ECtHR 20 October 2011), para 78; Babar Ahmad and Others 
v United Kingdom App nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09 (ECtHR 10 April 2012), 
paras 213-214. 
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cells.1045  The ECtHR mentions the Prisons Standards developed by the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture1046, which specifically deal with outdoor exercise and consider it a 
basic safeguard of prisoners’ well-being, and that all of them, without exception, should be 
allowed at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day, preferably as part of a 
broader programme of out-of-cell activities.1047 Under the standards of the ECHR “access to 
outdoor exercise is a fundamental component of the protection afforded to persons deprived 
of their liberty under Article 3 and as such it cannot be left to the discretion of the 
authorities.”1048 For that reason, physical characteristics of outdoor exercise facilities are also 
relevant.1049 In addition, the time during which an individual was detained in the contested 
conditions is an important factor to consider.1050 As regards the notion of the so called 
“continuous detention”, the ECtHR stated that when complaints in relation to conditions of 
detention do not simply relate to a specific event, but which concern a whole range of 
problems regarding sanitary conditions, the temperature in cells, overcrowding, lack of 
adequate medical treatment, which have affected an inmate throughout his or her 
incarceration, the ECtHR regards this as a “continuing situation”, even if the person 
concerned has been transferred between various detention facilities in the relevant period. 
1051 
 
For concrete examples of circumstances where the ECtHR did (not) find a violation of Article 3 of the 
ECtHR, see summaries of cases in the judgment of the Khlaifia and others v Italy (paras. 171-177) and 
the Explanatory Note. 
                                                 
1045
Novoselov v Russia App no 66460/01 (ECtHR 2 June 2005), paras 32 and 40-43; Khoudoyorov v Russia, paras 
106-107; Belevitski v Russia App no 72967/01 (ECtHR 1 March 2007), paras 73-79. 
1046
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
‘CPT Factsheet on immigration detention’ (CPT/Inf(2017)3,  Council of Europe 2017). 
1047
Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta App nos 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR 22 November 2016) 
para 102. 
1048
This is so regardless of how good the material conditions might be in the cells: Alimov v Turkey App no 
14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 83. See also: Mahamed jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 
25 November 2015), para 93. 
1049
For instance, an exercise yard that is just two square metres larger than the cell, is surrounded by three 
metre high walls, and has an opening to the sky covered with metal bars and a thick net does not offer 
inmates proper opportunities for recreation and recuperation: Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 
(ECtHR 25 November 2015) para 93; see also paras 94-95. 
1050
Kalashnikov v Russia App no 47095/99 (ECtHR 15 July 2002), para 102; Kehayov v Bulgaria App no 41035/98 
(ECtHR 18 January 2005), para 64; Alver v Estonia App no 64812/01 (ECtHR 8 November 2005), para 50. 
1051
Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 59. 
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Standard 37.4. Right to communication and information in detention 
 
Third-country nationals in detention shall be allowed, upon request, to establish in due time, 
contact with legal representatives, family members and competent consular authorities.1052  
 
Relevant and competent national, international and non-governmental organisations and 
bodies shall have a possibility to visit detention facilities to the extent that they are being 
used for detaining third-country nationals in accordance with Chapter IV of the Return 
Directive.1053 Third-country nationals kept in detention shall be systematically provided with 
information, which explains the rules applied in the facility and sets out their rights and 
obligations. Such information shall include information on their entitlement under national 
law to contact the organisations and bodies referred to in Article 16(4) of the Return 
Directive.1054 
 
37.5. Minors 
 
“The best interest of a child shall be a primary consideration in the context of the detention 
of minors pending removal.”1055 Minors in detention shall have a possibility to engage in 
leisure activities, including play and recreational activities appropriate to their age, and shall 
have, depending on the length of their stay, access to education.1056 Apart from general 
conditions and procedural requirements that are described in other standards of this check-
list, Article 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child1057 among other things 
provides that deprivation of liberty of a child “shall be used only as a measure of last resort 
and for the shortest appropriate period of time” /.../ and “in a manner which takes into 
account  the needs of persons of his or her age” /.../.1058 Every child deprived of liberty “shall 
be separated from adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so and 
                                                 
1052
Article 16(2) of the Return Directive. 
1053
Article 16(4) of the Return Directive. 
1054
Article 16(5) of the Return Directive. 
1055
Article 17(5) of the Return Directive. See also recital 22 of the Return Directive. 
1056
Article 17(3) of the Return Directive. 
1057
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 
1577 UNTS 3. 
1058
Those needs have to be considered also in the light of the right to primary education under Article 28 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.    
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shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and 
visits, save in exceptional circumstances /.../ and shall have the right to prompt access to 
legal and other appropriate assistance.”1059 When minors are detained, they shall have the 
possibility to engage in leisure activities, including play and recreational activities 
appropriate to their age.”1060  
 
37.6. Unaccompanied minors 
 
“Unaccompanied minors shall only be detained as a measure of last resort and for the 
shortest appropriate period of time.”1061 Unaccompanied minors shall as far as possible be 
provided with accommodation in institutions provided with personnel and facilities which 
take into account the needs of persons of their age.”1062   
 
37.7. Ill-health and special medical conditions 
 
In detention, emergency health care and essential treatment of illness shall be provided.1063 
As regards the detention of persons with special medical needs, the case-law of the ECtHR 
has mostly considered the situation of detainees with mental illness, suicidal tendencies, 
detainees who are HIV-positive, paraplegics, persons who are confined to a wheelchair, and 
pregnant women. See the Explanatory Note on ill-health (special medical conditions) and 
Standard 37.8 on the detention of the elderly. 
 
37.8. Elderly 
 
The ECtHR has not expressly considered the detention of elderly persons in the expulsion context. 
The ECtHR, however, has routinely stated that age and state of health will be relevant to the 
                                                 
1059
Article 37(c) and(d) of the UN Convention on the Right of the Child. 
1060
For concrete examples in the case law of the ECtHR, see the Explanatory note to this Check-list. 
1061
Article 17(1) of the Return Directive. 
1062
Article 17(3) of the Return Directive. see also standard no 37.5 of this Check-list on minors and the 
Explanatory note to this Check-list on examples of detention of unaccompanied minors in the case-law of 
the ECtHR. 
1063
Second sentence of Article 16(3) of the Return Directive. 
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assessment of the level of severity of ill treatment, and there are a number of cases in which the 
ECtHR has addressed the vulnerability of this group within the domestic prison regime.1064  
 
37.9. Other vulnerable persons (female applicants, mothers, LGBT etc.) 
 
In case of female detainees, a lack of female staff in the centre may be relevant, too.1065 In 
the case of Mahamad Jama v Malta, irrespective of health concerns or age factor the ECtHR 
considered the female applicant more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker 
detained at the time.1066 
 
In the case of O.M. v Hungary1067 the ECtHR held that the authorities had failed to exercise 
particular care in order to avoid situations which may reproduce the conditions that forced 
that person to flee in the first place. The authorities ordered the applicant's detention 
without considering the extent to which vulnerable individuals, for instance, LGBT persons 
were safe or unsafe in custody among other detained persons, many of whom had come 
from countries with widespread cultural or religious prejudice against such persons.1068  For 
further concrete examples in case law of the ECtHR on the detention of vulnerable persons, 
see the Explanatory note. 
 
  
                                                 
1064
See, for example: Sawoniuk v United Kingdom App no 63716/00 (ECtHR 29 May 2001); Papon v France App 
no 54210/00 (ECtHR 25 July 2002); Farbtuhs v Latvia App no 4672/02 (ECtHR 2 December 2004) and Enea v 
Italy App no 74912/01 (ECtHR 17 September 2009), Haidn v Germany App no 6587/04 (ECtHR 13 January 
2011)  Contrada (no2) v Italy App no 7509/08 (ECtHR 11 February 2014); see also the Explanatory note to 
this Check-list. 
1065
See, for example: Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), para 97; Abdi 
Mahamud v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), paras 84, 86, 89. 
1066
Ibid. para 100. 
1067
O.M. v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR 5 July 2016). 
1068
Ibid. para 53. 
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Explanatory Note to the Basic Judicial Check-List 2 
 
Standard 2. Definition of detention 
 
The right to freedom of movement under Article 45 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU (hereinafter: the Charter) or under Article 2(1) of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR1069 
cannot be applicable to irregular migrants in detention cases, because these categories of 
third country nationals do not have the status of “legal residents” or they are not “lawfully 
staying” on the territory of the Member States.1070 
 
In its case law (until 2016), the CJEU mostly uses the term “detention” without developing a 
distinction between deprivation of freedom of movement and deprivation of liberty. In 
addition to the case of Kadzoev, in the judgment in the case of Mahdi, which also refers to 
detention under the Return Directive, the CJEU briefly refers to Article 6 of the Charter.1071 In 
the case of Alo and Osso, the resident permits were issued to the applicants with subsidiary 
protection with a condition requiring them to take up residence, in Mr. Alo's case, in the 
town of Ahlen (Germany), and in Ms. Osso's case, in the Hannover region (Germany), with 
the exception of the capital of the Land of Lower Saxony. The CJEU delivered a preliminary 
ruling based on the provision on freedom of movement, 1072 providing that the fact that 
Article 33 of Directive 2011/95 is entitled “Freedom of Movement” is not sufficient to dispel 
the ambiguities in its wording.1073 Similarly, the ECtHR states that “it is often necessary to 
look beyond the appearances and the language used and concentrate on the realities of the 
situation.”1074 
                                                 
1069
Article 45(2) of the Charter states that freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance 
with the treaties, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State. Article 
2(1) of the Protocol No 4 to the ECHR states that: “everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, 
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.” 
1070
Recital 9 of the Return Directive; C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2009:741 para 41; C-
534/11, Arslan EU:C:2013:343 para 48. 
1071
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014] para 52 and point 1 of the operative part of the judgment. 
1072
C-443/14 and C-444/14 Joined Cases Alo and Osso, EU:C:2016:127 paras 15-16 and 22-24. 
1073
Ibid. para 25. For distinctions between the notions of restriction of person's liberty of movement, 
restriction of liberty and deprivation of liberty in the context of detention under the European arrest 
warrant, see judgment of the CJEU in the case C-294/16 PPU JZ EU:C:2016:610. 
1074
 Kasparov v Russia, App no 53659/07 (ECtHR 11 October 2016) para 36; see also: Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary 
App no 47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017) para 66. 
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In the case Nada v Switzerland, the ECtHR states in general terms that “the requirement to 
take account of the type and manner of implementation of the measure in question /.../ 
enables it to have regard to the specific context and circumstances surrounding types of 
restriction other than the paradigm of confinement in a cell /.../. Indeed, the context in which 
the measure is taken is an important factor, since situations commonly occur in modern 
society where the public may be called on to endure restrictions on freedom of movement or 
liberty in the interest of the common good” /.../.1075  In this case, the ECtHR observed that 
the area in which the applicant was not allowed to travel was the territory of a third country, 
Switzerland. The restrictions in question did not prevent the applicant from living and 
moving freely within the territory of his permanent residence, which he had chosen of his 
own free will, to live and to carry on his activities. These circumstances differ radically from 
the factual situation in Guzzardi.1076 
 
In the case Guzzardi v Italy, the applicant was suspected of belonging to a “band of mafiosi” 
and he had been forced to live on an island within an (unfenced) area of 2.5 km2, together 
with other residents in a similar situation and supervisory staff. The ECtHR found that the 
applicant had been deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the ECHR. 
 
In the case of Raimondo v Italy the applicant was suspected of involvement with mafia and 
he had been confined to his home in the evenings. He had an obligation to inform the police 
when he planned to leave his home, though he did not require permission from the police to 
leave his home. The ECtHR concluded that this amounted to a restriction of freedom of 
movement and not to deprivation of liberty. When a border official stops a passenger during 
border control in an airport in order to clarify his/her situation and where a detention has 
not exceeded the time strictly necessary to comply with relevant formalities, no issue arises 
under Article 5 of the ECHR.1077 
                                                 
1075
Nada v Switzerland (Grand Chamber) App no 10593/08 (ECtHR 12 September 2012), para 226. 
1076
Ibid. para 229. 
1077
Gahramanov v Azerbaijan (decision) App no 26291/06 (ECtHR 15 October 2013) para 41. For further 
examples, see also: Cyprus v Turkey App no 25781/94 (ECtHR 10 May 2001); Djavit An v Turkey App no 
20652/92 (ECtHR 20 February 2003), Hajibeyli v Azerbaijan App no 16528/05 (ECtHR 10 July 2008); Streletz, 
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In the case Khlaifia and others v Italy the Italian authorities had kept the Centro di Soccorso e 
Prima Accoglienza (CSPA) on the island of Lampedusa, where after giving migrants first aid, 
the authorities proceeded with their identification “under surveillance” and the applicants 
were “prohibited from leaving the centre and the ships Vincent and Audace”. Despite the 
fact that detainees were not in cells, the conditions to which they were subjected were 
similar to detention and deprivation of freedom. They were subject to prolonged 
confinement, unable to communicate with the outside world and there was a lack of 
freedom of movement for the migrants placed in the Lampedusa reception centres. They 
were not free to leave the CSPA. “When they have managed to evade the police surveillance 
and reach the village of Lampedusa, they were stopped by the police and taken back to the 
reception centre. This suggests that the applicants were being held at the CSPA involuntarily. 
The duration of the applicant’s confinement in the CSPA and on the ships, lasting for about 
twelve days in the case of the first applicant and about nine days in that of the second and 
the third applicants, was not insignificant. Classification of the applicantsʹ confinement in 
domestic law cannot alter the nature of the constraining measures imposed on them. 
Moreover, the applicability of Article 5 of the ECHR cannot be excluded by the fact, relied on 
by the Government that the authoritiesʹ aim had been to assist the applicants and ensure 
their safety. Even measures intended for protection or taken in the interest of the person 
concerned may be regarded as a deprivation of liberty.”1078 
Depending on the factual circumstances, under the case-law of the ECtHR, detention during 
the period of 9 hours,1079 12 hours,1080 or even only 21081 or 3 hours1082 may mean a 
deprivation of liberty. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kessler and Krenz v Germany App no 34044/96, 35532/97, 44801/98 (ECtHR 22 March 2001), Ashingdane v 
United Kingdom (ECtHR 28 May 1985). 
1078
Khlaifia and others v Italy, (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), paras 65-71. 
1079
Tiba v Romania App no 36188/09 (ECtHR 13 December 2016), para 45. 
1080
Iustin Robertino Micu v Romania App no 41040/11 (ECtHR 13 January 2015), para 109.  
1081
Tomaszewscy v Poland App no 8933/05 (ECtHR 15 March 2014), para 129. 
1082
Baisuev and Anzorov v Georgia App no 39804/04 (ECtHR 18 December 2012), para 53. 
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Standard 3. Persons who can be subject to detention 
 
According to the so called “Return Handbook”1083 persons “apprehended or intercepted” by 
the competent authorities in “direct” connection with the irregular crossing of external 
borders are persons arriving irregularly by boat, apprehended upon or shortly after their 
arrival; persons arrested by the police after having climbed a border fence; and irregular 
entrants, who are leaving the train/bus which brought them directly into the territory of a 
Member State without previous stopover on the Member State’s territory. The Return 
Handbook also defines situations where there is no more direct connection to the act of 
irregular border crossing.1084 
 
However, under the case-law of the ECtHR, in exceptional circumstances, when a State, 
through its agents operating outside its territory, exercises control and authority over an 
individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to 
that individual the rights and freedoms that are relevant to the situation of that individual 
under Section I of the ECHR. In each case, the question of the existence of exceptional 
circumstances, requiring and justifying a finding by the ECtHR that the State was exercising 
jurisdiction extraterritorially, must be determined with reference to the particular facts, for 
example, full and exclusive control over a prison or a ship.1085 
 
In its case law, the CJEU also dealt with a situation in which a third country national was 
detained on the basis of the Return Directive, on the ground that there was a risk of 
absconding, after which he also applied for asylum. In such a case if “it seems” that an 
asylum application has been made with the sole intention of delaying or even jeopardising 
enforcement of the return decision, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis of all 
relevant circumstances, such circumstances can justify the detention of such a national even 
                                                 
1083
The Return Handbook does not create any legally binding obligations upon Member States. It bases itself, 
to a large extent, on the work conducted by Member States and the Commission within the European 
Commission Directive Contact Committee Return Directive (2008/115/EC) in the years 2009-2014 and 
regroups in a systematic and summarised form the discussions that have taken place within that forum, 
which do not necessarily reflect a consensus among Member States on the interpretation of legal act. 
1084
Ibid. p15. 
1085
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 27765/09 (ECtHR 23 February 2012), para 73; Al-
Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 55721/07 (ECtHR 7 July 2011), paras 132, 
136; Medvedjev and Others v Russia App no 34184/03 (ECtHR 24 April 2012), para 67. 
Explanatory Note to the Basic Judicial Check-List 2 
 
218 
 
after an application for asylum has been made.1086 
 
Standard 8. Objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding 
 
The Return Handbook (draft) on page 11 (point 1.6.) provides that frequently used criteria 
for risk of absconding based on the Return Directive, that are defined in national law, are for 
instance: lack of documentation; absence of cooperation to determine identity; use of false 
documentation or destroying existing documents; failing repeatedly to report to relevant 
authorities; explicit expression of intent of non-compliance; existence of conviction for 
criminal offence; violation of a return decision; non-compliance with an existing entry ban; 
prior conduct (i.e. escaping); and being the subject of a return decision made in another 
Member State. However, it needs to be pointed out that based on the judgment in the case 
of Mahdi, the State may consider, for example, a lack of identity documents as an objective 
criteria for the risk of absconding. However, the mere fact that the person concerned has no 
identity documents cannot, on its own, be a ground for detention or extending detention, 
since any assessment relating to the risk of the person concerned must be based on an 
individual examination of that person's case.1087 
 
Where national legislation had not introduced objective criteria for assessing the risk of 
absconding, the German Federal High Court1088 and the Austrian High Administrative 
Court1089 ruled that the detention of the applicants lacked sufficient legal basis and could not 
be applied. 
 
Standard 12. Control of the quality of law on detention 
 
In the cases of Abdolkhani and Karimnia and Keshmiri v Turkey (no.2), the Government 
sought to rely on certain legal provisions to justify the applicants’ detention, but the ECtHR 
held that these provisions were not concerned with a deprivation of liberty in the context of 
                                                 
1086
C-534/11, Arslan EU:C:2013:343 paras 57-62; see also: C-601/15 PPU J.N. (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2016:84, 
paras 75, 79-80; Nabil and Others v Hungary App no 62116/12 (ECtHR 22 September 2015), para 38. 
1087
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320 [2014] 70-74. 
1088
Bundesgerichtshof Beschluss v. 26. 6. 2014, AZ.:. ZB 31/14. 
1089
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (VwGH), 19. 2. 2015, ZI. Ro 2014/21/0075-5. 
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deportation proceedings, but rather with the regulation of the residence of certain groups of 
foreigners in Turkey. Consequently, it found that the applicants’ detention had no legal 
basis.1090 Likewise, in the case of Khlaifia v Italy, the ECtHR held that there had been no legal 
basis for the applicants’ detention in a reception centre in Lampedusa, as domestic law only 
permitted foreigners to be detained if they needed special assistance or where additional 
identity checks or documentation were required. Furthermore, even if these criteria were 
met, they should have been detained in a different centre pursuant to an administrative 
decision. The ECtHR also considered whether power to detain existed under a bilateral 
agreement between Italy and Tunisia. However, it noted that even if such a power had 
existed, the contents of this agreement were not public. It was, therefore, not accessible to 
the interested parties and they could not have foreseen the consequences of its 
application.1091 
 
In the case of Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary detention  in a transit zone was based on 
“elastically interpreted general provision of the law. Thus, according to Article 71/A(1) and 
(2) of the Asylum Act asylum seekers who were subjected to the border procedure were not 
entitled to stay in the territory of Hungary or to seek accommodation at a designated facility 
and the ECtHR was not persuaded that these rules circumscribe with sufficient precision and 
foreseeability. Furthermore, no special grounds for detention in the transit zone were 
provided for in Article 71/A of the Asylum Act. These were important elements in 
argumentation that detention was not lawful for the purposes of Article 5(1) of the ECHR.1092 
 
Standard 15. Best interests of a child 
 
In the case of MA, BT, DA, the CJEU refers to the best interests of a child as a fundamental 
right and not as a general principle of law. The CJEU provides that /.../ “those fundamental 
rights include, in particular, that set out in Article 24(2) of the Charter /.../ Thus, the second 
                                                 
1090
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey App no 30471/08 (ECtHR 22 September 2009) paras 125-135; Keshmiri v 
Turkey (No2) App no 22426/10 (ECtHR 17 January 2012) para 33. 
1091
Khlaifia v Italy App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 1 September 2015), paras 69, 71. The Grand Chamber had 
confirmed that decision of the ECtHR from September 2015 (Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber), 
App no 16483/12 (15 December 2016), paras 102-108). 
1092
Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no  47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017) paras 65-69. 
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paragraph of Article 6 of the Dublin III Regulation cannot be interpreted in such a way that it 
disregards that fundamental right”.1093 The difference between the right and the general 
principle of law in the light of the Charter is significant, because “principles” may be 
implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions of the Union, and by acts 
of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective 
powers and “they shall be judicially congisable only in the interpretation of such acts in the 
ruling on their legality.”1094 Such limitation, therefore, does not exist in case of judicial 
interpretation of “rights.” 
 
The general position of the ECtHR regarding the best interests of a child is that “there is 
currently a broad consensus – including in international law – in support of the idea that in 
all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be paramount”.1095 The following 
examples demonstrate  how this principle can affect the outcomes of the court proceedings: 
Rahimi v Greece, Popov v France,1096 Tarakhel v Switzerland.1097 
 
Standard 16. Consideration of the effectiveness and less coercive alternative 
measures to detention 
 
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency (hereinafter: FRA) proposes the following alternatives to 
detention: the obligation to surrender passports or travel documents; residence restrictions 
                                                 
1093
C-648/11 MA, BT and DA v Secretary of State of the Home Department EU:C:2013:367 paras 57-58. In the 
earlier case C-427/12 Commission v Parliament EU:C:2014:170, where the judgment was delivered before 
the Charter came into force, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU stated that the right to respect for private or 
family life from Article 7 of the Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification [2003] OJ L251/12 must be read in conjunction with the obligation to have regard to the 
child's best interests which is recognised in Article 24(2) of the Charter. The CJEU adds that various 
instruments that stress the importance to a child of family life recommend that the State has regard to the 
child's interests, but “they do not create for the members of a family an individual right” to be allowed to 
enter the territory of a State and cannot be interpreted as denying States a certain margin of appreciation 
when they examine applications for family reunification (C-540/03 Parliament v Council (Grand Chamber) 
EU:C:2006:429 paras 58-59). Member States must have due regard to the best interests of minor children 
when weighing those interest (Ibid. paras 63, 73). 
1094
Article 52(5) of the Charter. 
1095
 Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (Grand Chamber) App no 41615/07 (ECtHR 6 July 2010) para 135. 
1096
See the Explanatory note concerning standards nos. 37.5. and 37.6 of this Check-list. 
1097
Tarakhel v Switzerland (Grand Chamber) App no 29217/12 (ECtHR 4 November 2014) paras 116-122. See 
also the Explanatory note to this Check-list on standard no 17 on principle of proportionality and the 
necessity test. 
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combined with regular reporting requirements in designated places; open or semi-open 
facilities run by the government or NGOs, as well as hotels, hostels or private addresses; 
release on bail and provision of sureties by third parties; regular reporting to the authorities; 
placement in open facilities with caseworker support; and electronic monitoring.1098 The 
UNHCR in its publication entitled “Alternatives to Detention”1099 lists very similar, less 
coercive alternative measures to detention: deposit or surrender of travel or identity 
documentation; reporting at periodic intervals by using new technologies; use of a 
designated or directed residence; bail or bond systems – a financial deposit that may be 
forfeited in the event of the individual absconding; community supervision and case 
management; child and family appropriate alternatives to detention (foster care, supervised 
independent living, group care, collective residential (institutional) care; youth villages 
etc.).1100 The UNHCR lists five elements that have been widely found to contribute to the 
success of alternatives to detention, and the research of the Odysseus network in Europe 
confirmed that alternatives were less successful when they did not incorporate one or more 
of those five elements.1101 These are: 1) treating asylum-seekers (and migrants) with dignity, 
humanity and respect throughout the relevant asylum or migration procedure; 2) providing 
clear and concise information about rights and duties under the alternative to detention and 
the consequences of non-compliance; 3) providing asylum-seekers with legal advice, 
including on their asylum applications and options available to them should their asylum 
claim be rejected. Such advice is most effective when made available at the outset of and 
continuing throughout relevant procedures; 4) providing access to adequate material 
support, accommodation and other reception conditions; and 5) offering individualized 
“coaching” or case management services.1102 The UNHCR stresses the importance of the 
context-specific development and implementation of the alternatives to detention. Despite 
the fact that no single alternative to detention will be fully replicable in every context, there 
are elements that remain constant through the many existing examples.1103 
                                                 
1098
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Alternatives to detention for asylum seekers and 
people in return procedures (FRA 2015). 
1099
UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, ‘Alternatives to Detention’ (2015) 
UN Doc EC/66/SC/CRP. 
1100
Ibid. points 8-19. 
1101
Ibid. point 20. 
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Ibid. point 20. 
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Ibid. point 21. 
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In regards to the availability of effective less coercive measures to detention, it is relevant to 
note that Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration 
Fund1104 provides, in the second sub-paragraph of Article 5(1)(g) and in the second sub-
paragraph of Article 11(a), that this fund shall support actions focusing on the 
establishment, development and improvement of alternatives to detention in relation to the 
categories of persons mentioned in the first sub-paragraph of the aforementioned 
provisions. Report of the UNHR Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants 
(Francois Crèpeau, 2 April 2012, A/HRC/20/24) pointed to research which found that over 
90% compliance or cooperation rates can be achieved when persons are released to proper 
supervision and assistance. The alternatives have also proved to be considerably less 
expensive than detention, not only in direct costs but also when it comes to longer-term 
costs associated with detention, such as the impact on health services, integration problems 
and other social challenges.1105 
 
As regards empirical research, the UNHCR has found, too (in 2014), that asylum seekers are 
inclined to comply with immigration procedures; and that the perception of fairness in the 
asylum procedure was far more important for ensuring compliance than the use of 
detention.1106 Empirical findings of the International Detention Coalition reveal that a 
community-based alternatives to detention programme had demonstrated a cost saving of 
USD $49 in the USA, AUD $86 in Australia and CAD $167 in Canada per person/per day.1107 
 
                                                 
1104
Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing 
the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and repealing 
Decisions No 573/2007/EC and No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council 
Decision 2007/435/EC [2014] OJ L 150/168.  
1105
Cited in: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Alternatives to detention for asylum seekers 
and people in return procedures (FRA 2015). 
1106
UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Costello, Cathryn & Kaytaz, Ezra ‘Building empirical 
research into alternatives to detention: perceptions of asylum seekers and refugees in Toronto and 
Geneva’ (2013) UN Doc PPLA/2013/02. 
1107
International Detention Coalition, There are alternatives: a handbook for preventing unnecessary 
immigration detention, 13 May 2011 (cited in: UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme, ‘Alternatives to Detention’ (2015) UN Doc EC/66/SC/CRP point 6). 
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Standards 17. Principle of proportionality and the necessity test 
 
In the cases of Chahal and Saadi, the ECtHR examined whether the person has been 
detained under Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR with a view to deportation. It held that “Article 
5(1)(f) does not demand that the detention of a person against whom action is being taken 
with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his 
committing an offence or fleeing; in this respect Article 5(1)(f) provides a different level of 
protection from Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR”.1108  “Any deprivation of liberty under Article 
5(1)(f) will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress. If such 
proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be 
permissible.”1109 However, in some recent cases the ECtHR has also introduced the necessity 
test, the purpose of which is to check that deprivation of liberty is not only in line with 
national law, but also necessary in the circumstances of the case, so that less coercive 
measures to attain legitimate aims are taken into consideration, too.1110 This is so 
particularly in cases of the detention of minors.1111 
In any event, it is a requirement of Article 5(1) of the ECHR that detention be “in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by domestic law”;1112 therefore, in considering the question of 
“lawfulness”, the ECtHR may also have regard to the “necessity” of the measure where 
“necessity” is a requirement of domestic law based on EU secondary law and the case-law of 
the CJEU or national constitutional law. For example, in Rusu v Austria (para. 58), while the 
ECtHR reiterated that “necessity” did not form part of the test under Article 5(1)(f), it noted 
that in Austria it was part of the domestic law test. In that case, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the ECtHR found that the applicant’s detention was such a serious measure 
that – in a context in which the necessity of the detention to achieve the stated aim was 
required by domestic law – it would be arbitrary unless it was justified as a last resort where 
                                                 
1108
Chahal v United Kingdom App no 22414/93 (ECtHR 15 November 1996), para 112. 
1109
 Ibid. para 113. See also: Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 Jan 2008) 
para 72; A and Others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009) para 
164; Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no16483/12 (15 December 2016), para 90. 
1110
For example: Richmond Yaw and Others v Italy App nos. 3342/11, 3391/11, 3408/11 and 3447/11 (ECtHR 6 
October 2016), para 71. 
1111
See: Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta App no 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR 22 November 
2016), paras 111, 144, 146. 
1112
This includes international law: Medvedyev and Others v France (Grand Chamber) App no 3394/03 (ECtHR 
29 March 2010) para 79; Toniolo v San Marino and Italy App no 44853/10 (ECtHR 26 June 2012), para 46. 
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other less severe measures had been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard 
the individual or public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained. 
The ECtHR, therefore, found a violation of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR in that case. Mutatis 
mutandis this is relevant for detention under the Return Directive, since EU secondary law 
requires the necessity test. 
 
In regards to alternatives to detention, in a number of cases the ECtHR has considered 
relevant the fact that alternatives to detention were available to the authorities,1113 
especially if this is a requirement of domestic law.1114 This is especially (but not exclusively) 
the case when the detainee is exceptionally vulnerable, for example, on account of his or her 
youth or ill health or sexual orientation.1115  In Rahimi v Greece the ECtHR observed that the 
authorities had not examined whether it had been necessary, as a measure of last resort, to 
place the applicant – an unaccompanied fifteen year old – in a detention centre, or whether 
less drastic action might not have sufficed to secure his deportation. These factors gave the 
ECtHR cause to question the authorities’ good faith in executing the detention measure. A 
similar approach was adopted in respect of an HIV-positive applicant in Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v 
Belgium. The ECtHR in the case of Popov v France (para. 119) stated that with respect to 
minors, even if accompanied by their parents, and even though the detention centre had a 
special wing for the accommodation of families, the authorities “did not verify that the 
placement in administrative detention was a measure of last resort for which no alternative 
was available.”1116 
 
Standard 18. Length of detention and conditions for extension of detention, 
including due diligence requirement 
 
The general standard regarding the length of detention, based on the case law of the ECtHR 
and on Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, provides that it should not continue for an unreasonable 
length of time. Deprivation of liberty will be justified only for as long as the relevant 
                                                 
1113
See Raza v Bulgaria App no 31465/08 (ECtHR 11 February 2010), para 74; Louled Massoud v Malta App no 
24340/08 (ECtHR 27 July 2010) para 68.  
1114
See, for example: Nabil and Others v Hungary App no 62116/12 (ECtHR 22 September 2015) para 40. 
1115
See: O.M. v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR 5 July 2016) para 52. 
1116
For more on this, see concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in the case of Abdullahi Elmi and 
Aweys Abubakar v Malta App nos 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR 22 November 2016) paras 27-28. 
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proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the 
detention will cease to be permissible.1117 This means that the ECtHR will probably examine 
the activity or inactivity of the authorities during the period of an applicant’s detention in 
order to determine whether or not they acted with adequate diligence. The refusal of an 
applicant to cooperate may be relevant for the assessment of the reasonableness of the 
length of detention.1118 The reasoning in the case of Abdi v the United Kingdom provides 
that not all refusals to transfer voluntarily will be treated equally. A conclusion that the 
refusal to return voluntarily is relevant to the assessment of the reasonableness of the 
length of detention cannot be drawn in every case. It is necessary to distinguish between 
cases in which the return to the country of origin was possible, and cases where it was not. 
Where the return was not possible for reasons extraneous to the person detained, the fact 
that this person was not willing to return voluntarily could not be held against this individual 
since his/her refusal had no causal effect. If return was possible, but the detained person 
was not willing to go, it would be necessary to consider whether or not this individual had 
issued proceedings challenging the deportation. If this person had done so, it would be 
entirely reasonable that he/she should remain in the [State] (…) pending the determination 
of those proceedings, unless they were an abuse of process, and his/her refusal to return 
voluntarily could not be seen as a trump card which enabled the Secretary of State to 
continue to detain until deportation could be effected, otherwise the refusal would justify as 
reasonable any period of detention, however, long.”1119 Although in some cases the ECtHR 
seemed to suggest that fixed domestic time-limits for detention were necessary to comply 
with the “quality of law” – the requirement under Article 5(1) of the ECHR1120 – in the recent 
case J.N. v the United Kingdom the Court expressly rejected the applicant’s assertion that 
Article 5(1) requires contracting States to establish a maximum period of immigration 
                                                 
1117
Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 Jan 2008), para 72; 33; A and Others 
v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 164. 
1118
See, for example, the opinion of the ECtHR in the case of Abdi v United Kingdom App no 27770/08 (ECtHR 9 
April 2013). 
1119
Ibid. para 73. 
1120
Azimov v Russia, App no 67474/11 (ECtHR 18 March 2013), para 171; Ismoilov and others v Russia App no 
2947/06 (ECtHR 24 April 2008), paras 139-140; Ryabikin v Russia App no 8320/04 (ECtHR 19 June 2008), 
para 129; Muminov v Russia App no 42502/06 (ECtHR 11 December 2008), para 121; Nasrulloyev v Russia 
App no 656/06 (ECtHR 11 October 2007), paras 73-74; Abdolkhani And Karimnia v Turkey App no 30471/08 
(ECtHR 22 June 2009), para 135; Garayev v Azerbaijan App no 53688/08 (ECtHR 10 June 2010), para 99; 
Mathloom v Greece App no 48883/07 (ECtHR 24 March 2012), para 71.  
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detention. Rather it stated that it would examine the system of immigration detention in the 
respondent State as a whole, having regard to the particular facts of each individual case. In 
that case, it concluded that the system of the United Kingdom, according to which detainees 
could challenge their ongoing detention by way of judicial review, having regard to domestic 
law principles closely reflecting the requirements of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, in principle 
complied with the requirements of that Article. Consequently, the absence of domestic 
time-limits will not, by itself, constitute a breach of Article 5(1) of the ECHR. However, the 
ECtHR has in some cases suggested that such time-limits might constitute an important 
procedural safeguard,1121 in which the ECtHR noted that in the absence of time limits, the 
applicant was subject to an undetermined period of detention, and, consequently, the 
existence of other procedural safeguards (such as an effective remedy by which to contest 
the lawfulness and length of detention) would become decisive. It is also important to note 
that, where fixed time-limits exist under domestic law, compliance with those time limits 
cannot automatically be regarded as bringing the applicant’s detention in line with Article 
5(1)(f) of the ECHR if the expulsion proceedings were not otherwise prosecuted with due 
diligence. However, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of 
“lawfulness”, as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to be 
considered “in accordance with the law”.1122 It would, therefore, appear that while time-
limits are one of a number of possible safeguards against arbitrariness, alone they are 
neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure compliance with Article 5 (1)(f) of the ECHR. 
 
In the case of Djalti v Bulgaria,1123 an Algerian citizen did not have a travel document 
necessary for his expulsion. He had been detained for a period lasting longer than 1 year and 
3 months. The ECtHR found that despite the fact that the detainee was not inclined to 
cooperate, had refused to take a passport picture and did not want to meet with the 
representatives of the Algerian embassy, the mere fact of writing to the Algerian consulate 
requesting the issuance of the travel document was not sufficient to demonstrate that the 
authorities had acted with due diligence.1124 The ECtHR indicated that by failing to provide 
                                                 
1121
See, for example, Louled Massoud v Malta App no 24340/08 (ECtHR 27 October 2010), para 71. 
1122
Shamsa v Poland App no 45355/99 (ECtHR 27 November 2003), paras 57-60. 
1123
Djalti v Bulgaria  App no 31206/05 (ECtHR 12 March 2013). 
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the Algerian consulate with the additional information it had requested, and by not 
undertaking other necessary actions to set aside the obstacles to successful removal, the 
Bulgarian authorities did not show sufficient diligence required by Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.1125 In 
the case of Amie and Others v Bulgaria, the ECtHR held that 4 written requests for a travel 
document made to the Lebanese Embassy in Sofia during a period of 1 year and 8 months 
did not satisfy the requirement of due diligence , even if the Bulgarian authorities could not 
have compelled the issuing of such a document. Accordingly, the ECtHR found that by failing 
to pursue the matter vigorously and by not endeavouring to enter into negotiations with the 
Lebanese authorities with a view to expediting the delivery of the travel document, the 
Bulgarian authorities had violated Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.1126 Similarly, in the case of Singh v the 
Czech Republic, a 5- to 7-month inactivity on the part of the returning country’s competent 
authorities was found by the ECtHR to have breached the due diligence obligation under 
Article 5(1)(f) ECHR, despite the lack of cooperation of the embassy of the country of 
possible destination.1127 
 
Standard 21. Right to be informed “adequately” about the reasons for detention 
and about procedures laid down in national law for challenging the detention order 
 
In the case Rusu v Austria, the information given to the applicant on the day of her arrest 
was inaccurate as to the facts and incorrect as to the legal basis of her arrest and detention, 
and the ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(2) of the ECHR1128. In the case of T and A v 
Turkey (para. 66), the applicant was told she was held on suspicion of having committed a 
criminal act, rather than for the purposes of immigration control. The ECtHR thus found that 
the reasons for the applicant's detention were never communicated to her and decided 
there had been a violation of Article 5(2) of the ECHR.  
 
                                                 
1125
Ibid. para 54. 
1126
Amie and Others v Bulgaria App no 58149/08 (ECtHR 12 February 2013) para 77; see also: M. and Others v 
Bulgaria App no 41416/08 (ECtHR 26 July 2011), para 71. 
1127
Singh v République Tchèque App no 60538/00 (ECtHR 25 January 2005), para 62. See more examples of 
application of due diligence requirements in cases: Abdi Mahamud v Malta, App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 
May 2016), para 138; H.A. v Greece App no 58424/11 (ECtHR 21 January 2016), paras 52-53. 
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Explanatory Note to the Basic Judicial Check-List 2 
 
228 
 
Standard 24. Right to (free) legal assistance and/or representation 
 
In the case of DEB, which does not relate to detention, the CJEU decided that in the context 
of principle of proportionality and the right to free legal aid the following elements need to 
be taken into consideration: the subject-matter of litigation; whether the applicant has a 
reasonable prospect of success; the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the 
proceedings; the complexity of the applicable law; the applicant's capacity to represent 
himself effectively; the amount of the costs of the proceedings and whether those costs 
might represent an insurmountable obstacle to access to the courts.1129 Whilst Article 6 of 
the ECHR is not directly applicable in detention cases under the Return Directive, the 
following standards related to civil disputes may additionally serve as guidance for 
considering effective access to judicial review in detention cases. The question whether a 
particular case implies a requirement to provide legal aid depends, among other factors, on 
the following: the importance of what is at stake for the applicant;1130 the complexity of the 
relevant law or procedure;1131 the applicant’s capacity to represent him or herself 
effectively;1132 and the existence of a statutory requirement to have legal representation.1133 
However, the right in question is not absolute, and it may, therefore, be permissible to 
impose conditions on granting legal aid based, in particular, on considerations such as the 
financial situation of the litigant1134 and his or her prospects of success in the 
proceedings.1135 It is essential for the court to give reasons for the refusal to grant legal aid 
and to handle requests for legal aid with diligence.1136  
 
However, assigning a lawyer to represent a party does not in itself guarantee effective 
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56547/00 (ECtHR 16 July 2002), para 100. 
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Ibid. para 62. 
1136
Tabor v Poland App no 12825/02 (ECtHR 27 June 2006) paras 45-46; Saoud v France App no 9375/02 (ECtHR 
9 October 2007) paras 133-136. 
Explanatory Note to the Basic Judicial Check-List 2 
 
229 
 
assistance.1137  The lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes may be prevented, for a 
protracted period, from acting or may be asked to shirk his/her duties. If notified of the 
situation, the competent national authorities must replace the lawyer. Should they fail to do 
so, the litigant would be deprived of effective assistance in practice despite the provision of 
free legal aid.1138  It is above all the responsibility of the State to ensure the requisite balance 
between the effective enjoyment of access to justice on the one hand, and the 
independence of the legal profession on the other. The ECtHR has stressed that any refusal 
by a legal aid lawyer to act must meet certain quality requirements. Those requirements will 
not be met where the shortcomings in the legal aid system deprive individuals of the 
“practical and effective” access to court to which they are entitled.1139 
 
 
Standard 25. Other aspects of the practical and effective right to judicial review 
 
In the case L.M. And Others v Russia, an asylum seeker was detained for the period of the 
proceedings before the ECtHR. In this case, the ECtHR reiterated that it is of the utmost 
importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by 
Article 34 of the ECHR that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate 
freely with the ECtHR, without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities 
to withdraw or modify their complaints. “In this context, pressure includes not only direct 
coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation but also other improper indirect acts or instances 
of contact designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention 
remedy. The fact that an individual has actually managed to pursue his application does not 
prevent an issue arising under Article 34. The intentions or reasons underlying the acts or 
omissions in question are of little relevance when assessing whether Article 34 of the ECHR 
has been complied with; what matters is whether the situation created as a result of the 
authorities' act or omission conforms to Article 34. The ECtHR has already found in a number 
of cases that measures limiting an applicant's contact with his representative may constitute 
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interference with the exercise of his right of individual petition (see, for example, Shtukaturov 
v Russia1140,  where a ban on lawyer's visits, coupled with a ban on telephone calls and 
correspondence, was held to be incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under 
Article 34 of the Convention).” It might be necessary that a representative complies with 
certain formal requirements before obtaining access to a detainee, for instance, for security 
reasons, or in order to prevent collusion, or the obstruction either of the course of the 
investigation or justice. Excessive formalities in such matters, such as those that could de 
facto prevent a prospective applicant from effectively enjoying his right of individual 
petition, have been found unacceptable.1141 
 
Standard 26. Automatic judicial review or detainee’s right to initiate judicial review 
of the lawfulness of detention (including conditions of detention) 
 
In J.N. v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that no requirement of “automatic judicial 
review” could be read into Articles 5(1)(f) or Article 5(4) of the ECHR.1142 However, in the 
context of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, the ECtHR found that subjecting an applicant’s 
detention to automatic periodic judicial review provided an important safeguard against 
arbitrariness, but could not be regarded as decisive. The systems examined in Auad and of 
Dolinskiy were of automatic periodic review; in order to comply with the ECHR, it is likely 
that a system of automatic review would have to either be implemented at frequent 
intervals, or permit the detainee to also institute proceedings. Otherwise there would be a 
risk that detention could become unlawful without the detainee having any means by which 
to challenge it. 1143 For example, in the context of Article 5(1)(e) the ECtHR held that a person 
of unsound mind, who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy 
period of time, is entitled to take proceedings “at reasonable intervals” in order to put the 
lawfulness of his/her detention in issue.1144 A system of periodic review, in which the 
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initiative lies solely with the authorities, is not sufficient on its own.1145  The criteria for 
“lawful detention” under Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR entail that the review of lawfulness 
guaranteed by Article 5(4) in relation to the continuing detention of a mental health patient 
should be made by reference to the patient’s contemporaneous state of health, including his 
or her dangerousness, as evidenced by up-to-date medical assessments.1146  
Standard 27. Right to judicial review before an “independent and impartial 
tribunal/court established by law” 
 
In the case of H.I.D., the CJEU stated that  “according to the settled case-law of the CJEU, in 
order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes 
of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the CJEU takes account of 
a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is 
permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, 
whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent”.1147 In this particular case, the 
CJEU established that the Irish Refugee Appeals Tribunal met the criteria of establishment by 
law, permanence, application of rules of law; that positive decisions of the Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal had binding force;1148 that the requirement for the procedure to be inter partes was 
not an absolute criterion; and that each party had the opportunity to make the Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal aware of any information necessary to the success of the application for 
asylum or to the defence.1149 The CJEU established that the Refugee Appeals Tribunal had a 
broad discretion, since it was cognisant of both questions of fact and questions of law and 
ruled on the evidence submitted to it, in relation to which it enjoyed discretion.1150 
Regarding, the contested issue of the independence of the Refugee Appeal Tribunal, the 
CJEU reiterated that independence has its external and internal aspect. The external aspect 
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“entails that the body is protected against external intervention or pressure liable to 
jeopardise the independent judgment.” The internal aspect “is linked to impartiality and 
seeks to ensure a level playing field for the parties to the proceedings and their respective 
interests in relation to the subject-matter of those proceedings”.1151 As for the rules 
governing the appointment of members of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, in the opinion of 
the CJEU, these were not capable of calling into question the independence of that tribunal. 
The members were appointed for a specific term from among persons with at least five 
years of experience as a practising barrister or a practising solicitor, and the circumstances of 
their appointment by the Minister did not differ substantially from the practice in many 
other Member States.1152 With regard to the issue of the removal of members of the 
Refugee Appeals Tribunal, it followed from paragraph 7 of the second schedule to the 
Refugee Act that the Minister could remove the ordinary members of that Tribunal from 
office. The Minister’s decision had to state the reasons for such removal.1153 The CJEU then 
noted that cases in which the members “may be removed from office are not defined 
precisely by the Refugee Act. Nor does the Refugee Act specify whether the decision to 
remove a member of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal is amenable to judicial review.”1154 This 
was clearly a problematic aspect for the CJEU, because in the next paragraph the CJEU refers 
to the second sentence of recital 27 of the Directive 2005/85, which defines that the 
“effectiveness of the remedy, also with regard to the examination of the relevant facts, 
depends on the administrative and judicial system of each Member State seen as a whole.” 
Based on this recital of the secondary EU law, the CJEU then decided that since an applicant 
in the Irish system could also question the validity of the recommendations of the Refugee 
Applications Commissioner and the decisions of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal before the 
High Court, the judgments of which could be the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court, 
the Irish system “as a whole” respected the right to an effective remedy.1155 
 
However, in the context of the right to speedy judicial review of detention under the third 
and fourth sub-paragraphs of Article 15(2) of the Return Directive, or under Article 5(4) of 
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the ECHR, where in case of unlawful detention an applicant must be released immediately, it 
is not possible to consider the requirements of independence and impartiality of courts or 
tribunals as a whole.1156 Already at the first instance of judicial procedure, the court or 
tribunal which provides speedy judicial review must meet the requirements of 
independence and impartiality and must be established by law. Thus, in relation to Article 
5(4) of the ECHR, the ECtHR states that the court which reviews the lawfulness of detention 
must be independent both from the executive and from the parties to the case.1157 Basic 
standards regarding these requirements deriving from the case law of the ECtHR are as 
follows: 
 
The concept of tribunal/court:  
A court or tribunal is characterised in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial 
function, that is to say, determining matters within its competence on the basis of rules of 
law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner.1158 The proceedings must 
provide the “determination by a tribunal of the matters in dispute” which is required by 
Article 6 (1) of the ECHR.1159 For the purposes of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, a “tribunal” need 
not be a court of law integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country 
concerned. It may be set up to deal with a specific subject matter, which can be 
appropriately administered outside the ordinary court system. To ensure compliance with 
Article 6 § 1, it is important to put in place both substantive and procedural guarantees.1160 
The fact that it performs many functions (administrative, regulatory, adjudicative, advisory 
and disciplinary) cannot in itself preclude an institution from being a “tribunal”.1161 The 
power to give a binding decision, which may not be altered by a non-judicial authority to the 
detriment of an individual party, is inherent in the very notion of a “tribunal”.1162   
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The tribunal/court established by law:  
A “tribunal” must always be “established by law”, as it would otherwise lack the legitimacy 
required in a democratic society to hear individual cases.1163 The phrase “established by law” 
covers not only the legal basis for the very existence of a “tribunal”, but also compliance by 
the tribunal with particular rules governing it.1164 The lawfulness of a court or tribunal must 
by definition also encompass its composition.1165 The practice of tacitly renewing terms of 
office of judges for an indefinite period after their statutory term of office had expired, and 
pending their reappointment, was held to be contrary to the requirement  of having a 
“tribunal established by law”.1166 The procedures governing the appointment of judges could 
not be relegated to the status of internal practice.1167  The term “law”, within the meaning of 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR, thus comprises not only legislation providing for the establishment 
and competence of judicial organs, but also any other provision of domestic law which, if 
breached, would render irregular the participation of one or more judges in the examination 
of a case.1168 This includes, in particular, provisions concerning the independence of the 
members of a “tribunal”, the length of their term of office, impartiality, and the existence of 
procedural safeguards.1169 The object of the term “established by law” in Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR is to ensure that the organisation of the judicial system does not depend on the 
discretion of the executive, but is regulated by law emanating from the Parliament.1170 
 
An independent tribunal/court:  
The term “independent” refers to independence vis-à-vis other branches of power (the 
executive and the legislative),1171 and also vis-à-vis the parties.1172 The independence of 
judges will be undermined where the executive intervenes in a case pending before the 
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courts with a view to influencing the outcome.1173 The fact that judges are appointed by the 
executive and are removable does not per se amount to a violation of Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR.1174 The appointment of judges by the executive is permissible provided that the 
appointees are free from influence or pressure, and that they do not receive any instructions 
when carrying out their adjudicatory role.1175 In determining whether a body can be 
considered to be independent, the ECtHR has had regard, inter alia, to the following criteria: 
the manner of appointment of its members;1176 the duration of their term of office;1177 
guarantees against outside pressure,1178 including safeguards against arbitrary exercise of 
court president’s duty to (re)assign cases to judges;1179 and the appearance of 
independence.1180 
 
An impartial tribunal/court:  
The term “impartiality” normally denotes the absence of prejudice or bias, and its existence 
may be tested in various ways.1181The existence of impartiality shall be determined by  
conducting the following tests:1182 
- a subjective test, where regard must be had to the personal conviction and behaviour of a 
particular judge, specifically  whether the judge held any personal prejudice or bias in a 
given case. The personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed unless there is proof to 
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the contrary;1183   
- an objective test, that is to say, by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among 
other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt 
in respect of its impartiality. 
 
According to the objective approach, apart from the judge’s conduct, an assessment of the 
existence of the ascertainable facts, which may raise doubts as to judge’s impartiality, should 
be carried out. When a body sitting as a bench is being assessed, it is important to 
determine whether, apart from the personal conduct of any of the members of that body, 
there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to the impartiality of the body itself. 
This implies that, in considering the impartiality of a particular judge1184or a body sitting as a 
bench1185 in a given case, the standpoint of the person concerned is considered as an 
important factor, but not a decisive one. What is decisive is whether this fear may be held to 
be objectively justified.1186 The objective test mostly concerns hierarchical or other links 
between the judge and other actors in the proceedings.1187 Therefore, it must be decided in 
each individual case whether the relationship in question is of such a nature and degree as 
to indicate a lack of impartiality on the part of the tribunal.1188 For the courts to inspire 
confidence in the public, which is indispensable, account must also be taken of questions of 
internal organisation. The existence of national procedures for ensuring impartiality, namely 
rules regulating the withdrawal of judges, is a relevant factor.1189 Such rules manifest the 
national legislature’s concern to remove all reasonable doubts as to the impartiality of a 
judge or court concerned and constitute an attempt to ensure impartiality by eliminating the 
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causes of such concerns.1190 
 
Standard 28. Right to “speedy” judicial review of the lawfulness of detention 
 
In the case Khudyakova v Russia (para. 99), fifty four (54) days had elapsed between the date 
of the submission of the application and the final decision of the appeal court. The 
Government did not plead that complex issues had been involved in the determination of 
the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention, nor  sought to justify the delay, other than to 
state that the review of the applicant’s detention could not have affected her situation as 
the detention had been authorised by the court and should thus be considered lawful. In the 
case M.D. c. Belgique, an applicant was detained under the Dublin Regulation. On 2 July 
2010, the applicant’s detention was extended, and on 12 July 2010, he filed an appeal to the 
first-instance tribunal.  On the 15 July 2010, the first-instance tribunal decided not to grant 
the applicant’s lawsuit. In the next stage of the procedure, on 28 July 2010, the Court of 
Appeal decided to order the immediate release of the applicant. The Government appealed 
against that judgment to the Cour de cassation. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(4) of 
the ECHR, because the applicant was not released based on the judgment of the Appeal 
Court, while the Cour de cassation, which abrogated the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
did not examine the substantial issues of the case, but only the procedural issues.1191 
 
The ECtHR also stated in the case of Shcherbina v Russia that where a decision to detain a 
person has been taken by a non-judicial authority, the standard of “speediness”  of judicial 
review under Article 5(4) of the ECHR comes closer to the standard of “promptness” under 
Article 5(3) of the ECHR1192 where a delay of sixteen (16) days in the judicial review of the 
applicant’s detention order issued by the prosecutor was found to be excessive. The 
standard of “speediness” of the proceedings before a court of appeal is less stringent.1193 
Where a court, in a procedure offering appropriate guarantees of due process, imposed the 
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original detention order, the ECtHR may tolerate longer periods of review in the proceedings 
before the second instance court.1194 
 
Standard 30. The “scope and intensity” of judicial review including procedural 
guarantees 
 
From the standpoint of EU law, the basic principle provides that “Member States shall 
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union 
law,”1195 but the characteristics of such a remedy “must be determined in a manner that is 
consistent with Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of 
effective judicial protection.”1196 The principle of effective judicial protection (along with the 
principle of equivalence) is a general principle of European law stemming from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of 
the ECHR.1197 The principle of equivalence provides that the rules applicable in an EU law 
dispute shall not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions. It 
requires that the national rule in question is applied without distinction, whether the alleged 
infringement is of EU or national law, and where the purpose and cause of action are 
similar.1198 In regards to the application of the principle of effectiveness, the CJEU held that 
when a question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application 
of EU law (practically) impossible or excessively difficult, the cases must be analysed with 
reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its conduct and its special features, 
viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. For those purposes, where 
appropriate, account must be taken of the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, 
such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the 
proper conduct of procedure.1199 “In the absence of EU rules concerning the procedural 
requirements relating to a detention-review measure, the Member States remain competent, 
in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to determine those requirements, 
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whilst at the same time ensuring that the fundamental rights are observed and that the 
provisions of EU law relating to that measure are fully effective.”1200 
 
The above-cited argumentation was a (general) starting point of the interpretation adopted 
by the CJEU in the case of Mahdi, which deals with judicial review of the extension of 
detention under the Return Directive. Nevertheless, in the same case, the CJEU in its 
reasoning under cited paragraphs 62-64, expanded upon this general principle of 
effectiveness and explained in more detail the meaning of the term “fully effective”. 
 
Standard 31. Restrictions on the right to a defence and/or equality of arms based 
on national (public) security, public policy or public order 
 
The right to access a court file (“equality of arms”/“right to defence”), as being part of the 
right under Article 4(5) of the ECHR or Article 47(1) and (2) of the Charter in conjunction 
with the right to judicial review under Article 15(2) of the Return Directive, may be restricted 
on grounds of national (public) security, public policy, or public order, in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter.1201  In the case of Kadi, the 
Grand Chamber of the CJEU stated: “according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form 
an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the CJEU ensures. For that 
purpose the CJEU draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the 
protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they 
are signatories. In that regard, the ECHR has a special significance /.../ Measures 
incompatible with respect for human rights are not acceptable in the Community.1202 In the 
case of Kadi, in the context of measures against terrorism, the right to a defence, the right to 
be heard and the right to effective judicial review were at stake. The CJEU decided “in such a 
case, it is none the less the task of the Community judicature to apply, in the course of the 
judicial review it carries out, techniques which accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate 
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security concerns about the nature and sources of information taken into account in the 
adoption of the act concerned and, on the other, the need to accord the individual a 
sufficient measure of procedural justice.”1203 In the case A. and others v the United Kingdom 
(para. 218), the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR formulated the following basic principle: “It 
was essential that as much  information about the allegations and evidence against each 
applicant was disclosed as was possible without compromising national security or the safety 
of others. Where full disclosure was not possible, Article 5(4) of the ECHR required that the 
difficulties this caused were counterbalanced in such a way that each applicant still had the 
possibility effectively to challenge the allegations against him.” This must be decided on a 
case-by-case basis. Where the evidence was to a large extent disclosed, and the open 
material played a predominant role in the determination, the applicant cannot be said to 
have been denied an opportunity to challenge effectively the reasonableness of the belief 
and suspicion of the Secretary of State. In other cases, even where all or most of the 
underlying evidence remained undisclosed, if the allegations contained in the open material 
were sufficiently specific, it should be made possible for the applicant to provide his/her 
representatives and the special advocate with information to refute them, if such 
information existed, without him/her having to know the details or sources of evidence, 
which formed the basis of the allegations.1204 
In the case of A and Others v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR stated that even in proceedings 
under Article 6 of the ECtHR, concerning the determination of guilt on criminal charges, 
there may be restrictions on the right to a fully adversarial procedure where it is strictly 
necessary in the light of a strong countervailing public interest, such as national security, the 
need to keep secret police methods of investigation or the protection of the fundamental 
rights of another person. The conditions for a fair trial will not be fulfilled, unless any 
difficulties caused to the defendant by a limitation on his/her rights are sufficiently 
counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities.1205 Thus, while the 
right to a fair criminal trial under Article 6 includes the right to disclosure of all material 
evidence possessed by the prosecution (both for and against the accused), the ECtHR has 
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held that it might sometimes be necessary to withhold certain evidence from the defence on 
“public-interest” grounds.1206 
 
In cases of the lack of a definition of a particular term in EU law, when the decisions are 
made under the Return Directive in the context of the concept of the “risk of public policy”, 
the definition of the definition of this term must be determined by considering that term in 
its usual meaning in everyday language. Also the context in which that term occurs and the 
purposes of the rules, which it forms part of must be taken into account. When such a term 
appears in a provision, which constitutes derogation from a principle, the term must be read 
to allow a strict interpretation of the provision,1207 while a Member State should be able to 
prove that the person concerned “in fact constitutes such a risk.”1208 “While Member States 
essentially retain the freedom to determine the requirements of public policy in accordance 
with their national needs, which can vary from one Member State to another and from one 
era to another, the fact still remains that, in the EU context and particularly when relied upon 
as a justification for derogating from an obligation designed to ensure that the fundamental 
rights of third-country nationals are respected when they are removed from the EU, those 
requirements must be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined 
unilaterally by each Member state without any control by the institutions of the EU”.1209 
According to the general principles of EU law, decisions should be adopted on a case-by-case 
basis, and be based on objective criteria in order to ascertain whether the personal conduct 
of the third-country nationals concerned “poses a genuine and present risk to public policy”. 
The principle of proportionality must be observed throughout all the stages of the return 
procedure.1210 When a State relies on the general practice or on any other assumption in 
order to determine such a risk, without properly taking into account the individual’s personal 
conduct, and the risk which this conduct poses to public policy, a Member State fails to have 
regard to the requirements relating to an individual examination of the case concerned, and 
to the principle of proportionality. It follows that the fact that a third-country national is 
suspected, or has been criminally convicted, of an act punishable as a criminal offence under 
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national law, cannot in itself justify a finding that this individual poses a risk to public policy. 
In the event of a criminal conviction, however, a Member State may find that there is a risk 
to public policy even where that conviction has not become final and absolute, if that 
conviction taken together with other circumstances relating to the situation of the person 
concerned justifies such a finding. Moreover, a mere suspicion that a third-country national 
has committed an act punishable as a criminal offence under national law may, together 
with other factors relating to the case in question (including the nature and seriousness of 
that act, and the time which has elapsed since it was committed), may be used as a basis for 
a finding that he poses a risk to public policy.1211 
 
In the context of a decision refusing an EU citizen admission to a Member State, the CJEU 
stated that provisions of the Directive 2004/38 oblige Member States to lay down in 
domestic law the measures necessary to enable Union citizens and members of their 
families to have access to judicial, and where appropriate, administrative redress procedures 
to appeal against or seek review of any decision restricting their rights to move and reside 
freely in the Member States on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
In order to enable a person concerned to make effective use of the redress procedures, a 
competent authority is required, as the principle under Article 30(2) of Directive 2004/38 
provides, to inform the person precisely about the facts and circumstances on which the 
proposed measure is based in the administrative procedure, and in full of the public policy, 
public security or public health grounds on which the decision in question is based.1212 It is 
only by way of derogation that Article 30(2) of Directive 2004/83 permits the Member States 
to limit the information shared with the person concerned in the interests of State security. 
This provision must be interpreted strictly, but without depriving it of its effectiveness 
(Article 47 of the Charter). In this context, a question arises of whether and to what extent 
Article 30(2) and 31 of the Directive 2004/38 permit the grounds of a decision taken under 
Article 27 of the directive “not to be disclosed precisely and in full /…/. It should be taken into 
account that, whilst Article 52(1) of the Charter admittedly allows limitations on the exercise 
of the rights enshrined by the Charter, it nevertheless lays down that any limitations must in 
particular respect the essence of the fundamental right in question and requires, in addition, 
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that subject to the principle of proportionality, the limitation must be necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU.1213 According to the 
settled case law of the CJEU, “if the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter is 
to be effective, the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the 
decision taken in relation to him is based, either by reading the decision itself or by 
requesting and obtaining notification of those reasons, without prejudice to the power of the 
court with jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to provide that information /…/ so 
as to make it possible for him to defend his rights in the best possible conditions and to 
decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his applying to 
the court with jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position in which it may 
carry out the review of the lawfulness of the national decision in question. Admittedly, it may 
prove necessary, both in administrative proceedings and in judicial proceedings, not to 
disclose certain information to the person concerned, in particular in the light of overriding 
consideration connected with State security.”1214 In certain cases, disclosure of that evidence 
is liable to compromise State security in a direct and specific manner, in that it may, in 
particular, endanger the life, health or freedom of persons or reveal the methods of 
investigation specifically used by the national security authorities, and thus seriously 
impede, or even prevent, future performance of the task of those authorities.1215 By 
invoking reasons ofState security, the court of a Member State must have at its disposal, and 
apply, techniques and rules of procedural law which accommodate, on the one hand, 
legitimate State security considerations regarding the nature and sources of the information 
taken into account in the adoption of such a decision, and, on the other hand, the need to 
ensure sufficient compliance with the person’s procedural rights, such as the right to be 
heard and the adversarial principle.1216In the context of that judicial review, it is required 
that the Member States lay down rules enabling a court entrusted with the review of the 
decision’s legality to examine both the grounds and the related evidence on the basis of 
which the decision was taken. It is necessary for a court to be entrusted with verifying 
whether those reasons are precise and full disclosure of the grounds, on which the decision 
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in question is based and of the related evidence.1217Thus, the competent national authority 
has the task of proving, in accordance with the national procedural rules that state security 
would, in fact, be compromised by precise and full disclosure to the person concerned of the 
grounds which constitute the basis of a decision taken under Article 27 of Directive 2004/38, 
and of the related evidence. It follows that there is no presumption that the reason invoked 
by a national authority exists and is valid.1218If the court concludes that state security does 
not stand in the way of precise and full disclosure to the person concerned, it gives the 
competent national authority the opportunity to disclose the missing grounds and evidence 
to the person concerned. If that authority does not authorise their disclosure, the court 
proceeds to examine the legality of such a decision solely on the basis of the grounds and 
evidence which have been disclosed.1219 Any limitation of the right to effective judicial 
protection must be strictly necessary.1220 In particular, a person concerned must be 
informed, in any event, of the essence of the grounds on which a decision refusing entry, 
taken under Article 27 of Directive 2004/38, is based, as the necessary protection of State 
security may not have the effect of denying the person concerned his/her right to be heard 
and, therefore, of rendering his/her right of redress ineffective, as provided in Article 31 of 
that Directive.1221 
 
 
Standard 34. Derogation from obligations under Article 5(1) of the ECHR1222 
 
The concept of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” has a natural and 
customary meaning. Those words are sufficiently clear and they refer to an exceptional 
situation of crisis or emergency, which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat 
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to the organised life of the community, of which the state is composed. In the Greek case1223, 
the Commission held that, in order to justify a derogation, the emergency should be actual 
and imminent; that is should affect the whole nation to the extent that the continuance of 
the organised life of the community was threatened; and that the crisis or danger should be 
exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions permitted by the ECHR for the 
maintenance of public safety, health and order, were plainly inadequate. In the case Ireland 
v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR agreed that the Article 15 test was satisfied, since 
terrorism in Northern Ireland had for a number of years presented a particularly far-reaching 
and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the 
six counties of Northern Ireland and the lives of the inhabitants of that province. In the case 
of Aksoy, it was accepted that the Kurdish separatist violence had given rise to public 
emergency in Turkey.1224 The requirement of imminence should not be interpreted so 
narrowly as to require a State to wait for a disaster to strike before taking measures to deal 
with it.1225 Since the purpose of Article 15 is to permit States to take derogating measures to 
protect their populations from future risks, the existence of a threat to the life of the nation 
must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known at the time of 
the derogation.1226 The ECtHR’s case law has never explicitly incorporated a requirement of 
the temporary emergency, although the question of the proportionality of the response may 
be linked to the duration of the emergency.1227  In the past, the ECtHR has concluded that 
emergency situations have existed even though the institutions of a State did not appear to 
be imperilled, so that the existence of the institutions of the government or existence of civil 
society would be threatened.1228 
 
As regards the question of whether “the measures were strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation”, Article 15 of the ECHR allows the national authorities a wide margin of 
appreciation. However, in particular, where a derogating measure encroaches upon a 
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fundamental right under the ECHR, such as the right to liberty, the ECtHR should ascertain 
whether it was a genuine response to the emergency situation, fully justified by the special 
circumstances of the emergency, and that adequate safeguards were provided against 
abuse.1229 If the measures are found to be disproportionate to that threat and to be 
discriminatory in their effect, there is no need to go further and examine their application in 
the concrete case of each applicant.1230 
 
37.1. General conditions of detention in respect of EU law and protection against 
inhuman/degrading treatment and the protection of family life 
 
In the case Popov v France, the ECtHR has found a violation of the right to family life of 
applicants from Kazakhstan (parents and two children born in 2004 and 2007), because the 
applicants “did not present any risk of absconding that required their detention. Their 
confinement in a secure centre did not therefore appear justified by a pressing social need, 
especially as their compulsory residence in a hotel during the first phase of their 
administrative detention does not seem to have caused any problems. The ECtHR finds that 
there is no indication in the material transmitted by the Government that any alternative to 
detention was envisaged, whether a compulsory residence measure or, as decided by the 
Maine-et Loire prefecture, confinement in hotel accommodation. Neither does it appear that 
the authorities ever re-examined the possibility of confinement outside a detention centre 
during the period in question. Lastly, it does not appear from the facts of the case that the 
authorities took all the necessary steps to enforce the removal measure as quickly as possible 
and thus limit the time spent in detention. The applicants were held for fifteen days without 
any flight being arranged for them.”1231 
 
The ECtHR also found an interference with the right to respect for family life to be 
disproportionate: where parents and their four-year old child were detained together for 18 
days ( A.B.and Others v France).1232 where a mother and her two-year old child were 
                                                 
1229
Ibid. para 184. 
1230
Ibid. para 185. 
1231
Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012), paras 145-146. 
1232
A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), paras 144-156. 
Explanatory Note to the Basic Judicial Check-List 2 
 
247 
 
detained together for ten days (R.C. et V C. c. France);1233 and where parents and their 
fifteen-month old child were detained together for 4 or 9 days (R.K.and Others v France).1234 
For a case in which the detention of family members did not give rise to a violation of the 
right to respect for family life, see A. M. and Others v France.1235   
 
Standard 37.3. Conditions of detention: overcrowding, ventilation, access to light 
and natural air, quality of heating, health requirements, basic sanitary and hygiene 
requirements 
 
In S.D. v Greece, an asylum-seeker was confined to a prefabricated cabin for two months 
without being allowed to go outdoors, or to make a telephone call, and with no clean sheets 
and insufficient hygiene products. He was also detained for six days, in a confined space, 
with no possibility of taking a walk, no leisure area, sleeping on dirty mattresses, and with 
no free access to the toilet. The ECtHR found both periods of detention to be in breach of 
Article 3 of the ECHR.1236 In Tabesh v Greece, an asylum-seeker was detained for three 
months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no 
access to any recreational activities, and without access to proper meals.1237 In A.A. v 
Greece, an asylum-seeker was detained for three months in an overcrowded place in 
appalling conditions of hygiene and cleanliness, with no leisure or catering facilities, where a 
dilapidated state of repair of the sanitary facilities rendered them virtually unusable and 
where the detainees slept in extremely filthy and crowded conditions.1238 In the case MSS. v 
Belgium and Greece, the Grand Chamber reviewed immigration detention conditions in 
Greece, and found a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, as the applicant had been detained in 
a building next to the airport, where the sector for asylum-seekers was rarely unlocked. As a 
result the detainees had no access to the water fountain outside, and were obliged to drink 
water from the toilets. There were 145 detainees in the 110 m2 space in the sector for 
arrested persons. There was only 1 bed for 14 to 17 people in a number of cells with not 
enough mattresses, and a number of detainees were sleeping on the bare floor. There was 
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insufficient room for all the detainees to lie down and sleep at the same time; and because 
of the overcrowding, there was a lack of sufficient ventilation and the cells were unbearably 
hot. Detainees’ access to the toilets was severely restricted and they complained that the 
police would not let them out into the corridors. The police admitted that the detainees had 
to urinate in plastic bottles which they emptied when they were allowed to use the toilets. It 
was observed that in all sectors there was no soap or toilet paper, that sanitary and other 
facilities were dirty, with no doors, and no access to outdoor exercise. Against this 
background, the ECtHR found the relatively short periods of detention to be insignificant (4 
days and 1 week), especially when the particularly vulnerable position of the applicant 
(asylum-seeker) was taken into consideration. The applicant in MSS had been detained in 
Greece in 20091239. At that time, the poor detention conditions had been a persistent, long-
standing and well-documented problem (the Grand Chamber cited reports criticising 
detention conditions in Greece dating back as far as 2005). The Grand Chamber considered 
the issue of sudden arrival of a large group of migrants in the case Khalifia v Italy. The 
applicants in that case had fled from Tunisia during the “Arab Spring” in 2011. They 
complained both of their detention in a reception centre on the island of Lampedusa, and 
on board ships moored in Palermo harbour. In considering their detention conditions, the 
Court expressly accepted that during the relevant time, there existed a state of emergency in 
Lampedusa due to a wave of over 50,000 arrivals after the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya, 
which placed many obligations on the Italian authorities with regard to rescue, medical care, 
reception and maintenance of public order. 
 
The Grand Chamber took into consideration the fact that Italy had declared a state of 
humanitarian emergency on the island of Lampedusa and appealed for solidarity of EU 
Member States. The arrival en masse of North African migrants undoubtedly created 
organisational, logistical and structural difficulties for the Italian authorities in view of the 
combination of requirements to be met, as they had to rescue certain vessels at sea, to 
receive and accommodate individuals arriving on Italian soil, and to take care of those in 
particularly vulnerable situations. In this connection, the ECtHR observed that, according to 
the data supplied by the Government, some 3000 women and 3000 children arrived during 
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the period in question. The ECtHR could not criticise, in itself, the decision to concentrate 
the initial reception of the migrants on Lampedusa. As a result of its geographical position, 
where most rudimentary vessels would arrive, it was often necessary to carry out rescues at 
sea around the island in order to protect the life and health of the migrants. It was therefore 
not unreasonable, at the initial stage, to transfer the survivors from the Mediterranean to 
the closest reception facility. In addition to that general situation, there were some specific 
problems, like a revolt among the migrants, protest marches through the island's streets, 
clashes between the local community and a group of aliens threatening to explode gas 
canisters, self-harm and vandalism. While constraints inherent in such crises cannot, in 
themselves, be used to justify a breach of Article 3, the ECtHR was of the view that it would 
certainly be artificial to examine the facts of the case without considering the general 
context in which those facts arose.1240 In regard to detention in the Contrada Imbriacola 
CSPA, the ECtHR took into account several factors, and, among them, the fact that migrants 
could move around freely within the confines of the facility, communicate by telephone with 
the outside world, make purchases and contact representatives of humanitarian 
organisations and lawyers. Even though the number of square metres per person in the 
centre’s rooms was not established, the ECtHR found that the freedom of movement 
enjoyed by the applicants in the CSPA must have alleviated in part, or even to a significant 
extent, the constraints caused by the fact that the centre’s maximum capacity was exceeded. 
The applicants were not asylum-seekers and therefore were not inherently vulnerable , and 
did not claim to have endured traumatic experiences in their country of origin. They 
belonged neither to the category of elderly persons, nor that of minors. At the time of the 
events they were aged between 23 and 28 and did not claim to be suffering from any 
particular medical condition, nor did they complain of any lack of medical care in the centre. 
The applicants did not claim that they had been deliberately ill-treated by the authorities in 
the centre, that the food or water had been insufficient or that the climate at the time had 
affected them negatively when they had to sleep outside.1241 In regards to the conditions on 
the ships Vincent and Audace, the ECtHR also found no violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.1242 
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Standard 37.5. Minors 
 
In Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium the ECtHR considered the detention of a mother 
and four children (asylum-seekers) in the same detention centre as the unaccompanied five-
year old applicant in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga. In Muskhadzhiyeva and 
Others the ECtHR took into account the children’s ages (they were 7 months, 3 and a half, 5 
and 7 years old at the relevant time), the fact that they were found to be suffering from 
psychological problems and the fact that they were detained for more than 1 month with 
their mother in a centre which was not adjusted to reception of children. The court 
therefore accepted that detention conditions had violated the children’s rights under Article 
3 of the ECHR. . In the case of Kanagaratnam and Others v Belgium, the children were also 
detained with their mother. They did not have specific health concerns and they were older 
than the children in Muskhadzhiyeva and Others. Nevertheless, the ECtHR took into account 
a traumatic situation they had experienced in the past and the fact that they were detained 
for a longer period (4 months). The ECtHR found a violation of the children’s rights under 
Article 3 of the ECHR.1243 
 
In Popov v France, the ECtHR reviewed a 15-day detention of two infants (3-year, and five- 
month old asylum-seekers). During this period, they were detained with their parents at a 
centre authorised to receive families. In finding a violation of Article 3, the ECtHR noted that 
although the authorities had been careful to separate families from other detainees, the 
facilities available in the “families” area of the centre were nevertheless ill-adapted to the 
presence of children; there were no beds adapted for children, and adult beds had pointed 
metal corners; there were no activities for children; there was a very basic play area on a 
small piece of carpet; a concreted courtyard of 20 m2 with a view of the sky through a wire 
netting; there was a tight grill over the bedroom windows obscuring the view outside; and 
there were automatically closing bedroom doors with consequent danger for children.1244 
The ECtHR had regard to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
provided in Article 37 that “[e]very child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity 
and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into 
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account the needs of persons of his or her age”.1245 It accepted that confinement in 
conditions such as explained in detail in that judgment caused great emotional and mental 
suffering to minors, and that the abnormal living conditions imposed on very small children 
exceeded the threshold of seriousness for the purposes of Article 3 of the ECHR.1246 
However, as in the cases Muskhadzhiyeva and others v Belgium,1247 A.M. et autres c. 
France,1248 R.K. et autres c. France,1249 R.M. et autres c. France, in the case of Popov v 
France,1250 1251the ECtHR refused to find additional violation of Article 3 in respect of the 
parents. 
 
In the case of A. B. et autres v France, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in 
respect of a four-year old child detained together with his parents for 18 days in the centre 
Toulouse-Cornebarrieu, where he was exposed to extreme and constant noise from the 
nearby airport.  In the case of A. M. et autres c. France, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 
3 of the ECHR in respect of two children aged 2 and a half and 4 months who were detained 
together with their mother for 8 hours in the centre Metz-Queuleu, where conditions were 
not suitable for young children.1252 
 
Standard 37.6. Unaccompanied minors 
 
In Rahimi v Greece, an applicant was a fifteen-year old unaccompanied minor (asylum 
seeker) from Afghanistan, who was placed in a detention centre for a couple of days before 
being housed in a hostel. Although the ECtHR could not state with certainty whether he was 
placed in a detention centre with adults, it found that the conditions in the centre were in 
general so bad as to undermine the very meaning of human dignity. As the applicant was 
both an unaccompanied minor and an illegal alien, he had been extremely vulnerable and it 
had therefore been dependent on the contracting State to protect and care for him by taking 
                                                 
1245
Ibid. para  90. 
1246
Ibid. paras 101-103.  
1247
Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium App no 41442/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2010) paras 64-66. 
1248
A.M. and Others v France App no 24587/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), paras 79-97. 
1249
R.K. and Others v France, App no 68264/14 (ECtHR 12 July 2016). 
1250
Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and  39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012) paras 104-105. 
1251
R.M. and Others v France App no 33201/11 (ECtHR 12 July 2016) paras 71-76. 
1252
A.M. and Others v France App no 24587/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), paras 44-53. 
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appropriate measures in the light of its positive obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR.1253 
 
In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium a five-year old child (asylum seeker) 
from DRC had been detained alone for nearly two months in a transit centre for adults. In 
finding a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, the ECtHR had regard to the child’s extreme 
vulnerability on account of her age and the fact that she was alone in a foreign country. In 
finding a violation of her rights under Article 3, the ECtHR had regard to the fact that no one 
had been assigned to look after her; no measures were taken to ensure that she received 
proper counselling and educational assistance from qualified personnel; the place of 
detention was not adapted to her needs; and there was a legal void in respect of 
unaccompanied foreign minors. In respect of the last point, the ECtHR noted that there was 
virtually no possibility of accommodating a child such as the applicant in more suitable 
conditions (existing detention centres were not adapted to afford adequate protection to 
minors), and the domestic courts could only consider the lawfulness of her detention and 
not its appropriateness. The child had received legal assistance, had daily telephone contact 
with her mother or uncle, and staff and residents at the centre did their best for her. 
However, the ECtHR found that this “uncoordinated attention” could not be regarded as 
sufficient to meet all the needs of a five-year-old child.1254 
 
Standard 37.7. Ill-health and special medical conditions 
 
In the case Z v A Government Department and the Board of management of a community 
school, the CJEU stated that following the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities by the EU, the concept of “disability” within the meaning of the 
Framework Directive (2000/78)1255 had to be understood as referring to a “limitation which 
results in particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which in 
interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person 
concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers.” The provisions of that 
Convention, however, are not unconditional and sufficiently precise as regards their content; 
                                                 
1253
Rahimi v Greece App no 8687/08 (ECtHR 5 April 2011). 
1254
Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 October 2006). 
1255
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303. 
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they are “programmatic” and therefore do not have direct effect. The validity of the 
directive cannot be assessed in the light of the UN Convention.1256 
 
In the case Mahmundi v Greece, one of the applicants had been detained pending her 
deportation while she was heavily pregnant. The ECtHR was critical of the fact that, 
according to a report on detention conditions, several pregnant women, in the last month of 
pregnancy, had been held in inhumane conditions in overcrowded cells. The report noted 
that in addition to the suffering caused by the emotional and psychological impact of 
detention, these women were often not examined by a doctor. The fact of not knowing 
where they were going to give birth, and what would happen to them and their children, 
increased their anxiety. However, although the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3, it based 
its decision on a combination of factors, including poor detention conditions in general. 
Likewise, in Aden Ahmed v Malta, the ECtHR found violation of Article 3 in a case concerning 
the detention of a pregnant woman who miscarried in detention. In finding a violation, the 
ECtHR found “disconcerting” the lack of female staff in the centre. It confirmed that this 
must have caused a degree of discomfort to the female detainees, particularly the applicant, 
who suffered from specific medical conditions related to her miscarriage. 
 
The applicant in Asalya v Turkey was paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair. He was 
detained (pending his deportation) for seven days in a regular detention facility, which was 
not adapted for wheelchair users. No special arrangements were made to alleviate the 
subsequent hardship. As a consequence, the applicant experienced serious difficulties in 
meeting his most basic needs, such as using the toilet. He was dependent entirely on the 
good will of the police officers to assist him. In finding violation of Article 3, the ECtHR 
reiterated that where authorities decide to place and keep a disabled person in detention, 
they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to the 
special needs resulting from his/her disability.1257 
 
                                                 
1256
C-363/12, Z v A Government Department and the Board of management of a community school (Grand 
Chamber) EU:C:2014:159 paras 88 and 90. 
1257
See: Price v United Kingdom App no 33394/96 (ECtHR 12 September 2000), para 30; Farbtuhs v Latvia App 
no 4672/02 (ECtHR 2 December 2004), para 56, Jasinskis v Latvia App no 45744/08 (21 December 2010), 
para 59, and Z.H. v Hungary App no 28973/11 (ECtHR 8 November 2012), para 29.  
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In Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v Belgium1258, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 where an HIV-
positive woman was detained while being subject to the removal procedure. The authorities 
were aware of her condition and there was evidence that her state of health  had 
deteriorated, and the infection had progressed while she was in detention.  However, a 
number of weeks passed before she was examined by medical specialists, and after 
treatment was eventually prescribed it was not administered until one week later. 
Accordingly, the ECtHR found that in failing to take at an earlier stage all the measures that 
could reasonably have been expected of them to protect the applicant’s health and prevent 
a worsening of her condition, the authorities had not acted with the requisite diligence. That 
situation had impaired the applicant’s dignity, and, combined with the distress caused by the 
prospect of being deported, had subjected her to particularly acute hardship causing 
suffering beyond that inevitably associated with detention and with her condition. It had, 
therefore, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. 
 
The ECtHR has consistently held that detained persons with mental health problems should 
be detained in places appropriate to their pathology, and be provided with the necessary 
treatment. For example, the ECtHR has found a violation of Article 3 where an applicant with 
a severe mental illness was placed in a normal prison and treated the same way as other 
inmates.1259 It has also recognised that persons with mental health problems might be more 
vulnerable within the detention regime, and, therefore, the conditions of detention might be 
more likely to undermine the detainee’s human dignity and arouse in him or her feelings of 
humiliation and debasement.1260 However, in order to find a violation of Article 3 the Court 
will have to ascertain that the conditions of detention caused the deterioration in the 
applicant’s mental health.1261 
 
In cases where detained persons committed suicide, the ECtHR found a breach of the 
                                                 
1258
Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v Belgium App no10486/10 (ECtHR 20 December 2011). 
1259
Dybeku v Albania  App no 41153/06 (ECtHR 18 December 2007) ; Musial v Poland  App no 24557/94 (ECtHR 
25 March 1999).  
1260
See: Romanov v Russia App no 41461/02 (ECtHR 24 July 2008) in respect of overcrowding; see also 
Kucheruk v Ukraine  App no 2570/04 (ECtHR 6 September 2007) in respect of handcuffing and solitary 
confinement. 
1261
See: Novak v Croatia  App no 8883/04 (ECtHR 14 June 2007). 
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positive obligation under Article 2 whenever the authorities were aware of their suicidal 
tendencies and failed to either provide adequate treatment or adequate 
monitoring/supervision.1262 
 
In the case of Keenan v the United Kingdom, which does not refer to detention of asylum 
seekers or irregular migrants, the ECtHR stated that, in the case of mentally ill persons, the 
assessment of whether the treatment or punishment concerned is incompatible with the 
standards of Article 3 has to take into consideration their vulnerability and their inability (in 
some cases) to complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any 
particular treatment. Treatment of mentally-ill persons may be incompatible with the 
standards imposed by Article 3 on the protection of fundamental human dignity, even 
though a person may not be able or capable of pointing to any specific ill-effects. In this 
case, the ECtHR was struck by the lack of medical notes concerning the applicant, who was 
at an identifiable suicide risk, and was suffering from additional stresses, that could be 
expected from the segregation and, later, disciplinary punishment. The ECtHR ascertained an 
inadequate concern to maintain full and detailed records of his mental state and 
ineffectiveness of any monitoring or supervision process.1263 
 
 
Standard 37.8. Elderly 
 
In Contrada (No. 2) v Italy1264, the ECtHR considered the detention of an 82-year old man, 
who suffered from a number of serious and complex medical disorders. As it found that his 
state of health was incompatible with the prison regime to which he was subjected, it 
accepted that his continued detention had been incompatible with the prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. It appears that in such cases 
the state of health of a detained person is a relevant factor. In Haidn v Germany1265 (para. 
                                                 
1262
Renolde v France App no 5608/05 (ECtHR 16 October 2008); Jasinska v Poland App no 28326/05 (ECtHR 1 
June 2010); Ketreb v France 38447/09 (ECtHR 19 July 2012). 
1263
Keenan v United Kingdom App no 27229/95 (ECtHR 3 April 2011), paras 111, 113, 114 and 116. As regards 
the monitoring requirements in case of drug addicted prisoner, see also: McGlinchey and Others v United 
Kingdom  App no 50390/99 (ECtHR 29 July 2003), paras 57-58. 
1264
Contrada (No 2) v Italy App no 7509/08 (ECtHR 11 February 2014). 
1265
Haidn v Germany App no 6587/04 (ECtHR 13 January 2011). 
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108), the ECtHR found that the applicant's relatively advanced, but not particularly old age 
(70-years old), combined with his state of health, which cannot be considered as critical for 
detention purposes, did not as such attain a minimum level of severity so as to fall within 
the scope of Article 3 of the ECHR. 
 
Standard 37.9. Other vulnerable persons (female applicants, mothers, LGBT etc.) 
 
In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium, in addition to finding a violation of 
Article 3 in respect of the child, the ECtHR also found a violation of the Article 3 rights of the 
mother. In doing so, it noted that the only action the Belgian authorities took was to inform 
her that her daughter had been detained and to provide her with a telephone number, 
under which she could be reached. The ECtHR, therefore, recognised that, as a mother, she 
would have suffered deep distress and anxiety as a result of her daughter’s detention, and 
this suffering reached the level of severity required for there to be a violation of Article 3 of 
the ECHR.1266 
 
In Muskhadziyeva and Others v Belgium, in respect of the children’s mother, the ECtHR 
found, that as she had not been separated from her children, and their constant presence 
would have somewhat appeased the distress and frustration she must have felt from  her 
inability to protect them against the conditions of detention. Any suffering or distress she 
would have experienced did not reach the level of severity required to constitute inhuman 
treatment. Similarly, in Popov v France the ECtHR also did not find a violation of Article 3 of 
the ECHR in respect of the parents.1267 
  
                                                 
1266
Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v  Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 October 2006), paras 41-
71. 
1267
The same type of judgment as regards the mother of detained children was handed down in the case of 
Kanagaratnam and Others v Belgium App no 15297/09  (ECtHR 13 December 2011), paras 70-72. 
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Section 6. Detention under the Recast Reception Directive and the ECHR: Basic 
Judicial Check-list 3 
 
Standard 1. Article 8(1)(2) and (3) of the Recast Reception Directive1268 
 
The Reception Directive is binding as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State, 
but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.1269 However, the 
text of Article 8(1)(2) and (3) of the Reception Directive is very similar to Article 28 of the 
Dublin III regulation,1270 which is directly applicable legal provision.1271 Furthermore, Article 
8(1)(2) and (3) is basically the same as Article 15 of the Return Directive in conjunction with 
Article 3(7) and 7(3) of the Return Directive, which according to the interpretation of the 
CJEU has a direct effect.1272 However, grounds for detention are to be laid down in national 
law1273 and rules on alternatives to detention should be regulated in national law, too.1274 In 
that regard the CJEU recalls that, “when a directive allows the Member States discretion to 
define transposition measures adapted to the various situations possible, they must, when 
implementing those measures, not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent 
with the directive in question, but also ensure that they do not rely on an interpretation of 
the directive that would be in conflict with the fundamental rights or with the other general 
principles of EU law.”1275 
 
In the judgment in the case of J.N., where the CJEU developed an interpretation of the 
relevant provisions on detention of asylum seeker under the Reception Directive, the CJEU 
                                                 
1268
Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) (Official Journal of the EU, L 
180, 29. 6. 2013; hereinafter: the Recast Reception Directive). 
1269
Article 288(3) of the TFEU, Article 31 of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1270
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast), Official Journal of the EU, L 180, 29. 6. 2013; hereinafter the Dublin III Regulation. 
1271
See standard no 1 of the Check-list no 1 (section 4 of the Statement). 
1272
See the first paragraph of standard no 1 of the Check-list no 2 (section 5 of the Statement). 
1273
Second sub-paragraph of Article 8(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1274
Article 8(4) of the Recast Reception Directive; C-601/15 PPU, J.N.  (Grand Chamber), EU:C:2016:8415 
February 2016, para 61. 
1275
Ibid. para 60. 
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confirms that “Article 8(3) of Reception Directive must be undertaken solely in the light of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter”1276 and that “any EU measure must be 
interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity and in conformity 
with primary law as a whole and, in particular, with the provisions of the Charter.”1277 
 
Recital 10 of the Reception Directive states that: “With respect to the treatment of persons 
falling within the scope of this Directive, Member States are bound by obligations under 
instruments of international law, which they are party.”  Taking into account Article 78 of the 
TFEU and recitals 3 and 15 of the Recast Reception Directive the first relevant “instrument of 
international law” is the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which in Article 
31(2) regulates restrictions in movements of refugees.1278 
 
Recital 9 of the Recast Reception Directive states that “in applying this directive, Member 
States should seek to ensure full compliance with the principle of the best interests of the 
child and family unity, in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU,1279 
the 1989 UN Convention on the Right of the Child and the ECHR respectively.“ Article 6 of the 
Charter corresponds to Article 5 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the ECHR),1280 while Article 45(2) of the Charter”1281 
may be considered in the light of Article 2(1) of Protocol 4 to the ECHR. 
 
Standard 2. Definition of detention 
 
Article 31(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees uses the expression 
                                                 
1276
Ibid. para 46. 
1277
Ibid. para 48. 
1278
Recital 3 of the Recast Reception Directive uses the term “full and inclusive” application of the Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, while recital 15 explicitly states that detention should be 
applied in accordance with Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. See also paragraph 3 in the section 3 of 
this Statement. 
1279
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/ 02; hereinafter the Charter. 
1280
In the J.N. case, the CJEU established that rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter correspond to those 
guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR (C-601/15 PPU, J.N. (Grand Chamber) EU:C:2016:84, para 47. 
1281
Article 45 of the Charter states that freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance 
with the Treaties, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State. 
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“restrictions on movements of refugees”. Unlike Dublin III Regulation, the Recast Reception 
Directive  uses the specific terminology of “deprivation of freedom of movement”.1282 
However, the CJEU in the case of Al Chodor states that Articles 2(n) and 28(2) of the Dublin 
III Regulation provide for limitation on the exercise of the “fundamental right to liberty” 
enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter and that for the purpose of interpreting Article 6 of the 
Charter account must be taken of Article 5 of the ECHR as the “minimum threshold of 
protection.”1283 The CJEU further adds that detention of applicants constitutes a “serious 
interference” with applicant's right to liberty.1284 In the case of J.N., too, the CJEU examines a 
validity of detention under the Recast Reception Directive in the light of the provision on the 
right to liberty from Article 6 of the Charter and not in the light of the right to freedom of 
movement from Article 45(2) of the Charter. 
 
Despite this general position of the CJEU and Article 2(h) of the Recast Reception Directive it 
is worth noting that under the ECHR, a distinction between the right to liberty of movement 
under Article 2(1) of Protocol 4 to the ECHR and the right to liberty and security of person 
under Article 5 of the ECHR, leading to application of different procedural safeguards under 
the ECHR,  can be explained by the test established by the ECtHR, which says that “to 
determine whether someone has been deprived of his liberty /.../ the starting-point must be 
his concrete situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the 
type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The 
difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is merely one of degree or 
intensity, and not one of nature or substance /.../. The mere fact that it is possible for asylum 
seekers to leave voluntarily the country where they wish to take refuge cannot exclude a 
restriction on liberty /.../.”1285   
                                                 
1282
“Detention means confinement of an applicant by a Member State within a particular place, where the 
applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement” (Article 2(h) of the Recast Reception Directive). 
1283
C-528/15 Al Chodor EU:C:2017:213, paras 36-37. 
1284
Ibid. para 40. 
1285
Amuur v France (1996) App no 19776/92 (ECtHR 25 June 1996), paras 42 and 48; See also: Rantsev v Cyprus 
and Russia App no 25965/04 (ECtHR 7 January 2010), para 314; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App no 
367/60/06 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012), para 115; Medvedyev and Others v France (Grand Chamber) App no 
3394/03 (ECtHR 29 March 2010), para 73; Creangă v Romania (Grand Chamber) App no 29226/03 (ECtHR 
23 Feb 2012), para 91; Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 
2016), para 64. 
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The notion of deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the ECHR comprises 
not only the objective element of a person’s confinement in a particular restricted space for 
a non-negligible length of time, but also, as an additional subjective element, the question of 
whether he has validly consented to the confinement in question.1286 However, the ECtHR 
also decided that the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to 
lose the benefit of  protection for the single reason that he/she may have given 
himself/herself up to be taken into detention, especially when that person is legally 
incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action.1287 Thus, “[d]etention 
may violate Article 5 of the ECHR even though the person concerned has agreed to it.”1288 
Where the facts indicate a deprivation of liberty within Article 5(1) of the ECHR, a relatively 
short duration of the detention does not affect this conclusion.1289 For concrete examples of 
deprivation of liberty or restriction of freedom of movement in the case-law of the ECtHR 
and the CJEU, see standard no. 2. in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of this Statement. 
 
 
Standard 3. Special reception needs of vulnerable persons 
 
In order to effectively implement the “general principle” from Article 21 of the Recast 
Reception Directive on taking into account the special situation of vulnerable persons, 
Member States shall assess whether the applicant is someone with special reception 
needs.1290 Under Article 2(k) of the Recast Reception Directive applicant with special 
reception needs means a vulnerable person, in accordance with Article 21, who is in need of 
                                                 
1286
Storck v Germany App no 61603/00 (ECtHR 16 June 2006), para 74; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App 
no 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 117. 
1287
H.L. v United Kingdom, App no 45508/99 (ECtHR 5 October 2004), para 90; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand 
Chamber) App no 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 119. 
1288
Kasparov v Russia App no 53659/07 (ECtHR 11 October 2016), para 36. 
1289
Ranstev v Cyprus and Russia  App no 25965/04 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right 
to Liberty and Security (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014), pp. 5-6/points 7, 9, 12.  
Since measures of the Member States on detention under the Recast Reception Directive in most cases 
interfere with the right to personal liberty, this check-list further refers to standards and rules in relation to 
Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 6 of the Charter. 
1290
For more on this principle, see various standards under point 33 of this Check-list. 
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special guarantees in order to benefit from the rights and comply with the obligations 
provided for in this Directive. That assessment shall be initiated “within a reasonable period 
of time” after an application for international protection is made and may be integrated into 
existing national procedures, but does not need to take the form of an administrative 
procedure.1291 However, “reasonable period of time” could mean as soon as possible and 
without delay if age assessment is at stake and asylum seeker is detained.1292 Member States 
shall provide for appropriate monitoring of the situation of persons with special needs 
throughout the duration of the asylum procedure.1293 Member States shall ensure that those 
special reception needs are also addressed, if they become apparent at a later stage in the 
asylum procedure.1294 
 
Standard 4. Persons who can be subject to detention under Recast Reception 
Directive 
 
The Recast Reception Directive shall apply to all third-country nationals and stateless 
persons who make an application for international protection on the territory, including at 
the border, in the territorial waters or in the transit zones of a Member State, as long as they 
are allowed to remain on the territory as applicants, as well as to family members, of they 
are covered by such application for international protection according to national law.1295 An 
applicant who “may be detained” under Recast Reception Directive,1296 means a third-
country national or a stateless person who has made an application for international 
                                                 
1291
Article 22(1) and (2) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1292
See, for example, Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), paras 148-150; 
Aarabi v Greece App no 39766/09, (ECtHR 2 April 2015), para 43-45. 
1293
The third sub-paragraph of Article 22(1) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1294
The second sub-paragraph of Article 22(1) of the Recast Reception Directive. As regards the importance of 
early and proper examination of whether a child is accompanied or unaccompanied, see Rahimi v Greece 
App no 8687/08 (ECtHR 5 July 2011), paras 63-73. As regards an appointment of child's representative, see 
also standard no 12 on best interests of a child. For the example of excessive delays in the procedure for 
vulnerability assessment, see: Abdi Mahamud v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), paras 132-
135. 
1295
Article 3 of the Recast Reception Directive. See also recital 8 of the Recast Reception Directive and 
definition of an applicant under the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (O J 180/60, 
29. 6. 2013, hereinafter: the Recast Procedure Directive) 
1296
Article 8(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
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protection in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken.1297 
Standard 5. Authorities who can order a detention 
 
Detention of applicants shall be ordered by judicial or administrative authorities.1298 
 
Standard 6. Permissible grounds for detention 
 
While it is not allowed to hold a person in detention for the sole reason he or she is an 
applicant in accordance with the Recast Procedure Directive,1299 the “exhaustive” list of 
possible grounds for detention of applicants, which are “self-standing”, need to be 
interpreted as “exceptional circumstances,”1300 is as follows: 
- in order to determine or verify his or her identity or nationality (Article 8(3)(a)), 
- in order to determine those elements on which the application for international protection 
is based which could not be obtained in the absence of detention, in particular when there is 
a risk of absconding of the applicant (Article 8(3)(b)),1301 
- in order to decide, in the context of a procedure, on the applicant's right to enter the 
territory (Article 8(3)(c)), 
- when her she is detained subject to the Return Directive and the Member State concerned 
can substantiate on the basis of objective criteria, including that he or she already had an 
opportunity to access the asylum procedure, that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that he or she is making the application for international protection merely in order to delay 
                                                 
1297
Article 2(b) of the Recast Reception Directive. See also mutatis mutandis the first paragraph of standard no 
4 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1. As regards “applicants” who may be detained in accordance with 
Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation (Article 8(3)(f)), see standard no 4 in Section 4 of the Statement 
(Check-list no 1).  
1298
Article 9(2) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1299
Article 8(1) and recital 15 of the Recast Reception Directive and Article 26(1) of the Recast Procedure 
Directive. This rule also be considered as a reflection of the right to non-discrimination from Article 21 of 
the Charter which prohibits any discrimination based on any ground such as sex race, colour, ethnic or 
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, birth, political or any other opinion, membership 
of national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation; within the scope of application of 
the Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited, too. 
1300
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, paras 52 and 59 and Recital 15 of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1301
For more on risk of absconding under Article 8(3)(b) of the Recast Reception Directive, see standard no 7 of 
this Check-list.  
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or frustrate the enforcement of the return decision (Article 8(3)(d)); 1302 
- when protection of national security or public order “so requires” (Article 8(3)(e))1303; 
detention based on this provision “is subject to compliance with a series of conditions whose 
aim is to create a strictly circumscribed framework in which such a measure may be 
used;”1304 it may be decided “in view of the requirement of necessity, if the applicant’s 
individual conduct represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat, affecting a 
fundamental interest of society or the internal or external security of the Member State 
concerned”;1305   
- in accordance with Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation (Article 8(3)(f)).1306 
 
Under recital 17 of the Recast Reception Directive, the grounds for detention set out in this 
directive are without prejudice to other grounds for detention including detention grounds 
within the framework of criminal proceedings, which are applicable under national law, 
unrelated to the third country national's or stateless person's application for international 
protection. 
 
The second sub-paragraph of Article 8(3) of the Recast Reception Directive states that the 
grounds for detention shall be laid down in national law.1307 
 
As regards permissible grounds for detention form the perspective of ECHR, Article 5(1) sub-
paragraphs (a) to (f) of the ECHR, too, contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds of 
deprivation of liberty. Thus, no deprivation of liberty is lawful unless it falls within one of 
                                                 
1302
For this kind of situations under case law of the CJEU and ECtHR, see the first paragraph of standard no 4 
(persons who can be subject to detention) in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1303
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 58. As regards legal notions of “national security” and “public 
order”, see standard no 27 of this Check-list. 
1304
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 57. 
1305
Ibid. para 67. A competent authority must previously determine on a case-by-case basis, whether the 
threat presented by the person concerned to national security or public order corresponds at least to the 
gravity of the interference with the liberty of those persons that such measures entail (Ibid. para 69).   
1306
See standard no 6 in Section 4 of the Statement (Check-list no 1). 
1307
As regards the requirement of the quality of national law, see standard no 9 of this Check-list. 
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those grounds.1308 Only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the 
aim of that provision which enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of 
the individual against arbitrary interference by the state with his or her right to liberty.1309 
Grounds for detention in the context of the Reception Directive could be based on ECHR 
linked either to Article 5(1)(f)1310 or to Article 5(1)(b)1311 of the ECHR or in case of detention 
when protection of national security or public order so requires under Article 5(1)(c) of the 
ECHR.1312 However, in the case of J.N. the CJEU decided that point (e) of the first sub-
paragraph of Article 8(3) of the Recast Reception Directive does not disregard the level of 
protection afforded by the second limb of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, because an eventual 
rejection of the asylum application may open the way to the enforcement of removal orders 
that have already been made and have been only interrupted because of the asylum 
procedure.1313 
 
Standard 7. Objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding 
 
Risk of absconding can be related to the grounds for detention not only under Article 8(3)(b), 
but also under Article 8(3)(d)(e) and(f) of the Recast Reception Directive. While Article 2(n) 
of the Dublin III Regulation and Article 3(7) of the Return Directive explicitly regulate an 
obligation of the Member States to define objective criteria for a risk of absconding in 
national law, in case of the Recast Reception Directive comparably the very same obligation 
can be grounded on the second sub-paragraph of Article 8(3), which states that “the grounds 
                                                 
1308
Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 January 2008), para 43; A and Others 
v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 163. See also standard 
no 18 of this Check-list. 
1309
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 88. 
1310
The lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country 
or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
1311
The lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to 
secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law. 
1312
A person may be arrested and detained on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or to 
prevent committing an offence within the meaning of Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR (Kasparov v Russia App no 
53659/07 (ECtHR 11 October 2016), para 54). 
1313
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, paras 77-80. For more on the questions as regards possible legal grounds 
for detention of asylum seekers from the perspective of Article 5(1)(f) and (b), see standard no 6 in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
Section 6. Detention under the Recast Reception Directive and the ECHR: Basic Judicial 
Check-list 3 
 
265 
 
for detention shall be laid down in national law.”1314 The difference between the risk of 
absconding under Dublin III Regulation and the risk of absconding under the Recast 
Reception Directive is that in case of detention under the Recast Reception Directive the risk 
of absconding need not to be a “significant”. 
 
Standard 8. Proof and burden of proof concerning determination of a ground for 
detention 
 
The burden of proof for determination of a ground for detention, including an eventual risk 
of absconding, is on the State (Articles 8(2)(3) and 9(1)(2)). For example, before ordering 
detention based on Article 8(3)(e) of the Recast Reception Directive the competent authority 
must previously determine on a case-by-case basis whether the threat that the person 
concerned represent to national security or public order corresponds at least to the gravity 
of the interference with the liberty of those persons that such measure entail.1315 
 
According to Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, risk of absconding means the existence 
of legitimate reasons to “believe” that a person “may” abscond. The nature of the 
assessment of the risk of absconding can be compared to the nature of the assessment of 
real risk that an asylum seeker would be tortured or ill-treated if returned or extradited to 
his/her country of origin. In both those cases, any such allegation always concerns an 
eventuality, “something which may or may not occur in the future. Consequently, such 
allegations cannot be proven in the same way as past events.1316 
 
Standard 9. Control of the quality of law on detention 
 
                                                 
1314
For more on this, see mutatis mutandis standard no 7 in the section 4 of the Statement (Check-list no 1) 
and standards nos 8 and 9 of this Check-list. 
1315
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 69. 
1316
Fozil Nazarov v Russia App no 74759/13 (ECtHR 20 April 2015), para 38. In his concurring opinion in the 
case of Saadi v Italy App no 37201/06 (ECtHR 28 February 2008), Judge Zupančič opined that “the cognitive 
approach to future events may be only a rational probabilistic assessment in the spectrum of experiment 
which moves from abstract probability to concrete probability. The correctness of that probabilistic 
assessment – one might use the word prognosis – critically depends on the nature of information (not 
evidence!) adduced in a particular situation.” 
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Article 5(1) of the ECHR requires that any deprivation of liberty must be “lawful”; it must 
conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law.1317 The law must satisfy the 
principle of legal certainty. It must be “sufficiently accessible and precise, in order to avoid all 
risk of arbitrariness”1318 It must also be foreseeable.1319 This was reiterated by the Grand 
Chamber in the case of Khlaifia and others v Italy, in which the ECtHR stated “where 
deprivation of liberty is concerned it is particularly important that the general principle of 
legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of 
liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its 
application, so that it meets the standard of lawfulness set by the ECHR, a standard which 
requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate 
advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail”.1320 The standards on the quality of law relate not only to 
clearly regulated grounds for detention, but also to time-limits for detention or for extending 
detention and for the existence of a legal remedy by which the lawfulness of detention may 
be challenged.1321 
 
Standard 10. Right to information and a personal interview before detention order 
is issued 
 
The Recast Reception Directive does not regulate specifically that an applicant has a right to 
information and/or to a personal interview before detention order is issued. The last 
sentence of recital 15 merely states that where an applicant “is held in detention” he or she 
should have effective access to the necessary procedural guarantees, such as judicial remedy 
before a national judicial authority.1322 However, as it is stated under the corresponding 
                                                 
1317
Amuur v France (1996) App no 19776/92 (ECtHR, 25 June 1996), para 50; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey 
App no 30471/08 (ECtHR 22 September 2009), para 130. 
1318
Amuur v France (1996) App no 19776/92 (ECtHR, 25 June 1996), para 50. 
1319
Nasrulloyev v Russia App no 656/06 11 (ECtHR October 2007), para 71; C-528/15 Al Chodor EU:C:2017:213, 
paras 38-40. 
1320
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 92. 
1321
For further details, see standard no 9 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1322
For further procedural guarantees of applicants who are already held in detention, see Article 10(5) of the 
Recast Reception Directive. The preliminary question in the case of J.N. (C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84) 
did not refer to the issue of the right to defence or to be heard before a detention order is issued. 
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standard no. 10 in the Check-lists no. 1 and under standard no. 13 in the Check-list no. 2, the 
right to information and to a personal interview is part of the general principle of EU law to 
be heard or to a defence. The right to a personal interview as a general principle of EU law 
needs to be secured before a detention order is issued if such an interview is indispensable 
for the effective fulfilment of other standards such as individual assessment, consideration 
of less coercive alternative measures to detention and the principle of proportionality.1323 
 
Standard 11. Requirement of individual assessment 
 
Member States may detain an applicant on the basis of an “individual assessment of each 
case”, when it proves necessary, of other less coercive alternative measures cannot be 
effectively applied.1324 In practice, the requirement of an individual assessment means that 
the mere fact that, for example, the person concerned has no identity documents, which 
may be regulated as an objective criterion for the risk of absconding, cannot, on its own, be 
a ground for detention or extending detention, since any assessment must be based on an 
individual examination of that person's case.1325 
 
Standard 12. Best interests of a child 
 
“The minor's best interests, as prescribed in Article 23(2) shall be a primary consideration for 
Member States.”1326 Minors shall be detained “only as a measure of last resort and after it 
having been established that other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied 
effectively. Unaccompanied minors shall be detained only in exceptional circumstances. Such 
detention shall be for the shortest period of time and all efforts shall be made to release the 
                                                 
1323
For further discussion on the right to be heard and to defence in relation to detention and for the 
consequences of the interference in this right, see mutatis mutandis standard no 10 in the Explanatory 
Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1324
Article 8(2) of the Recast Reception Directive; C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, paras 52, 61; see also 
mutatis mutandis: C-528/15 Al Chodor EU:C:2017:213, para 34; O.M. v. Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR 5 
July 2016), para 52. 
1325
See mutatis mutandis: C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, paras 70-74. 
1326
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(2) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
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detained minors and place them in accommodation suitable for minors.”1327 Unaccompanied 
minors shall be detained “only in exceptional circumstances” and all efforts shall be made to 
release the detained unaccompanied minor “as soon as possible”.1328 
 
However, in the MA, BT, DA case, which relates to interpretation of the Dublin III Regulation, 
the CJEU states that “although express mention of the best interests of the minor is made 
only in the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Dublin III Regulation, the effect of Article 24(2) 
of the Charter,1329 in conjunction with Article 51(1) of the Charter thereof, is that the child's 
best interests must also be a primary consideration in all decisions adopted by the Member 
States on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Dublin III Regulation”.1330 This 
means – taking into account also the fact that the CJEU refers to Article 24(2) of the Charter 
as being a right and not a principle1331 – the principle of the best interests of a child extends 
beyond the requirements of the best interests of a child, which are expressly mentioned or 
regulated in the Recast Reception Directive (for example, in Article 23 of the Recast 
Reception Directive). The best interests of the child extend to all sorts of decisions taken 
during the procedures carried out under the Recast Reception Directive and this includes 
detention. As regards unaccompanied children, the child's representative must be appointed 
“as soon as possible” and before any administrative proceedings are undertaken.1332  Under 
the case law of the ECtHR, where children are seeking asylum their extreme vulnerability is 
compounded. Such double vulnerability must take precedence over child's irregular 
status.1333 It derives both from the case-law on the detention of children1334 and from other 
                                                 
1327
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(2) and 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1328
Articles 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. As regards material conditions for detention of minors see 
standards nos. 33.5. and 33.6 of this Check-list. 
1329
Article 24(2) of the Charter states that “in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public 
authorities or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration”. 
1330
C-648/11 MA, BT, DA EU:C:2013:367, para 59. 
1331
Ibid. paras 57-58. 
1332
Article 25(1)(a) of the Recast Procedures Directive. 
1333
Mubilanzila, Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 October), para 55; Popov v 
France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012), para 91; Tarakhel v Switzerland App no 
29217/12 (ECtHR 4 November 2014), para 99; A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 
2016), para 110. 
1334
Rahimi v Greece App no 8687/08 (ECtHR 5 July 2011), paras 51-96; Mubilanzila, Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga 
v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 October), para 53; Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium App no 
41442/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2010), paras 61-62; Popov v France, 39472/07 and 39474/07, paras 92-103. 
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cases concerning children,1335 and requires that in all actions relating to children an in-depth 
examination of the child's best interests must be undertaken prior to a decision that will 
impact that child's life. This includes principle of proportionality and consideration of the 
effectiveness of less coercive and alternative measures to detention.1336 
 
Standard 13. Consideration of the effectiveness of less coercive alternative 
measures to detention 
 
Article 8(4) of the Recast Reception Directive regulates that Member States shall ensure that 
the rules concerning alternatives to detention, such as regular reporting to the authorities, 
the deposit of a financial guarantee, or an obligation to stay at an assigned place, are laid 
down in national law. The assessment whether a less coercive alternative measure cannot 
be effectively applied in a particular case is a specific element of the requirement of 
individual assessment and principle of proportionality, since the text of Article 8(2) of the 
Recast Reception Directive says “when it proves necessary and on the basis of an individual 
assessment of each case, Member States may detain an applicant, if other less coercive 
alternative measures cannot be applied effectively”.1337 For further issues related to 
consideration of the effectiveness and less coercive alternative measures to detention, see 
standard no. 13 and the last paragraph of standard no. 14 (proportionality and the necessity 
test) in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
 
Standard 14. Principle of proportionality and the necessity test 
 
The necessity test in cases of restrictions of “movements” of refugees is part of Article 31(2) 
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The first sentence of the recital 15 
of the Recast Reception Directive states that detention under this directive should be in 
accordance with Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. The second sentence of this recital 
                                                 
1335
Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland App no 41616/07 (6 July 2010), para 139. 
1336
Popov v France, para 119; A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), para 110. For 
further discussion on the best interest of a child, see standard no 12 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 
of the Statement and standards nos. 33.1, 33.5. and 33.6 of this Check-list. 
1337
See also: C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 61.  
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states that applicants may be detained only under very clearly defined exceptional 
circumstances laid down in this directive and subject to the principle of necessity and 
proportionality with regard to both to the manner and the purpose of such detention. 
Recital 20 of the Recast Reception Directive states that detention should be a measure of 
last resort and may only be applied after all non-custodial alternative measure to detention 
have been duly examined.1338  "When it proves necessary and on the basis of an individual 
assessment of each case, Member States may detain an applicant, if other less coercive 
measures cannot be applied effectively“.1339 The CJEU uses the term “strictly necessary”1340 
and mentions that recitals 15 and 20 and other paragraphs of Article 8 of the Recast 
Reception Directive place “significant limitations on the Member States' power to detain a 
person”.1341  
 
Under EU law Article 8(2) of the Recast Reception Directive is also an expression of the 
principle of proportionality from Article 52(1) of the Charter and the necessity test forms a 
part of that principle of proportionality. Article 52(1) of the Charter states that “any 
limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must be 
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union on the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others.”1342 Principle of proportionality requires, according to settled case-
law of the CJEU, that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of 
what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the 
disproportionate to the aims pursued.1343  
 
                                                 
1338
See also: C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 63 and standard no 13 (consideration of the effectiveness 
and less coercive measures to detention) in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. For the 
relevance of alternative measures for detention from the standpoint of case-law of the ECtHR, see the last 
paragraph of standard no 14 on proportionality and the necessity test in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 
1 of the Statement. 
1339
Article 8(2) of the Recast Reception Directive; C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 61. 
1340
Ibid. para 56. 
1341
Ibid. para 61. 
1342
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 50.  
1343
Ibid. para 54. 
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 In a case of detention under the Recast Reception Directive, the objective of the general 
interest recognised by the EU is to conduct effectively the procedure for international 
protection under the Recast Procedures Directive (Article 8(3)(a) and (b)), to conduct 
effectively the procedures under the Return Directive (Article 8(3)(d)), to protect national 
security or public order (Article 8(3)(e)) or to “secure transfer procedures in accordance” 
with the Dublin III Regulation (Article 8(3)(f)). As regards the principle of proportionality and 
the necessity test, the standards under the case-law of the ECtHR – if taken in conjunction 
with applicable EU law – are not less stringent.1344 
 
Standard 15. Length of detention and due diligence requirement 
 
An applicant shall be detained only for as short a period as possible and shall be kept in 
detention only for as long as the grounds set out in Article 8(3) are applicable. 
Administrative procedures relevant to the grounds for detention set out in Article 8(3) shall 
be executed with due diligence. Delays in administrative procedures that cannot be 
attributed to the applicant shall not justify a continuation of detention. 1345 The notion of 
“due diligence at least requires that Member States take concrete and meaningful steps to 
ensure that the time needed to verify the grounds for detention is as short as possible, and 
that there is a real prospect that such verification can be carried out successfully in the 
shortest possible time. Detention shall not exceed the time reasonably needed to complete 
the relevant procedures.”1346  
 
Standard 16. Right to be informed “promptly” about the reasons for detention after 
a detention order is issued 
 
According to Article 9(4) of the Recast Reception Directive detained applicants “shall be 
                                                 
1344
For more on this, see mutatis mutandis standard no 14 on proportionality and the necessity test in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1345
Article 9(1) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1346
Recital 16 of the Recast Reception Directive; see also; C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 78, where the 
CJEU cites the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of Nabil and Others v Hungary (para 29). Concerning the 
length of detention, see also standard no 25 on the right to judicial review of the continuing detention. In 
regards to the length of the detention from the standpoint of the case-law of the ECtHR, see standard no 
15 (on length of detention and due diligence) in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement.   
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immediately” informed – among other things – of the reasons for detention. Article 5(2) of 
the ECHR states that “everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language 
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest.” The requirement of “prompt 
information”  is to be given an autonomous meaning extending beyond the realm of criminal 
law measures.1347 The standards of “immediate” information under EU law and of “prompt” 
information under the case-law of the ECHR could slightly differ, because of a different 
obligatory content and form of the information that needs to be given to the applicants.1348 
Under the case-law of the ECtHR the requirement of “promptness” means that the 
“reasons” for detention need to be given to the applicant within a few hours of arrest.1349 
Where reasons were provided after 76 hours of detention,1350 after 4 days of detention1351 
or after 10 days of detention,1352 the Court found that they were not given promptly. If the 
applicant is incapable of receiving the information, the relevant details must be given to 
those persons who represent his interests such as a lawyer or a guardian.1353 
 
Standard 17. Right to be informed “adequately” about the reasons for detention 
and about procedures laid down in national law for challenging the detention order 
 
Based on EU secondary law, detained applicants must be informed immediately “in writing, 
in a language which they understand or are reasonably supposed to understand” not just 
about the reasons for detention, but also about “the procedures laid down in national law 
for challenging the detention order, as well as of the possibility to request free legal 
assistance and representation”.1354 
                                                 
1347
Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 81. 
1348
See standard no 17 of this Check-list. 
1349
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom App no 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (ECtHR 30 August 
1990), paras 41-42; M.A. v Cyprus App no 41872/10 (ECtHR 23 July 2013), para 228; Kerr v United Kingdom 
App no 40451/98 (ECtHR 7 December 1999). 
1350
Saadi v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 13229/03 (ECtHR 29 January 2008), paras 81-85. 
1351
Shamayev and Others v Georgia and Russia App no 36378/02 (ECtHR 12 October 2005), para 416; Khlaifia 
and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 120. 
1352
Rusu v Austria App no 34082/02 (ECtHR 2 October 2008), para 43. 
1353
X. v United Kingdom App no 7215/75 (ECtHR 5 November 1981), paras 42-43; see: European Court of 
Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right to Liberty and Security (Council of Europe/European Court of 
Human Rights, 2014), p. 22/point 116. 
1354
Article 9(4) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
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As regards the manner of communicating the reasons for arrest, the ECtHR states that “any 
person arrested must be told in simple, non-technical language that he can understand, the 
essential legal and factual grounds for his arrest, so as to be able, if he sees fit, to apply to a 
court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with Article 5(4) of the ECHR /.../.” This 
information “need[s] not be related in its entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment 
of arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the information conveyed were sufficient 
is to be assessed in each case according to its special features,”1355 but the information 
provided must be correct.1356  Information about the legal status of a migrant or about the 
possible removal measures that could be implemented cannot satisfy the need for 
information as to the legal basis for the migrant’s deprivation of liberty.1357 Moreover “a 
bare indication of the legal basis” for the arrest, taken on its own, is insufficient for the 
purposes of Article 5(2) of the ECHR.1358 In M.A. v Cyprus (para. 229), the ECtHR has 
accepted that (correct) information does not necessarily have to be given in writing. “In 
cases where detainees had not been informed of the reasons for their deprivation of liberty, 
the ECtHR has found that their right to appeal against their detention was deprived of all 
effective substance”.1359 
 
Standard 18. Written decision on detention (or its extension)1360 must be delivered 
to the applicant/legal representative and must contain reasons closely connected 
to the grounds of detention 
 
Detention of applicants shall be ordered in writing. The detention order shall state the 
                                                 
1355
Shamayev and Others v Georgia and Russia App no 36378/02 (ECtHR 12 October 2005), para 413; Khlaifia 
and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 115. 
1356
Rusu v Austria, 34082/02, 2. 10. 2008, para 42. 
1357
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 118. 
1358
European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right to Liberty and Security (Council of 
Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014), p. 22/point 122; Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United 
Kingdom App no 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (ECtHR 30 August 1990), para 41; Murray v United 
Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 14310/88 (ECtHR 28 October 1994),  para 76, Kortesis v Greece App no 
60593/10 (ECtHR 12 June 2012), paras 61-62. 
1359
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 132. For 
some examples of incorrect information about the reasons for detention, see standard no 17 in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1360
"Detention and extension of detention are similar in nature since both deprive the third-country national 
concerned of his liberty“ /.../ (C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, para 44). 
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reasons in fact and in law on which it is based.1361 Similarly, under ECHR de facto detention 
must be “incarnated by a formal decision of legal relevance, complete with reasoning.”1362 If 
the express – or even underlying – reason for detention is other than to prevent the 
detainee from effecting an unauthorised entry or to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
prescribed by law, it cannot be justified under Article 5(1)(f)1363 or Article 5(1)(b) of the 
ECHR. The detention will be arbitrary where there has been bad faith or deception.1364   
 
Standard 19. The obligation to keep records on detention cases 
 
A special requirement of Article 5(1) of the ECHR is the obligation to keep records of matters 
of detention. The ECtHR considers that the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a 
complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the 
ECHR and discloses the gravest violation of that provision.1365 The absence of a record of 
such information as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the 
reasons for detention and the name of the person effecting it must be seen as incompatible, 
inter alia, with the very purpose of Article 5 of the ECHR.1366 
 
Standard 20. Right to free legal assistance and representation 
 
“In cases of a judicial review of the detention order provided for in paragraph 3, Member 
States shall ensure that applicants have access to free legal assistance and representation. 
This shall include, at least, the preparation of the required procedural documents and 
participation in the hearing before the judicial authorities on behalf of the applicant. Free 
                                                 
1361
Article 9(2) of the Recast Reception Directive; C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 62. The obligation of 
the administration to give reasons for its decisions is a general principle of EU law (see: Article 41(2)(c) of 
the Charter); see also mutatis mutandis C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, paras 44, 52. 
1362
Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017), para 67. 
1363
See mutatis mutandis: Bozano v France App no 9990/82 (ECtHR 18 December 1986), para 60, Čonka v 
Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR 5 Feburary 2002), para 42; Khodorkovskiy v Russia App no 5829/04 
(ECtHR 31 May 2011), para 142, Azimov v Russia App no 67474/11 (ECtHR 18 April 2013), para 164. 
1364
Bozano v France App no 9990/82 (ECtHR 18 December 1986), para 55; Čonka v Belgium App no 51564/99 
(ECtHR 5 Feburary 2002), para 42. 
1365
El-Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Grand Chamber) App no 39630/09 (ECtHR 13 
December 2012), para 233; Kurt v Turkey App no 15/1997/799/1002 (ECtHR 25 May 1998), para 125. 
1366
Kasparov v Russia App no 53659/07 (ECtHR 11 October 2016), para 55. 
Section 6. Detention under the Recast Reception Directive and the ECHR: Basic Judicial 
Check-list 3 
 
275 
 
legal assistance and representation shall be provided by suitably qualified persons as 
admitted or permitted under national law whose interests do not conflict or could not 
potentially conflict with those of the applicant.”1367 Procedures for access to legal assistance 
and representation shall be laid down in national law.1368 These are mandatory provisions of 
EU law. The second sentence of Article 47(2) of the Charter states that “everyone shall have 
the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.” Article 47(3) of the Charter 
states that “legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far 
as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice”. Article 9(7) of the Recast 
Reception Directive is a non-mandatory provision and sets possible conditions or modalities 
that Member States may regulate regarding the right to free legal assistance and 
representation.  
 
From the standpoint of the case-law of the ECtHR, the ECHR “is intended to guarantee rights 
that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective.”1369 In the case of Čonka, the 
ECtHR held that the accessibility of a remedy implies, inter alia, that the circumstances 
voluntarily created by the authorities must be such as to afford applicants a realistic 
possibility of using the remedy.1370 In the context of detention proceedings, the ECtHR has 
held that the authorities are not obliged to provide free legal aid.1371 However, if the 
absence of legal aid raises concerns about the accessibility of a remedy, an issue may arise 
under Article 5(4) of the ECHR1372 (for example, when legal representation is required in the 
domestic context) or under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the ECHR.1373 
 
 
                                                 
1367
Article 9(6) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1368
Article 9(10) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1369
Čonka v Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR 5 Feburary 2002), para 46. 
1370
Ibid. para 46. 
1371
Lebedev v Russia, App no 4493/04 (ECtHR 25 October 2007), para 84; Susa Musa v Malta App 42337/12 (23 
July 2013), para 61. 
1372
Ibid. para 61; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey App no 30471/08 (ECtHR 22 September 2009), para 141. 
For further standards as regards free legal aid under EU law and the ECHR, see mutatis mutandis standard 
no 20 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1373
See, for example: Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), paras 66-67. 
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Standard 21. Other aspects of the practical and effective right to judicial review 
 
Apart from the issues of free legal aid and representation,1374 there may be certain other 
aspects of effective access to a court relevant in detention cases. The following guidance 
may be gleaned from the case-law of the ECtHR regarding general standards for practical 
and effective access to a court in civil disputes. The right of access to a court must be 
“practical and effective”.1375 For the right of access to be effective, an individual must “have 
a clear, practical opportunity to challenge an act that is an interference with his rights”.1376 
The rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied with in 
lodging an appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring a proper 
administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal 
certainty.1377 The rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from 
using an available remedy.1378 The practical and effective nature of this right may be 
impaired by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial 
capacity;1379 by issues relating to time-limits;1380 and by the existence of procedural bars 
preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court.1381 The right of access to a 
                                                 
1374
For the examples of L.M. And Others v Russia App nos 40081/14, 40088/14 and 40127/14 (ECtHR 10 
October 2015) and I. M. v France App no 9152/09 (ECtHR 2 May 2012), see standard no 21 in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1375
Bellet v France App no 23805/94 (4 December 1995), para 38. 
1376
Ibid. para 36. See also: Stoichkov v Bulgaria App no 9808/02 (ECtHR 24 March 2005), para 66; Vachev v 
Bulgaria App no 42987/98 (ECtHR 8 July 2004), para 71; Ismoilov and others v Russia, App no 2947/06 
(ECtHR 24 April 2008, para 145; Nunes Dias v Portugal App nos 69829/01; 2672/03 (ECtHR 10 March 2003).  
1377
Cañete de Goñi v Spain App no 55782/00 (ECtHR 15 October 2002), para 36. 
1378
Miragall Escolano and Others v Spain App nos. 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 
41400/98, 41446/98, 41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98 (ECtHR 25 January 2000); Zvolsky and Zvolska v 
Czech Republic, App no 46129/99 (ECtHR 12 November 2002), para 51. 
1379
Aït-Mouhoub v France App no 22924/93 (ECtHR 28 October 1998),  paras 57-58; Garcia Manibardo v Spain, 
App no 38695/97 (ECtHR 15 February 2000), paras 38-45; Kreuz v Poland (no1), App no 28249/95 (ECtHR 19 
June 2001), paras 60-67; Podbielski and PPU PolPure v Poland App no 39199/98 (ECtHR 26 July 2005), paras 
65-66; Weissman and others v Romania App no 63945/00 (ECtHR 24 May 2006), para 42. 
1380
Melnyk v Ukraine App no 23436/03 (28 February 2006), para 26; Yagtzilar and Others v Greece App no 
41727/98 (6 December 2001), para 27. 
1381
Perez de Rada Cavanilles v Spain App no 28090/95 (ECtHR 28 October 1998),  para 49; Miragall Escolano 
And Others v Spain App no 38366/97 (ECtHR 25 January 2000), para 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras Attee v 
Greece, App no 39442/98 (ECtHR 16 February  2001), para 20; Beles and Others v Czech Republic App no 
47273/99 (ECtHR 12 November 2002), para 50; RTBF v Belgium App no 50084/06 (ECtHR 29 March 2011), 
paras 71, 72, 74; Annoni di Gussola and Others v France App no 31819/96, 33293/96 (ECtHR 14 November 
2000), para 56; The Holy Monasteries v Greece App nos 13092/87, 13984/88 (ECtHR 9 December 1994), 
para 83; Philis v Greece App nos 12750/87, 13780/88, 14003/88 (ECtHR 27 August 1981), para 65. 
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court is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations permitted by implication.1382 The 
limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way 
or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. The limitation must 
pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.1383 
Standard 22. Automatic judicial review or detainee’s right to initiate judicial review 
of the lawfulness of detention (including conditions of detention1384) 
 
Under secondary EU law, a judicial review of the lawfulness of detention (including 
conditions of detention) may be provided ex officio from the beginning of detention or/and 
at the request of the applicant after the launch of the relevant proceedings.1385 However, 
according to Article 5(4) of the ECHR, everyone who is deprived of his/her liberty by arrest or 
detention “shall be entitled to take proceedings” by which the lawfulness of his/her 
detention shall be decided. 1386 A difference between EU law and the ECHR could imply that 
the ECtHR may find a breach of Article 5(4) of the ECHR, because proceedings could only be 
initiated ex officio, for example by the prosecutor, meaning that the applicant himself had no 
right to bring proceedings.1387 Article 5(4) is the lex specialis which cannot be bypassed by 
relying on the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR read together with Article 
5. However, where the complaint concerns the conditions of detention, Article 13 can be 
invoked together with Article 3. However, even if the ECtHR does not find a violation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR, it may find a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the 
                                                 
1382
Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR 21 February 1975), para 38; Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand 
Chamber) App no 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 230. 
1383
Ashingdane v United Kingdom App no 8225/78 (ECtHR 28 May 1985), para 57; Fayed v United Kingdom App 
no 17101/90 (ECtHR 21 September 1994), para 65; Markovic and Others v Italy App no 1398/03 (ECtHR 14 
December 2006), para 99. For more details about these aspects of effective and practical right to access to 
a court, see standard no 22 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement) and the European 
Court of Human Rights Guide on Article 6, Right to fair trial (civil limb) (Council of Europe/European Court 
of Human Rights, 2013), p. 15. 
1384
As regards conditions of detention, see standard no 33 of this Check-list. 
1385
Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. See also Article 26(2) of the Recast Procedures Directive, 
which imposes an obligation to the Member States to ensure a possibility to speedy judicial review. 
1386
This option should not be merely hypothetical; see, for example: Abdi Mahamud, v Malta App no 56796/13 
(ECtHR 3 May 2016), para 53. 
1387
Nasrulloyev v Russia App no 656/06 (ECtHR 11 October 2007), paras 88-90.  For some further examples of 
automatic review under the case-law of the ECtHR (including of persons of unsound mind), see standard no 
22 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
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ECHR.1388 
 
While the ECtHR has generally held that Article 5(4) can only be invoked while the person 
remains in detention, which means that that Article 5(4) had no application for the purpose 
“of obtaining, after release, a declaration that a previous detention or arrest was 
unlawful,”1389 Article 3 complaints can be invoked anytime. Nevertheless, Article 5(4) 
complaint might be admissible if lodged while the applicant is still in detention, even if 
he/she is subsequently released, if the applicant did not have an effective remedy to 
challenge the lawfulness of his/her detention during the time he/she was detained; likewise, 
the ECtHR has recognised that a complaint concerning the “speediness”  of the review can 
be raised even after the person has been released.1390  Furthermore, complaints under 
Article 3 of the ECHR may be raised not just based on Article 5(4) of the ECHR, but also 
based on Article 13 of the ECHR.1391 
 
A difference between EU law, which regulates alternatively automatic judicial review and 
detainee’s right to initiate judicial review, and the ECHR, which guarantees the right to 
initiate judicial review, could imply that the ECtHR may find a breach of Article 5(4) of the 
ECHR where proceedings could only be initiated ex officio, for example, by the prosecutor, 
meaning that the applicant had no right to bring proceedings.1392 
 
At the same time, the requirement deriving from the ECtHR case law that the detainee be 
“entitled to take proceedings” suggests that there is no requirement for automatic review, 
even where the detainee may find it difficult to initiate proceedings (for example, where 
                                                 
1388
See, for example: Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR 14 March 2017), paras 98-101. 
1389
Stephens v Malta (no 1) App no 11956/07 (ECtHR 21 April 2009), para 102; Fox, Campbell and Hartley v 
United Kingdom App nos 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (ECtHR 30 August 1990), para 45; Slivenko v Latvia 
App no 48321/99 (ECtHR 9 October 2003), para 155;  X v Sweden App no 10230/82 (ECtHR 11 May 1983); 
Richmond Yaw and Others v Italy App nos 3342/11, 3391/11, 3408/11, 3447/11 (ECtHR 6 October 2016), 
para 82. 
1390
Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta App 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR 22 November 2016), 
paras 117-119. 
1391
Khlaifia and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 267. 
1392
For some further examples of automatic review under the case-law of the ECtHR (including of persons of 
unsound mind), see standard no 22 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
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there are language difficulties or he/she is not represented).1393  As regards distinction 
between judicial protection concerning lawfulness of detention and judicial protection 
concerning compensation in the case of unlawful detention see standard no. 31 of this 
Check-list. 
 
Standard 23. Right to judicial review before an “independent and impartial 
tribunal/court established by law” 
 
Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive and Article 26(2) of the Recast Procedures 
Directive do not define the concrete character of the institution which must provide a 
“judicial review”. A logical conclusion might be that “judicial” review may only be provided 
by a judicial authority. Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive taken in conjunction 
with Article 47(1) and (2) of the Charter provide a guarantee that the “judicial review” on 
detention is provided by an “independent and impartial tribunal.”1394  Furthermore, Article 6 
of the Charter corresponds to Article 5(4) of the ECHR (a lex specialis to Article 13 of the 
ECHR), which gives a right to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of detention will be 
decided by a “court.” The CJEU has already stated: “limitations which may legitimately be 
imposed on the exercise of the rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter may not exceed 
those permitted by the ECHR.”1395 In the case of H.I.D. the CJEU has put that “the first 
sentence of recital 27 in the preamble to the Procedures Directive 2005/85 states that, in 
accordance with a fundamental principle of European Union law, the decisions taken in 
relation to an application for asylum and the withdrawal of refugee status must be subject to 
an effective remedy before a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.”1396 
Based on this starting point, the CJEU then developed standards on independence of courts 
or tribunals with a reference to the settled case-law of the CJEU in relation to the question 
whether a “body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 
                                                 
1393
See: J.N. v United Kingdom App no 37289/12 (ECtHR 19 May 2016). 
1394
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal in a compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article” (Article 
47(1) of the Charter). “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law” (first sentence of Article 47(2) of the 
Charter). 
1395
C-601/15 (PPU) J.N. EU:C:2016:84, para 47. 
1396
C-175/11 H.I.D EU:C:2013:45, para 81. 
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TFEU.”1397 In respect of determination of courts or tribunals, unlike the recital 27 in the 
preamble of the Procedures Directive 2005/85, the recital 15 in the preamble of the Recast 
Procedures Directive no longer refers to Article 267 of the TFEU. Since the standards on the 
notions of “tribunal/court”, “established by law”, “independence and impartiality” in the 
case-law of the CJEU in the field of rights of asylum-seekers are limited to the interpretation 
provided by the preliminary ruling in the H.I.D. case, additional guidance for the 
interpretation of these standards may be found in the case-law of the ECtHR.1398  
 
Standard 24. Right to “speedy” judicial review of the lawfulness of detention 
 
Under the provisions of Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive and Article 26(2) of the 
Recast Procedures Directive, according to which administrative authorities order detention, 
Member States shall provide for a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention. 
Under the Recast Reception Directive, a judicial review of the lawfulness of detention may 
be provided as speedily as possible ex-officio from the beginning of detention or/and as 
speedily as possible at the request of the applicant after the launch of the relevant 
proceedings. A Member State has an obligation to define in national law the period within 
which the judicial review (ex-officio and/or at the request of the applicant) shall be 
conducted.1399 
Under the standards of the ECHR, “speediness” is in itself a virtue to be protected regardless 
of the outcome of the proceedings in question.1400 As a starting point, the ECtHR has taken 
the moment when the application for release was made/proceedings were instituted. The 
relevant period comes to an end with the final determination of the legality of the 
applicant’s detention, including any appeal.1401 If an administrative remedy has to be 
exhausted before recourse can be taken to a court, time starts running when the 
                                                 
1397
Ibid. para 83. 
1398
For the concrete standards on “independence” and “impartiality” of courts “established by law” that are 
developed by the CJEU in the case of H.I.D. and by the ECtHR, see mutatis mutandis standard no 23 in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1399
Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1400
Doherty v United Kingdom App no 76874/11 (18 February 2016), para 80. 
1401
Sanchez-Reisse v Switzerland App no 9862/82 (ECtHR 21 October 1986), para 54; E. v Norway App no 
11701/85 (ECtHR 29 August 1990), para 64. 
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administrative authority is seized of the matter.1402 If the proceedings have been conducted 
over two levels of jurisdiction, an overall assessment of the speediness of judicial review 
must be made in order to determine whether the requirement of speediness has been 
complied with.1403 There could be a breach of Article 5(4) of the ECHR even if the applicant 
has not been prejudiced by the failure to conduct a “speedy” review (for example, if his/her 
detention was at all times lawful). The question whether a right to the speedy decision has 
been respected must be determined in light of the circumstances of an individual case.1404 
The relevant questions arise as to whether an applicant or his/her counsel had in some way 
contributed to the length of the appeals proceedings and if the Government provided some 
justification for the delay.1405 Any exceptions to the requirement of “speedy” review of the 
lawfulness of a measure of detention call for “strict interpretation. The question whether the 
principle of speedy proceedings has been observed is not to be addressed in the abstract but 
in the context of a general assessment of the information, taking into account the 
circumstances of the case, particularly in the light of the complexity of the case, any 
specificities of the domestic procedure and the applicant’s behaviour in the course of the 
proceedings”.1406 
Thus, the ECtHR in its case-law decided that where an individual's personal liberty is at stake, 
the ECtHR has very strict standards concerning the State's compliance with the requirement 
of a speedy review of the lawfulness of detention. In the cases of Kadem v Malta (paras. 44-
45) and Rehbock v Slovenia (paras. 82-86), the ECtHR considered periods of seventeen (17) 
and twenty-six (26) days excessive for deciding on the lawfulness of the applicant's 
detention. In Mamedova v Russia (para. 96), the length of appeal proceedings lasting, inter 
alia, twenty-six days (26), was found to be in breach of the speediness requirement.1407 In 
Karimov v Russia, the ECtHR established that delays of thirteen (13) to twenty (20) days in 
                                                 
1402
Sanchez-Reisse v Switzerland App no 9862/82 (ECtHR 21 October 1986), para 54. 
1403
Hutchison Reid v United Kingdom  App no 50272/99 (ECtHR 20 Feb 2003), para 78; Navarra v France App no 
13190/87 (ECtHR 23 November 1993), para 28; European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right 
to Liberty and Security (Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014), p. 33/points 211-213. 
1404
Karimov v Russia App no 54219/08 (ECtHR 29 July 2010), para 123; Rehbock v Slovenia App no 29462/95 
(ECtHR 28 November 2000), para 84. 
1405
Karimov v Russia App no 54219/08 (ECtHR 29 July 2010) paras 125-126. 
1406
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 131. 
1407
Aden Ahmed v Malta App no 55352/12 (ECtHR 23 June 2013), para 115. 
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examining the appeals against detention order may be incompatible with the “speediness” 
requirement of Article 5(4) of the ECHR.1408 It is thus for a State to organise its judicial 
system in such a way as to enable the courts to comply with the requirements of Article 5(4) 
of the ECHR.1409 Neither an excessive workload nor a vacation period can justify a period of 
inactivity on the part of the judicial authorities.1410 
 
Standard 25. Right to judicial review of the continuing detention 
 
“Detention shall be reviewed by a judicial authority at reasonable intervals of time, ex-officio 
and /or at the request of the applicant concerned, in particular whenever it is of a prolonged 
duration, relevant circumstances arise or new information becomes available which may 
affect the lawfulness of detention.”1411 Also from the standpoint of ECHR, it is not sufficient 
that the lawfulness of detention is determined at the time of an arrest. There must be a 
possibility of subsequent review to ensure that the continuing detention does not become 
unlawful or arbitrary. For example, in Kim v Russia (para. 42), the ECtHR expressly recognised 
that during a long period of detention new factors may come to light which impact on the 
lawfulness of detention, and the detained person should have the possibility of bringing new 
proceedings before a court which has jurisdiction to consider the complaint “speedily”.  
 
Standard 26. The scope and intensity of judicial review including procedural 
guarantees 
 
The Recast Reception Directive does not regulate specifically the scope or intensity of the 
judicial review of a detention order.  The relevant standards should, therefore, be derived 
                                                 
1408
Karimov v Russia App no 54219/08 (ECtHR 29 July 2010), para 127. 
1409
Ibid. para 123. 
1410
E. v Norway App no 11701/85 (ECtHR 29 August 1990), para 66; Bezicheri v Italy App no 11400/85 (ECtHR 
25 October 1989), para 25. For further examples of decisions as regards speediness of judicial review, see 
standard no 24 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1411
Article 9(5) of the Recast Reception Directive. See mutatis mutandis standard no 29 on the right to judicial 
review of the continuing detention or its extension in case of detention under the Return Directive (Section 
5 of the Statement). 
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from the general principle of effectiveness of legal remedies under EU law1412 in conjunction 
with Article 47(1) of the Charter. Furthermore, in this respect, the CJEU's interpretation of 
the right to an effective legal remedy in cases of the extension of detention under the Return 
Directive and the case-law of the ECtHR under Article 5(1)(f) and 5(4) of the ECHR 
concerning expulsion of irregular migrants, are relevant, too. Thus, based on the standards 
developed in the Mahdi case, a judicial authority must be able to rule on all relevant matters 
of fact and of law in order to determine whether a detention is justified. This requires an in-
depth examination of the matters of fact specific to each individual case. Where detention is 
no longer justified, the judicial authority must be able to substitute its own decision for that 
of the administrative authority and to make a decision on whether to order an alternative 
measure or to release the third country national concerned. To that end, the judicial 
authority must be able to take into account both the facts stated and the evidence adduced 
by the administrative authority and any observations that may be submitted by a third-
country national. Furthermore, a judicial authority must be able to consider any other 
elements that are relevant for its decision should it so deem necessary. Accordingly, the 
powers of the judicial authority in the context of an examination can under no 
circumstances be confined only to the matters adduced by the administrative authority 
concerned. Any other interpretation would result in an ineffective examination by the 
judicial authority and would thereby jeopardize the achievement of the objectives 
pursued.1413 The reviewing court must have jurisdiction to decide on whether or not 
deprivation of liberty has become unlawful in the light of new factors, which have emerged 
subsequently to the initial decision depriving a person of his/her liberty.1414 
 
Under the case-law of the ECtHR, the scope and intensity of judicial review on detention is 
explained in a slightly different way as this is decided by the CJEU in the case of Mahdi. 
“Article 5(4) of the ECHR does not guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to 
empower the court, on all aspects of the case including questions of pure expediency, to 
                                                 
 
1412
For more on this, see mutatis mutandis standard no 26 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of this 
Statement. 
1413
C-146/14 PPU Mahdi EU:C:2014:1320, paras 62-64. 
1414
Azimov v Russia App no 67474/11 (ECtHR 18 April 2013), paras 151-152; Article 9(5) of the Recast 
Reception Directive. 
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substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making authority. The review should, 
however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions, which are essential for the lawful 
detention of a person according to Article 5(1) of the ECHR. The reviewing court must not 
have merely advisory functions but must have the competence to decide the lawfulness of 
the detention and to order release if the detention is unlawful. The requirement of 
procedural fairness under Article 5(4) does not impose a uniform, unvarying standard to be 
applied irrespective of the context, facts and circumstances. Although it is not always 
necessary that an Article 5(4) procedure be attended by the same guarantees as those 
required under Article 6 for criminal or civil litigation, it must have a judicial character and 
provide guarantees appropriate to the type of deprivation of liberty in question. Thus, the 
procedure must be adversarial and must always ensure equality of arms between the 
parties. An oral hearing may be necessary, for example in cases of detention on remand.”1415 
Equality of arms is not ensured if the applicant, or his/her counsel, is denied access to those 
investigation file documents which are essential in order to challenge effectively the 
lawfulness of his/her detention.1416 It may also be essential that the individual concerned 
not only has the opportunity to be heard in person but that he/she also has the effective 
assistance of his/her lawyer.1417Article 5(4) of the ECHR does not require that a detained 
person is heard every time he/she lodges an appeal against a decision extending his/her 
detention, but it should be possible to exercise the right to be heard at reasonable 
intervals.1418 
 
Standard 27. Restrictions on the right to a defence and/or equality of arms based 
on national (public) security, public policy or public order 
 
If in a given case a Government ascertains the existence of a risk to national security either 
in relation to Article 8(3)(e) or in relation to any other ground for detention under Article 
                                                 
1415
A and Others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 204; 
Reinprecht v Austria App 67175/01 (ECtHR 15 November 2005), para 31; see also: Khlaifia and others v Italy 
(Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 128. 
1416
Ovsjannikov v Estonia App no 1346/12 (ECtHR 20 February 2014), para 72; Fodale v Italy App no 70148/01 
(1 June 2006), para 41; Korneykova v Ukraine App no 56660/12 (ECtHR 24 March 2016), para 68. 
1417
Cernák v Slovakia App no 36997/08 (ECtHR 17 December 2013), para 78. 
1418
Çatal v Turkey App no 26808/08 (ECtHR 17 March 2012), para 33; Altınok v Turkey App no 31610/08 (ECtHR 
29 November 2011), para 46. 
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8(3) of the Recast Reception Directive, because a person had been, for example, concerned 
in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism and were 
members of, belong to, or had links with an international terrorist group, then certain 
limitations as regards standards of equality of arms and/or the right to a defence, such as 
restricted access to a court file, may be imposed.1419 The right to have access to a court file 
(as being part of the right from Article 5(4) of the ECHR or Article 47(1) and (2) of the 
Charter in conjunction with Article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive) may be restricted 
for reason of national security and public order in accordance with principle of 
proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter.1420  
 
Standard 28. Right to be released immediately in cases of unlawful detention 
 
The second sub-paragraph of Article 9 of the Recast Reception Directive states that “where, 
as a result of the judicial review, detention is held to be unlawful, the applicant concerned 
shall be released immediately.” However, not every irregularity in the exercise of the rights 
for the defence in an administrative procedure will constitute an infringement of those 
rights, and therefore, not every such breach will automatically require the release of the 
person concerned.1421 
 
                                                 
1419
See circumstances of national security concerns in the case of A and Others v United Kingdom (Grand 
Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 166. The recital 37 of the Directive 2011/95/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted (recast) (Official Journal of the EU, L 337, 20. 12. 2011) states that the notion of national security 
and public order also covers cases in which a third-country national belongs to an association which 
supports international terrorism or supports such an association. 
1420
See mutatis mutandis: C-300/11 ZZ EU:C:2013:363, para 50-51; J.N. v United Kingdom App no 37289/12 
(ECtHR 19 May 2016), para 50; C-402/05 P and C-415/05 Kadi and Al Barakaat (Grand Chamber) 
EU:C:2008:461. For further comparison, see approach of the CJEU concerning the risk of “public policy” in 
the case of C-554/13 Z.Zh. and O EU:C:2015:377 paras 48, 50, 56, 60, 65) and standard no 27 in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. In the case J.N.  the CJEU states that strict 
circumscription of the power of the competent national authorities to detain an applicant on the basis of 
Article 8(3)(e) of the Recast Reception Directive is also ensured by the interpretation which the case-law of 
the CJEU gives to the concepts of “national security” and “public order” found in other directives and which 
applies in the case of Recast Reception Directive (C-601/15 PPU, J.N. , 15 February 2016, para 64). 
1421
C-383/13 PPU, M.G., N.R. EU:C:2013:533, para 39. 
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Similarly, Article 5(4) of the ECHR states that for “everyone who is deprived of his liberty /.../ 
the  “lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered 
if the detention is not lawful.“ The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Stanev v Bulgaria states 
that “the reviewing court must not have merely advisory functions but must have the 
competence to decide the lawfulness of the detention and to order release if the detention is 
unlawful” (see Ireland v the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 200, Series A no. 25; Weeks 
v the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, § 61, Series A no. 114; Chahal v the United Kingdom, 
15 November 1996, § 130, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V; and A. and Others v 
the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 202, ECHR 2009).1422 The court must have the 
power to order release if it finds that the detention is unlawful, because a mere power of 
recommendation is insufficient.1423 It is inconceivable that in a State subject to the rule of 
law a person should continue to be deprived of his liberty despite the existence of a court 
order for his release.1424 Therefore, while the ECtHR recognises that some delay in carrying 
out a decision to release a detainee is understandable and often inevitable, the national 
authorities must attempt to keep it to a minimum.1425 This rule needs to be applied in 
conjunction with standards on the right to speedy judicial review.1426 If a judgment of the 
first instance court on unlawfulness of detention with a judicial order to release a detainee is 
not final due to the possibility of the administrative authority appealing against the 
judgment of the first instance court to the appellate court, then it is highly probable that 
                                                 
1422
Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App no 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 168; see also: Amie v 
Bulgaria App no 58149/08 (ECtHR 12 February 2013), para 80; A and Others v United Kingdom (Grand 
Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 202; Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) 
App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 131. 
1423
Benjamin and Wilson v United Kingdom App no 28212/95 (26 September 2002), paras 33-34. In case the 
ECtHR finds a violation of Article 5 of the ECHR, it may decide in the operative part of the judgment that the 
respondent State must ensure immediate release of applicants from detention (see, for example L.M. And 
Others v Russia App nos 40081/14, 40088/14 and 40127/14 (ECtHR 10 October 2015), point 9 of the 
operative part of the judgment, para 169 and the last paragraph of section 3.5. of the ELI Statement). 
1424
Assanidze v Georgia (Grand Chamber) App no 71503/01 (ECtHR 8 April 2004), para 173. 
1425
Giulia Manzoni v Italy App no 19218/91 (ECtHR 1 July 1997), para 25. In the case of Quinn v France, a delay 
of eleven hours in executing a decision to release the applicant “forthwith” was found to be incompatible 
with Article 5(1) of the ECHR (Quinn v France App no 18580/91 (ECtHR 22 March 1995), para 39-43; 
European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 5 – Right to Liberty and Security (Council of 
Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2014), p. 11/point 40). In the case of Mahamed Jama v Malta, 
the applicant remained in detention for five days following a decision granting her subsidiary protection 
and the ECtHR found violation of article 5(1) of the ECHR (Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 
(ECtHR 26 November 2015),  paras 154-159). 
1426
See standard no 24 of this Check-list. 
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standards of immediate release and speedy judicial review cannot be guaranteed, unless the 
first instance court issues an effective interim measure regarding the release of a detainee or 
if the first instance court applies the principle of direct effect of the second sub-paragraph of 
article 9(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. In this respect, it is also relevant that pursuant 
to Article 47 of the Charter, “the principle of effective judicial protection affords an individual 
a right of access to a court or tribunal but not to a number of levels of jurisdiction.”1427 Also, 
under the case-law of the ECtHR, States are not obliged to set up a second level of 
jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention.1428 However, if a State 
institutes such a system, it must in principle accord to detainees the same guarantees on 
appeal as at first instance1429 and this includes the principle of adversarial proceedings and 
equality of arms.1430 
 
For the standards on immediate release in case of infringement in the right to be heard 
before the detention order is issued, see mutatis mutandis standard no. 10 on the right to 
information and to personal interview before the detention order is issued in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
 
Standard 29. The impact of interim measures (under Rule 39 and national law) on 
the lawfulness of detention1431 
 
The ECtHR has held that the grant of an interim measure under Rule 39 does not in itself 
render the detention of the person concerned unlawful.1432 However, the authorities must 
still envisage expulsion at a later stage.1433 Therefore, in a number of cases, in which 
                                                 
1427
C-69/10, Diouf  EU:C:2011:524, para 69. 
1428
A.M. v the Netherlands App no 29094/09 (ECtHR 5 July 2016), para 70. 
1429
Kučera v Slovakia App no 48666/99 (ECtHR 17 July 2007), para 107; Navarra v France App no 13190/87 
(ECtHR 23 November 1993), para 28; Toth v Austria App no 11894/85 (ECtHR 12 December 1991), para 84. 
1430
Çatal v Turkey App no 26808/08 (ECtHR 17 March 2012), paras 33-34. 
1431
Rule 39(1) states that Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge 
appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may, at the request of a party or of any other person 
concerned, or of their own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which they consider should 
be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings (Rules of Court, 
Registry of the Court, Strasbourg, 1 January 2016). 
1432
Gebremedhin v France App no 25389/05 (ECtHR 26 April 2007), para 74. 
1433
S.P. v Belgium App no 12572/08 (ECtHR 14 June 2011). 
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respondent States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with a Rule 39 
measure, the ECtHR accepted that expulsion proceedings were temporarily suspended, but 
nevertheless remained “in progress”, with the consequence that the applicant’s continued 
detention did not violate Article 5(1) of the ECHR.1434 Similarly, when expulsion is suspended 
or blocked as a consequence of internal judicial review proceedings, the ECtHR considers 
them as a part of the deportation proceedings being ‘in progress’.1435 Nevertheless, 
suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the 
ECtHR should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in detention for an 
unreasonably long period.1436 
 
Standard 30. Derogation from obligations under Article 5(1) of the ECHR1437 
 
In regards to Article 15 of the ECHR, the ECtHR states that by reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in 
principle better placed than an international judge to decide both on the presence of such 
an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. 
Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national 
authorities. Nonetheless, Contracting Parties do not enjoy an unlimited discretion. It is for 
the ECtHR to rule whether, inter alia, the States have gone beyond the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the crisis. The domestic margin of appreciation is thus 
accompanied by European supervision. In exercising this supervision, the ECtHR must give 
appropriate weight to such relevant factors as the nature of the rights affected by the 
derogation and the circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the emergency 
situation.1438 If the highest domestic court has examined the issues relating to the States’ 
                                                 
1434
Al Hanchi v Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 48205/09 (ECtHR 15 November 2011),  paras 49-51; Al Husin v 
Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 3727/08 (ECtHR 7 February 2012), paras 67-69;  Umirov v Russia App no 
17455/11 (ECtHR 11 February 2013), paras 138-42. 
1435
Alim v Russia  App no 39417/07 (ECtHR 27 September 2011), para 60. 
1436
A.H. and J.K. v Cyprus App nos 41903/10 and 41911/10 (ECtHR 21 July 2015), para 188. 
1437
Article 15 of the ECHR states that “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this 
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures 
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.” 
1438
A and Others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 173. 
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derogation, the ECtHR considers it would be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only 
if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the ECtHR's 
jurisprudence under that Article or reached a conclusion which was manifestly 
unreasonable.1439 
 
Standard 31. Right to compensation in the case of unlawful detention 
 
Explanations relating to the Charter provide that “the rights in Article 6 are the rights 
guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR, and in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, they 
have the same meaning and scope. Consequently, the limitations which may legitimately be 
imposed on them, may not exceed those permitted by the ECHR.1440 Article 5(5) of the ECHR 
states that “everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” In the case of 
Richmond Yaw and others v Italy the ECtHR confirmed that mere recognition given by the 
Supreme Court of the irregularity of the prolongation of detention does not constitute a 
sufficient redress for the victim of a violation of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.1441 Under the 
case-law of the ECtHR, the right to compensation set forth in paragraph 5 presupposes that 
a violation of one of the paragraphs has been established, either by a domestic authority or 
by the Court.1442 Article 5(5) of the ECHR is complied with where it is possible to apply for 
compensation in respect of a deprivation of liberty affected in conditions contrary to 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4.1443 The arrest or detention may be lawful under domestic law, but 
                                                 
1439
Ibid. para 174. For the standards on “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” and on the 
measures “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, see standard no 30 in the Explanatory Note 
to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1440
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Official Journal of the EU, C 303, 14. 12. 2007). 
The third sub-paragraph of Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union states that the rights freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with 
the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due 
regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions. 
1441
Richmond Yaw and Others v Italy App nos 3342/11, 3391/11, 3408/11, 3447/11 (ECtHR 6 October 2016), 
para 50. 
1442
N.C. v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 24952/94 (ECtHR 18 December 2012), para 49; Pantea v Romania, App 
no 33343/96 (ECtHR 3 June 2003), para 262; Vachev v Bulgaria App no 42987/98 (ECtHR 8 July 2004), para 
78. 
1443
Michalák v Slovakia App no 30157/03 (ECtHR 8 February 2011), para 204; Lobanov v Russia App no 
15578/03 (ECtHR 2 Feburary 2010), para 54. 
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still in breach of Article 5, which makes Article 5(5) of the ECHR applicable.1444 Article 5(5) 
creates a direct and enforceable right to compensation before the national courts.1445 An 
enforceable right to compensation must be available either before or after the ECtHR’s 
judgment.1446 The effective enjoyment of the right to compensation must be ensured with a 
sufficient degree of certainty.1447 Compensation must be available both in theory1448 and in 
practice.1449 In considering compensation claims, the domestic authorities are required to 
interpret and apply domestic law in the spirit of Article 5, without excessive formalism.1450 
The right to compensation relates primarily to financial compensation. It does not confer a 
right to secure the detained person’s release, which is covered by Article 5(4) of the 
ECHR.1451  In the case of Abdi Mahamud v Malta, the ECtHR established that action in tort 
cannot be considered as an effective remedy for the purpose of a complaint about 
conditions of detention under Article 3 of the ECHR. In that case the ECtHR established that 
it has not been satisfactory established that action in tort may give rise to compensation for 
any non- pecuniary damage and that it was not a preventive remedy as it cannot impede the 
continuation of the violation alleged or provide the applicant with an improvement in the 
detention conditions.1452 
 
Article 5(5) of the ECHR does not prohibit the Contracting States from making the award of 
compensation dependent upon the ability of the person concerned to show damage 
resulting from the breach. There can be no question of “compensation” where there is no 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage to compensate.1453 However, excessive formalism in 
requiring proof of non-pecuniary damage resulting from unlawful detention is not compliant 
                                                 
1444
Harkmann v Estonia App no 2192/03 (ECtHR 11 July 2006), para  50. 
1445
A and Others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber) App no 3455/05 (ECtHR 19 February 2009), para 229; 
Storck v Germany App no 61603/00 (ECtHR 16 June 2005), para 122. 
1446
Stanev v Bulgaria (Grand Chamber) App no 36760/06 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), paras 183-84; Brogan and 
Others v United Kingdom App no 11386/85 (ECtHR 29 November 1988), para 67. 
1447
Ciulla v Italy App no 11152/84 (ECtHR 22 February 1989), para 44; Sakık and Others v Turkey App no 
87/1996/706/898-903 (ECtHR 26 November 1997), para 60. 
1448
Dubovik v Ukraine App nos 33210/07 and 41866/08 (ECtHR 15 October 2009), para 74. 
1449
Chitayev and Chitayev v Russia App no 59334/00 (ECtHR 18 January 2007), para 135. 
1450
Shulgin v Ukraine App no 29912/05 (ECtHR 8 December 2011), para 65; Houtman and Meeus v Belgium App 
no 22945/07 (ECtHR 17 March 2009), para 46. 
1451
Bozano v France App no 9990/82 (ECtHR 18 December 1986). 
1452
Abdi Mahamud, v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), para 50. 
1453
 Wassink v the Netherlands App no 12535/86 (ECtHR 27 September 1990), para 38. 
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with the right to compensation.1454 
 
Article 5 (5) of the ECHR does not entitle the applicant to a particular amount of 
compensation.1455 However, compensation which is negligible or disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the violation would not comply with the requirements of Article 5 (5) of the 
ECHR as this would render the right guaranteed under that provision theoretical and 
illusory.1456 An award cannot be considerably lower than that awarded by the ECtHR in 
similar cases.1457 
For the general principles and standards regarding state liability where an individual suffered 
loss or damage as a result of the breach of EU law by a Member State, see paragraph 13 of 
Section 3.3. of this Statement. 
 
 
Standard 32. Right to reasoned judicial decisions and their enforcement (execution) 
 
In general, the fundamental right to fair legal process enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter 
entails an obligation “to provide a relevant and adequate statement of reasons”.1458  
Concerning disputes on detention of asylum seekers, the secondary EU law explicitly 
regulates that decisions on detention, which must be ordered in writing by judicial or 
administrative authorities, shall state “the reasons in fact and in law on which the decision is 
based”.1459 Since Article 47 of the Charter is not limited to civil rights (and obligations and 
criminal charges) as is the case with Article 6 of the ECHR,1460 more detailed standards 
regarding the obligation to state reasons in judgments may be inspired by the guarantees 
enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR. Under case-law of the ECtHR, these guarantees include 
                                                 
1454
Danev v Bulgaria App no 9411/05 (ECtHR 2 September 2010), para 34-35. 
1455
Damian-Burueana and Damian v Romania App no 6773/02 (ECtHR 26 May 2009), para 89; Şahin Çağdaş v 
Turkey App no 28137/02 (ECtHR 11 April 2006), para 34. 
1456
Cumber v United Kingdom App no 28779/95 (ECtHR 27 November 1996); Attard v Malta (decision) App no 
46750/99 (ECtHR 28 September 2000). 
1457
Ganea v Moldova App no 2474/06 (ECtHR 17 May 2011), para 30;  Cristina Boicenco v Moldova  App no 
25688/09 (ECtHR 27 September 2011), para 43. 
1458
C-439/11 P Ziegler EU:C:2013:513, para 104. 
1459
Article 9(2) of Reception Directive 2013/33/EU. 
1460
Maaouia v France App no 39652/98 (ECtHR 5 October 2000), paras 33-41. 
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the obligation for courts to give “sufficient” reasons for their decisions.1461 A reasoned 
decision shows the parties that their case has truly been heard. Although a domestic court 
has a certain margin of appreciation when choosing arguments and admitting evidence, it is 
obliged to justify its activities by giving reasons for its decisions.1462 Article 6(1) of the ECHR 
obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, but cannot be understood as requiring a 
detailed answer to every argument.1463 The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies 
may vary according to the nature of the decision,1464 and can only be determined in the light 
of the circumstances of the case. It is necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity 
of the submissions that a litigant may bring before the courts and the differences existing in 
the contracting States with regard to statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion and 
the presentation and drafting of judgments.1465 However, where a party’s submission is 
decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, it requires a specific and express reply.1466 The 
courts are therefore required to examine the litigants’ main arguments1467 and/or pleas 
concerning the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR and its Protocols with 
particular rigour and care.1468 
 
Furthermore, the right to enforcement (execution) of judicial decisions, given by any court, is 
an integral part of the right of access to court.1469 The effective protection of the litigant and 
the restoration of legality therefore presuppose an obligation on the administrative 
                                                 
1461
H. v Belgium App no 8950/80 (ECtHR 30 November 1987), para 53. 
1462
Suominen v Finland App no 37801/97 (ECtHR 01 July 2003), para 36. 
1463
Van de Hurk v the Netherlands App no 16034/90 (ECtHR 19 March 1994), para61; Garcia Ruiz v Spain 
(Grand Chamber) App no 30544/96 (ECtHR 21 January 1999), para 26 ; Jahnke and Lenoble v France App no 
40490/98 (ECtHR 29 August 2000); Perez v France (Grand Chamber) App no 47287/99 (ECtHR 12 February 
2004), para 81; see mutatis mutandis: C-439/11 P, Ziegler (Appeal) EU:C:2013:513, para 82. 
1464
Ruiz Torija v Spain App no 18390/91 (ECtHR 9 December 1994), para 29; Hiro Balani v Spain App no 
18064/91 (ECtHR 9 December 1994), para 27. 
1465
Ibid. 
1466
Ruiz Torija v Spain App no 18390/91 (ECtHR 9 December 1994),  para 30; Hiro Balani v Spain App no 
18064/91 (ECtHR 9 December 1994), para 28. 
1467
Buzescu v Romania App no 61302/00 (ECtHR 24 May 2005), para 67; Donadze v Georgia App no 74644/01 
(ECtHR 7 March 2006), para 35. 
1468
Wagner and J.M.W.L. v Luxembourg App no 76240/01 (ECtHR 28 June 2007), para 96; European Court of 
Human Rights Guide on Article 6, Right to fair trial (civil limb) (Council of Europe/European Court of Human 
Rights, 2013), pp. 45-46/points 237-242. 
1469
Hornsby v Greece App no 18357/91 (ECtHR 19 March 1997), para 40; Scordino v Italy (no1) (Grand 
Chamber) App no 36813/97 (ECtHR 29 March 2006), para 196. 
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authorities’ part to comply with the judgment.1470 Thus, while some delay in the 
enforcement (execution) of a judgment may be justified in certain circumstances, the delay 
may not be such as to impair the litigant’s right to enforcement of the judgment.1471 
Enforcement (execution) must be full and exhaustive and not just partial,1472 and may not be 
prevented, invalidated or unduly delayed.1473 
 
Standard 33. Conditions of detention 
 
Standards for the reception of applicants that will suffice to ensure them a dignified 
standard of living and comparable living conditions in all Member States should be laid 
down. The harmonisation of conditions for the reception of applicants should help to limit 
the secondary movements of applicants influenced by the variety of conditions for their 
reception.1474 
The standard no. 33 is composed of 9 particular elements that are described under points 
33.1. - 33.9. below. 
 
Standard 33.1. General conditions of detention: respect for human dignity, prohibition of 
inhuman/degrading treatment and the protection of family life 
 
“Applicants who are in detention should be treated with full respect for human dignity and 
their reception should be specifically designed to meet their needs in that situation.”1475 The 
CJEU in the case of Cimade states that “further to the general scheme and purpose of the 
Reception Directive 2003/9 and the observance of fundamental rights, in particular the 
requirements of Article 1 of the Charter, under which human dignity must be respected and 
                                                 
1470
Hornsby v Greece App no 18357/91 (ECtHR 19 March 1997), para 41; Kyrtatos v Greece App no 41666/98 
(ECtHR 22 May 2003), paras 31-32. 
1471
Burdov v Russia, App no 33509/04 (ECtHR 15 January 2009), paras 35-37. 
1472
Matheus v France App no 62740/00 (ECtHR 31 March 2005), para 58; Sabin Popescu v Romania App no 
48102/99 (ECtHR 2 March 2004), paras 68-76. 
1473
Immobiliare Saffi v Italy, (Grand Chamber) App no 22774/93 (28 July 1999), para 74. See also standard no 
28 of this check-list on the right to be immediately released in case of unlawful detention. 
1474
Recitals 11 and 12 of the Recast Reception Directive. See also Article 2(f) and (g) of the Recast Reception 
Directive. For further details on this issue, see also standards of the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT, /Inf(2017)3, Factsheet, 
March 2017, Council of Europe). 
1475
First sentence of recital 18 of the Recast Reception Directive. 
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protected, the asylum seeker may not /.../ be deprived  - even for a temporary period of time 
after the making of the application for asylum and before being actually transferred to the 
responsible Member State - of the protection of the minimum standards laid down by that 
directive.”1476 
 
As a rule, detention shall take place in specialised detention facilities. If this is not possible, 
the detained applicant shall, in so far as possible, be kept separately from ordinary prisoners 
and detention conditions, as provided for in the Recast Reception Directive.1477 This 
exception (derogation) must be interpreted strictly,1478 because the separated 
accommodation of third-country nationals and ordinary prisoners is an unconditional 
obligation.1479 
 
When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects, 
as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant. In particular, the major factors will 
be the length of the period during which the applicant was detained in the impugned 
conditions and where overcrowding reaches a certain level, the lack of space in an 
institution may also constitute a key factor to be taken into account.1480 
 
Moreover, where children are detained (either alone or together with their parents), the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR shows that Article 3 of the ECHR is not the only right that may be 
engaged. In the case of Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium the Court found 
that the detention of an unaccompanied five-year old violated the Article 3 and Article 8 
rights of both the child and her mother in DRC.1481  In the case of A.B et autres c. France, 
                                                 
1476
C-179/11 Cimade EU:C:2012:594, para 56. 
1477
Article 10(1) of the Recast Reception Directive. See also standards on separation of facilities for detainees 
who are irregular migrants from ordinary prisoners in: C-473/13 and C-514/13 Bero EU:C:2014:2095; C-
474/13 Pham EU:C:2014:2096. 
1478
See for comparison: C-473/13 and C-514/13 Bero EU:C:2014:2095, para 25. 
1479
C-474/13 Pham EU:C:2014:2096, para 17. This stands even if a person concerned wishes to be detained 
together with ordinary prisoners (Ibid. para 23). The third sentence of Recital 19 of the Recast Reception 
Directive states that derogations should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and should be duly 
justified, taking into consideration the circumstances of each case, including the level of severity of the 
derogation applied, its duration and its impact on the applicant concerned. 
1480
C-474/13 Pham EU:C:2014:2096, for example para 97. See more on this in standard 33.3 of this Check-list. 
1481
Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03, paras 72-85. 
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which concerned the administrative detention of accompanied foreign minors, the Court not 
only held that the conditions of detention violated the children’s Article 3 rights, but also 
that there had been an interference with the whole family’s Article 8 rights.1482 In this 
context, the ECtHR has also adjudicated that the sole fact that a family unit is maintained 
does not necessarily guarantee respect for the right to a family life, particularly where the 
family is detained.1483 The fact of confining the applicants to a detention centre, for fifteen 
days, thereby subjecting them to custodial living conditions typical of that kind of institution, 
can be regarded as an interference with the effective exercise of their family life.1484 Such 
interference must be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society.1485 
Authorities have a duty to strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the 
individual and society as a whole. In assessing proportionality, the child's best interests must 
be paramount. The protection of the child's best interests involves both keeping the family 
together as far as possible, and considering alternatives to detention so that the detention 
of minors is only a measure of last resort.1486 
 
From the standpoint of EU law, there is a “general principle” that in implementing the 
Reception Directive Member States shall take into account the specific situation of 
vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, 
pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of human trafficking, persons 
with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who have been subjected 
to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, such as 
victims of female genital mutilation1487 in order to ensure that such reception is specifically 
designed to meet their special reception needs.1488 
 
                                                 
1482
A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), paras 139-156. 
1483
Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012), para 134. 
1484
Ibid. para 134. 
1485
Ibid. para 135. 
1486
Ibid. 139-141. See also standard no 33.5 of this check-list on minors and standard no 37.1 in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 2 of the Statement. 
1487
Article 21(1) and Recital 14 of the Reception Directive. 
1488
Recital 14 of the Recast Reception Directive. 
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Standard 33.2. Inhuman/degrading treatment in detention: threshold and onus 
 
Article 3 of the ECHR enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies 
and prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
irrespective of the circumstances and of the victim’s conduct. In view of the absolute nature 
of Article 3 of the ECHR, the “margin of appreciation” does not apply where there is an 
alleged breach of the substantive Article. In order to fall within the scope of Article 3, ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is 
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the 
treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of 
health of the victim.1489 Article 3 of the ECHR requires the State to ensure that detention 
conditions are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of 
the execution of the measure do not subject the detainees to distress or hardship of an 
intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given 
the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately 
secured.1490 From the standpoint of Article 3 of the ECHR, the ECtHR “attaches considerable 
importance to the applicant's status as an asylum seeker and, as such, a member of a 
particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special 
protection”.1491 
 
In order to determine whether the threshold of severity has been reached, the ECtHR also 
takes other factors into consideration, in particular: the purpose for which the ill-treatment 
was inflicted, although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot 
conclusively rule out its characterisation as degrading; the context in which the ill-treatment 
was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions; whether the 
victim is in a vulnerable situation, which is normally the case for persons deprived of their 
                                                 
1489
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Grand Chamber) App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011), para 219; Kudła 
v Poland (Grand Chamber) App no 30210/96 (ECtHR 26 October 2000), para  91; Khlaifia and others v Italy 
(Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), paras 158-159. 
1490
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Grand Chamber) App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011), para 221. 
1491
Ibid. para 251. 
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liberty, but there is an inevitable element of suffering and humiliation involved in custodial 
measures and this as such, in itself, will not entail a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.1492 
The ECtHR considers treatment to be “inhuman” when it was “premeditated, was applied for 
hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental 
suffering”.1493 The treatment is considered to be “degrading” when it humiliates or debases 
an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or 
arousing feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and 
physical resistance.1494 It may suffice that the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes, 
even if not in the eyes of others. Although the question whether the purpose of the 
treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the 
absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 
of the ECHR.1495 In practice, the ECtHR will not always distinguish between inhuman 
treatment and degrading treatment, sometimes preferring instead to simply find that there 
has been a breach of Article 3. In other cases, it might make a specific finding that the 
treatment in question is either inhuman or degrading. 
With regard to the burden of proof, the ECtHR generally relies on the rule that allegations of 
ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. In other words, the applicant 
bears the responsibility of providing evidence of treatment contrary to Article 3. However, 
the ECtHR has noted that cases concerning allegations of inadequate conditions of detention 
do not lend themselves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit 
probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation) because in such instances 
the respondent Government alone has access to information capable of corroborating or 
refuting these allegations. Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in 
procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection. Nevertheless, in such 
cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts 
complained of and provide – to the greatest possible extent – some evidence in support of 
                                                 
1492
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 160. 
1493
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Grand Chamber) App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011), para 220. 
1494
Ibid. para 220;  Kudła v Poland App no 30210/96 (26 October 2000), para 92; Pretty v United Kingdom App 
no 2346/02 (ECtHR 29 April 2002),  para 52. 
1495
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Grand Chamber) App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011), para 220; 
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 169. 
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their complaints.1496 However, after the ECtHR has given notice of the applicant’s complaint 
to the Government, the burden is on the latter to collect and produce relevant documents. A 
failure on their part to submit convincing evidence on material conditions of detention may 
give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant’s 
allegations.1497 “In assessing evidence, the ECtHR has generally applied the standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of 
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of 
facts”.1498 
 
Standard 33.3. Conditions of detention: overcrowding, ventilation, access to light and 
natural air or to exercise in the open air, quality of heating, health requirements, basic 
sanitary and hygiene requirements 
 
The ECtHR has found overcrowding by itself to be sufficient to breach Article 3 where the 
personal space granted to the applicant was less than 3 m² of floor surface per detainee 
(including space occupied by furniture but not counting the in-cell sanitary facility). In multi-
occupancy accommodation this ought to be maintained as the relevant minimum standard 
for its assessment under Article 3 of the ECHR.1499 A weighty but not irrebuttable 
presumption of a violation of Article 3 arose when the personal space available to a detainee 
fell below 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation. The presumption could be rebutted 
in particular by demonstrating that the cumulative effects of the other aspects of the 
conditions of detention compensated for the scarce allocation of personal space. In that 
connection, the ECtHR takes into account such factors as the length and extent of the 
                                                 
1496
See Visloguzov v Ukraine App no 32362/02 (ECtHR 20 May 2010), para 45. 
1497
See: Gubin v Russia App no 8217/04 (ECtHR 17 June 2010), para 56; Khudoyorov v Russia App no 6847/02 
(ECtHR 8 November 2005), para 113; Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 
74. 
1498
Koktysh v Ukraine App no 43707/07 (ECtHR 10 December 2009), para 90; Salman v Turkey, (Grand 
Chamber) App no 21986/93 (ECtHR 27 June 2000), para 100; Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) 
App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), paras 127, 168. 
1499
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 166; see 
also: Kadikis v Latvia App no 62393/00 (ECtHR 4 May 2006), para 55; Andrei Frolov v Russia App no 205/02 
(ECtHR 29 March 2007), paras 47-49; Kantyrev v Russia App no 37213/02 (ECtHR 21 June 2007), paras 50-
51; Sulejmanovic v Italy App no 22635/03 (ECtHR 16 July 2009), para 43; Torreggiani and Others v Italy App 
nos 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09 (ECtHR 8 January 2013), para 68. 
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restriction, the degree of freedom of movement and the adequacy of out-of-cell activities, 
as well as whether or not the conditions of detention in the particular facility are generally 
decent.”1500 
In Aden Ahmed v Malta (para. 87) the ECtHR had regard not just to the floor space afforded 
to each detainee, but also to whether each detainee had an individual sleeping place in the 
cell, and whether the overall surface area of the cell was such as to allow detainees to move 
freely between the furniture items. Based on standards from Aden Ahmed v Malta, in 
deciding whether or not there has been a violation of Article 3 on account of the lack of 
personal space, the ECtHR has to have regard to the following three elements: “each 
detainee must have an individual sleeping place in a cell; each detainee must dispose of at 
least three square meters of floor space; and the overall surface area of the cell must be such 
as to allow the detainees to move freely between the furniture items. The absence of any 
above elements creates in itself a strong presumption that the conditions of detention 
amounted to degrading treatment and were in breach of Article 3.1501 As the fourth element, 
the ECtHR refers to “other aspects.” Where overcrowding was not significant enough to raise 
itself an issue under Article 3, the ECtHR has taken into account “other aspects” of detention 
conditions, including the ability to use the toilets privately,1502 available ventilation, access to 
light and natural air, the quality of heating and balanced meals1503 and respect for basic 
health requirements. Therefore, in cases where each detainee had 3 to 4 m², the ECtHR 
found a violation of Article 3 where the lack of space was accompanied by a lack of 
                                                 
1500
Khlaifia and others v Italy (Grand Chamber) App no 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016), para 166. For 
example, the ECtHR notes that scarce space in relative terms may in some circumstances be compensated 
for by the possibility to move about freely within the confines of a detention facility and by unobstructed 
access to natural light and air (Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 78) or by 
the freedom to spend time away from the dormitory rooms (Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 
(ECtHR 26 November 2015), para 92). See also: Abdi Mahamud, v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 
2016), paras 81-83. 
1501
Aden Ahmed v Malta App no 55352/12 (ECtHR 23 June 2013), para 87. 
1502
For the compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements, see, for example: Anayev and Others v 
Russia App nos 42525/07, 60800/08 (ECtHR 10 January 2012), paras 156-159, Aden Ahmed v Malta App no 
55352/12 (ECtHR 23 June 2013), para 88; Moiseyev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR 9 October 2008), 
para 124. 
1503
See, for example, Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), paras 96, 98; Abdi 
Mahamud v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), paras 84, 85, 89). 
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ventilation and light,1504 limited access to outdoor exercise,1505 or a total lack of privacy in 
cells.1506  The ECtHR mentions the Prisons Standards developed by the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture, which specifically deal with outdoor exercise and consider it a basic 
safeguard of prisoners' well-being that all of them, without exception, should be allowed at 
least one hour of exercise in the open air every day, preferably as part of a broader 
programme of out-of-cell activities.1507 Under the standards of the ECHR “access to outdoor 
exercise is a fundamental component of the protection afforded to persons deprived of their 
liberty under Article 3 and as such it cannot be left to the discretion of the authorities.”1508 
For that reason, physical characteristics of outdoor exercise facilities are also relevant.1509 
Under EU secondary law, there is a special provision which says that detained applicants 
shall have access to open-air spaces. 1510 
 In addition, the time during which an individual was detained in the contested conditions is 
an important factor to consider.1511 As regards the notion of the so called “continuous 
detention”, the ECtHR stated that when complaints in relation to conditions of detention do 
not simply relate to a specific event, but which concern a whole range of problems regarding 
sanitary conditions, the temperature in cells, overcrowding, lack of adequate medical 
treatment, which have affected an inmate throughout his or her incarceration, the ECtHR 
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Torreggiani and Others v Italy App nos 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09 (ECtHR 8 January 2013), para 69; see 
also Babushkin v Russia App no 5993/08 (ECtHR 16 October 2014), para 44; Vlasov v Russia App no 
51279/09 (ECtHR 20 September 2016), para 84; Moisseiev, paras 124-127. 
1505
István Kovács Gábor v Hungary App no 15707/10 (ECtHR 17 January 2012), para 26; see also Mandič and 
Jović v Slovenia App nos 5774/10, 5985/10 (ECtHR 20 October 2011), para 78; Babar Ahmad and Others v 
United Kingdom App nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09, 67354/09 (ECtHR 10 April 2012), paras 
213-214. 
1506
Novoselov v Russia App no 66460/01 (ECtHR 2 June 2005), paras 32 and 40-43; Khoudoyorov v Russia, paras 
106-107; Belevitski v Russia App no 72967/01 (ECtHR 1 March 2007), paras 73-79. 
1507
Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta App nos 25794/13 and 28151/13 (ECtHR 22 November 2016), 
para 102. 
1508
This is so regardless of how good the material conditions might be in the cells (Alimov v Turkey App no 
14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 83. See also: Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 
25 November 2015), para 93). 
1509
For instance, an exercise yard that is just two square metres larger than the cell, is surrounded by three 
metre high walls, and has an opening to the sky covered with metal bars and a thick net does not offer 
inmates proper opportunities for recreation and recuperation (Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 
(ECtHR 26 November 2015), para 93; see also paras 94-95). 
1510
Article 10(2) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1511
Kalashnikov v Russia App no 47095/99 (ECtHR 15 July 2002), para 102; Kehayov v Bulgaria App no 41035/98 
(ECtHR 18 January 2005), para 64, Alver v Estonia App no 64812/01 (ECtHR 8 November 2005), para 50. 
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regards this as a “continuing situation”, even if the person concerned has been transferred 
between various detention facilities in the relevant period. 1512 
For concrete examples of circumstances where the ECtHR did (not) find a violation of Article 
3 of the ECtHR, see summaries of cases in the judgment of the Khlaifia and others v Italy 
(paras. 171-177) and standard 34.3 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
 
Standard 33.4. Right to communication and information in detention 
 
In regards to the right to communication, representatives of the UNHCR or of the 
organisation which is working on the territory of the Member State concerned (on behalf of 
the UNHCR) pursuant to an agreement with that Member State, shall have the possibility to 
communicate and visit applicants in conditions that respect privacy.1513 Member States shall 
ensure that family members, legal advisers or counsellors and persons representing relevant 
non-governmental organisations recognised by the Member State concerned have the 
possibility to communicate with and visit applicants in conditions that respect privacy. 
Restrictions on access to the detention facility may be imposed only where, by virtue of 
national law, they are objectively necessary for the security, public order or administrative 
management of the detention facility, provided that access is not thereby severely restricted 
or rendered impossible.1514 In addition, regarding rules applied in detention facilities and 
rights and obligations of detainees, Member States shall ensure that applicants in detention 
are systematically provided with information that explains those rules, rights and 
obligations. They must be informed in a language which they understand or are reasonably 
supposed to understand. Member States may derogate from this obligation in duly justified 
cases and for a reasonable period which shall be as short as possible, in the event that the 
applicant is detained at a border post or in a transit zone.1515 
 
                                                 
1512
Alimov v Turkey App no 14344/13 (ECtHR 6 September 2016), para 59. 
1513
Article 10(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1514
Article 10(4) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1515
The derogation shall not apply in cases referred to in Article 43 of Directive 2013/32/EU (Article 10(5) of the 
Recast Reception Directive). 
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Standard 33.5. Minors 
 
According to Article 2(d) of the Recast Reception Directive “minor” means a third country 
national or a stateless person below the age of 18 years. “The minor's best interest, as 
prescribed in Article 23(2), shall be a primary consideration for Member States.”1516 This 
includes taking due account of family reunification possibilities; the minor's well-being and 
social development, taking into particular consideration the minor's background; safety and 
security considerations, in particular where there is a risk of the minor being a victim of 
human trafficking; and the views of the minor in accordance with his or her age and 
maturity.1517 The child's extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence 
over considerations relating to the status of illegal migrants.1518 
 
The second sentence of Recital 18 of the Recast Reception Directive states that Member 
States should in particular ensure that Article 37 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child is applied. Apart from general conditions and procedural 
requirements that are described in other standards of this check-list, Article 37 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child   among other things provides that deprivation of 
liberty of a child “shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time” /.../ and “in a manner which takes into account the needs of 
persons of his or her age” /.../.1519 Every child deprived of liberty “shall be separated from 
adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right 
to maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in 
exceptional circumstances /.../ and shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other 
appropriate assistance.”1520 When minors are detained, they shall have the possibility to 
engage in leisure activities, including play and recreational activities appropriate to their 
age.”1521 In general, from the standpoint of Article 3 of the ECHR, several criteria need to be 
                                                 
1516
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(2) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1517
See also standard no 12 on the best interests of a child. 
1518
Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR 19 January 2012), para 91; Mubilanzila Mayeka 
and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR 12 October 2006), para 55. 
1519
Those needs have to be considered also in the light of the right to primary education under Article 28 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
1520
Article 37(c) and (d) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
1521
Third sub-paragraph of Article 11(2) of the Recast Reception Directive.  
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taken into consideration in cases concerning the detention of children: whether the child is 
accompanied or not; the age of the child, his/her state of health, including eventual feelings 
of fear, anguish, inferiority; the duration of detention and its physical and mental effects; 
and the particular circumstances in the detention centre, including circumstances in the 
close surrounding area.1522 
 
Standard 33.6. Unaccompanied Minors 
 
Unaccompanied by an adult responsible for him or her whether by law or by the practice of 
the Member State concerned, and for as long as he or she is not effectively taken into the 
care of such a person; it includes a minor who is left unaccompanied after he or she entered 
the territory of the Member State.1523  
 
 “Unaccompanied minors shall be detained only in exceptional circumstances. All efforts shall 
be made to release the detained unaccompanied minor as soon as possible.”1524 
Unaccompanied minors have to be accommodated separately from adults1525 and shall 
never be detained in prison accommodation.1526 As far as possible, they shall be provided 
with accommodation in institutions provided with personnel and facilities which take into 
account the needs of persons of their age.1527 
 
Standard 33.7. Ill-health and special medical conditions 
 
As regards detention of persons with special medical needs, the case-law of the ECtHR has 
considered the situation of detainees with mental illness, suicidal tendencies, detainees who 
are HIV-positive, paraplegics who are confined to a wheelchair and pregnant women. 
                                                 
1522
A.B. and Others v France App no 11593/12 (ECtHR 12 July 2016), paras 109-115; Rahimi v Greece App no 
8687/08 (ECtHR 5 July 2011), para 59; Mubilanzila, Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 
(ECtHR 12 Jan 2007), para 48. See concrete examples of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in standard no 
34.5 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1523
Article 2(e) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1524
First sub-paragraph of Article 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1525
Fourth sub-paragraph of Article 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1526
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1527
Third sub-paragraph of Article 11(3) of the Recast Reception Directive. See also standard 33.5. on minors 
and standard no 34.6. in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
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Besides, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities1528, to which the EU 
became a party, provides “programmatic” standards that need to be implemented by the 
adoption of subsequent measures which are the responsibility of the Contracting Parties in 
relation to the detention of people with disabilities.1529 
 
Standard 33.8. Elderly 
 
The ECtHR has not expressly considered the detention of elderly persons in the expulsion 
context. However, the ECtHR has routinely stated that age and state of health will be 
relevant to the assessment of the level of severity of ill-treatment, and there are a number 
of cases in which the ECtHR has addressed the vulnerability of this group within the 
domestic prison regime.1530 
 
Standard 33.9. Other vulnerable persons (female applicants, mothers, LGBT etc.) 
 
“Where female applicants are detained, Member States shall ensure that they are 
accommodated separately from male applicants, unless the latter are family members and 
all individuals concerned consent thereto.” Exceptions may apply to the use of common 
spaces designated for recreational or social activities, including the provision of meals.1531 
“Where vulnerable persons are detained, Member States shall ensure regular monitoring and 
adequate support taking into account their particular situation, including their health.”1532 In 
case of female detainees, a lack of female staff in the centre, may be relevant, too.1533 In the 
                                                 
1528
Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Official Journal of the EU, L 23, 27. 1. 
2010. 
1529
See also standard no 34.7 the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1530
See, for example: Sawoniuk v United Kingdom App no 63716/00 (ECtHR 29 May 2001), Papon v France App 
no 54210/00 (ECtHR 25 July 2002), Farbtuhs v Latvia App no 4672/02 (EctHR 2 December 2004), and Enea v 
Italy App no 74912/01 (ECtHR 17 September 2009), Haidn v Germany App no 6587/04 (ECtHR 13 Janurary 
2011), Contrada (no 2) v Italy App no 7509/08 (ECtHR 11 Feburary 2014). See also standard no 34.8. in the 
Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
1531
Article 11(5) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1532
Second sub-paragraph of Article 11(1) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1533
See, for example: Mahamed Jama v Malta App no 10290/13 (ECtHR 26 November 2015), para 97; Abdi 
Mahamud, v Malta App no 56796/13 (ECtHR 3 May 2016), paras 84, 86, 89. 
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case of Mahamad Jama v Malta, irrespective of health concerns or age factor the ECtHR 
considered the female applicant more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker 
detained at the time.1534 Detained families shall be provided with separate accommodation 
guaranteeing adequate privacy.1535  
 
In the case of O.M. v Hungary the ECtHR decided that the authorities failed to exercise 
particular care in order to avoid situations which may reproduce the conditions that forced 
that person to flee in the first place. The authorities ordered the applicant's detention 
without considering the extent to which vulnerable individuals - for instance, LGBT were safe 
or unsafe in custody among other detained persons, many of whom had come from 
countries with widespread cultural or religious prejudice against such persons.1536 For 
further concrete examples in the case-law of the ECtHR on the detention of vulnerable 
persons, see standard no. 34.9 in the Explanatory Note to Check-list 1 of the Statement. 
                                                 
1534
Ibid. para 100. 
1535
Article 11(4) of the Recast Reception Directive. 
1536
O.M. v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR 5 July 2016), para 53. 
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